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Use of This Volume
 
Aside from the Introduction, this volume is 	a collection of essays on
 
some twenty Issues that we have identified as reflecting a need for
 
national policy-making and, a priori, having implications for spaceflight.
 
Each essay contains a statement of the issue, a discussion of the
 
dimensions of the problem, supporting information and data, and a
 
list of potential policies or actions that might be taken.
 
These issues have then been aggregated into six topics which we have
 
called Trends. A brief overview of each of these Trends has been in­
cluded. Thus the content of the report is:
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0e$Y .i 6 VTHE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT: INTRODUCTION
 
1. 	 Overview: 
In June 1975, the Administrator of The National Aeronautics and Space
 
Administration established a Study Group of twenty NASA scientists, engineers
 
and managers to conduct a study of the role of civilian space flight in the
 
U.S. in the period 1980-2000.
 
The study was to last one year and, although conducted by a NASA group,
 
was expected to draw extensively on outside consultants and on expertise
 
in disciplines not indigenous to NASA. The study was intended to be con­
textual; i.e., that is, the study topics were to be considered within the
 
framework of other societal activities. This direction was set by two of
 
the five objectives the Administrator established for the study:
 
1. 	"To identify social and economic challenges which can benefit
 
from space." 
2. 	"To relate goals and objectives of civilian space activities
 
to national goals and objectives."
 
In recognition of its lack of exIpertise in economics, sociology, inter­
national affairs, and the future, the Study Group undertook a number of
 
activities to bolster its knowledge and expand its horizons. A major effort
 
along these lines was a contract with Forecasting International and The
 
Futures Group which has resulted in this report to the Study Group.
 
Included in this support to the Study Group, were extensive contacts with
 
Working Group II (Future Environments) of the study team, with other members
 
of the Group, and frequent participation in the Study Group discussions and
 
deliberations on the relationships between space flight activities and the
 
future economic, intellectual and other needs of the American Society.
2/­
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Specifically, the basic contract required support, as follows:
 
a) Methodologies of technological forecasting
 
b) Lectures and seminars on contextual planning 
c) Comments on the "system design" of the Outlook for 
Space Study 
d) Literature searches and reports on the future
 
e) Participation in Study Group activities
 
and consultation on related matters as required. In addition, during the
 
initial phases of the study, Forecasting International provided considerable
 
support to the Technology Forecasting Task being performed by JPL for the
 
OFS Study. Tutorial lectures on methodologies, existing technology forecasts
 
and editorial assistance were furnished. This work is not reported here but
 
was included, where appropriate, in the Working Group V (Technology) report.
 
An early task of the Working qroup II, and of the Study Group, was the.
 
examination of the various methodologies by which the future could be
 
characterized and the choice of one for use as a framework for evaluating
 
the differing contributions that various space fiight activities could make
 
in the future. Our early reports examined three approaches for consideration
 
3 4
by the Study Group.2 , , One developed several scenarios, as forecasts of
 
1A Forecast of Space Technology, 1980-2000, Final Draft, Report for Working
 
Group V, OFS Study Group, J. James andR. R. McDonald, JPL, Prindipal
 
Authors, July 1975.
 
2Theodore J. Gordon, et al, Prospective Crises: Some Challenges to Planning,
 
(The Futures Group; Glastonbury, Connecticut), 4 September 1974.
 
3Kathryn H. Humes, et al, Forecasts and Assessments of Future Civilian SpaceActivities
 
(Forecasting International, Ltd.: Arlington, Virginia), 28 September 1974.
 
4Kathryn H. Humes, et al, Two Alternative Futures and Their Impact,
 
(Forecasting International, Ltd.: Arlington, Virginia), 21 October 1974.'
 
the future; another was an attempt to develop a set of national goals and
 
objectives; and the third was a collection of brief essays on some potential
 
crises that could radically change the future.
 
The scenarios, four in number, were derived from a "scenario map" in
 
which the two dimensions were (a) the degree-to which the U.S. Government
 
intervenes in domestic economic activities and (b) the degree to which the
 
U.S. participates in the solution of international problems. Of the four
 
scenarios possible with these two dinensions; (a) nationalist - laissez faire,
 
(b)nationalist - planned, (c) cooperative - laissez faire, and (d) cooperative ­
planned, two were chosen for more detailed description; i.e., (a) and (d). 
Finally, in this approach, space-programs which best fit each of the two 
future scenarios were discussed. 
The second approach developed was to forecast and assess future space
 
activities in the context of national goals and objectives. The immediate
 
difficulty with this approach is that there does not exist in one place for
 
all to know a statement of America's goals as a nation. The report surveyed
 
the various studies and public polls on goals and objectives, selected a set
 
which seemed most reasonable to the investigators and proceeded, in a semi­
quantitative way, to weigh the contributions that space activities might make
 
to meeting these various goals. The result was a matrix of numbers showing
 
the contribution of space missions to weighted national goals.
 
The thitd approach was to develop a set of brief essays or descriptions
 
of potential future crises which, it was deemed, would prompt policy analysis
 
and policy-making by the Government. In the time frame of the next twenty­
five years, the following crises were discussed: nuclear war, food shortages,
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deterioration of the biosphere, imbalances in the distribution of wealth,
 
shortages of mineral resources, energy sources and technology and inflation
 
and international economics,
 
At the Study Group meeting at Marshall Space Flight Center in
 
November 1974, these and other alternative approaches to examining the future
 
were reviewed. The Study Group decided to proceed with an approach based
 
on the potential crises essays, since, it was felt, this would provide the
 
Group an indepth background on what was happening in society-but would leave
 
the Group itself free to evaluate space activities in the context of that
 
background. The balance of the Forecasting International/The Futures Group
 
study has been the preparatiQn of a series of 20 essays on various selected
 
issues in U.S. and World Trends.
 
The approach taken is outlined in the attached Figure 1. Six topics
 
or Trends were selected: Non-renewable resources (including energy),Population
 
and Food, etc. and within each of these Trends, a number of Issues
 
are identified. One criterion for the choice of an Issue was that it might
 
have, a priori, some direct or indirect implications for space flight in
 
the future. In-depth analyses and narratives on each of the Issues were
 
prepared. An overview or brief on each of the Trends was written.
 
This "trends and issues" approach was not intended to be comprehensive
 
or in-any way exhaustive. The specifics in one essay may conflict with
 
those of another. There are many different views of what is changing, and
 
how, in today's world. This approach was intended to provide the Study
 
Group as wide-ranging and diverse a set of information as was possible
 
within the time and resources available.
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FIGURE 1 
FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS: U.S. AND WORLD TRENDS 
Non-renewable Resources: Environment: 
Minerals Contamination of Environment 
Energy - Energy and Growth Oceans 
Land Abuse 
International Conflict: 
Toxic Substances 
Economic Disparities 
Modification of Biosphere 
Shared Resources 
Warfare Economics: 
Inflation 
Population and Food: 
Capital Shortages 
Fourth World 
Food and Fourth World Starvation Individual and Society: 
Population Constraints on Growth Scidnce/Technology Process 
Urbanization - U.S. Changing-Concept of Equality 
Age Distribution - U.S. Values 
Institutional Failure 
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2. Two Alternative Futures;
 
A frequently used approach to characterizing the future is that of
 
scenario writing which has been defined as a "tool for creative thinking in
 
preparing policy decisions." 5 Properly executed,, it is not a forecast of
 
the future, but a systematic way of combining technological, economic or
 
political.developments to obtain a feel for the long-range consequences.
 
To illustrate the technique, and to provide alternative futures to which
 
space flight planning might be referred, we have created two significantly 
different and self-consistent scenarios. The first step was to construct 
a "scenario map" (Figure 2), which graphically presents the major boundaries 
of the scenarios. Two major boundaries or continua were chosen as being 
the dominant descriptions of these futures. 
FIGURE 2
 
A SCENARIO MAP
 
Nationalistic Cooperative 
0 and and 
Z Planned Planned 
H 
C)0 
E 
Nationalistic Cooperative 
O0 H 
P and and 
di 
Laissez Faire Laissez Faire 
Nationalistic Cooperative
 
FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSIObf
 
5Gerardin, L., "Study of Alternative Futures, A Scenario Writing Method," in
 
a Guide to Practical Technological Forecasting, J. R. Bright and
 
M. E. F. Schoeman, Editors, Prentice-Hall, Eng3ewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973.
 
-7-

One boundary is the degree to which the U. S. Government intervenes in
 
domestic economic activities. This ranges from one extreme of a laissez-faire
 
economy to a totally planned and regulated economy. In the laissez-faire
 
economy, the belief is that industrial activities, left to the forces of
 
market supply-and demand, an most efficiently and effectively provide the
 
necessary goods and services to the society and that only this way can a
 
high standard of living be attained. The planned economy is based on the
 
premise that industry does what is best for industry, which may not coincide
 
with the interests of oci&ty and the common good. Hence, the Government
 
must actively and aggressively intervene to ensure that industry acts in
 
accordance with proscribed societal standards.
 
The second dimension is the degree to which the U.S. participates in
 
the solution of international problems. One extreme is the super nationalist
 
chauvinism while the other extreme is total cooperation and leadership
 
perhaps at the expense of domestic standards of living.
 
The four scenarios which result from these combinations are shown on
 
the map and include:
 
nationalist - laissez faire
 
nationalist - planned
 
cooperative - laissez faire
 
cooperative - planned 
For this exercise we have chosen to describe the nationalist - laissez faire 
and cooperative - planned scenarios, Many other dominant boundaries could 
have been chosen. It is difficult, of course, to determine the causal
 
events of characteristics from which a societ evolves. We have chosen
 
tbese boundaries because, to a very large extent, they embody just the kinds
 
of choices that the nation is presently making. v 
The country is erratically moving upward (in the map) in the
 
continuum describing U.S. intervention in the domestic economy. Recent
 
actions such as the establishment of Amtrak, the Lockheed loan, efforts to
 
assist Pan Am, the proposed Consumer Protection Agency, manipulation of the
 
U.S. wheat market, wage and price controls, housing subsidies and Model
 
Cities legislation emphasize this trend. At the same time, when efforts
 
such as these do not immediately achieve their stated goals regardless of
 
the reason, policy quickly moves in the other direction. Among these shifts
 
are Postal Service reorganization, abolition of wage and price controls,
 
revenue sharing, and abandonment of the "Great Society" legislation.
 
Overall, however, the trend over the past two decades has been towards
 
increased government planning and intervention in the domestic economy.
 
This is often thought of as a departure from traditional'American philosophy
 
and intent, but examination of U.S. economic history suggests that the
 
dominance of government over industry is in fact a retur-n to the original concepts
 
of the Founding Fathers, The "robber baron" era was, in fact, an anomaly
 
made possible by loopholes in several legislative changes. Fearful of
 
potential corporate power, it was not until late in U.S. history that the
 
corporate body could own land in its own right. Hence, the concept of the
 
'government manipulating the economy and dominating the productive forces for
 
the common good is, contrary to folklore, a tasic American tenet.
 
The path of the U.S. along the second continuum, the degree of inter­
national cooperation, has been much more circuitous, Clearly, the nation is
 
not wearing the blinders of the isolationism so prevalent in the early part
 
of the century. However, neither have humane considerations and cooperation
 
become fundamental forces of foreign policy. This was dramatically evidenced
3Jp
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by the recent conditions of agricultural assistance to the starving nation of
 
Bangladesh; in return for agricultural assistance the nation had to agree to
 
forego the Cuban market for its only export -- gunny sacks. Concomitantly,
 
in real dollars, U.S. foreign aid has been decreasing, and as a percentage
 
of total GNP, the U.S. allocates less to foreign aid than most other developed
 
nations.
 
witness
Economic policy has always been a tool of foreign policy --

centuries of embargoes, tariff restrictions and the like. Recognizing the
 
need for cooperative action in the face of resource shortages, grave inter­
national economic, pollution, famine and energy crises, the nation has yet
 
Nationalism
to turn this recognition into any concerted action or policy plan. 

is clearly not waning, and it is difficult to discern a conscious U.S. move­
ment along this continuum.
 
The two boundaries for the scenarios were also chosen because they
 
represent particularly sensitive issues for the acceptability of space
 
The space program, it can be argued, is necessary to maintain full
missions. 

employment, and this alone justifies substantial federal investment. The
 
degree to which the federal government manipulates funding of the space
 
program to achieve domestic goals may soon be a very real policy question.
 
Space missions can, of course,, be used to satisfy international goals.
 
In the 1960s, space activities were a dominant inbtrument of increasing U.S.
 
prestige and world respect in the aftermath of the Cold War. Many of the
 
international crises requiring international cooperative action -- degradation
 
of the biosphere, resource and energy shortages, famine, proliferation of
 
nuclear weaponery -- can all utilize different aspects of space capabilities.
 
The following scenarios are presented in summary form. The scenarios
 
are self-consistent combinations of events depicting a likely world within the
 
boundary definitions. 
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SCENARIO A: NATIONALIST/LAISSEZ-FAIRE SCENARIO
 
Assumptions of the Scenario:
 
This scenario is based primarily on two basic assumptions:
 
First, the U.S. government will rely more on industry

for the maintenance of the economy. The market forces
 
of supply and demand will determine the proper allo­
cation of resources.
 
Second, the U.S. government seeks to maintain the U.S.
 
position as the most advanced nation in the world,
 
both militarily and economically.
 
To avoid the danger of a distorted reality, it should be mentioned that
 
the above set of government policies, if carried to the extremes, would find
 
few supporters. 
Most people would agree that some government involvement
 
in the domestic economy, and some involvement in international cooperation
 
is valuable. 
However, many people believe there is too much government involve­
ment already and that the proper balance must be'reached. This scenario- then,
 
attempts to point out some possible effects of a change from the present set
 
of government policies towards'a system of less government involvement, The
 
fundamental attributes of this scenario are presented in Figure 3.
 
There are several present or potential situations that could trigger
 
this form of policy change. First, the government has increasingly tried to
 
manipulate the domestic economy to stabilize it, 
-- in terms of employment and
 
production fluctuations and price stability, 

-- while still promoting a high
 
rate of economic growth. The present situation of high inflation, high
 
unemployment and declining "real" economic growth has certainly disenchanted
 
many people with the government's economic policies. The stronger the
 
measures taken by government (price controls), the more ineffective they
 
-seem to be (created shortages which increased ififlation instead of curbing it).
 
y9
 
FIGURE 3 
IMPORTANT ATTRIBUTES: NATIONALIST/LAISSEZ-FAIRE SCENARIO 
o 	Maintenance of many current institutions, i.e., nuclear family,
 
religious institutions.
 
" Individual choice contlnues to be a social goal.
 
" High rate of economic growth.
 
* 	Profit motive is best method of resource allocation.
 
* 	Economic~independence for U.S.
 
" Strong defense system is necessary to maintain the international
 
balance of power.
 
* 	Self-achievement is still an important goal of most individuals.
 
* 	Technology is important for economic growth and increased well­
being.
 
" 	Prefer local solutions, rather than fedeial intervention into
 
social problems.
 
o 	Some reduction in civil rights is necessary for the benefit of
 
society.
 
" 	Foreign aid continues to be tied to national goals.
 
* 	Continuation of ideological split between "East - West" powers.
 
* 	Relaxation of some environmental and consumer protection legislation
 
to maintain a strong national economy.
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Another government policy, its attempts to fight poverty, has also 
been viewed by many as an utter failure, for several different reasons. 
Many people resent supporting those who do not work. They perceive no real 
improvement in the poverty situation and do not wish to pay higher taxes for 
more ineffective programs, especially now with inflation so high and "real" 
incomes declining. 
Also of concern to a great many people is the size of the federal 
government and the problem of "red tape". How can any organization so large ­
and unwieldly be expected to operate effectively? Such an attitude creates
 
popular pressure to limit the scope of government and to keep it more effi­
cient, or at least maintain its functions in smaller, local units where
 
there is knowledge and care for local problems.
 
Obviously it is unreasonable, given our present values and conditions,
 
to assume that government involvement'will, or should, dry up completely.
 
What is generally called for is a re-ordering of priorities. Individuals
 
must be responsible for themselves, the government cannot be- There are
 
certain areas that government involvement is necessary for the survival of
 
society.
 
Crime prevention is one of those areas. Thd rapid increase in crime
 
and violence in the recent past, and the prospect for continued increases
 
in the future are alarming. The costs of crime are borne by everyone in
 
society through increased prices, insurance rates, fear, etc. (of course,
 
the costs are higher for the victims), and most people do want to decrease
 
,crime prevention activities. In recent years, crime prevention has often stressed
 
rehabilitAtion and changing the environmental influences of crime. 
To many people
 
these methods have been complte failures; crime has increased-and recidivism is
0J
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still high. This indicates a need for another policy change, a change to
 
more stringent law enforcement,
 
If the political process is at all sensitive to the wishes of the
 
people, and if the government is responsive and if the number of people with 
these views grows in the future, government involvement is likely to change
 
in these directions.
 
In terms of international involvement, there are several conditions
 
that will cause the United States to maintain a strong nationalist policy.
 
For example, increased international competition has hurt many U.S. industries,
 
causing the loss of many jobs. Many cooperative efforts benefit other
 
countries more than the U.S., and sometimes involve sacrifices in the U.S.
 
If the U.S. economy continues to suffer-its present condition of economic
 
doldrums, it is unlikely that many Americans will want to sacrifice their
 
well-being for someone in another country. With jobs very difficult to find,
 
few people are willing to give one up to foreign competition.
 
Another situation that is likely to increase the nationalism of U.S.
 
foreign policies is the shortage of materials, including food and energy.
 
Especially important is the likelihood of the formation of cartels to limit
 
the supply and raise the price of essential materials, i.e., oil. The goals
 
of resource independence and national security are likely to become more
 
* important, necessitating strong nationalist foreign policies to preserve our
 
national well-being.
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SCENARIO B: PLANNING/COOPERATION SCENARIO
 
Assumptions of the Scenario:
 
This scenario is based on two fundamental premises­
the U. S. government actively intervenes in the U.S.
 
economy to manipulate and direct the actions of the
 
productive forces of the economy for the common good;
 
and
 
the U.S. government actively participates and
 
cooperates with other nations and international organi­
zations to assist in the solution of existing and
 
prevention of .potential international crises.
 
This scenario could logically develop from the present domestic and
 
international troubles that the U.S. finds itself in. First, industry with
 
some oversight and regulation by the U.S. government seems unable to sustain
 
continued economic prosperity without severe economic fluctuations incor­
porating material shortages, insufficient supply and inadequate quality of
 
goods and services, rampant inflation, and rising balance of payments
 
deficits. At the same time, while the national economy is experiencing difficulty,
 
many flrms are enjoying excellent sales and history making profits. Hence,
 
decision making becomes centralized in the federal government which increases
 
its regulation and intervention to "guide" the performance of the economy
 
along acceptable lines. This could include stringent, yet realistic, wage
 
and price controls; allocation of existing supplies of scarce resources and
 
stockpiling supplies for the future; government takeover of "true monopolies"
 
such as utilities, transportation and communication firms; and institution
 
of excess profits taxes and elimination of depletion allowances. The funda­
mental attributes of this scenario are illustrated in Figure 4.
 
At the same time great c6ntrol w6ull be exercised over the nature of
 
the-goods and services produced-and the methods by which they could be produced
 
and distributed. This would include stringentl nforcedquality
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FIGURE 4, 
OTHER ATTRIBUTES: PLANNED/COOPERATIVE SCENARIO 
e Tolerance of new and different lifestyles.
 
" Moderate economic growth.
 
* Rigid consumer and environmental legislation. 
" No self-sufficiency in energy.
 
" Possible fear and distrust of U.S. as an international "do-gooder".
 
" Increases in per capita real affluence.
 
* Food/Energy/Resource crisis present but considerably less severe.
 
" Active multi-country exploration and exploration of the oceans.
 
" Economic interdependence among developed nations and between
 
underdeveloped and developed nations.
 
e Cohtinued worldwide inflation.
 
" Decrease in use of military force and interdependency creates
 
fear of using economic force.
 
" Recognition that social problems require institutional and
 
political remedies rather than technological panaceas.
 
* Decrease in per capita-domestic resource use and waste generated.
 
5N 
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and safety regulations and standards for all products, rigid pollution
 
abatement requirements without exception, consumer legislation governing
 
the integrity of firm's conduct, provision for damages to the consumer as
 
a result of itidustrial malfeasance, strict regulations governing occupational
 
safety and protection of the employee.
 
Internationally, the U.S. would actively assist in solving and
 
preventing international crises by contributing two of the nation's greatest
 
strengths: its managerial and technical capability as well as substantial
 
financial assistance. Individuals representing the nation's best would be
 
"loaned" full time at federal expense to international organizations charged
 
with attention to a given problem. International cooperation would include
 
automatic large scale disaster relief; mutual interdependence for supplies
 
of scarce resources, especially food and energy; U.S. medical, technical,
 
and population planning assistance; and a forum with supralegal powers for
 
resolution of conflict and monitoring of the proliferation of weaponery.
 
Concomitantly, the government would assume more and more responsibility
 
for the individual and the scenario implies implementation of large scale
 
social welfare programs. Among them would be income redistribution through
 
a negative income tax, taxing of the super rich, and abolition of tax
 
shelters; government financial insurance including medical and dental health
 
care, retirement insurance; day care centers; food and housing allowances
 
to offset inflationary trends (no household would have to pay in excess of
 
45% of their disposable income for minimum standards of food and housing);
 
government subsidies to education, revitalization of the cities, medical
 
health care and research, and so forth. 
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Individual behavior would be deregulated and there would be a great
 
deal of choice among life styles, living arrangements and work relationships.
 
The Implications of this World:
 
What does this world mean? First, while economic growth will continue
 
at moderate levels,, it will be an inflationary world at the outset because of
 
the large amounts.of government spending. Over time, however, the inflationary
 
aspects could be dampened through tax reform and income redistribution so that
 
government programs could be financed'through general revenues.
 
Secondly, the scenario implies that the institutions will be created
 
that can effectively provide the necessary national and international mechanisms
 
for the scenario events to occur. This is probably the weakest link of the
 
scenario. The scenario implies threats to existing power bases such as
 
industry leadership, political patronage, even individual national identity
 
would be subservient to international liaisons and organizations. Because of
 
the threats to existing power bases, it will be extremely difficult to move
 
completely into this path. Institutional insufficiency is the major difficulty.
 
Only through creation of effective and responsive bureaucracies can this
 
scenario be successful.
 
Thirdly, the scenario also implies a great deal of individual freedom
 
of action and choice. There are many incentives built into it hot to join the
 
labor force. This could have exceedingly disrupting implications not only
 
in terms of inadequate supplies of available labor but also increasing demands
 
for government services.
 
Finally, the world implies a great deal of support for space activities,
 
both to ensure domestic full employment and to assist in international activities.
 
It is likely that these efforts would be largely government-financed through
 
government agencies rather than as sole ventures of private industry.
 
This world may be inherently unstable. The threats of inflation and
 
the drains that the social welfare programs and international cooperation
 
would entail may be too severe. The success and stability of this scenario
 
would depend upon several factors:
 
* 	institutional reform and creation of an effective
 
and responsive bureaucracy;
 
* 	income redistribution to prevent massive deficit
 
financing and, hence, rampant inflation;
 
" 	adequate incentives to participate in the labor force;
 
* 	form for resolution of international conflict.
 
3. 	 Forecasts and Assessments of Future Civilian Space Activities:
 
a) The Development of National Goals
 
At best, the concept of national goals is ambiguous, at worst controversial.
 
There is no national consensus about priorities, no set of national goals
 
neatly summarized in a document. Indeed, the great discussion about "re-ordering
 
of national priorities" has made it clear that no consensus exists concerning
 
national objectives and their integration in a set of ordered priorities.
 
Only through analysis of actions by the Congress, the Executive branch of
 
the government, the business community and the private consumer .sector, can
 
one discern a phantom set of national goals and priorities implied in those
 
actions.
 
It has been argued5 that national goals can be inferred from the level of
 
expenditure allocated to a given area. The argument goes as follows.
 
5Lecht, Leonard A., Changes in National Priorities During the 1960s: 
 Their
 
Implications for 1980,(National Planning Association, Washington, D.c.), 1972.
 
Lecht, Leonard A., Goals,9Prior-ties and Dollars: The Next Decade (The
 
Free Press: New York), 1966,
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The allocation of'the total efforts of the nation at any given point
 
in time should indicate the momentary sense of priorities, and changes in
 
allocations over a period of time should indicate changing trends in those
 
priorities. The best available common denominator for the allocation of
 
the nation's efforts is the dollar expenditure toward each of the phantom
 
goals.
 
In the aggregate, U.S. dollar expenditures represent the blending of
 
judgments on national priorities by government, business and private
 
consumers. The government responds to perceived needs, and through debate
 
and compromise, charts new directions and changes in priorities. The
 
business community, labor unions and private consumers act on the basis of
 
what they perceive to be in their best interests and their actions collectively
 
are a measure of their current priorities iIth a discounted future interest.
 
Elements of national expenditures which comprise the Gross National
 
Product (GNP) thus constitute one measure of priorities for the nation as
 
a whole.
 
However, level of expenditures may more accurately reflect a condition
 
of the-past, rather than a statement about where the nation wishes to be. 
Using expenditure,levels for 1969 andA&R62.one can see (Figure 4) that there 
were shifts in the aggregate levels of expenditure, the relative ranking -­
priorities, if you will, of the different categories did not shift
 
dramatically.
 
In establishing a set of national goals, it is important to develop a
 
quantifiable statement of where .the nation wishes to be in each area so that
 
progress to or away from that goal can be monitored. Dollar expenditures
 
are often the means to achieve the goal, but in and of themselves do not
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reflect'a goal. 
Hence, in this task a great deal of effort was devoted to
 
determining what the nation does wish to accomplish. This was done by
 
reference to the existing goals, literature,6 interviews and polling.
 
A list of the national goals obtained by this process is given in
 
Figure 5. All national goals, of course, are not equal. 
Earlier efforts to
 
determine priorities among competing goals were based on levels of expendi­
tures of the past. 
In the effort here, we have asked the question: "In
 
view of where we are today, to what activities should the nation's efforts
 
be devoted?" Using a modified Delphi approach questioning'a panel of experts
 
and nonexperts, the relative weights and rankings shown in Figure 6 were
 
determined. 
These weights were then used in the later matrix analysis.
 
These weights, of course, are highly subjective and the public's view of them
 
may change frequently and rapidly. For instance, the goal category "agri­
culture and food" was considerably higher in urgency due to recent concern
 
with the world food supply. 
Any solution to this problem would undoubtedly
 
lower the priority of that goal.
 
6Albert H. Cantril and Charles Roll, Hopes and Fears of the American People
 
(Universe Books: New York, 1971).
 
The "Quality of Life" Concept: A Potential New Tool for Division Makers
(An Anthology of Selected Readings prepared by the Environmental Protection
 
Agency) 1972.
 
The Economics of National Priorities, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress
 
of the U.S., 92nd Congress, First Session (June 1971).
 
Barry M. Blechman, E. M. Gramlich, and R. W. Hartman, Setting National
 
Priorities: 
 The 1975 Budget (Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.) 1974.
 
Olaf Helmer, On the Future State of the Union, Report R-27 (Institute for
 
the Future: Menlo Park, California), 1972.
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FIGURE 5
 
EXPENDITURES FOR SOME GOAL AREAS
 
1962 Versus 1969
 
(Billions of 1969 Dollars)
 
Rank
Goal Area Expenditures 

1969
1962 1969 1962 

Housing 37 35 8 9
 
59 	 2 6
Urban Facilities 	 47 

1 	 1
67 	 79
National Defense 
 2
46 71 	 3
Social Welfare 

4 3-4
44 	 64
Health 

64 	 5 3-4
42
Education 
 5
Transportation 	 39 62 7 10
21 27 10
R&D 

7 10 11 	 11
Natural Resources 
 12
6
Environment 
 13
Foreign Aid 6 5 12 

22 37 
 9 	 8
Communication 

51 6 	 7
Farm Product 	 40 

b) Relationship Between Space Actvitie and National Goals
 
We drew up a list of possible space missions, 
functions, and activities
 
(Figure 7) which might be conducted now or in the 
next two and one half 
no attempt waseliminate redundancies,While an attempt was made todecades. 
made to distinguish between new and innovative 
missions and missions which
 
are currently being planned or studied.
 
It should be noted that the items in the 
list are not mutually exclusive.
 
For
 
In some cases, a combination of items may 
be mutually supportive. 

example, weather satellites can provide data 
for weather forec~asting, and the
 
weather forecasts could then be communicated 
to large numbers of individuals
 
4 /by broadcast satellites. 
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FIGURE 6
 
NATIONAL GOALS - A RANK ORDERING AND WEIGHTING
 
Goal 

Agriculture and Food 

Natural Resources and Material Supply 

Housing 

Environmental Quality & Pollution 

Education 

Jurisprudence 

National Economy 

Law and Order 

Medicine & Health 

Defense 

International Cooperation 

Social Interaction 

Urban Design & Environment 

Foreign Aid 

Cultural Activities 

Economics of the Individual 

Transportation 

Disaster Prediction and Control 

Recreation and Leisure 

Public Utilities 

Communication 

Maintenance of the Bureaucracy 

Rank Weight 
1 8.4 
2 6.8 
3 6.7 
4 6.5 
5 6.3 
6-7 5.9 
6-7 5.9 
8 5.6 
9 5.4 
10-11 4.8 
10-11 4.8 
12 4.3 
13 4.2 
14-16 3.4 
14-16 3.4 
14-16 3.4 
17 2.9 
18 2.6 
19 2.4 
20 2.3 
21 2.2 
22 1.6 
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We then carried out a cross support analysis of the identified space
 
missions/functions/activities, and their contribution to national goals. The
 
possible missions were treated both as independent variables and as dependent
 
variables. That is, two kinds of cross support analyses were performed.
 
The first analysis was conducted by assigning numbers (representing
 
judgments of the degree of cross support) in answer to the following
 
questions: "Assuming this particular mission were conducted successfully, to
 
what degree would its results support the achievement of the particular
 
national goal?". Numbers were assigned according to the following scale:
 
1 = little or no support 
2 = some support 
4 = considerable, significant degree of support 
8 = major support 
Because of the difficulties which can arise with combining negative and 
positive numbers, no negative numbers were utilized. 
The second analysis was conducted in a similar manner, representing
 
a response to the following question: "Assuming the United States makes a
 
commitment to this particular goal, to what degree will this commitment tend
 
to support this particular space mission?". Numbers were assigned as in
 
the first analysis.
 
The-national goal areas previously defined were used in the cross
 
support analyses.
 
c) Mission Support for Equally Weighted Goals;
 
The detailed results of the cross support analysis (matrix worksheets)
 
are given in the September 28, 1974 report. Figure 7 summarizes the results
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FIGURE 7
 
RANK ORDERING OF MISSIONS
 
(Assuming Goals are Equally Weighted)
 
PANEL 1
 
1. Pollution Monitoring 

2. Resource Mapping/Monitoring 

3. Data Network 

4. Reflectors 

5. Broadcast Satellite 

6. Weather, Climate Control 

7. Disaster Warning 

8. Meteorological 

9. Atmospheric Physics 

10. International Missions 

ii. Multiple Access 

12. Navigation/Traffic Control 

13. Data Commercialization 

14. Common Carrier 

15. Colonization 

16. Aircraft Noise Reduction 

17. Hazardous Material Tracking 

18. Orbiting Power Station 

19. Ionospheric Physics 

20. Defense System Monitoring 

21. Manufacturing 

22. Aerodynamics Research 

23. High Energy Physics 

24. Private Communications Satellite 

25. Waste Disposal 

26. Health Treatment 

27. 	 Electromagnetic and Particle 

Experiments 

28. Intra-solar System Probes 

29. Astronomy 

30. Paired Probes 

31. Extra-solar System Probes 

32. Satellite Servicing 

33. Extraterrestrial Communication 

34. Solar, Other Measurements 

35. Meteor Analysis 

36. Assembly 

PANEL 2
 
Disaster Warning
 
Weather, Climate Control
 
Resource Mapping/Monitoring
 
Broadcast Satellite
 
Data Network
 
Common 	Carrier
 
Meteorological
 
Multiple Access
 
Navigation/Traffic Control
 
Aerodynamic Research
 
Hazardous Material
 
Pollution Monitoring
 
Satellite Servicing
 
Aircraft Noise Reduction
 
Reflectors
 
Orbiting Power Station
 
Private Communications Satellite
 
Atmospheric Physics
 
International Mission
 
Health 	Treatment
 
Data'Commercialization
 
High Energy Physics
 
Defense System Monitoring
 
Solar, 	Other Measurements
 
Ionospheric Physics
 
Waste Disposal
 
Electromagnetic and Particle
 
Experiments
 
Paired Probes
 
Assembly
 
Colonization
 
Manufacturing
 
Meteor Analysis
 
Astronomy
 
Intra-solar System Probes
 
Extraterrestrial Communication
 
Extra-solar System Probes
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by rank ordering the missions according to the total support each provides 
for the national goals. 
Although there are differences in the two independent rankings, 
considerable agreement exists. For example, four of the top six missions are 
common to both rankings. 
* weather, climate control
 
* resource mapping/monitoring
 
o data network
 
" broadcast satellite
 
Out of the top one-third (12) missions, the two rankings list eight common
 
missions. In addition to the above four, these include:'
 
* disaster warning
 
* meteorological satellites
 
• multiple access communications satellites
 
* navigation/traffic control
 
The differences in rankings may be attributed to one or a combination
 
of the following factors: unintentional biases based on perceived feasibility,
 
differences in perceived opportunities and in future values, and different
 
judgments as to the strengths of perceived impacts.
 
d) Relationship Between Weighted Goals and Missions:
 
The mission to goal analysis to this point has assumed that all
 
national goals have the same weight. If we add the dimension of differences
 
in priorities among the goals, as shown earlier in Figure 6, we find that
 
space missions are able to substantially contribute, in theoryto the achieve­
ment of some of the highest priority goals. The Figure 8 below indicates
 
that environmental quality and agriculture and food receive the greatest
 
contribution from space missions.
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FIGURE 8
 
NATIONAL GOALS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM CIVILIAN SPACE MISSIONS
 
Goal Total Space Contribution
 
Agriculture and Food 2368.8
 
Natural Environment 2132.0
 
Natural Resource and Material Supply 1768.0
 
Urban Environment 1699.2
 
Health and Medicine 1609.2
 
When consideration is made of the priorities among the goals, the rank
 
orderings of the missions are somewhat different than those rankings which
 
assumed equal weights. The highest ranking missions are:
 
" Pollution monitoring
 
" Resource Mapping/Monitoring
 
" Data Network
 
" Broadcast Communications
 
4. Prospective Crises: Some Challenges to Planning
 
This.section describes another dimension of planning for the future;
 
i.e., the understanding of potential future crises which might face the U.S.
 
over the next decades, and an examination of the relative importances of
 
these crises in terms of their impacts on society. The crisis orientation is
 
an important point of departure -increative thinking about the future because
 
it is the nature of our society to respond to crises.
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For example, in describing our time to a visitor from the past, we
 
would almost certainly include the energy crisis, the Middle East crisis,
 
the Watergate crisis, and the inflationary crisis in our list of descriptors
 
of the present. Without focusing on potential crises, as depressing as that
 
might be, our descriptions of the future would be totally inadequate; more
 
importantly, little would be known of the immediate need for creative and
 
decisive policy-making. We talk of crises, of unpleasant futures, to prompt
 
policy analysis and policy-making where it may count the most.
 
Inevitably, this approach presents arguments which will be discouraging.
 
If the projection of crises are believable, the import will be one of
 
Gotterdammerung. But the future is not likely to be as dismal as these
 
essays might indicate for several reasons:
 
- The crises are plausible but not necessarily probable.
 
- The consequences, as mentioned above, may be seen in a
 
different perspective than we think.
 
- We have focused only on crises not their opposite. (For
 
reasons which are not very clear, it is easier to visualize
 
odious situations than desirable states).
 
- As the probability of a crisis increases, it is more likely
 
that action will be taken in an attempt to avert the
 
evolving situation.
 
- Some of the crises discussed here are-apparently casually
 
.connected; correction of one may mitigate others.
 
Yet running throughout the discussion is the suggestion that the coming
 
twenty-five years is indeed a time of climax, a time of issues of unprecedented
 
magnitude and permanence. Food shortages, materials and energy availability,
 
and monetary instability: all of these issues have affected society before;
 
what is new is their potential simultaneity and world scope. Certainly within
 
these crises, and their concomitant consequences~are the seeds of the future.
 
,S7
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Important changes of the next two and a half decades seem likely to 
come not only from science and technology, from the waxing and waning of 
institutions responding to external pressures and internal decay, from 
policies of Governments and the values and actions of groups of people, but 
from the unexpected and deleterious actions of the socio/economic/political 
system. These unexpected system responses can trigger crises. 
"Crisis" can have several definitions; the meaning employed in this
 
essay is:
 
A crucial situation; a situation whose outcome
 
decides whether possible bad consequences will
 
follow.
 
Thus, this section on future crises deals with poteneial situations which
 
may have grievous consequences. At least two degrees of uncertainty are
 
involved in each crisis: the inevitability of the crisis itself and the
 
likelihood that the anticipated consequences will flow from the crisis
 
situation. With respect to the former uncertainty, each crisis is defined
 
in terms of trends already well-established, which, through their coincidence
 
and reinforcement make the crisis, if not likely, at least plausible. 'The
 
second uncertainty, that of the consequences of the crisis, is more difficult.
 
Society has a marvelous propensity to adapt, and situations which seem
 
onerous and threatening tous may, to some future society,. seem part of the
 
natural order and a desirable -state of affairs. For example, a chronic
 
energy shortage is perceived by many economists as a potential cause of
 
inflation, recession and perhaps economic depression. Yet this image assumes
 
a continuation of current lifestyles; it is possible that society, faced
 
with high energy costs, will change to lifestyles requiring lower energy
 
inputs. Thus the crisis, energy shortage, may have occurred, but its conse­
quences will be viewed with quite a different feeling in retrospect than
 
42
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some view it prospectively. There is no alternative, however, to using
 
current values in projecting crisis.
 
It is one thing to suggest that recognizing key future crises can form
 
an interesting forecasting model; it's quite another to develop a metric for
 
selecting a subset of issues to address. John Platt, in his paper "What We
 
Must Do," suggested as an index of crisis intensity, a measure which included
 
the number of people likely to be affected, the degree of this effect, and
 
the time until the effect is realized. In his scaling, a grade I crisis
 
represented total annihilation; a grade 2 crisis, great destruction or
 
physical, biological, or political change; a grade 3 crisis, almost unbearable
 
7,
 
world tension, and so on.
 
Recent work in technology assessment has added other criteria to
 
Platt's list. One might include "relative confidence" or certainty in the
 
degree of effect of the crisis. For example, a potential crisis which is
 
very uncertain and yet which could have a tremendous effect might be
 
accorded a very high priority. The list might include "reversibility" (that
 
is, the ability for any policy to reverse the consequences of the crisis -­
an irreversible crisis is much worse than a reversible one). Finally,
 
"responsibility" could be an important priority-ordering criterion: does
 
the responsibility for curing the crisis lie clearly within some existing
 
institution's mission? The responsibility criterion also becomes important
 
when more than one institution thinks it has the job of correcting a problem,
 
because more often than not, jurisdictional disputes will arise that can
 
inhibit clear-cut and decisive action.
 
7John Platt, "What We Must Do," Science, Vol, 166, No. 3909 (November 28, 1969),
 
pp. 1115-1121.
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Thus the dimensions by which the severity of a future crisis might be 
judged,(although these criteria are clearly not of equal weight) include: 
1. Number of people affected.
 
2. Degree of effect.
 
3. Pr6bability of timing of the impact.
 
4. Reversibility.
 
5. Responsibility.
 
6. Confidence in judgments.
 
A most important crisis would be one in which a large number of people are
 
likely to be severel affected, almost immediately, in an irreversible way,
 
with no institution clearly having responsibility for detecting or curing the
 
problem. 
This situation would obtain at either of two levels of confidence:
 
great certainty in the judgments, or great uncertainty.
 
What then are some of the issues which meet these criteria? While
 
others could certainly extend this list considerably, our nominations for the
 
top set are shown in Figure 9.
 
We made an attempt to understand the relationships among the crises
 
on this selected list, using the cross-impact matrix technique.
 
Figure l0is a cross-impact matrix of crises discusseduin this section.
 
As in the case of all cross-impact matrices, this figure'shows the relation­
ships which appear to exist among the variables considered. The seven 
postulated crises appear on both the ordinate and abscissa. The numbers in 
the cells of the matrix are in answer to the question: 
If the crisis shown in the ordinate occurs, how will the
 
crisis, shown in the abscissa, be effected?
 
d.*
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A +4 indicates a judgment that the dependent crises will be greatly intensi­
fied; a -4 indicates the judgment that the dependent crisip will be greatly
 
mitigated.
 
The preponderance of + signs in the matrix indicates that by and large
 
the occurrence of any of the crises seems likely to intensify the crises
 
which have not yet been realized. More specifically:
 
- All of the crises .lead in the direction of war, and except
 
for war itself, in the direction of inflation and capital
 
shortages.
 
- Imbalance in the distribution of wealth seem likely to be
 
intensified by food shortages, inflation and capital
 
shortages, but are mitigated by shortages of mineral
 
resources and energy shortages, particularly if energy
 
supplies and mineral resources are owned by currently
 
impoverished countries.
 
Figure 11 shows the other side of the coin. In this cross-impact matrix,
 
it is assumed that the crises are corrected and the matrix displays the conse­
quences of these corrections. For example, the numbers contained in the
 
cells of the matrix answer the question:
 
If the crisis shown in the ordinate were to be prevented,
 
how would the other crises be affected?
 
In this case, the matrix shows a preponderance of minus signs, showing that
 
correction of the crises generally leads to improvement in other areas as
/ 
well. However, the intensities contained in this matrix as compared with
 
the previous matrix shows that the situation is probably non-linear; that
 
is,.the occurrence of one crisis seems more likely to trigger other crises
 
than the curing of one crisis is likely to cure other crises. For example,
 
eliminating the possibility of nuclear war probably has little affect on
 
any of the other crises except food shortages which may be intensified.
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Curing of deterioration of the biosphere seems to be ineffective in all
 
other areas except inflation and capital shortages which it will help
 
(since the need for spending for anti-pollution devices will be diminished).
 
Cross impacts of specific note include:
 
- Curing of imbalances in the distribution of wealth will
 
greatly mitigate food shortages since developing
 
countries would be able to purchase agricultural inputs
 
and food; in other words; the free market system could
 
be brought into play to help avoid starvation.
 
-
 Energy shortages reduce the intensity of deterioration
 
of the biosphere since freely available energy could be
 
used to clean the environment.
 
- Similar abundant energy can be substituted in many
 
instances for short raw materials; therefore the
 
availability of energy mitigates the potential mineral
 
resource crisis.
 
Anticipating crises, understanding their nature to the degree possible, and
 
moving to implement policies which mitigate them, would seem to be an important
 
thrust for the political sciences in the next two decades. We need, following
 
the suggestion of John Platt, a metric for crises; and following the suggestion
 
of Hal Lijistone, a system of crisis discounting akin to cash flow discounting
 
which could help sort out priorities for the nation.
 
The dimensions of these and other potential crises are discussed in the
 
next section which constitutes the bulk of this report since the Study Group
 
decided that its approach to characterizing the future would be based on the
 
examination of certain Trends and Issues facing the nation.
 
5. Conclusions 
There is no doubt that the next twenty-five years will be a period of 
crisis and challenge. The principle components of the "problematique" and 
the idea that the world is in the midst of a major transition in its historic
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developmental patterns are familiar to almost everyone. The contents of
 
this report, particularly the essays on Trends and Issues have provided some
 
measures of the dimensions of the problems' food, population, warfare, energy,
 
pollution, etc. and their intense interactions. The core issue may well be
 
stated as the maintenance of an equitable and dynamic equilibrium between 
world population and world resources. This issue is not new; Malthus
 
advanced it, albeit pessimistically, at the beginning of the 19th century.
 
What is new, in addition to the exponentially growth of the crises, is the
 
profound changes in the world's perceptions of equity and social justice,
 
which would require, if pursued, a redistribution of the wealth and basic
 
changes in thd rules of the "system". It is not reasonable to expect that a
 
system in which "the rich get -icher and the poor get poorer" will survive
 
without the imposition of imperialism on the international scene and a
 
paternal fascism in domestic affairs.
 
The alternatives are the challenges that face the nation and the
 
world.
 
It became clear to us during the course of this study on the Outlook for
 
Space that space flight with its global perspective, its ability to tie
 
nations and peoples together, and its unique capabilities to illuminate
 
mants universe and his nature has an enormous, untapped potential for contri­
buting to the solutions of the world's problems and to meeting its needs.
 
With tools such as space flight, mnfkiiid has the means to make the
 
difficult transition into the twentieth century. He needs only the will and
 
determination.
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ENERGY AND OTHER NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES
 
The United States and other countries, both developed and developing,
 
have assumed a future course of action which includes growth at an ipcreasing
 
rate, despite their expanding populations. It is only recently that we have
 
freed the realities of growth costs, especially in the area of new technolo­
gies, and finite resources on a world-wide basis. The desire for a rising
 
standard of living and a more equitable level of distribution within the
 
U. S. and elsewhere simply cannot happen immediately. A totally free, market
 
enterprise system would leave less developed areas.,unable to compete in the
 
bidding for scarce resources, now rising in price. Furthermore, existing
 
political allegiances have controlled such resources as oil, phosphate,
 
mercury and bauxite; and we can expect future cartel-like actions to further
 
limit an "ideal" distribution of mineral resources.
 
The fact is future U. S. demands for non-renewable resources, based
 
upon traditional consumption patterns, lead to requirements of materials
 
which significantly exceed anticipated domestic supply. In 1974 it was
 
necessary to import $28 billion dollars worth of oil; and despite increases
 
in the price of oil, 1975 demands are projected to increase another 6%. By
 
the year 2000, it is estimated that the U. S. will import 90% of the chro­
mium, tin, titanium, platinum, berylium, aluminum and flourine needed for
 
production. A world-wide projection for the year 2000 forecasts a doubling
 
of the population and an increase in per capita mineral consumption by a
 
factor of 4, increasing total mineral consumption by a factor of 8. Given
 
this view, we should find our resources of silver and mercury depleted within
 
the next 10-15 years and copper, lead, tin, zinc, tungsten and barite within
 
s7 
25 years. Decreases in energy sources and other minerals due to scarcity
 
and/or increased prices may mean a percentage reduction in our Gross National
 
Product, until more efficient technologies and substitute materials come to
 
pass. The U. S. and others must pay now for future growth, as new technolo­
gies and legislative standards are expensive to develop and not readily
 
available.
 
Beyond the limitations inherent in our supply of natural resources, the
 
U. S. cannot assume the availability of imported minerals and fuel oil.
 
First, there is the problem of maintaining a balance of trade in the world
 
economy. Second, the desire for world-wide growth, particularly in newly
 
developing areas, will decrease the large percentage of materials we have in
 
the past been able to purchase. Third, the political groupings now forming
 
among smaller nations have increasing economic overtones as trade controls
 
become a means to world power.
 
The question is what can we do now, to become more independent and yet,
 
at the same time, cognizant of our responsibility to the world environment?
 
In the area of energy, we must move toward independence to provide for the
 
monumental demands forecasted for the U. S.: 103 to 118 x 1015 BTU by 1985.
 
Development of other sources of energy beyond oil is essential. Unfortunately,
 
the econimic feasibility to develop efficient new energy technologies has
 
come about after the "energy crisis". Despite the increased pollution and
 
transportation problems-involved, coal will provide a greater percentage of
 
our energy demands in the near future, than in the past. The technology
 
problems of solar energy and pollution fears of nuclear energy hamper our
 
immediate use of these sources to a large degree; however, these sources plus
 
coal and electricity, which advantageously uses less desirable energy products,
 
I.
 
will enable the U. S. to reach a stable importation rate of fuel by 1985
 
and become independent by the year 2000, if a modicum of conservation is
 
also carried out.
 
In the immediate sense, education toward conservation and recycling of
 
finite, not just immediately scarce, resources will aide the U. S. in closing
 
the gap between supply and demand and could reduce our energy needs 15%; and
 
legislative tax-incentives and controls which stimulate new efficient tech­
nologies and preserve virgin resources will help the overall picture and
 
specifically reduce energy demands another 15%. Additionally, in the socio­
economic sector, the U. S. may attempt to form trade cartels of its own.
 
For the long-term changes necessary in the energy and mineral supply
 
and demand gap, new technologies and substitute materials, hopefully, will
 
provide for most of our future needs. Ocean mining for mineral nuggets and
 
traces within the water itself proposes to be one large source of minerals,
 
as well as more efficient and automated mining processes for coal, shale oil,
 
etc.
 
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES: THE ISSUES
 
Future U. S. Mineral Demands Based Upon Traditional Consumption
 
Patterns Lead to Requirements for Economically Important Materials
 
Which Significantly Exceed Anticipated Domestic Supply
 
Future U. S. Energy Demands Based Upon Traditional Consumption
 
Patterns Lead to Requirements Which Significantly Exceed
 
Domestic Supply
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ISSUE: 	 FUTURE U.S. MINERAL DEMANDS BASED UPON TRADITIONAL CONSUMPTION 
PATTERNS LEAD TO REQUIREMENTS FOR ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT MATERIALS 
WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED ANTICIPATED DOMESTIC SUPPLY. 
The Issue:
 
The economic condition of the United States depends, in large measure,
 
on the continued availability of reasonably priced, economically important
 
materials. These materials can be derived from domestic or foreign sour-

In either case, there is now reason for concern about both continuity
ces. 

of supply and price stability. This concern stems from three basic forces:
 
the potential for the formation of OPEC-like oligopolistic consortia; the
 
growing 	competition for raw materials on the world market as developing
 
countries industrialize; and the possibility of depletion of economically
 
viable resources.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
The Possibility of New Materials-Controlling OligoDolies
 
The economy of the United States is a voracious consumer of raw
 
materials and as the economy grows in the future, so will demand for raw
 
Figure 1 lists for several key materials, current per capita
materials. 

levels of consumption and assuming a real economic growth rate of
 
4-5 percent, the expected growth per capita of material use. Of course
 
'there are a host of factors that could change this forecast from the Depart­
ment of the Interior such as changing prices and the introduction of
 
FIGURE 1
 
U.S. MATERIALS CONSUMPTION
 
QUANTITY 

1970 

(SHORT TONS/1000 PERSONS)
 
ACUMINUM 
 19 

CALCIUM 
 .0.44 

CHLORINE 
 48 

FLUORINE 
 3.0 

IRON 
 410 

MAGNESIUM, METAL 0.47 

NICKEL 
 0.76 

NI TROGENt COMPOUNDS 51 

POTASSIUM 
 19 

S.ILVER (TROY OZ./1000 PERSONS) 360 

SODIUM 
 99. 

SULFUR (LONG TONS/000 PERSONS) 45 

TITANIUM, METAL 0.12 

TITANIUM, NONMETALLIC 2.3 

ASBESTOS 
 3.6 

PERCENT CHANGE
 
(PER CAPITA)
 
1970-1985 1970-2000
 
140 360
 
34 84
 
70 200
 
61 170
 
10 	 24
 
100 310
 
29 68
 
60 162
 
44 110
 
39 96
 
49 130
 
48 120
 
170 370
 
63 170
 
50 130
 
Source; 	Derived from U.S. Department of the Interior First Annual Report of the Secretary
 
of the lnterioi under The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-631)
 
(Washington, D.C.: 1972), p. 63.
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substitute materials, but the point is clear: economic growth demands
 
increased mineral consumption. To meet its needs, the United States has
 
to depend increasingly upon imports of certain materials--domestic pro­
duction has lagged behind consumer demand (see Figure 2).i
 
MATERIAL 
1950 
ALUMINUM 71 
COPPER 35 
LEAD 59 
MERCURY 92 
PLATINUM 91 
TIN 100 
TITANIUM 32 
ZINC 37 
IRON ORE 6 
CHROMIUM 100 
- COBALT 92 
COLUMBIUM 100 
MANGANESE 77 
NICKEL 99 
TUNGSTEN 80 
PETROLEUM 8 
NATURAL GAS 0 
TIMBER 11 
IMPORTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL 
U.S. CONSUMPTION 
1970 CHANGE 
86 +15 
8 -27 
40 -19 
38 -54 
98 + 7 
100 
47 +15 
60 +23 
14 + 8 
100 
96 + 4 
100 
94 +17 
91 - 8 
40 -40 
22 +14 
3 + 3 
8 -3 
Figure 2. Changing United States reliance upon selected materials from abroad.
 
1Material Needs and Environment Today and Tomorrow, Final Report othe
 
National Commission on Materials Policy (Washington, D.C.: June 1973),

pp•9-8. 
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Dependence on imports seems almost certain to grow. As shown in
 
Figure 3, under the assumption of continued economin growth in the United
 
States, reasonable projections indicate that by 2VL0, imports will account
 
for more than 90 percent or more of all the chromium, tin, titanium,
 
platium, beryllium, aluminum and flourine,the country consumes.2
 
'As the Middle East situation demonstrated, when a few nations con­
trol a resource in demand, they can readily assert oligopolistic power.
 
Without competition, they can set prices, control production rates,
 
demand political compliance with their goals, seek favorable trade
 
arrangements, and become generally obnoxious. Oligopoly is illegal
 
within the United States except under Federal charter; but not in the
 
world market.
 
A paradigm for forecasting future OPEC-like situations might be to
 
identify key materials used by industrial nations which are concentrated
 
in a few other nations that could be linked politically. The paradigm
 
becomes-particularly strong if the recipient countries do not have access
 
to economically viable substitutes. Figure 3 presents some possible
 
groupings.2
 
The United States imports some minerals which are present in the United
 
States but have not been tapped; sometimes it is cheaper to import than to
 
2U;S. Department of the Interior, First Annual Report of the Secre­
tary of the Interior, under the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970
 
(P.L. 91-631) (Washington, D.C., .1972) p-. 63, and Material Needs and the
 
Environment-Today-and'Tomorro Final Report of the National Commission
 
on Materials Policy (Washington, D.C., June 1973), pp. 2-25.
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FIGURE 3 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. MATERIAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
 
14970 1985 	 2000
 
PERCENTAGE- PERCENTAGE: PERCENTAGE--' MAJOR FOREIGN SOURCES 
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 
. .U ...........	 ,,
----CH OM UM:::i''iii:i;?'ii:!:'::::!;:!!:::ii.........'...........R 	 :.....:....::....::.:::::::::::::::::.. S SO THA.IC,. E
 
CHROMIUM .:xUSSR, SOUTH AFRICA, TURKEY
 
TIN NO DATA AVAILABLE : : _:::::::::: MALAYSIA, THAILAND, BOLIVIA
 
TITANIUM, METAL . :.:.. .. _"_"''________::: AUSTRALIA
::.....:: 

USSR, S. AFRICA, CAN.,NOR.,tJAPLATNUMUK 

BERYLLIUM NO DATA AVAILABLE
 
........	 EL ._:___:..'_ CANADA, NORWAY
 
::.:w. JAMAICA, SURINAM, CAN., AUSTRALIAALUMINUM 

:: . CANADA, SOUTH AFRICAASBESTOS 
MEXICO, 	SPAIN,ITALY, S. AFRCA
FLOURINE 
_CANADA...... 	__:POTASSIUM 
CANADA, 	AUSTRALIA'
TITANIUM, NONMET. 

CAN., PERU, MEX., HON., .AUSTRALIA,
SILVER 	 ..... 

CAN., PERU, MEXICO,, AUSTRALIA
 LEAD 

: 	 CAN., JAPAN, VENEZUELA, EECIRON 	 ... 
GREECE, 	IRELAND
MAGNESIUM, NONMET. 
NSODIUM 
' >CALCIUM 	 __________ 
MAGNESIUM, METAL
 
NITROGEN, COMP.
 
SILICON
 
SULFUR
 
0 o 1 6 80 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80100 
SHORTFALL 
DOMESTIC PRIMARY PRODUCTION
 
':BASED ON WEIGHT
 
SOURCE: 	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR UNDER TFE MINING AND MINERALS
 
POLICY ACT OF 1970 (P.L. 91-631) (WASHINGTON, D.C., 1972), P. 63, AND MATERIAL NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT TODAY AND
 
AND TOMORROW, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MATERIALS POLICY (WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 1973), PP. 2-25.
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develop domestic reserves. If. shortages developed in~materials for
 
which indigenous but untapped reserves exist, we would undoubtedly develop
 
those resources. Vincent E. McKelvey, Chief of the United States
 
Geological Survey, believes that at higher prices, most of our mineral
 
needs could be met through the turn of the century at least, by using
 
materials which lie within our borders. 3 However, among materials not
 
to be found in quantity in the United States are tin, manganese, and
 
chromite.
 
The world already has several examples of cartel-like actions cast
 
in the image of OPEC. Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Algeria recently
 
agreed to raise the price of phosphate rock; this has led to increases in
 
the price of fertilizer and detergent. These price increases are partic­
ularly unfortunate since they occur at a time when fertilizers based on
 
the use of nitrogen are in short supply because of the energy problems the
 
world is experiencing, and-when alternatives.to phosphate based fert-ilizers
 
are being seriously questioned from an ecological standpoint.
 
The suppliers of bauxite, the principal raw material used in alumi­
num production, have met several times, most recently in Kingston,
 
Jamaica, and in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. According to the British publica­
tion, New Scientist, the major producers, including Australia, Guiana,
 
Guinea, Surinam, and Yugoslavia (and perhaps.Jamaica as well) are likely
 
to form'a cartel.
 
3"Raw Material: U.S. Grows More Vulnerable to Third World Cartels,"
 
Science (January 18, 1974).
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Nationalization appears to bethe most likely strategy
 
of the bauxite producing countries: Guiana is one
 
success story from whibh they might draw inspiration.
 
In 1971, Guiana'nationalized the Demba Bauxite operation
 
owned by Alcan Aluminum. Bauxite is responsible for the
 
major part of Guiana's economy, and western experts were
 
quick to forecast the troubles which would undoubtedly
 
beset the country after the takeover. They were proved
 
sadly wrong. Despite a severe aluminum market recession
 
in 1971-72 the Guiana Bauxite (Guybau) operation has gone
 
from strength to strength and Guiana is now negotiating
 
the takeover of its remaining bauxite mining company,
 
Reynolds Mines, owned by Reynolds Metals, a U.S. company.
 
Guiana's dream is that of many other bauxite producing
 
countries: a national integrated aluminum industry.4
 
Producers of mercury met in Queratano, Mexico, last year to agree on
 
a general pricing strategy and to form a group of mercury producing coun­
tries. Central American nations have recently established a tax on ex­
ported-fruit. Other organizations, such as the International Tin Council
 
and the Inter-governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries, already
 
exist and it would not be unexpected to see cooperative action being
 
suggested within these groups.
 
Unfortunately, if groups of nations exercise oligopolistic-pressures,
 
others may be hurt severely. For example, while the oil situation con­
fronts the developed nations with uncertainty about their-balance of pay­
ments and economic stability, the underdeveloped countries may be on the
 
verge of disaster. Treasury Secretary George Shultz recently stated that
 
they were victims of a "horrible chain in which the lack of fuel goes to
 
a lack of fertilizer, goes to lack of food, and which goes to starvation." 5
 
4Andrew Staines, "Digesting the Raw Materials Threat," New Scientist
 
(March 7, 1974), p. 610.
 
5New York Times (February 17, 1974).
 
-8-

Competition for Raw Materials on the World Market
 
This rising world demand for raw materials is based on two factors:
 
the number of people in the world is increasing and per capita consumption
 
is increasing (see Figure 4). By the end of the century, the total world
 
population will nearly double. Concurrently, following past trends, per
 
capita mineral consumption will increase by a factor of four.6 Therefore,
 
by combining these two forces, by the year 2000, the world as a whole may
 
increase its mineral consumption by a factor of eight or so. Failure to
 
achieve this growth would mean that developing countries are not able to
 
achieve their current economic goals.
 
The dilemma implied by this tremendous growth rate is illustrated
 
in Figure 5. Since 1945 annual world production of the indicated minerals
 
has doubled every seven or eight years, while in the United States the
 
production doubling rate was approximately twenty-five years. in 1945
 
the United States consumed about 60 percent of the world total for the
 
minerals shown; by 1971, primarily because of the growth of consumption
 
of other nations in the world, this figure had fallen to 16 percent.
 
$71
 
6
 ugene N. Cameron, "U.S. Contribution to Mineral Supplies, "Mineral
 
Position of the United States, 19,75-2000 (Madison, Wisc.: University of
 
Wisconsin Press, 1973), p.21.
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FIGURE 4 The Effect of increased Population on Natural Resources 
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FIGURE 5 
World production and United States production
 
and consumption, 1930-71, of eighteen minerals
 
(iron ore, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten,
 
chromium, nickel, molybdenum, maganese, tin,
 
vanadium, fluorspar, phosphate, cement, gypsum,
 
potash, and sulfur), in metric tons.7
 
7 
Data compiled at the University of Wisconsin by Kenneth D. Markart 
ind E.N. Cameron, from U.S. Bureau 6f Mines, Minerals Yearbook and Commodity 
Data Summaries. From Mineral Position of the United States, 1975-2000 
(Madison, Wisc.: *University df Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 19 
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From the end of World War II, to the early 1970's,
 
worldwide production of eighteen important minerals increased by 600
 
percent, reaching a level of about 1.7 billion tons in 1971. Consumption
 
in the United States during this period increased by about 75 percent,
 
8
 
reaching a level of about .3 billion tons in 1971. Hence, the United
 
States finds itself in growing competition for the increasingly short
 
supply of many mineral resources.
 
The 	Prospects for Depletion
 
It does not appear that the world will be depleted of any major
 
mineral resource in this century. This statement is based on the fol­
lowing assumptions:
 
1. 	World rate of consumption of raw materials will continue
 
to increase exponentially. 'Projected growth rates run
 
from 1.1 percent per year for tin to 6.4 percent per
 
year for aluminum.
 
2. 	Known reserves will increase by a factor of five before
 
the turn of the century. This assumption is intended to
 
capture the effect of price elasticity: as the resource
 
nears depletion its price will rise; as prices rise,
 
there is additional incentive for exploration and recov­
ery of previously marketable resources. This "factor of
 
five" assumption could, of course, be wrong.o
 
8 Eugene N. Cameron (ed.), The Mineral Position of the United States,
 
1975-2000 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 19.
 
9These assumptions and the figures shown in the text are from Donella
 
H. Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972).
 
In their computations, the known global reserves were derived from U.S.
 
Bureau of Mine estimates.
 
The proven world reserves of selected materials, especially critical
 
materials, range from about ten years to more than 100 years (see Figure 6)10 .
 
However, several materials are in relatively short supply as far as proven
 
reserves. 
Rdserves of copper, lead, tin, zinc, tungsten, and barite range
 
up to about 25 years, whereas supplies of mercury and silver are estimated
 
at only 15 years. Certainly the world will continue to find new supplies
 
of minerals. In the period 1950-1970 the proven reserves of potash in­
creased by about 2400 percent and those of iron ore about 1200-1300 per­
cent (see Figure 7).11 However, certain materials, such as lead, were
 
found only in relatively small additional quantities in terms of those
 
previously known. In the case of tin, manganese, and tungsten, exploration
 
for additional reserves essentially proved fruitless,during this period.
 
Thus there are three reasons why wexay have shortages in the future:
 
the possibility of oligopolistic practices by foreign nations, increasing
 
world competition for scarce supplies, and the near exhaustion of certain
 
economically recoverable ores.
 
There are important consequences which flow from these new forces.
 
Among them are:
 
- All of these forces are inflationary and will cause
 
balance of payment difficulties.
 
- "Repatriation" of export dollars could cause problems
 
of world financial stability.
 
10Executive Office of the President, Council of International Economic
 
Policy, "Critical Imported Materials" (December 1974) p. 15. (Hereafter
 
called Critical Imported Materials.)
 
lCritical Imported Materials, p. 14
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TABLE 2 
PROVED WORLD RESERVES OF SELECTED MINERALS
 
More Than 100 Years: 

51-100 Years: 

26-50 Years: 

15-25 Years: 

10-15 Years: 

Columbium
 
Potash
 
Phosphorus
 
Magnesium
 
Iron Ore
 
Chromi te
 
Nickel
 
Vana di um 
Cobalt
 
Asbestos
 
Molybdenum
 
Manganese
 
Bauxite
 
Pl ati num
 
Titanium 
Antimony
 
Sulfur
 
Copper
 
Lead
 
Tin 
Zinc 
Tungsten 
Bxt ite 
Mercury
 
Si 1ver
 
SOURCE: Executive Office of the President Council on Interna­
tional Economic Policy "Critical Imported Materials"
 
December, 1974, p. 15.
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Figure 7 
Change in world proved reserves 1950-70
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- Higher costs of minerals on a world market will affect
 
the ability of certain countries to purchase needed
 
commodities on the open market and'affect their rates
 
of industrialization and agriculture.
 
- Economic growth of developed nations will be slowed.
 
- International political stability will diminish.
 
Potential Actions
 
The actions that may be implemented to affect United States material
 
demand and domestic supply may be classed into four major categories:
 
education, science and technology, legislation, and socio-economic strategies.
 
A summary of such programs is shown in Figure 8.
 
con-
Educational programs and public relations campaigns relating to 

servation and recycling within the United States might be important. The
 
recent OPEC oil embargo and concomitant public awareness of the need for
 
conservation resulted in major fuel conservation. Similarly, such conser­
vation programs might be imagined for critical materials in short supply.
 
The National Adademy of Sciences recently recommended that;
 
- The federal government proclaim and deliberately pursue
 
a national policy of conservation of material, energy,
 
and environmental resources, informing the public and
 
private sectors fully about the needs and techniques to
 
reducing energy consumption, the development of substitute
 
materiali, increasing the durability,and maintainability of
 
products, and reclamation and recycling.1 2
 
In addition, educational programs might be directed toward foreign suppliers.
 
These programs might stress the implications of price changes and continuity
 
of supply on the relations between countries and world economic stability.
 
1 2 ineral Resources and the Environment, National Academy of Sciences
 
(Washington,- D.C., 1975), p. 37. (Hereafter called Mineral Resources and 
the Environment.) 
Education
 
o 	Educational programs and public relations campaigns about
 
conservation and recycling.
 
o 	Programs for domestic and foreign suppliers on the socio­
economic implications of materials availability and cost.
 
Science and Technology
 
o 	Development of materials for and methods of substitution.
 
0 Development of techniques for more efficient use, recycling,
 
and reuse of end product materials.
 
o 	Development of techniques to economically utilize lower grade ores.
 
o 	Development of improved techniques for identifying, location, and
 
assaying material deposits.
 
o 	Development of improved techniques for extraction and mining
 
(e.g., automated mining, offshore procedures, reclamation
 
technologies to prevent environmental degradation).
 
Legislation
 
o 	 Financial incentives (e.g., taxes, subsidies) for conservation of
 
scarce resources.
 
o 	Prohibition of certain non-recyclable/non-reusable materials and
 
establishment of packaging standards.
 
o 
Financial incentives to increase mineral supplies (e.g., differential
 
pricing to encourage exploration and R&D).
 
o 	Federal stockpiling of materials.
 
o 	Rationing/allocation of materials.
 
Figure 8 Actions that may affect U.S. material demand and domestic supply
 
27
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Legislation (Cont'd)
 
° Relaxation or abolishment of environmental quality and occupational
 
safety standards.
 
o 	Enactment of federal land use regulations.
 
o 	 Establishment of material export quotas and/or taxation on
 
exports.
 
Enactment of anti-exodus laws for U.S. materials-producing
 
corporations.
 
Socio-Economic
 
Formation of a multinational material users cartel.
 
Figure 8 (Cont'd)
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Scientific and technical developments will be urgently important in
 
solving material problems. Technology could have an important role to
 
play in providing substitutions, improving processing efficiencies,
 
promoting recycling and re-use, developing economic processes for the use
 
of lower grade ores, and in improving techniques of exploration and recovery.
 
In the area of exploration, clearly improved methods would be useful
 
in helping to identify the location of mineral deposits, both in the United
 
States and throughout the world. These techniques include, for example;
 
- Geological techniques, including field work, aerial surveys,
 
subsurface investigations, mapping or rock types, and
 
petrological studies.
 
- Aerial or orbital surveys using visible light, infrared, and
 
microwave photography, as well as gravimetric and magnetic
 
sensing.
 
- Geochemical exploration involving analyses performed 
-on solid,
 
liquid., and gaseous samples.derived from surface manifestations
 
and drilling cores.
 
- Geophysical techniques including measurements of temperatures,
 
electrical conductivity, propagation velocity of elastic waves,
 
and density and magnetic susceptability of various strata.
 
- Seismographic techniques, including active or passive seismic 
methods (active methods include reflective and refractive; 
passive techniques involve recording naturally generated
 
microearthquakes or acoustic noise patterns within prescribed
 
frequency ranges).
 
- Electrical methods including self-polarization, induced polariza­
tion, and telluric approaches..13
 
In addition to simply developing improved methods for identifying the
 
location of resource deposits, general improvements in the field of geology
 
would probably be very helpful. These improvements could lead to the
 
13 T.J. Gordon, et al., A Technology Assessment of Geothermal Energy

Report 164-46-11 (Glastonbury, Conn.: The Futures Group, September 1974).
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development of statistical and mathematical methods for projecting the
 
extent of the deposits, given certain surface and subsurface geologic
 
information. 14
 
The mineral position of the United States might also be improved
 
through the development of new mining technologies. The industry in
 
general is in a depressed state, as evidenced by the relatively slow
 
advance of mining technology and the large number of imported technologies.
 
The National Academy of Sciences recently recommended several potential
 
research programs associated with improved mining technology. For
 
example:
 
In conventional approaches there is a need to determine whether
 
harder cutting materials can be synthesized in suitable sizes
 
and shapes (tungsten carbide and synthetic diamond have led
 
to considerable progress in this respect), and to explore
 
their capabilities in factors affecting bit performance in various
 
types of rock. Novel approaches for both soft and hard rock
 
should be fully explored and evaluated for various mining con­
ditions. These include the use of high powered lasers, electron
 
beam, plasma torches, thermal fragmentation, ultrasonics and
 
shock waves, percussion and hydraulic jet techniques, and auto­
mated continuous explosive sytems."
 
"It is recommended that research be accelerated on ways to
 
automate mining operations. Stch automation requires the
 
development of suitable sensing devices (to monitor rock
 
composition, for example), information processing equipment
 
(minicomputers), and servo-mechanisms (robots), all of which
 
have to be exceptionally rugged."15
 
Scientific and technological developments will also be important in the
 
economic utilization of lower grade ores. The country will move from the use
 
14L. Heston and H.S. Becker, Focal Points in the Future of Food and
 
Mineral Resources, Report 151-46-10 (Glastonbury, Conn.: The Futures Group,
 
July 1974). (Hereafter called Mineral Resources.)
 
lAMineral Resources. 6$W
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of its richest ores to those which are currently marginal. Therefore, a
 
series of developments which improve the economics of the use of low grade
 
ore will be necessary; these may involve for example, in situ leaching of
 
ore deposits, improving methods of beneficiatlon (e.g., beneficiation of
 
magnetic taconite in coarse crushing plants in the process of producing
 
iron), lower cost transportation, new grinding and separation techniques,
 
diminished energy requirements, etc. 16
 
Ocean mining is a particularly promising era. Here the processes
 
involve both the removal of minerals from sea water through distillation
 
or osmotic processes and the direct recovery of minerals from the ocean
 
floor. Sea water contains almost all of the chemical elements, although
 
only four elements--sodium, chlorine, magnesium, and bromine--are now
 
being recovered in relatively large quantities. Landsberg, Fishman,
 
and Fisher project that:
 
It is not unreasonable to expect that within the next twenty
 
to forty years some byproduct recovery will be carried out in
 
sea water conversion plants built for meeting fresh water
 
needs. But these plants will probably be of a limited number
 
in the United States, at least in this century; barring the
 
achievement of the extremely low-processing costs, application
 
will probably not be of major significance except for the sea
 
water minerals already being recovered.17
 
With respect to use of the ocean bottom, mineral resources may be "mined"
 
from beneath- the surface of the Continental Shelf, recovered in the form of
 
deposits from silt, slime, and solid debris covering the ocean floor (these
 
3'6fineral Facts and Problems, Bureau of Mines Bulletin 650, United 
States Department of the Interior, 1970. 
-_ ­
17 H.H. Landsberg, L.L. Fishman, and J.L. Fisher, Resources in America's 
Future, 1963, p. 495. (Hereafter called Resources in America's Future.) 
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materials are believed to have collected from land erosion and deterioration
 
of submerged rock), and nodular material lying on the ocean bottom, at con­
siderable depth. The recovery of nodules is particularly interesting since
 
they appear to be primarily maganese and also contain nickel, copper, and
 
cobalt. Nodules have been found at depths of from 500 to 3000 feet off
 
the United States southeast coast, and to a range of 5000 to 14,000 feet
 
in the eastern Pacific Ocean.
 
..One square mile would contain 70,000 tons of nodules or 
20,000 to 35,000 tones of maganese.. .a breakthrough here 
would almost at once shake free the United States of growing 
dependence upon overseas sources. Recovery of phosphates from 
the ocean bottom, especially along the west coast, may proceed 
that of maganese.18 
Recycling technology is indeed promising. Americans discard approxi­
mately 250 million tons of solid wastes per year. Today nearly all major 
materials are to some extent recycled. The rate varies from nearly 100 
percent for lead to 50 percent for copper, 31 percent for iron and steel, 
and 19 percent for paper and board, to 4.2 percent of glass.19 Considering 
just iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, glass, textiles, and rubber, about 
25 percent of the materials consumed in the country are currently recycled. 
Improved processes•of recovery for the huge waste stream will reduce demand 
for virgin materials. The National Commission on Materials Policy has 
recommended that the government accelerate research and development and 
technology transfer on resouce recovery from scrap, especially encouraging 
the recovery of resources in municipal waste.20 
18Resources in America's Future, p. 496
 
19 "Report to Congress on Resource Recovery", Environmental Protection
 
Agency, February 1973.
 
20 Needs in the Environment, Today and Tomorrow: Final Report of the
 
National Commission on Materials Policy, June 1973, p. 4d-19. (Hereafter
 
called Needs insthe Environment.)
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Finally, science and technology can aid in the development of materials
 
which can substitute for curiently imported minerals or minerals which are
 
likely to be in'short supply in the future. 
Several of these substitutions
 
are already'in progress; for example, the use of plastics for metals in
 
automobiles. This substitution began in 1960 and had reached a level of
 
about 10 percent by 1970.21 The National Academy of Sciences recently urged
 
that the search for substitute materials begin immediately:
 
We cannot emphasize too strongly that the discovery and
 
development of new and improved materials as possible
 
substitutes for existing ones takes time, and that the
 
process is generally driven by clearly perceived func­
tional objectives rather than by ill-placed optimism that
 
"something will turn up when the crunch comes."22
 
There are three major difficulties encountered in seeking to substitute
 
one material for another: complexity of design, considering specialized uses;
 
accounting for the many uses of single materials of different combinations;
 
and accommodating the huge volume of use which is experienced in the case
 
of many commodities. In technically complex applications, such as nuclear
 
reactors and jet engines, some substitute materials are nearly impossible
 
to find. 
In other cases, the material is so crucial to adequate performance
 
(e.g., palladium in telephone systems) that a substitute would mean redesign
 
of the entire system if that were possible.
 
There are many political actions possible in this domain that relate
 
to creating incentives or removing barriers in order to influence production
 
or consumption of minerals. 
For example, taxes or subsidies could be created
 
21
 
*J.C. Fisher and R.H. Pry, "A Simple Substitution Model of Technological
 
Change ", Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. III, No. 1, p..75.
 
22Mineral Resources and the Environment.
 
-23­
to promote conservation of scarce resources, federal stockpiling programs
 
could be introduced, or materials rationed. As a single example, the
 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment recently pointed out that
 
more than a hundred million acres of federal lands including wildlife refuges,
 
national parks, and land administered by the Department of Defense are hardly
 
used to produce materials, yet these lands are thought to be quite rich in
 
mineral wealth. The various institutional factors which affect the use of
 
such land include:
 
- environmental policy, laws, and regulations
 
- mining and leasing laws and regulations
 
- administrative processes for environmental and other
 
certification reviews 
- economic policy (e.g., tax provisions such as depletion 
allowances and accelerated amortization of facilities or 
investment tax credit) 
- transportation policy (e.g., construction and operation 
of rail lines) 
- government programs for geological and geophysical surveying, 
exploration and mapping. 
- conflicting or concurrent federal-state jurisdictions (e.g., 
sovereignty and unitization of oil fields involving federal 
lands) 23 
The National Commission of Materials Policy recently recommended a full
 
legislative program in this area. They urged that federal agencies intensify
 
their efforts to'encourage worldwide development of resources by diplomatic,
 
23
 
Request for Proposal from the Office of Technology Assessment: OTA/RP
 
75-4, February 1975.
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financial, and educational means, that the federal government give
 
users of materials economic incentives in the form of tax credits for
 
expanded use of recycling materials and thatCongress modify the existing
 
General Mining law to modify the procedure for reclaiming abandoned mining
 
claims. They urged that prospectors should be granted sufficient rights
 
to encourage their active exploration for new mineral deposits.-24-

The possibility of forming an international-material-users-cartel
 
needs to be examined. In the case of petroleum, such action has already
 
been suggested by Secretary Kissinger and others. Whether or not the
 
commonality of interests among consuming nations is sufficiently strong
 
to utilize this "collective buying power" in order to control prices and
 
ensure availability, is problematic.
 
Potential Effectiveness and Acceptability of Alternative Actions
 
Scientific developments and technology can provide the most far­
reaching solution, but can help only in the long term. 
On the other hand,
 
actions that focus on strengthening the legislative environment can be
 
very effective in the short term, while education programs can be immedi­
ately helpful or very remote, depending on- whether they are directed toward
 
swaying popular opinion or focused on research and innovation. R&D programs
 
that bring about more efficient mining and concentrating of ores as well
 
24 Needs in the Environment.
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as those that provide recycling and substitutability of currently processed
 
materials are likely to be the most effective in reducing U.S. needs for
 
imports while maintaining a viable economy. Aside from technological
 
know how, the major barriers to the realization of these steps are the
 
obtaining of consensus among the public and private sectors so that the
 
required funds are allocated. Individual industries and companies are
 
likely to resist the costs for new plant and equipment that recycling and
 
substitute materials may bring and for the cultivation of new markets which
 
such charges may necessitate. Implementation time is another problem.
 
The Council on International Economic Policy estimates that, using present
 
technology, the U.S. could achieve aluminum self-sufficiency, but only
 
after at least 10 to 15 years. This assumes the construction of one new
 
plant per year, each capable of producing one million tons of alumina from
 
clay, starting in 1978 or 1979 of about $2 billion25for new mines and
 
smelter capacity.
 
While R&D may be the most effective response, the greater feasibility
 
of some legislative and educational steps make some of these alternatives
 
attractive, especially in the near term. In particular, the establishment
 
of federal stockpiling as well as the introduction of taxes or subsidies
 
to encourage conservation of scarce resources and the construction of new
 
plant and equipment could be instituted immediately. Other possible measures,
 
such as rationing or enactment of material export quotas may be effective,
 
but resistance by the public and private sectors respectively seems to
 
place them at a lower priority. 

2 5 
""Special Report: Critical Imported Materials," Executive Office of
 
President Council on International Economic Policy, December, 1974, p. 28.
 
4 
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Finally, some actions may have effects that are uncertain and really
 
need further study before their attractiveness can be adequately assessed.
 
The development of improved techniques for identifying, locating and
 
assaying mineral deposits, for example, will undoubtedly help the situation.
 
David Swan reports that space technology "may have a significant impact on
 
terrestrial mineral exploration," despite the problems of "precisely and
 
economically determining undergroup ore locations, extent, and grade."26
 
Clearly, the United States is faced with a series of alternative
 
courses of action. The action which the United States chooses to pursue
 
obviously could be strongly motivated by an embargo of imported materials
 
by suppliers. Such constraints might be removed by importing nations, such
 
as the United States, if they were to take actions to control such sources,
 
for example, through intervention. It is not clear that such steps are
 
likely, nor are they recommended here, although it is recognized that such
 
steps are being openly discussed with increasing frequency.
 
26Eugene H. Cameron (ed.) The Mineral Position of the United States,
 
1975-2000, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 92.
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ISSUE: FUTURE U.S. ENERGY DEMANDS BASED UPON TRADITIONAL CONSUMPTION
 
PATTERNS LEAD TO REQUIREMENTS WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED 
DOMESTIC SUPPLY. 
The Issue:
 
Energy consumption in the United States and around the world has in­
creased dramatically since the end of World War II. In the United States
 
it has grown at 3.6 percent annually since 1960 and now stands at about 70
 
quadrillion Btu annually.1'2 Energy consumption has risen in response to
 
both increasing population and to increasing levels of affluence. In
 
America, per capita consumption has grown steadily in all sectors, rising
 
in the aggregate by about 2.8 percent annually since the early 1960's (see
 
Figure 1).
 
When domestic production of crude oil and natural gas peaked in 1970­
1971, increases in petroleum imports were required. For example, in 1970
 
3.5 bbl8/day of petroleum were imported; in 1973 imports had increased to
 
6 bbls.day.
 
1C.E. Steinhart and J. S. Steinhart, Energy-Sources, Use, and Role
 
in Human Affairs (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).
 
2Shell Oil Company, The National Energy Outlook (March 1973), p. 10.
 
(Hereafter called The National Energy Outlook.)
 
3Understanding the National Energy Dilemma, a report of the Joint Com­
mittee on Atomic Energy, The Center for Strategic and International Studies'
 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1973), 
and Project Independence,
 
a Report by the Federal Energy.Administration (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, November 1974).
 /6'
 
U.S. 1929 1939 1947 1955 1960 1970 
101 5BTU % 1015BTU % 101 53TU % 1015BTU % 1015BTU % 1015BTU % 
'ousehold & 
Commerciala 7.06 28 7.22 31 10.52 30 10.83 27 12.86 28 15.79 25 
Transportation 6.55 26 5.79 25 8.17 23 8.09 20 9.21 20 16.31 25' 
Industry 9.32 37 7.78 34 12.46 36 15.71 39 15.95 35 20.71 32 
Otherb 2.06 08 2.22 10 3.73 1l 5.44 14 7.34 16 11.78 18 
Total 24.99 99 23.01 100 34.88 100 40.07 100 45.34 99 64.59 100 
a. Commercial: Wholesale, Retail trade & Services.
 
b. Other: Defense, Public(mostly gov't), Agriculture (fuel only), Gas lost, and
 
wasted, and Miscellaneous.
 
Source: Steinhart, C.E., and Steinhart,J.S.,1974,pp.215,230.
 
Figure 1. U.S. energy use by sector: historical breakdown
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The 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo vividly dem6nstrated the need for an
 
ordering of national energy priorities and policies. The major questions
 
which these priorities and policies address are: To what degree need we
 
rely on foreign sources ot energy? How will supply and demand come into
 
balance? To what extent can domestic supply be stimulated and demand
 
restrained? To what degree will lifestyle changes be required to bring
 
about supply/demand balance?
 
Dimensions of the Problem--Energy Costs
 
Clearly, in the future, for the next 20 years at least, energy will
 
be more costly than in the past 4 and'is likely to be in short supply in
 
some sectors in the United States, causing social values and economic con­
ditions to change.
 
,The basic reasons are:
 
- Energy demand is expected to increase5 at about the rate of
 
3.6 percent per year from 1970-1980.
 
- Domestic crude oil production appears to have peaked in
 
1971. Optimistic projections (which include the North
 
Slope) are for domestic crude oil production to slowly
 
decline over the next 15 years. 5,7,8
 
4 Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation Report, A Time To Choose-­
America's Energy Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974).
 
(Hereafter called America's Energy Futurei)
 
5 -Federal Energy Administration, Project Independence Report (Washington,
 
D.C., November-1974). 
-(Hereafter called Project Independence Report.)
 
6 National Energy Outlook, pp. 10.
 
7National Energy Outlook, pp. 
16-18. 

A
 
8 The Office of Energy Research and Planning, Office of The Governor,
 
State of Oregon, A Report to the Oregon Energy Council, Transition (Jan­
uary 1, 1975), p. 12.
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- There have been delays in building nuclear power plants and
 
bringing them to full power production due to environmental
 
concerns and certain engineering difficulties.
 
- Recent environmental laws prohibiting the burning of high
 
sulfur coal place an extra burden on oil and natural gas
 
usage
 
- Environmental pressure has caused delays in the construction 
10 
of oil refineries and other energy-related facilities.9 ,
 
One of the most important consequences of these trends is the need to
 
increase petrbleum importation. Figure 2 shows a recent forecast for
 
energy demand and domestic supply; the demand curve is predicated on the
 
continuing growth of the U.S. economy and a continuance of current life­
styles. The supply curves are based on industry and AEC projections.
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Figure 2
 
9Project Independence Report.
 
10Aa
 
National Academy of Sciences, Mineral Resources.and-the Environn ent
 
(Washington, D.C., January 1975). (Hereafter called National Academy of Sciences.)
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There are several ways in which this gap can be closed:
 
- Increasing amounts of petroleum can be imported.
 
- Policies can be established and technologies introduced in
 
an effort to increase domestic supply.
 
- Policies can be established and technologies introduced in
 
an effort to reduce consumption.
 
The prospect of importing ever increasing amounts of petroleum is
 
disturbing for two reasons: it implies growing dependence on foreign nations'
 
for a material which is intimately bound to our lifestyle and national self­
determination,because it leads to an unfavorable balance of trade. 
 In 1974,
 
the United States imported 36.9 percent of the oil consumed,11 6,275,000
 
barrels per day,12 at an estimated cost of $28 billion per year. It is
 
estimated that oil imports in 1975 will increased over 1974 by 6.4 percent13
 
with a corresponding increase in dollar outflow for oil payments. Figure 3
 
shows the fourfold increase in oil prices from OPEC.14  A recent price
 
for Saudi Arabian oil was $10.46/barrel (February 28, 1975). The OPEC oil
 
prices have continuously increased from 1970'until now, and future price
 
changes are presently uncertain.
 
11American Petroleum Institute, News release, "Oil Demand, Imports,"
 
Washington, D.C., January 26, 1975.
 
120il and Gas Journal (January 27, 1975).
 
13Oil and Gas Journal (January 27, 1975), p. 104.
 
14
-America's Energy Future.
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Figure 3. Average market price of Persian Gulf 0il
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Energy Use and Economic Growth
 
The level to which energy consumption can be reduced without impinging
 
unduly on the country's economic viability is difficult to define because
 
the precise relationships between energy costs and availability and the
 
economy are largely unknown.
15
 
Real growth in GNP per capita and in energy consumption per capita in
 
the United States have been remarkedly parallel (see Figure 4). 6 Hence
 
energy has long been viewed as a resource essential to economic growth-1 7
 
and to growth of the gross national product,'both here and abroad (see
 
Figure 5.).
 
The economy of the United States and the technologically
 
advanced nations is based on energy. Energy is the ulti­
mate raw material which permits the continued recycle of
 
resources into most of man's requirements for food, cloth­
ing, and shelter: The productivity, and consumption, of
 
'
society, is directly related to the per capita energy
 
available.18
 
It seems,no coincidence that the United States, presently the world's
 
largest economy with the highest per capita income, is also the largest
 
consumer of energy. The United States, with about 6 percent of the world's
 
population, is consuming about 36 percent of its energy. Annual energy
 
consumption per capita in the United States is about 340 million Btu, the
 
highest in the world.
 
15National Academy of Sciences, pp. 266-280. 
16 The Conference Board, "Roadmaps to Industry," No. 1699 (October 1, 
1972. 
17 C. Starr, "Energy and Power," Scientific American, Vol. 225, No. 3 
(September 1971), p. 38. 
18 Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, The Economy, Energy, and 
the Environment, September 1970, p. 5. 
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Figure 4. 	U.S. energy consumption and
 
economic growth
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Figure 5. Energy use and economic growth for 1968
 
Arguments are now being raised, however, that the historic relation­
ships between growth in energy consumption and economic activity need not
 
really apply in the long term. Although the growth in GNP and energy has
 
been closely parallel, the rate of growth of each has not been equal. GNP
 
has grown at a slightly greater rate than energy consumption. Since the
 
early 1920's the U.S. energy/GN? ratio has been decreasing, as more in­
tensive use of energy was offset by increased technical efficiency. But
 
from 1966 through 1970, the trend reversed itself and the ratio moved
 
steadily upwards (see Figure 6). This had alarming implications for the
 
future and there was much speculation at the time'that if the rise con­
tinued it would lead to even more drastic energy shortages than have been
 
predicted. In 1971-1972, however, the ratio resumed its downward direction.
 
Both the National Petroleum Council and the Bureau of Mines of the U.S.
 
Department of the Interior anticipate that the ratio will continue to fall
 
in the future. As a matter of fact, in comparing the energy efficiency of
 
nations'on the basis of energy use per dollar of GNP versus per capita GNP,
 
the United States appears as a highly efficient user of energy (see
 
Figure 7).19
 
Also, in a recent study, The Conference Board argues that as the
 
national economy grows, energy consumption grows more slowly. The Con­
ference Board states that energy needs can come close to zero growth as
 
more efficient plants and processes become standard in the industry. The
 
study also notes that continued transition to service industries, which are
 
less energy intensive, will reduce per capita energy needs. However, the
 
study also notes that major cutbacks in energy consumption are certain to
 
cause immediate hardship and uhemployment.
 
. Felix-, "U.S. Using Electricity More Efficiently," Electrical World 
(December 1, 1974), pp. 59-62. 
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Figure 6. Forecast of U.S. energy/gap ratio
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Future Demand for Energy in the United States
 
Most of the projections of total energy demand for the United States
 
are actually projections of-consumption made using more or less sophisti­
cated analyses of past use trends. These projections describe what might
 
be consumed if there were no supply constraints, if prices remained essen­
tially constant, and if other factors affecting use (e.g., efficiency of
 
consumption) remained essentially fixed. However, as is now known, supply
 
is likely to be constrained and prices will surely remain high. Therefore,
 
projections of future consumption must take into account the supply avail­
ability and price elasticity of the various kinds of energy, a very diffi­
ctult chore.
 
Nevertheless, a range of forecasts of energy consumption have been
 
made recently. The Project Independence study of the Federal Energy Agency
 
analyzed demand as a function of oil price and, as shown in Figure 8,
 
produced estimates of demand which ranged from 103 to 118 x 1015 Btu by
 
1985. A comparison with other recent studies is presented in Figure 9.
 
Note that the FEA projections are lower than most previous forecasts for
 
$11/barrel oil.
 
Figure 10 summarizes in graphical form eight forecasts of demand out
 
to the year 2000. The range clearly is enormous, but a fair estimate of
 
demand might be made by using the projection of Figure 7 and an average
 
estimate of real GNP growth rate, say, 3.2 percent to the year 2000. In
 
115 20
 
this base the demand in that year would be 150,7 x 10 Btu.
 
29F. Maslan and.T. J. Gordon, U.S. Energy Development: Fotn Scenarios,
 
Report 165-69-01 (Glastonbury, Conn.:*The Futures Group, October 25, 1974).
 
(Hereafter called U.S. Energy Development.)
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Total Demand 
1972 1985 Estimated 
Price of Imports Actual Quads % Growth 
$4 72.1 118,3 3.8 
$7 72.1 109.6 3.2 
$11 72.1 102.9 2.7 
SOURCE: Project Independence Report.
 
Figure 8. -U.S. total energy demand in the base case
 
as a function of price (in quadrillion Btu
 
per year)*
 
*Three units of energy used in this report are quadrillion Btu per year
 
(Quads), millions of barrels of oil per day (MMBD), and trillions of cubic
 
feet of natural gas per year (TCF). These are related by the formulas
 
INM D = 2 quad; ITCF = 1 quad..
 
Projected Demand 
1985 Annual 
Compound 
Growth Rate 1972-19F5 
FEA @ $4 per barrel 
FEA @ $11 per barrel 
I18A 
102.9 
3.8% 
2.7% 
Ford Foundation, 
Energy Policy Project* 
Dupree-West 
National Petroleum Council 
115.0 
]16.6 
124.9 
3.6% 
3.7% 
4.2% 
SOURCE: Project Independence Report
 
Figure 9. Comparison of PEA projection of energy demand
 
with other projections, 1985 (quadrillion Btu
 
per year)
 
*Aerica's Energy Future. 
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Source: 	Robert Anthony, et al, Technological Forecast of the Coal Extraction
 
Process: Summary Report (Forecasting Internatinal Report to the-

U.S. Bureau of Mines) October 7, 1974.
 
Figure 10. Total energy demand projection
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Future Energy Supplies
 
Now, despite the uncertainty in projections of demand, it is important
 
to ask how much of the demand can be satisfied by indigenous resources.
 
That portion which cannot be produced domestically must be imported or
 
economic dislocations will result. The major sources of energy available
 
to the United States include coal, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear, geo­
thermal, solar, and hydroelectric. The historical evolution of these
 
sources is shown in Figure 11.
 
Clearly, a great deal of information about each of these sources of
 
domestic energy is available and need not be repeated here; nevertheless,
 
in order to provide an overview, some important facets of the situation
 
are summarized below.
 
Coal. The indigenous energy supply in the form of coal is very large.
 
However, because of the availability of relatively cheap alternate fuels,
 
air quality regulations, surface environmental concerns, and the prospect
 
of nuclear energy rendering its product obsolete, the coal industry in
 
the last generation has failed to grow in line with the rate of energy
 
demand. Now, however, indications are that the trend is changing for an
 
increased usage of coal in our national energy economy.
 
Coal is costly to transport compared to other forms of primary energy
 
because it is a solid; and with emphasis on the huge western deposits which
 
may be strip mined, improved transportation networks will be required to
 
deliver these supplies to the major consuming areas at competitive prices.
 
The growth of the coal industry will depend mainly upon solving safety,
 
health, and environmental problems, the advent of improved mining tech­
nology, successful implementation of commercial processes for sulfur re­
moval from stack gases, and successful processes for gasification and
 
liquefaction. The gasification program is particularly-important because
 
it has a twofold potential use. First, low Btu gas can be used, after
 
sulfur removal, as a very good fuel for combined cycle power plants which
 
have potentially a very high thermodynamic efficiency, 45-55 percent.
 
Second, high Btu gas is essentially pure methane and is a substitute for
 
natural gas which is now in a state of declining resource in the United
 
States. 21; 22
 
21S. H. Schurr, Energy Research Needs, Report PB-207516 (October 1971).
 
22U.S._Energy Outlook (Washington, D.C.: National Petroleum Council,
 
1972). (Hereafter called U.S. Energy Outlook.)
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Figure 11. Historical energy use patterns in the United States
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Geothermal Energy. The potential for exploiting the extensive geo­
thermal steam resources under public control is promising but still uncer­
tain. There are five basic types of geothermal resources: dry steam,
 
liquid dominated, hot dry rock,-geopressure, and magma. In terms of
 
systematic commercial exploitation of geothermal resources for general
 
societal benefit, the chemical plant at Larderello (Tuscany), Italy, which
 
was producing boric acid in 1818, predates all others. In 1904 the first
 
attempt to generate electrical energy from geothermal energy was made on a
 
small scale. By 1913 a capacity of 250 kWe had been installed. During
 
World War II, a large part of the Larderello plant was destroyed by the
 
retreating German Army; however, the plant has been fully restored and its
 
capacity expanded to its present 384 MWe.
 
Geothermal programs exist in Italy, Iceland, New Zealand, Japan,
 
Hungary, the Soviet Union, Mexico, the Phillipines, Turkey, and in several
 
African countries, Greece, Israel, Yugoslovia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El
 
Salvadore, and India.
 
At The Geysers, California, a well was drilled in 1921 (by J. D. Grant
 
of Healdsburg, California) for the purpose of generating electric power;
 
however, large-scale production of electric power from this resource did
 
not occur until 1960 when the Pacific Gas & Electric Company commissioned
 
their Unit No. 1 (12.5 MWe). Total installed capacity of this installa­
tion is now 396 MWe (net), with an additional 110 MWe (net) under con­
struction and an additional 406 MWe (net) committed for construction.
 
Geothermal energy can be a relatively important energy source in the
 
United States by the year 2000. It is possible to supply on the order of
 
100,000-200,000 MWe, or more, compared to an expected U.S. total capacity
 
of 2 million MWe. (For comparison, the State of California currently has
 
a total generating capacity of 30,000 MWe.) At this level, by the year
 
2000 geothermal sources will be contributing more to our energy supply
 
than will hydroelectric sources.23
 
Technology for conversion of geothermal energy from vapor-dominated
 
and moderate salinity liquid-dominated geothermal systems is fairly well
 
in hand. However, conversion processes and equipment for high salinity
 
systems and moderate to low temperature systems are still experimental.
 
Conversion processes for hot dry rock have not yet been developed, but
 
will probably be similar to vapor- or liquid-dominated geological systems.
 
Processes for geopressured resources are only conceptual at this time.
 
The possibility of extracting and converting energy from magma is so
remote that little or no serious thought has been given to this problem.
 
23The Futures Group, A Technology'Assessment of Geothermal Energy,
 
Report 164-46-11 (Glastonbury, Conn., September 1974).
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Oil Shale. Except for a couple of demonstration plants, no shale oil
 
is being produced commercially in the United States at this time. However,
 
recent research and development by industry, the Bureau of Mines, and uni­
versities since the mid-1940's has provided the technological framework
 
considered applicable to commercial oil shale operations that use mining
 
and surface processing techniques.. At least two 1000-ton per day demon­
stration plants are now being constructed or operated in Colorado.
 
In situ retorting, in which shale would be heated underground (thus
 
avoiding mining) is relatively untried.. Experiments by industry and the
 
Bureau of Mines suggest that in situ processing may be feasible under
 
certain conditions of rich oil shale deposits, but viable processes are
 
not yet proven.
 
Coupled with this the western oil shale industry has some difficult
 
environment problems in the disposal of the solid waste from the process
 
and from a desperate lack of water in the region of the major deposits.
 
Currently, the estimates are that the required selling price of shale
 
oil will be in the region of $10-15 per barrel (1973) in order to achieve
 
an adequate return. Assuming a large national effort, production of shale
 
25

oil could reach as much as 900,000 barrels a day by the mid-1980's.24 ,
 
Oil-Tar ,Sands. Asphalt and heavy oil bearing sands have been recog­
nized for many years as a potential source of synthetic crude oil. There
 
are numerous tar sands occurrences throughout the world, including several
 
in the United States. The largest known domestic tar sands deposits are
 
in Utah, with lesser ones in California, New Mexico, and Kentucky.
 
However, the Athabasca tar sands deposit in northeastern Alberta,
 
Canada, is the world's largest, followed by an almost equalty large one
 
in Venezuela. An American company placed a full-sized commercial plant,
 
45,000 barrels per day, in operation in 1967 at the Canadian site.
 
Various difficult technical problems have been encountered and solved so'
 
that by now the process seems to be technically viable. Several other
 
organizations are now also building plants at Athabasca.
 
Tar sands recovery requires a large initial capital outlay for plant
 
-construction and thus will require a high selling price for its oil pro­
duct. It is currently estimated that oil from the Canadian oil sands will
 
24 
. V. Dinneen and L. Cook, Oil Shale and the Energy Crisis, Report
 
ASME 72-WA/Fu-3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, November
 
1972).
 
Z§1'Secretary Morton Announces Prototype Oil Shale Lease Sales," Depart­
ment of the Interior news release, November 28, 1973.
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have to sell in the price range of $9-12 'perbarrel (1973) in order to
 
achieve an adequate return.
 
A political point of great importance to the United States is that
 
the Athabasca tar sands are in,Canada and therefore cannot be regarded as
 
a completely available domestic resource.26
 
Hydropower. Further hydropower utilization in the United States is
 
limited by'the number of available natural sites and by the very high
 
capital costs of new projects. Although the Federal Power Commission has
 
estimated a large undeveloped potential, few new additions are expected
 
in the next generation and the forecast is that the percentage of power
 
supplied from this source will decrease to about 6 percent of the total
 
electricity generation by 1990.'27
 
Solar Energ. Radiation energy from the sun falling upon the earth's
 
surface is enormous. Sunlight failing on an area the size of Lake Erie in
 
one day is equal to the energy from all fuels man has so far burned on the
 
earth. Of course, this basic solar energy is the prime element in plant
 
growth and in animal comfort; and was the initial source of the earth's
 
fossil fuels.
 
The concept of the direct use of solar heat for space heating and
 
cooling is technically feasible. Up to now solar heating and cooling has
 
been generally uneconomical. Besides the dependence for advanced design
 
and technology in the utilization of this solar heat, the architectural
 
design of buildings must be considered and improved-for the successful
 
utilization of it, and reliable systems for incorporating solar heat on a
 
continuous basis must be developed. On the other hand, the present sudden
 
increase in the cost of &ll fuels has made the economics of solar energy
 
more competitive. Although solar energy utilization systems use a fuel
 
which is free, the capital costs have generally been very high so that the
 
manufacturing cost in most instances is high.
 
At present the government is sponsoring extensive research in the
 
utilization of wind power and ocean thermal gradient power, both originat­
ing from solar energy, for the generation of electricity. Successful de­
velopment of both of these is regarded as 5-20 years in the future and
 
26J. Wade Watkins, "Tar Sand and Heavy Oil Sand Resources and Technology,"
 
Bureau of Mines news release, September 1973.
 
27U.S. Energy Outlook 
­
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will probably be, at best, auxiliary sources of power in the complete
 
national system. 28, 29
 
A more sophisticated method of employing solar energy involves the
 
conversion of solar radiation into electricity directly by the use of
 
solid-state solar cells. The efficiency of these photovoltaic cells, which
 
is defined as the ratio of the electric power output divided by the inci­
dent solar energy, is theoretically between 15 and 28 percent, depending
 
on the specific semiconductor used. In the laboratory actual efficiencies
 
of 14-16 percent have been obtained, while commercial units have a long­
term efficiency of 6-8 percent. 30
 
An extensive R&D program is predicted to lead to improved materials
 
for photovoltaic cells. It is believed that higher efficiencies can be
 
obtained and that the capital costs of the units can be decreased by orders
 
of magnitude. The present forecasts are that this may be accomplished by
 
the 1990's. Starting at this time, it is believed that in the good geo­
graphic locations in the country, solar energy converted electricity will
 
start to become commercially available. 30
 
Hydrogen Energy Economy. Hydrogen may be produced by the use of one
 
of the new forms of commercial energy: nuclear, solar, geothermal, and oil
 
shale. This hydrogen may then be utilized as a gas in the national gas
 
supply or may be converted into other gaseous and liquid fuels. As such,
 
hydrogen would act as a secondary energy carrier from the basic resource
 
to the utilized fuel. In doing so, the hydrogen can be used as a means
 
for developing a continuously available energy system and substitute for
 
sources which have individual peculiarities such as non-continuous supply
 
for solar and necessary base loading for nuclear and geothermal power
 
plants..31
 
olar Energy As A National Resource (Washington, D.C.: NSF/NASA Solar
 
Energy Panel, December 1972).
 
2 9 L. 0. Herwig, "U.S. Solar Energy Research Program," Paper presented
 
at the International Solar Energy Society, U.S. Section Annual Meeting,
 
October 3-4, 1973, Cleveland, Ohio.
 
30 Solar Thermal Conversion Mission Analysis (The Aerospace Corporation,
 
January 1974). (Hereafter called Solar Thermal Analysis.)
 
31E. Fein and J. Stover, Hydrogen: A Fuel for the Electric Utility,
 
Report 86-08-12 (Glastonbury, Conn.: The Futures Group, May 1973).
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Nuclear Power. Nuclear power is presently the long-term key to the
 
U.S. energy future. New electric utility plants are forecast to be mostly

nuclear in the future due to the increase in cost of fossil fuels, limita­
tions on their availability, and the need to meet increasingly stringent

pollution criteria. 
Also, it is presently forecast that electricity gen­
eration will account for approximately 50 percent of the basic national
 
energy utilization by the year 2000. 32
 
The most probable course of reactor development appears to be a con­
tinued reliance on the light water reactors (LWR) types through 1990.
 
Advanced converter reactors such as the high temperature gas-cooled reactor
 
(HTGR) will probably start to be used extensively by the mid-1980's. The
 
breeder type reactor is presently under development. The most advanced
 
candidate is the liquid metal fast breeder reactor 
(LMFBR) which is visu­
alized ast becoming the dominant nuclear reactor type selected for central
 
power plants by 1995-2000. The fast breeder reactor has many very diffi­
cult technical problems which still have to be solved and then demonstrated
 
before it can be successfully commercialized. This will undoubtedly take
 
a long term of years. 32
 
Meanwhile, the nuclear power industry also has its problems. 
Siting

of new plants has become extremely difficult, and the adequacy of emergency
 
core cooling design together with radiation emission standards is being

continuously questioned. 
Much future effort is required in good engineer­
ing design before these basic questions can be answered in a manner that
 
answers all of the previously mentioned social criteria.
 
Controlled thermo-nuclear fusion in which the nuclei of light elements
 
fuse to form heavier nuclei and in the process release enormous quantities

of thermal energy offers the possibility of direct conversion of this
 
thermal energy into electricity based on an almost infinite energy resource,
 
heavy hydrogen.
 
The scientific and technical problems facing the successful development

of fusion are very great., In one of the two systems being developed, a
 
workable magnetic containment system must be demonstrated. Then, the power

required to energize the magnetic field and other power losses of the
 
system must be less than that released by the fusion reaction. Achievement
 
of this net energy gain may require extremely large reactors since the
 
power output would depend directly on the volume of the reacting plasma. 32
 
'Petroleum. Petroleum and natural gas production peaked in 1970-1971
 
and industry projections indicate that production is likely to remain lower
 
than peak through the turn of the century. This is demonsttated in Figures
 
12 and 13. However, some potential'recovery technologies are enormously
 
32Fusion Power, An Assessment of Ultimate Potential, Report AEC-WASH
 
1239 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, February 1973).
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important. Present recovery from oil wells is some 32 percent.33 Steady
 
improvements in tertiary and secondary recovery efforts are likely to in­
crease this percentage to- about 35-40 in 1985 and may be substantially
 
higher in the 1990's. These remaining supplies generally require addi­
tional in-place processing before recovery is possible. More than 150
 
billion barrels of oil having a viscosity above current equipment capa­
bility are estimated still in place in the United States.34 Effective
 
techniques to economically recover these quantities are required for
 
effective utilization of the resource.
 
Improvement in assaying offshore deposits can also increase future
 
production. Underwater assaying on the Contingental Shelf is currently
 
limited to 600-800 feet below the surface of the water. 35 A projected
 
increase to between 1500 and 2000 feet capability by 1990 will increase
 
production approximately 10-15 percent over current levels.
 
The U.S. energy production in 1969 is given in Figure 14. This is
 
compared to the estimated recoverable resources to provide a qualitative
 
view of the relative importance of the domestic reserves in contributing
 
to the resolution of the issue.
 
What Are the Limits to Conservation?
 
Consumption can and will be modulated by changing relative fuel elec­
tricity prices, government incentives designed to shape market forces,
 
perceived relative abundance of various fuels, and regulations designed
 
to control rate of use of various fuels. Which techniques are employed
 
will depend on the political and economic situation in the United States
 
and the world in the months and years ahead.
 
33

.U.S. Energy Outlook.
 
34,"
3 Energy Resources of the United States," U.S. Geological Survey
 
Bulletin 650 (1972).
 
35personal communication, N. K. Anderson, The Bechtel Corporation,
 
October 1973;
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DOMESTIC ENERGY RESERVES AND RESOURCES
 
The 1969 production is compared with cumulative production,proved-recoverable
 
reserves, and estimates reitaining recoverable resources.
 
(in units of i015 BtuY
 
Cumulative Reserves Proved Remaining

1969 Domestic Production Recoverable Recoverable
 
Commodity Productiona Through 1969 
 at end of 1969 Resources
 
Coal 14.951 1040 1087 64,400
 
Petroleum (crude oil) 18.922 166
501 594
 
Natural Gas Liquid 2.392 49 
 33 168
 
Natural Gas (dry) 20.466 284
382 975
 
Oil Shale Neg. Neg. 113 
 1066,
 
Uranium: U-235
b
 
<$8/lb 5.15 83
83 200 
$8-i0/lb 
-- 56 278
 
$15/lb .... 
 687
 
Uranium: U-238
b
 
$8/lb 710 11,486 11,504 27,631
 
$8-l0/lb 
 -- 7,669 38,345 
$15/lb .... 9,022 94,735 
Thorium NIA NIA N/A 15,025 
Geothermald Neg. Neg. -- 770,000 MWe 
aBureau of Mines
 
bConversion gives energy released from complete fissioning of uranium isotopes.
 
CU308 prices as high as $100/lb will be economically viable with breeder reactors. 
Resources in the $15-100/ib bracket were estimated to be 37,240,000 tons. 
dA Technology Assessment of Geothermal Resource Development for the National
 
Science Foundation by The Futures Group and Bechtel Corporation (to-appear).
 
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Understanding the National Energy

Dilemma (Washington, D.C., 1973); and Georgetown University (Washing­
ton, D.C.).-

Figure 14
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The consumption of primary fuels for the generation of electricity
 
was about 25 percent of the total national energy input in 1970, and may
 
reach 30-50 percent by the year 2000.36 This increasing role for electricity
 
involves conversion from primary energy sources and this conversion neces­
sarily involves losses, increasing relative use of electricity will result
 
in rapid growth in the use of primary fuels. In other words, relative
 
growth of electricity results in consumption of larger portions of the
 
total energy supply as conversion losses. Of course, the magnitude of
 
the conversion losses depends heavily on the absolute levels of electricity
 
generated, the state of generation technology, the fuel mix, and other
 
factors. A recent study can provide an example of the magnitude of energy
 
losses involved. The.Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project projected con­
version losses of 18.4 percent of total energy input in,1975; by 2000,
 
these losses were projected to be 31 percent of total energy consumption. 37
 
The second implication of the increasing relative use of electricity
 
is that unusable energy sources can be more fully emplbyed. For example,
 
uranium, hydro-resources, solar, geothermal, coal, and residual oil can
 
enter the overall fuel mix in the form of-inputs to electricity generation.
 
The cheapest and most abundant fuels are-thus available for electricity
 
generation, and scarce fuels such as natural gas and petroleum remain avail­
able for direct use. Furthermore, the primary energy sources useful in the
 
36Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Understanding the National Energy
 
Dilemma (Washington, D.C., 1973); and Georgetown University (Washington,
 
D.C.).
 
'Edward A. Hudson and Dale W. Jorgenson,'U.S. Energy Policy and Economic
 
Growth, 1975-2000 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University and Data Resources,
 
Inc. [part of the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project], June 1974).
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generation of electricity are, for the most part, indigenous; therefore,
 
the increasing relative use of electricity moves the country towards energy
 
independence from foreign supply with all of its associated political­
financial headaches.
 
Among the conservation strategies which have been discussed within the
 
various consuming sectors are:
 
Transportation
 
Increasing new car efficiency by limiting horsepower or
 
gross weight, or by imposing MPG standards.
 
Imposing a 30q tax on gasoline (President Ford recently
 
rejected this approach).
 
Encouraging the use of mass transit by providing capital,
 
and operating subsidies.
 
Household and Commercial
 
Encouraging the improvement of building thermal insulation
 
by offering tax credit, improved mortgages, and so on.
 
Reducing lighting through the promulgation of new standards.
 
Promoting the introduction of solar heating through tax
 
credits, low-cost loans, and so on.
 
Industrial
 
Introducing accelerated depreciation on energy-saving­
related investments.
 
Promoting recycling and effective solid use of solid wastes
 
.in general.
 
Utilities
 
Reducing peak demand through the introduction of energy
 
storage mechanisms.
 
Improving efficiency of generation and transmission.
 
Shaping and reducing load through the introduction of
 
various rate structures. 38 C
 
38Project Independence Report.
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The FEA, AEC, NSF, the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Study, and others
 
have analyzed one or more aspects of the levels of energy savings which
 
are attainable through such measures. The problem is quite complex be­
cause the effectiveness of price increases in reducing demand is not well
 
known. Nevertheless, it is estimated that with petroleum selling for $7/
 
barrel, such policies could reduce consumption 7 percent in 1980 and as much
 
as 12 percent in 1985. The most significant gains are to be made in the
 
transportation sector (about half of the total). At higher petroleum
 
prices, the indicated energy savings would be even larger.
 
The Outlook
 
All things considered, it would not be unreasonable to expect that
 
conservation strategies could "save" 15 percent or so from a no-conservation 
case, and supply-stimulation policies (such as encouraging outer continental
 
shelf drilling and improved tertiary recovery) could increase domestic
 
supply by 15 percent over a no-action case, by the year 2000.3 9 If no
 
more than this could be achieved, complete energy independence would not
 
be possible before the turn of the century, but the amount of imported oil
 
about 10 x 1015 Btu/year.39
 would remain constant after 1985; 

3U.S. Energy Development.
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Some Potential Future Actions
 
Alternative Approaches. The classes of alternative actions available
 
to reduce the country's dependence on imported energy include educational
 
programs, directed at both suppliers and consumers; scientific ,and tech­
nological research and development aimed at increasing consumption effi­
ciency, improving current supplies, and bringing new energy sources on­
stream; and legislative initiatives'ranging from allocation of energy and
 
deregulation of various energy prices, to providing financial incentives
 
for exploration and development of new energy supplies. A summary of such
 
actions is presented in Figure 15.
 
Three time domains provide a convenient framework for discussing those
 
steps necessary to alleviate energy constraints in the United States.
 
Immediate results can be obtained through legislative actions such as
 
rescinding selected environmental restrictions, providing a peak load
 
primary schedule, etc. In the short-term (15 years or so), present actions
 
directed at drawing on our domestic supplies by expanding current tech­
nologies are our major hope. Extensive coal mining and offshore drilling
 
are examples. Our dependence on fossil resources can be diminished only
 
when entirely new technologies are operational. Therefore; we must commit
 
ourselves to a long technological endeavor which may extend into the next
 
century in order to once again provide ourselves with secure energy sources.
 
Nuclear fission has been a growing energy resource; however, signifi­
cant questions have been raised about waste heat and radiation as well as
 
the dangers resulting from a possible engineering failure of a nuclear
1 1/50 
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FIGURE 15
 
ACTIONS THAT 1AY
 
AFFECT U.S. ENERGY DEMAND
 
AND DOMESTIC SUPPLY
 
Education
 
o 	Programs for domestic and foreign suppliers on the socio-economic
 
implications of energy availability and cost
 
o Programs for the public and private sectors on energy consumption and
 
use
 
Science and Technology
 
Development of more efficient means of electrical energy generation,
 
storage, transmission, more efficient transmission lines, high
 
efficiency storage devices, etc. (Also development of the hydrogen
 
energy economy.)
 
o 	Development of more efficient energy consumption modes (e.g., improved
 
mass transit, new automobile engines, improved insultation and con­
struction, more efficient appliances, industrial machinery, etc.)-

Development of new supplies of energy (secondary/tertiary recovery
 
of petroleum, geothermal systems, solar energy, oil shale recovery,
 
underground and strip mining of coal, coal gasification, nuclear
 
fission and fusion, improved geophysical exploration, etc.)
 
o Improvements in understanding of the relationships between energy
 
consumption and economic growth
 
Legislation
 
o 	Rationing of energy
 
o 	Deregulation of energy prices
 
o Financial incentives (e.g., taxes, subsidies) for exploration, R&D
 
and more efficient utilization and consumption of energy
 
o Relaxation or abolishment of pollution constraints on energy pro­
duction and/or use
 
4:/
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plant. 40 The breeder reactor has been viewed as a means of overcoming
 
this resource limitation. However; the breeder itself has been plagued
 
with engineering difficulties.and cost and schedule overruns. Recently,
 
strong arguments also have been raised about the possibility that radio­
active materials may easily be stolen by dissidents who might blackmail
 
private institutions or even nations with bombs made from such material.41
 
Concern about the safety of nuclear power generating stations has led to
 
the introduction of significant constraints in the approval and construc­
tion cycle, to the point where it now takes about ten years from initial
 
application to the point where a nuclear plant can begin supplying signi­
ficant amounts of electrical energy for public consumption.
 
Thermo-nuclear fusion has been described as a potentially attractive
 
long-term solution. 42 This technique employs the energy conversion process
 
40 Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident Risk in U.S. Commercial
 
Nuclear Power Plants, Summary Report, WASH-1400 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
 
Atomic Energy Commission, 1974).
 
41John McPhee, The Curve of Binding Energy (Ndw York: Farrar, Straus &
 
Giroux, 1974).
 
42In this concept, very light atomic nuclei (ie., hydrogen) combine
 
to create highly energetic new nuclei, various sub-atomic particles, and
 
energy in the form of radiation. Control of the fusion process involves
 
many scientific principles which are not completely understood and which
 
will require engineering capabilities not currently available. Stated
 
simply, the most difficult problems are associated with maintaining an
 
environments typically in the form of a plasma, which is at sufficiently
 
high temperature and is sufficiently stable so that the fusion process
 
can be maintained. Recent developments using laser techniques have been
 
applied to this problem. In this concept, a laser beam is focused on a
 
pellet of diuterium to create the conditions necessary to sustain fusion.
 
(Moshe J. Lubin and A. P. Fraas, "Fusion by Laser," Scientific American,
 
Vol. 224, No. 6 [June 1971], pp. 21-23.) In any event, it is-clear that
 
even these recent breakthroughs cannot make fusion available in more than
 
just laboratory, or at the-most, engineering pilot plan demonstrations
 
during the next several years. /113
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in which hydrogen atoms combine to produce heavier atoms with an accompany­
ing release of energy; Much remains to-be done before this concept can
 
be utilized to provide significant amouts of power.
 
The major thrust in making America energy independent, at least
 
through the next 20 years, must necessarily focus on expanding America's
 
ability to supply fossil fuels from domestic sources. Indeed, the recent
 
crude petroleum price increases resulting from the oil embargo have made
 
hitherto uneconomic petroleum deposits and other energy sources more
 
attractive. Proposals have been made to produce oil from shale, gas from
 
coal, hydrogen from water, and methane from growing plants and wastes.
 
Several important impediments exist in many such plans; among them are
 
water availability and capital availability. It has been estimated that
 
shale oil plants (100,000 barrels/day and coal gasification plants (250
 
million cubic feet/day) may cost $700 million or more per plant.43
 
The potential use of America's enormous coal reserves as a means of
 
providing energy independence was mentioned earlier. Work is underway to
 
find economic means of converting coal to a methane-like natural gas or
 
petroleum-like liquid. Serious consideration is already being given to
 
ways of improving underground mining 'techniques to recover deep deposited
 
coal and to develop means of land reclamation techniques for strip mining
 
operations. The desire to exploit U.S. coal resources may moderate the
 
influence, at least partially, of the arguments of the environmentalists.
 
43Achieving Energy Independence, Research and Policy Committee of the
 
CED, December 1974, p. 54. (Hereafter called Achieving Energy Independence.)
/'32 
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But approximately $300 billion in investments may be needed for the pro­
duction of conventional oil, natural gas, coal, and urantum supplies
 
equivalent to the 1985 demand. 44
 
Figures 17-20 present more detailed lists of potential technological
 
and legislative programs--which have been recently studies and proposed. 45,46
 
TECHNICAL PROGRAMS AFFECTING DEMAND
 
Technology
 
Emergence of a solar home heating industry
 
Significant agricultural and industrial uses for low
 
grade heat
 
Advent of electric auto commercialization
 
Advent of fuel cells for substations, homes, buildings,
 
etc.
 
Development of low flammability foam for high efficiency
 
low-cost insulation
 
Development of lighting which essentially doubles
 
efficiency in visible spectrum
 
Practical auto engine which is non-polluting and 20
 
percent more efficient than current
 
Greatly increased use of plastic in automobiles to
 
reduce weight (less than 1800 lb. average) -and improve
 
MPG
 
Figure 17
 
44
 
- Achieving Energy Independence. 
4 5
'Project Ifidependence-Reporr 
6U.S. Energy Development.
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TECHNCIAL PROGRAMS AFFECTING SUPPLY
 
Technology
 
SO2 scrubbers technically and economically proven.
 
Coal liquefaction and coal fasification implemented on
 
large scale.
 
First large-scale oil shale plant on-line.
 
Hot dry rock geothermal proven feasible.
 
Combined cycle turbine.proven technically And economically.
 
Improved secondary and tertiary recovery.
 
Tar sand oil proven technically and economically sound.
 
Deeper water oil operations, and recovery.
 
New and improved uranium enrichment processes.
 
Nuclear breeder power plant demonstration.
 
EHV large long distance (more than 1500 miles) electricity
 
transmission lines.
 
Utilization factor of light water reactors is high.
 
Effective solvent processes for sulfur removal from coal.
 
Figure 18
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POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SUPPLY POLICIES
 
Policies
 
Natural gas wellhead prices removed.
 
Defeat of arguments for depletion allowance termination.
 
Geothermal exploration and use incentives.
 
Offshore oil leasing stimulated.
 
Very large-scale government R&D programs.
 
Coal mining environmental constraints eased.
 
SO2 restrictions eased.
 
Nuclear power plants expedited.
 
Incentives for the development of oil shale established.
 
Obtaining favorable trade arrangements for oil.
 
Oil storage increased to one-year supply.
 
Figure 19
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POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE CONSERVATION POLICIES
 
Policies
 
Increase new car efficiency with an accelerated excise tax on low
 
efficiency cars, or mandatory fuel efficiency standards.
 
Reduce vehicle miles traveled with a 30¢ per gallon conservation
 
fee.
 
Additional capital and operating subsidies for public transit
 
linked to auto disincentives.
 
25 percent tax credit for installation of insulation, etc., in
 
existing homes.
 
Minimum efficiency standards for all new home construction.
 
15 percent investment credit for energy reduction investments in
 
existing commercial buildings.
 
Minimum standards on new commercial buildings.
 
Minimum energy efficiency standatds on new appliances.
 
Mandatory lighting standards for commercial buildings.
 
50 percent tax credit on solar appliances.
 
Accelerated depreciation on energy investments.
 
Subsidies for solid waste systems.
 
Reduce peak through changing of rate structure.
 
Reduce peak demand through regional and national interties.
 
Reduce peak demand through termal storage.
 
Increase generation and transmission efficiency by 5 percent in new
 
plants.
 
Figure 20
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Potential Effectiveness
 
A review of the programs suggested in Figure 17-20 indicates that
 
energy independence would most effectively be promoted by:
 
- Diminished gasoline demand
 
'increasing auto efficiency
 
0limiting maximun auto weight
0taxing gasoline or petroleum
 
- Improved methods of tertiaty recovery
 
- Improved efficiency on industrial energy use
 
- Improved space heating efficiency through, for example,
 
the use of higher performing insulation
 
- Incentives for the development of safe nuclear plants
 
and geothermal energy resources
 
- Exploring and developing the outer continental shelf.
 
- Improved methods of coal extraction and processing.
 
- Although the "pay off" is not likely to be until the
 
next century, fusion and solar energy research.
 
In essence, the question of energy production and use in the United
 
States during the next several years.resolves itself to ways in which we will
 
be able to produce fossil fuels, make compromises in using these fuels, and
 
implement more efficient conversion techniques. Large-scale transitions to
 
non-fossil fuel energy sources are not likely to occur in the 1970's or 1980's.
 
'SF
 
WORLD CONCERN: INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
 
The threat of nuclear holocaust dominates the course of the U.S.
 
international relationships and U.S. foreign policy. The U.S., U.S.S.R.,
 
Great Britain, France, China, India, possibly Israel, and maybe in the
 
near future Argentina, have nuclear capabilities, with the two major
 
powers having staggeringly large delivery capabilities. The growth of the
 
use of nuclear energy for electrical power throughout the world increases
 
not only the numbers of nations with nuclear weapon capabilities, but the
 
insidious potential for the hijacking of nuclear materials for acts of
 
blackmail or terrorism by extremist groups. The possibility that a smaller
 
nation will use its nuclear capability for blackmail of a neighboring or
 
other nation for economic, resource or political concessions is and will,
 
in all likelihood, become very real. A scenario wherein India, desperate
 
for food for her hungry people and economically constrained from buying
 
food would use her nuclear capabilities to force the rest of the world to
 
bargain food in exchange for her signing of the non-proliferation agreement.
 
Even aside from the nuclear threats, the conflict potential is enormous,
 
ranging from cartels auch as that of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 
Countries (OPEC) to individual acts of terrorism by small dissident groups.
 
Armed conflict throughout the world has been almost continuous during the 
present century and shows no signs of abating. Since 1961 military expen­
ditures around the world have doubled from an estimated $100 billion to 
over $200 billion (inflation accounts for 50% of the increase). Whereas in 
the U.S. and Western Europe military expenditures demand a smaller percent­
age - in the Near East, the percentage rose from 6 to 12% of GNP in the 
decade 1961 to 1971. The world is or is rapidly becoming an "armed camp" 
with the U.S. as the major supplier of arms. 
Another source for disruption of peace in specific places throughout 
the world is an overt military, political or economic action by a major 
power in support of an ally or an intervention in the affairs of a satellite. 
The propensity to engage in such action may be enhanced by the growing 
international economic and resource interdependency. Despite the intensity 
of forces tending to fractionate the world, the view of the earth as a 
planet and the need for the nations to act in concert to preserve the 
environment, the resources and the civilization is present and possibly
 
growing. International conferences onsthe Environment (Stockholm), 
Population (Budapest), Food (Rome), and the Law of the Sea (Caracas), 
although not reaching their stated objectives can be considered evidence 
of world-wide concern over theissues. 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: THE ISSUES
 
Widening Disparity Between the Wealthy and Poor Nations Leading
 
to Militant Actions Among Groups of Nations (Such as Resource
 
Cartels, Block Voting in the U.N., Covert Terrorism, Economic
 
Warfare, and so Forth) to Achieve Political and Economic
 
Objectives and Contributing to International Conflict
 
Lack of Agreement over the Use and Ownership of the Internationally
 
Shared Resources (Such as Air Space, Outer Space and the Oceans)
 
Leading to International Conflict
 
The Issue of War
 
WIDENING DISPARITY BETWEEN THE WEALTHY AND POOR NATIONS LEADING TO MILITANT
 
ACTIONS AMONG GROUPS OF NATIONS (SUCH AS RESOURCE CARTELS, BLOCK VOTING IN
 
THE U.N., COVERT TERRORISM, ECONOMIC WARFARE, AND SO FORTH) TO ACHIEVE
 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
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ISSUE: 	 WIDENING DISPARITY BETWEEN THE WEALTHY AND POOR NATIONS LEADING 
TO MILITANT ACTIONS AMONG GROUPS OF NATIONS (SUCH AS RESOURCE 
CARTELS, BLOCK VOTING IN THE U.N., COVERT TERRORISM, ECONOMIC 
WARFARE, AND SO FORTH) TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
 
AND CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
 
The Issue:
 
-It has been argued that one of the-greatest forces for international
 
conflict in the world today is the inequitable allocation of accumuzated
 
wealth and the inequitable distribution of potentiaZ wealth and resources
 
in the world. While inequity in the world is clearly not new, there is
 
no question that the gap between the rich nations and the poor nations
 
is widening. A larger percentage of the world's population is located in
 
lesser developed countries than ever before, as shown in Figure 1. Seventy
 
percent of the world's population lives in lesser developed countries,
 
1
 
and the rate of change has been increasing over the past twenty years.
 
At the same time, the concentration of wealth is bedoming increasingly
 
inequitable. As Figure 2 shows, per capita incomes in the developed world
 
grew 3.9 percent in 1960-68 period, but only grew at 2.7 percent in the less
 
2
 
developed countries. While real economic growth (measured in terms of GNP
 
growth) may be increasing at greater annual rates in some of the lesser
 
developed countries, population growth mutes these advantages. Additionally,
 
the tremendous disparity in standards of living indicates that even if
 
substantially higher rates of economic growth were-sustained for lengthy
 
periods of time (a situation most economi&ts believe to be impossible), it would
 
require centuries to narrow the gap.
 
I. 	N., The Determinants and Conse5uences of Population Trends; New Sutnary
 
of Findings on Interaction of Demographic, Economic and Social Factors,
 
2Vol. I (United Nations: New York) 1973.
 
Committee for Economic Development, Assisting Development in Low-Income
 
Countries: Priorities for U. S. Government Policy (Committee for Economic
 
Development: New York) 1969.
 
FIGURE 1
 
THE SPREAD OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT
 
Percentage of Total Population
 
More Developed 
Year Regions 
1920 36.2% 
1930 36.7 
1940 35.8 
1950 34.5 
1960 32.1 
1970 30.0 
Less Developed
 
Nations
 
63,8
 
63.3
 
64.2
 
65.5
 
67-.9
 
70.0
 
Source: 	 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Determinants and
 
Consequence of Population Trends: New Summary on Findings on
 
Interaction of Demographic, ,Economic and Social Factors,
 
(United Nations: New York) 1973, p.529,
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Figure 2 
GoNPER CAFI A 
WORLD DEVELOPED AREAS VS. WORLD DEV3LOPING AREAS 
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Source: 	 United States Arm Control and Disarmament Agency, World
 
Military Expenditures 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government
 
Printing Office).
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This widening gap is increasingly becoming a source of international con­
flict among nations. The lesser developed countries are beginning to resort 
to group actions such as tacit and covert terrorism, resource cartels and 
political blackmail to achieve economic and political objectives. The recent
 
economic and political success of the OPEC cartel is likely to encourage
 
similar activities by other nations.
 
As Harrison Brown has noted, the basic sources of international conflict
 
have not changed very much since the beginnings of history. He notes:
 
"To be sure, the basic causes of war have not changed very much since urban
 
civilization first appeared; they still closely resemble those which brought
 
ancient empires into armed conflict. Wars are still fought to obtain or to
 
keep markets and supplies of raw materials, to spread economic, social,and
 
religious creeds, to pursue power and military security, and to combat
 
threats to power in security.
 
If this is an age old problem, then why are we so concerned with it?
 
It is an especially frightening issue because the pressures for conflict have
 
never been greater. Among the pressures aggravating the situation are the
 
following:
 
(1) The tremendous technological advances in weaponry and the pro­
liferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials among the
 
nations of the world, both developed and underdeveloped alike
 
greatly increases the likelihood of nuclear blackmail or nuclear
 
war.
 
3Harrison Brown, The Challenge of Man's Future, (Viking Press: New York,
 
.1954, p.64 .
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(2) 	The proliferation of communications and increasing contact between 
the rich and poor nations has increased the awareness of this 
widening gap. Before the advent of widespread communications 
among countries the discrepancies in standards of living was 
only readily apparent through international travel, limited by an. 
.extremely small population. Such increasing awareness contributes to
 
the level of expectation, frustration and eventually, militancy.
 
(3) 	The failure of traditional economic development approaches to
 
stem the widening gap has generated frustration and encouraged
 
new approaches to economic wealth, regardless of how radical,
 
militant and threatening they may be.
 
(4) 	The realization by many of the lesser developed but resource rich
 
nations that they have played an essential role in the economic
 
development and concentration of wealth in other nations perhaps at
 
a.price of their own development, has generated fury, a
 
sense of exploitation and a desire for expropriation.
 
(5) 	In those regions where it is occurring, economic development is
 
essentially a disruptive, unstable, hostile and threatening_
 
process for the society experiencing itas traditional patterns are
 
abandoned. "Development is apt to be characterized by a grow­
ing gap between expectations and achievements -- that is, by
 
an increased awareness of insufficiency and a decreased tolerance
 
of both poverty and privilege. For the underlying masses, develop­
ment is apt to be a time of awakening hostilities, of newly
 
-6­
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felt 	frustrations, of growing impatience and dissatisfaction."

Heilbroner further speculates that "it would be wise to anticipate
 
* . .a rise of diversionary activities of a supernationalistic 
or military nature as a safety valve for frustration.7
5 
(6) 	 The combination of sophisticated weaponry with a national feeling 
of exploitation is an extremely volatile and dangerous mixture. 
In fact, Professor Heilbroner views it with a degree of inevitability. 
"Thus there seems little doubt that some nuclear capability will 
be in the hands of the major underdeveloped nations, certainly within 
the next few decades and perhaps much sooner. The difficult ques­
tion must then be faced as to how these nations might be tempted
 
to use this weaponry. I suggest that it may be used as an instru­
ment 	of blackmail to force the developed world to undertake a
 
massive transfer of wealth to the poverty-striken world. . . two 
considerations give a new credibility to nuclear terrorism:
 
nuclear weaponry for the first time makes such action possible; 
and 'wars of redistribution' may be the onZy way by which the 
poor nations can hope to remedy their condition."6 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
It is clear that the wealth of the world is unevenly allocated among 
the member nations and this inequitable distribution is, in fact, increasing. 
By any measure, whether it be GNP per capita, health measures, educational 
4Robert L. Heilbroner, The Great Ascent: The Struggles for Economic Develop­
ment in Our Time (Harper & Row: New York) 1963, pp.18-19.
 
51bid, p.21.
 
RobertL. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (t. W. Norton:
 
New York) 1974, p.42-43.
 
6
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measures, natural resource measures, food'intake per capita or a host of 
other measures of industrial and economic development and achievement, 
there is an increasingly large portion of the world that is not receiving the 
benefits of industrialization and ecomomic development 
The growing gap between the rich and poor nations is substantial. 
Some nations of the world subsist on per capita incomes amounting to but
 
1180 of the U.S. percapita. income. While the barriers to narrowing this 
gap are discussed elsewhere, it is becoming increasingly evident that
 
except for a small portion of the world's population, the gap will not be
 
closed in the foreseeable future. Examine, for example. the condition of
 
Latin America, which edomomically is more viable than many other nations:
 
"If we make the highly optimistic assumption that total
 
Latin American output will. . .provide a 2.5% annual _
 
growth in output per capita, it would still be some
 
forty years before Latin American per capital income 
reached one third the- present U.S. per. capital income. 
But if U.S. income continues to grow at around two 
percent per year, it would be cwer 250 years before 
Latin American income would reach one-third of the 
then-current United States income levels. Even if 
Latin American per capita income rose at four percent 
a year, more than fifty years would be required to 
reach one-third of the then prevailing U.S. levels."7 
Aside from the pessimistic arithmetic of development, the issue is 
further aggravated by -the increasingly dominant view that economic development 
is not the eventual fate of all countries. The Industrial Revolution of
 
the 18 - 19th century was not at all either inevitable or random. In fact,
 
there were many circumstances supporting the Industrial Revolution that
 
7G. L. Bach,.Economics, An Introduction To Analysis and Policy (New York)
 
1958, p. 806 / s
 
made the situation unique. The inability of a large number of nations to
 
duplicate the process of industrialization and economic development attests 
to the uniqueness of the process.
 
Until recently, economic development theorists thought that by merely
 
putting the requisite pieces together in the proper order and combination 
(the proper order and combination remained elusive, however) economic development 
would result. Increasingly, this notion of the transferability and inevit­
ability of industrialization and development is being questioned and grad­
ually abandoned. Professor Heilbroner for one, after two decades of
 
writing on the subject, has gradually moved from expressing fears about
 
the consequences of widening disparity of wealta8 to concluding most recently
 
that not only is a large portion of the world unlikely to experience econ-­
omic develop and as a result, nuclear blackmail and international conflict
 
is inevitable, but also he concludes that the fate of the earth is so
 
threatened, that it is the 'inescapable heed to limit industrial growth
 
that emerges as the central challenge to the world."
9
 
Others believe that while development may still be possible, it .requires
 
substantial, even radical, reform and institutional change in the lesser
 
developed countries and greater concern, aid and massive sacrifice by the
 
developed countries. Even these optimists conclude: "By far most impor­
tant are the needed reform policies in the underdeveloped countries themselves.
 
8Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future as History (Harper & Row: 
New York) 1959.
 
9Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, op.cit., p. 54.
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Figure 3
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Figure 4 
GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA
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But the difficulties they encounter are so great that most of them will
 
have slight chance to succeed without more aid from the developed
 
countries."1 0
 
Why this pessimism? Just how severe is the inequitable distribution
 
of wealth? The inequitable allocation of wealth is so great with such
 
profound and devastating impact upon the standards of living being exper­
ienced that it is difficult for anyone from the wealthy developed
 
world to comprehend 'the magnitude. For example, the contrast between a per
 
capita annual income of $5,000 (U.S. level) and $100 (Indonesia), strains
 
the imagination.
 
Measures of the Widening Income Gap;
 
The growing income gap is presented in Figures 3 and 4. In 1971 the
 
average per capitaGNP in the developing world is $229, while it is more
 
than $2,900 in the developed world -- an order of magnitude greater than
 
the developing world. It is difficult to understand what these levels of
 
income mean, but as Figure 5 shows the lower incomes are related to widespread
 
illiteracy and a sick and hungry population. The consumption of energy is another
 
excellent indicator of economic development. The average per capita consumption
 
internationally (in coal equivalents) is 4,400 pounds annually, yet in the
 
United States it is almost 26,000 pounds per capita (see Figure 6). In such
 
countries as Burma, it is less than 1/100th of this, in Ethopia it is 77 pounds, in
 
Italy 6;000.
 
Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of Wbrld Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty

Program in Outline (Vintage Books: New York) 1970, p.45.
/s7
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Figure 5
 
CONTRAST BETWEEN UNDERDEVELOPED & DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
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Figure 6 
PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1971 
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This level of energy consumption translates into a subsistence
 
existence. Almost all (98%) housing units in this country have electricity
 
and piped water but in Honduras less than 15% do, in Iran about 25%, even
 
in Mexico, the number hovers only around 50%. Undoubtedly, in the poorest
 
African and Asian countries, for which there is no data, the numbers would
 
be precipitously lower.
11
 
Another indicator of general well being is telephones. This is an
 
indicator not only of consumer affluence but also of the country's ability
 
to develop, manage and maintain a complicated communications infrastructure.
 
It is probably also a measure of the nationts ability to utilize modern
 
business procedures. In the United States'there are 62 telephones per 100
 
population. The world total is almost seven. There are some countries in
 
Africa that have less than one telephone per 100 population (as shown in
 
Figure 7).
 
Another indicator of the implications of the widening income gap is
 
the quality of health care and the kinds of illnesses. Birth rates and
 
death rates differ as a function of wealth. The United States has an infant
 
mortality rate of 18.5 (that is, the number of deaths of infants,per 1,000
 
live births). Albania normally thought of as a relatively developed
 
country, has an infant mortality rate at over 86 per 1000. Many countries
 
are considerably higher yet.
 
1i
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
 
1974, 95th Edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) p.819-820.
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Figure 7 
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The kinds of illnesses that affect nations differ as a function of the
 
state of their economic development and income. Developed nations are
 
bothered by the diseases of industrialization: lung and respiratory diseases,
 
cancer, heart diseases. Underdeveloped countries are more often subject to
 
epidemics of insect and animal borne diseases caused by lack of sewage,
 
sanitation and water purification systems. Tuberculosis and pneumonia are another
 
two common diseases of poverty. Most of these diseases are easily preventable
 
and well understood and it is the more complex diseases of the Western World
 
that are awaiting scientific breakthroughs.
 
The lesser developed countries have essentially no preventative health
 
care except for the small portion of wealthy, eren therapeutic health
 
care is available only to a select few. While it is not well understood,
 
there is no question that generations of inadequate medical care and
 
an equally long period of inadequate food has profound health and genetic
 
effects upon a population. Malnutrition causes a host of physical problems,
 
contributes to mental retardation and affects reproductive capacity. The
 
vast majority of the underdeveloped nation's population (and hence, the
 
vast majority of the world's population) exists on a caloric level that is
 
substantially beZow the minimum requirement as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8 
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Education and scientific and technological capability is another
 
area in which the effects of the income disparity are immediately obvious
 
and where long term economic development consequences are likely to be
 
felt. Figure 9 displays the differences in educational achievement
 
between developed and lesser developed countries. It has been estimated
 
that over 40% of the world's population is illiterate, a number difficult
 
for the universally literate United States to comprehend. But education is
 
extraordinirily expensive. The United States Government spends 6.5% of its
 
national income on education, a percentage exceeded only by Sweden and the
 
Soviet Union. Public education expenditures per capita are even more
 
startling. The average per capita expenditures by the lesser developed
 
nations if $8.69 compared to $264.28 in the United States (see Figure 9).
 
Even if the developing nations began to spend the same level on education
 
it would do little to narrow the gap because of the large illiterate
 
adult population, lack of teachers, and inadequate education plans and
 
equipment. Strangely enough, the educational process is further complicated
 
by the lack of students. In the lesser developed countries the children's labor
 
is often an essential part of the family agricultural efforts.
 
The effect of this level of educational expenditures is that the lesser
 
developed countries are far behind the developed nations in science and
 
technology. Consider the simplest and least expensive means of transferring
 
scientific and technological information -- books and magazines. The United
 
States published over 81,000 new books (that is, new titles) in 1972, West
 
Germany published over 40,000, the USSR over 80,000. Compare that to the few
 
lesser developed nations about which we have data. Afghanistan published 83
 
titles, El Salvador 39, Iran over 3,000, and Nigeria-,over l;000.12
 
12 Statistical Abstract of the U.S., op.cit., p. 821.
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FIGURE 10 
WORLD PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, 1970 
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The lack of an educational structure has fundamental impact upon the
 
availability of scientists, engineers and technicians. The United States
 
has almost 3 million people so employed; the Congo has less than 1,000,
 
Iran has almost 100,000, Afghanistan 8,000.13 The source of the disparity
 
is obvious: in the developing world only about 1% of the population that
 
reaches university age goes to college. .Of those, it is likely that a
 
large number of them are educated in foreign shores and leave their home
 
country for employment opportunities elsewhere.
 
The dimensiohs of this disparity in wealth are becoming apparent.
 
The problem is complex to solve: even if it were possible, a sudden
 
equality of the per capita incomes between the developed and developing
 
nations would have little impact. The long history of lack of social
 
overhead capital, inadequate infrastructure and an uneducated population
 
means that the lesser developed countries would have to spend substantially
 
more per capita for sustained perioas of time than the developed countries
 
to recoup the past.
 
The Role of the Lesser Developed Countries in the World Economy:
 
The above discussion is not to say that the lesser developed countries are
 
without power, either economic or political. In fact, it is the increasing
 
recognition of this power by the lesser developed nations that is contri­
buting to .international conflict. While only a moderate portion of the
 
world is experiencing the benefits of economic development, the natural
 
resource base of the world is globally, and inequitably, distributed.
 
The industrialized and developed world is becoming increasingly
 
dependent upoii the lesser developed countries for the natural ,resources
 
necessary to sustain industrialized nation's economies. ThaeUnited States
 
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook; 1973 (New York) p.788.
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Figure 11 
U.S. DEPENDENCY ON FOREIGN MINERAL SUPPLIES, 1972
 
Iportas Major Mveloped County Total, Major ajov Developing County Total, Major 
PremlntolU.s. tappher with lbprm Devolped Country SupplierawithlIports Developing Country 
MineraI Comumpton Supplied by Each SuppTIer. S.uppliedby ach Suptlerm 
Aluminiun 908 
Blauxita Austalia,2.0% 2,0% Jamaica, 53 5% 682Y 
Surinan, 27.4% 
Guyana, 7.3% 
Alumina Australla, 40.9% 41.5% Jamala. 26.0% 46.4% 
Canada, 0.6% Surinam. IS 8% 
Guyana, 5 6% 
Metal Canada, 63.1% 70.7% 
Chomnmhb I06 
Nornay. 7.6% 
South Africa, 32.% BSA% 
U.S S R., 27 8% 
Turkey, 25 6% 
CObalt 98 Belgium­
Luxembourg,23 18% 46.1% Zalre, 34,5% 43.0% 
Finlarld,100% Zambia, 8.5% 
Norway. 7.3% 
Copper 18 Canoda,34.1% 34.1% Peru, 23.2% 37.9% 
Chile. 14.7% 
IronjSteet? 28 Canada, 50.8% 508% Veezuela,30.6% 30.6% 
La 20 Caada,33.1% 60.5% Pru, 22.0% 31.7% 
Australia, 17.4% Mexto 91% 
Man9sa' 05 South Africa. 14.6% 14.% Gabon, 26 3% 55.5% 
Br=il, 1s8% 
Zaire, 10.4% 
Marcurya 58 Canada,52.7% 523% Mexico. 18.7% 18.7% 
Nickel 74 Canada, 76.0% 856% 
Nouway. 10 6% 
"Sulfur, 13 Canada, 76.4% 75A% Mexico, 24 6% 24A% 
Tmn 77 Matas, 64 3% 9m.5% 
Thailand, 23.3% 
Bolnela,8.9% 
Titanium 72 Austraha, 996% 996% 
Tungrem 44 Canada,300% 
Australia, 11 0% 
41.0% Bolivia, 18.0% 
Peru., 12.0% 
39.0% 
Thailaal, 9.0% 
Uraniuni 12 Canada, 100% 1000% 
Vanadiu m 32 South Africs. 56.6% 56.5% 
Znc 62 Camada.509% 69.4% Mexico. 8 3% 14.i% 
Aastalia, 5 6% Penu, 6.8% 
Selgium 
Luxembourg. 5 0% 
Wert Germary, 4.1% 
Japan, 3,8% 
4Iigornl a pnim1ieey. 
*nAtXJna1078. 
o poo -PAO 
- 23 ­
is becoming increasingly dependent upon foreign sources of raw materials
 
(as shown in Figure 11). It has been estimated that the United States with
 
5% of the world's-population consumes 30% of the world's raw materials.14  i.
 
This dependency on foreign sources of materials is never more
 
evident than the international dependency of the deveioped nations upon the
 
lesser developed nations for petroleum. Figure 12 dramatically illustrates
 
the lesser developed nation's role in the developed world's industrialization.
 
All evidence suggests that this dependency will, if allowed, continue, and
 
probably increase, as by far the levels of the known and easily obtainable
 
petroleum resources are located in the lesser developed nations. The
 
United States has only about 5% of the proven oil reserves while the
 
Mideast has more than 50% (see Figure 13). While the United States has a
 
more assured supply of coal, the allocation of coal internationally is
 
again inequitable. The extent of the metal and mineral reserves of the
 
lesser developed countries is probably not adequately estimated.
 
The impact that a group of resource rich countries can have upon the
 
U.S. and global economy is obviously substantial, witness, the disruptions
 
caused by the OPEC cartrl While the possibility of other cartels is
 
disputed widely, and the impending collapse of the OPEC cartel predicted
 
daily, there is no doubt that the OPEC experience'will prbvide a model for 
other lesser developed nations to emulate. Most economic development theorists 
argue that capital accumulation is the critical and essential step of economic 
development, never did forecast such an effective and rapid method. The 
OPEC nations increased their oil revenues by more than a factor of seven from 
1971 to 1974, as shown in Figure 14. 67$ 
14 Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment (W. H.
 
Freeman) 1970, p. 72.
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Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
TOTAL DISCOVERED RESERVES OF CRUDE OIL
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Estimated Total Oil Revenues of Eleven OPEC 
Governments,a 1971-1974 
(S millions) 
85,210 
22,675 
12.120 14,51
-E12,12fl1 
1971 1972 1973 1974 
c3 he eleven governments are: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Venezuela.a'
Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia. 
SO9CE• ., zr" t . Ic.,d Bank estimates. 
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The potential for substantial impact upon the lesser developed nations by
 
actions of the lesser developed is a fairly recent possibility and stems from
 
two continuing phenomena: one, the rise of the one world economy and two, the
 
changing international political relationships. The increasing economic
 
interdependency of nations, irrespective of political boundaries, has been
 
discussed at great length, but it is an important development of recent vintage
 
and contradicts many analysts who argued for isolationist self-sufficiency
 
as the effective approach to economic development and wealth (for example, the
 
emphasis on import substitution industries by many countries). An increasing
 
part of this interdependency is, at present, totally outside of the bounds of
 
government as it is increasingly the role of multinational firms, a recent
 
organizational form yet of, such potential economic power that the parameters
 
of its impact are not understood at all.15 The second phenomena is the change
 
in political relationships referring in general to the demise of colonialist
 
relationships among nations. The increase in political independence has by
 
definition changed the nature of the international economic relationships.
 
All pf this adds up to continuing pressures for international conflict,
 
and for group response on the part of the lesser developed nations. The OPEC
 
experience is a good model for "militant" economic action, the EEC experience
 
is a model for acceptable economic growth and development. In either case the
 
conclusion to be drawn is the same: the need for- cooperative group action for
 
economic and political gain.
 
15 In fact, it is interesting to note that the 1968 edition of a classic
 
economic development text (Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development: Problems,
 
Principles and Policies, 1968) does not even use the word "multinational"
 
in its otherwise extensive index, and the word "multinational" could nat_
 
be found in the discussion on foreign investment.
/7) 
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Forces for International Conflict: There are many characteristics
 
of the twentieth century world economy which support group and/or indivi­
dual militant action against the developed "have nations." This section
 
briefly discusses some of the current trends which contribute to this
 
tension and conflict.
 
(I) Regionalism versus Nationalism:
 
While the heart of the argument presented here suggests that there
 
are strong incentives for group action on the part of the lesser developed
 
nations, there are equally strong motivations for isolated, nationalistic
 
actions. This conflict between these two opposing approaches could
 
aggravate the situation further. A precedent is clearly established
 
demonstrating the success of group action and runs the gamut from the
 
European Economic Community to the Palestine Liberation Front. However;
 
nations which have only recently achieved political independence, whether
 
freedom from a centuries old monarchy or freedom from the colonialist power
 
of another nation, are not motivated to surrender any of that independence
 
to a group,, even to a group of its peers, and even for potential economic
 
reward.
 
Aggravating the situation further is the instability of these
 
political/economic relationships (witness the on and off quality of the
 
Eqyptian/Syrian United Arab Republic). Partially exacerbated by the actions
 
of the developed world and partially aggravated by the insecurity of the
 
lesser developed nations themselves, the relationships will be tenuous at
 
best. This probably resuls from their experience with colonialism, as well
 
as resulting from economic and political insecurity.
 
/71
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In addition, maintenance of a successful group activity requires
 
extensive diplomatic, bureaucratic, technical and managerial skills; skills
 
that are often lacking in the lesser developed nations.
 
So what can the forces for group action possibly be? In a word: size.
 
Despite all the pressures for nationalism, the underdeveloped world is
 
cognizant of the political, economic, and perhaps most importantly,
 
psychological impact of concerted group action, -- the bigger the better.
 
Size in this context does not refer to population size; if it did, the under­
developed nations would have long ago taken over the world. Size as used
 
here refers more to political power in the context of control -- such as over
 
a resource (i.e., OPEC), control over public opinion (i.e., block voting in
 
the UN), or brief military control over an historical moment (i.e., PLU
 
encounters). It is quite clear that irrespective of the pressures for
 
nationalism among the lesser developed countries, of which there are many,
 
the power that accrues from group action. -- however, intermittent -- is
 
increasingly recognized.
 
While the consensus, then, is for group militant action, there is no
 
question that this will be a controversial alliance that will increasingly
 
contribute to international conflict. The regionalism versus nationalism
 
conflict will dominate any group interaction; and hence, the group structure
 
itself will be fragile and prone to violent reaction within the group. Such
 
in-fighting already has been threatening the unity of OPEC. Yet persistently,
 
there has been adherence to the group goals. The New York Times has noted:
 
"The oil producers relate their political and economic growth is that of the
 
entire developing world; they were unwilling to bargain away their trump card,
 
6
 
oil, except under conditions they considered favorable."1l

16 "The Early Oil Talks End in Disarray," The New York Times (April 20, 1975), 
Section 4, page 2. / 7 
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In highly unstable political atmospheres one of the ways of attempting
 
to ensurd and consolidate a strong political base in the world is by overt
 
action against other nations, especially those viewed as more powerful or
 
more developed. Because of the perceived power balances these actions are
 
likely to be most effective if done ix cooperation with other nations. For
 
example, look at the political power, prestige and international esteem that
 
the Arabs have achieved through the OPEC actions. Unstable situations such as
 
are found in the lesser developed countries where the administrations
 
prone to frequent government upheavals and other domestic turmoil, contribute
 
to the threat to international security. Because of this domestic instability,
 
the frequent shifts in international political allegiances, and the disparity
 
between political, economic and resource isupply boundaries, group actions,
 
however effective they are in the short run, are inherently unstable and
 
will collapse soon after any success. The only exception to this is group
 
action that is composed of nations that are cultural, economically,
 
politically and historically similar and relatively equal, such as the
 
European Economic Community.
 
The recency of political independence in many lesser developed
 
countries further contributes to the intensity and propensity for
 
conflict and unilateral action for two reasons. One is the need to
 
establish, in a rapid and dramatic fashion, political credibility and
 
political power, as discussed before. The second is the inexperience
 
in international political processes and the most likely lack of an
 
inadequate infernal-political bureaucracy.
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(2) Population Growth:
 
While many of the direct implications of population growth are 
discussed elsewhere, it is important to note here the immense dichotomy 
between the population characteristics of the developed and underdeveloped 
world. More importantly than population growth per s6 as a force for 
conflict is the population transition that is occurring internationally.
 
This contributes substantially to social instability and, in turn, to
 
political instability, domestic violence and eventually becomes incorporated
 
"
into the world view of that nation. There are essentially three population ,
 
configurations in the world: the developed, the undeveloped and by far
 
the largest group--the intermediate lesser developed transitional nations.
 
The conflict between a modern technological and highly urbanized population
 
and a peasant, traditional agrarian culture contributes to social disruption'
 
In fact, Harrison Brown suggests: "It appears most unlikely that these two
 
greatly different ways of life can co-exist for long. A world containing two
 
major patterns of existence is fundamentally unstable--either the agrarian
 
regions of the world will industrialize or, in the long run, the industrial
 
regions will revert to agrarian existence." 17
 
(3)- Political Instability:
 
While the problem of political instability is world wide, the lack of
 
political stability in the lesser developed nations clearly contributes to
 
both domestic and international conflict.
 
17fHarrison Brown, The Challenge of Man's Future 
 (Viking Press: New
 
York) 1954, p.225 .
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(4) Social Instability:
 
As previously discussed, the forces of population shifts from
 
traditional peasant culture to a modern technological cultural, from
 
rural to urban, from barter to money, and from economic underdevelopment
 
to economic development all contribute to social instability. And any
 
condition of instability aggravate tensions and produce conflict.
 
(5) Weaponry:
 
One of the fundamental shifts in the dynamics of international
 
relations in the last several decades that makes it significantly different
 
from other periods in history is the easy access to highly sophisticated
 
armaments by all nations. Highly sophisticated armaments (often even nuclear
 
arms) are available at low cost. Most horrifying, a recent study has
 
indicated that the technical capability necessary to construct a small
 
19
 
nuclear weapon is obtainable through the publicly avaiiable literature.
 
It has been estimated by some experts that the intermediate transition
 
countries which are the most unstable (i.e., Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil,
 
South Africa, India, Pakistan, Iran) are likely to possess nuclear weapons
 
by the end of the century.20 Obviously, the greater the proliferation of
 
nuclear weaponry, the likelier it is that terrorist groups will soon
 
possess stolen nuclear weapons as well. It is also likely that within a
 
decade, perhaps even sooner, terrorists will have access to homemade
 
nuclear weapons. The proliferation of weaponry and the conclusion that
 
even the least developed nations will soon have access to them presents
 
18 Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards,
 
A Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation (Ballinger
 
Publishing Company: Cambridge) 1974.
 
1 9
'The Hudson Institute, Trends Affecting U.S. Aeronautics R&D By the Year
 
2000.
 75S 
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an incredibly threathening situation, especially in the increasingly
 
volatile world circumstances that we have suggested are likely to
 
occur.
 
(6) Recognition of Underdeveloped Status:
 
As mentioned previously, the increasing awareness by the lesser developed
 
countries of their economic predicament vis a vis the developed nations 
increases the level of frustration, expectation, anger, and sense of 
exploitation. All of this, of course, contributes to conflict situations. 
(7) Successful Models:
 
It is probably the case that just one example of a successful joint
 
venture, the OPEC cartel, will lead to a host of imitations. There is some
 
concern that Venezuela is initiating a similar action in the coffee and
 
tin markets in Latin America. It is quite likely that most lesser developed
 
nations are evaluating their current position with respect to potential
 
similarities to the OPEC example.
 
Faced with all of the characteristics of underdevelopment noted
 
before (i.e., lack of population growth control, public health inadequacy,
 
widespread illiteracy, p6litical instability, social instability, lack of
 
infrastructure development, lack of managerial and technical skills and
 
capital shortages), the -lesser developed countries have exhausted their
 
options and must play the one trump-card that they might possibly have:
 
scarce natural resources. Resources can be viewed as a means for capital
 
accumulation, an essential step to industrial development. With the
 
increasing dependency of the developed nations upon the lesser developed
 
for scarce resources, it is quite likely that attempts at similar resource
 
cartels and economic blackmail are inevitable before the end of the
 
century. / a
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Other nations may use blackmail and group action to achieve a politi­
cal goal, apart from economic objectives. This kind of action may be even
 
more dangerous than economically motivated actions. The solidification
 
of a power base to achieve military and political security is likely to be
 
most damaging to international peace. The rise of terrorism in the Middle
 
East, for example, is not associated with the oil cartel action of the OPEC
 
nations; rather that is associated with historical anomosities and the
 
centuries-old fight for the Holy Land. There are other such ancient
 
antagonisms brewing in the world today. What makes them especially
 
dangerous, and the world especially vulnerable to them currently, is the
 
widespread proliferation of armaments.
 
Some Positive Actions:
 
This section has identified four major contributing trends that increase
 
the likelihood of group action by the lesser developed countries to achieve
 
political and economic goals. These include: (1) the increasing disparity of
 
wealth between the developed and lesser developed nations; (2) the increasing
 
reliance of the industrialized world upon the resource base of the lesser
 
developed nations; (3) the proliferation of easily available sophisticated
 
weaponry in the world, and (4) wide-scale political and social instability
 
in the world resulting from massive population transition. One approach to
 
minimize vulnerability to blackmail, cartelization and other acts of international
 
conflict is to respond to these causes of potential conflict. There are
 
essentially two categories of strategies that can be undertaken to ameliorate the
 
situation by the United States. One set of actions includes strategies to
 
prevent the actual act of cartelization or blackmail from occurring, and the
 
second includes strategies that would increase the capability of the United
 
States torespond to these actions once they occur. 
 1 7 
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It seems unlikely in view of the long history of colonialism,
 
imperialism and mercantilism by the developed world that there will be
 
substantial success in actually preventing the majority of these
 
activities from occurring. It does appear, however, that the probability
 
of occurrence of these events could be reduced. A first set of strategies
 
would have t6 do with reducing the inequitable allocation of wealth. It is
 
quite clear that the developed nations will be called upon in increasing
 
frequency to assist with such international disasters as starvation. It
 
seems clear that it would be advantageous, not only for humanitarian
 
purposes, but also to achieve political and military goals, to participate
 
as fully as possible in these activities. A second method contributing
 
to the potential narrowing of this gap is to share U.S. technology and
 
educational experience with these nations.
 
Inferior -managerial, technical and entrepreneurial skills are the
 
major impediment the lesser developed nations face. The goal of the
 
U.S. foreign aid effort should be to remedy this deficiency. If the
 
United States is indeed part of the one-world economy; and if resource
 
dependency does indeed increase, one way of ensuring international cooperation
 
and reducing conflict would be to contribute in a substantial and real way
 
to economic development by assisting in the development of human capital.
 
A second set of strategies would have to do with resources supplies.
 
Obviously, the less dependent upon foreign sources for material and energy
 
sources a nation is, then the less vulnerable it is to acts of blackmail
 
by lesser developed countries. This is not to suggest an isolationist
 
approach but merely to encourage further energy and material self-sufficiency.
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This could occur through development of domestic sources ot development
 
of technological substitutes. Either would decrease the degree of
 
economic and political vulnerability to these kinds of actions. If the
 
potential for success of these blackmail actions decreases, they will also
 
decrease in importance as a political tool.
 
A third area of strategies has to do with proliferation of weaponry in
 
the world. While it may be axiomatic to state that the fewer the number
 
of nuclear powers, the lower the probability of nuclear war or nuclear
 
terrorism, it is also quite accurate. The Strategic Arms Limitation talks
 
currently underway are addressing the question of weaponry for the super
 
powers only. A fruitful source of future negotiation would appear to be the
 
question of arming the lesser powers.
 
A final set of strategies has to do with international cooperation. The
 
formation of anticartel cartels is likely to occur. In fact, they are beginning
 
to develop in response to the OPEC oil cartel. It is not at all clear that
 
this is a progressive step for the reduction of international tension. However,
 
it is likely that these kinds of regional, special-purpose alliances will
 
form to combat unique, and perhaps random, acts of the lesser developed countries.
 
To the degree that these cooperative efforts reduce vulnerability to such
 
random acts, they will, of course, reduce international conflict. Despite the
 
short term, stop-gap efforts that the United States may take, it seems likely
 
that the nation will be continually exposed and vulnerable to such actions by
 
other nations. Unfortunately, these activities are largely unpredictable, but
 
probably likely to increase in the future. The unfortunate success of the OPEC
 
cartel encourages this kind of economic and political behavior. It is further
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likely that this kind of behavior will continue until such point that it
 
actually provokes military response. Hence, one can anticipate increasing
 
international tensions and conflict, periodically resulting in military
 
skirmishes for-the next several decades.
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ISSUE: LACK OF AGREEMENT OVER.THE-SE "'AND OWNERSHIP' OF THE INTERNATIONALLY 
.SHARED RESOURCES (SUCH AS AIR SPACE, OUTER SPACE AND THE OCEANS) 
LEADING TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
 
The Issue:
 
The lack of adequate institutional mechanisms to regulate, monitor,and
 
govern the use of the commonly owned and shared resources of the world has
 
been a problem for centuries, beginiing with the origins of international
 
trade and exploration. It is exacerbated today because of the growing
 
dependency and international trade among nations and the impact of advanced
 
technology.
 
There is no question that technology is one of the dominant factors
 
affecting the exploration and management of commonly shared resources.
 
Technology has made it possible to oversee a larger and larger portion of
 
the shared resources. For instance, the three mile limit was established
 
when it was technologically impossible to monitor any larger area. It is
 
quite clear that technological advancement has made it possible to monitor
 
larger segments of the oceans, and the atmosphere, as well as individual
 
activities of nations.
 
This ability to monitor individual activities of nations from space 
has generated a-sense of confidence-in our efforts to control nuclear 
military devices but also provided a new source for international conflict. 
Not only can military activities be monitored, but location and extent of the 
natural resource-base of a given country can he identified as .ell. Such iden­
tification by orbital satellites (as well as the resulting problem of ownershin 
and dissemination of data) generates a central force for conflict. The fears are 
that a technologically superior nation may be able to identify and quantify the 
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resource deposits of a less technologically sophisticated country. This
 
could trigger conflict between the "haves" and "have nots."
 
There are essentially three major commonly owned resources over
 
which there is lack of agreement governing their use. These include:
 
(1) space, (2) the oceans, and (3) the biosphere. Increasingly sophisti­
cated uses of these resources for a wide range of purposes provides a
 
large arena for international conflict. These uses include transportation,
 
communication, scientific research, material and food supply, waste dis
 
posal, and military security.
 
There are a host of pressures and events, such as new technologies;
 
food and energy shortages; population pressures and economic strains, currently
 
underway internationally which may further aggravate international conflict.
 
These forces have tot simultaneously come into play before, and the lack of
 
agreement governing shared resources only places the world in a more vulner­
able position then before. These pressures are discussed in some detail below.
 
Impact of Technology: Technological capability Of the world has never
 
been greater. The ability of nations to monitor the activities of each other
 
through sophisticated'listening devices and monitoring devices from space,
 
the oceans or even from other remotely controlled areas has made it
 
impossible for countries to conduct any kind of activities in secret for
 
a sustained period of time. Hence, in times past, international conflict
 
may have been prevented merely by lack of knowledge (albeit, just as it
 
may have been caused by too much information as well as incorrect
 
information).
 
This technological capability also means that some of the commonly
 
shared resources can be more effectively used -- such as using the oceans
 
for material and energy supplies. The ability to mine the oceans, still
 
not commercially feasible, is of such recent vintage that there are not
 
adequate national mechanism, not to mention international mechanisms, to
 
govern oceaA mining. Estimates of the value of the riches in the oceans
 
vary substantially and no figure can be relied upon. Quite clearly, the
 
existence of such international riches is a source for international conflict.
 
One can imagine that similar kinds of disagreements and conflict would have
 
occurred had the United States found substantial material resources on the moon.
 
In this era of resource scarcity, the oceans are being heralded as the solution
 
to the supply problem, yet inevitably this will be a source of continuing
 
conflict.
 
Technological capability also means that existing internationally 
shared resources can be put to new functional uses -- such as off-shore deep 
water -ports. Technology has also made it possible to substantially alter 
climate and weather patterns, although at this point we do not fully under­
staid the consequences.
 
Impaot of Population: Population growth as well as population density
 
is another set of factors which contribute indirectly to international
 
conflict. The sheer density of the planet and the frequency with which the
 
space and oceans are being used by the population necessitates some kind of
 
international agreement to reduce conflict in the future. Secondly,
 
population pressures decrease the ability of a given country
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to provide for its population. This population pressure,, in the face of
 
disagreements over allegedly "shared"resources, can only aggravate volatile
 
conflict situations. Population pressures may force a nation to become
 
increasingly dependent upon the oceans for food supplies, mineral
 
resources, waste disposal, and so forth. Undoubtedly, this dependency
 
will not be experienced equally by all countries; hence, another source
 
of conflict.
 
Impact of Interdependency: The interdependency among nations of the
 
world is another source of international conflict. More than in any other
 
period of history, the nations of the world are dependent upon each other
 
for supplies of scarce goods (materials, energy, technology and skilled
 
manpower) as well as for markets for manufactured goods and services. No
 
longer can a nation remain economically viable through isolationism. The
 
result of such interdependency is to reduce the ability of a given nation
 
to effectively control its own economic future, because its economy is
 
affected by economic decisions and activities made by external prganizations
 
and by organizations over which it is likely to have minimal influence at
 
recentbest. The actions by the OPEC nations illustrate the vulnerability 
of the complex and interrelated world economy. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the arbitrary political
 
boundaries achievedlundreds 
-- even tens of hundreds -- of years ago have very
 
little to do with the boundaries of economic relationships that will
 
dominate over the next few decades. Hence, political boundaries are becoming
 
increasingly subordinate to economia boundaries; again, contributing to ten­
sion. The success of the OPEC grouping and the European Common Market are
 
examples of such economic alliances. l e Z 
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Impact of Science: A final pressure that is contributing to inter­
national conflict is the increasing understanding of the impact of man's
 
activities upon the globe and the interrelatedness of such activities.
 
Activities in one country can have substantial climatic and environmental
 
impact on countries miles away. International conflict may result from the
 
indirect effects of such activities as massive industrial pollution, as
 
well as, from the deliberate alteration of weather and climate for military
 
purposes. While the threat of such climate and weather modification is
 
clearly recognized, the lack of sufficient understanding of, the climate'
 
and weather mechanisms precludes an adequate scientific solution, to some
 
degree.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
This section will briefly describe the status of agreements governing
 
space, the oceans, and the biosphere.
 
1. Space: Since the airways were first used for transportation
 
and communication, the issue of "air rights" has been of concern, and the advent
 
of the space age only extended the range of argument to "space rights."
 
The first major issue associated with space is the delineation of
 
sovereign "air space" and "outer space." This boundary dispute is
 
analogous to the current dispute governing the world's oceans. According
 
to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (The Treaty on Principles Governing the
 
Activities of States in The Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including The
 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies), "outer space" is defined as an open frontier
 
for the exploration and use of all mankind. The treaty states: "Outer
 
space,. including the moon and other-celestial bodies shall be free for
 
exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind on
1117( 
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.the basis of equality and in accordance with international law and there
 
shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies."
 
This is in direct conflict with the fundamental tenet of inter­
national law which states that a nation exercises complete and exclusive
 
sovereignty over its territorial air space. 
Because of the conflict that
 
is resulting over these two legal concepts, a serious dispute has risen
 
in recent years as to whether this delineation between "air space" and
 
Iouter space" is a reasonable objective. If it.is a reasonable goal, the
 
question of how the delineation should be determined then poses.problems.
 
There are arguments pro and con about further definition and delineation
 
of outer space. Some experts think that any further delineation will
 
result in more international conflict, while others say that the current
 
vagueness of international law-generates conflict.
 
There are arguments for.both sides of the controversy. Arguments
 
supporting the.view that formal delineation of outer space is necessary
 
for international peace include: (1) such-an agreement would preclude
 
states from making unjustified claims in the future to large areas of.
 
space; (2) under.certain interpretation of the existing treaties,, there
 
is the possibilitythat some nations will abuse space activities as a
 
violation of their sovereignty; (3) disputes regarding the extent of
 
air space will inevitably lead to international conflict; (4) the
 
resolution of this fundamental legal question would establish a precedent
 
for cooperative international attitudes towards the governance of other
 
shared resources and would establish an effective 
-model for progress
 
towards reducing international conflict. 
 f7 
At the same time various writers on space laws have also argued
 
that this issue should remain unresolved at least for the time being for
 
equally substantial reasons which include: (1) the absence of this
 
delineation has not led to international disagreements and conflict;
 
(2) attempts to reach an agreement may lead to immoderate demands and may
 
actually lead to international conflict (similar to the boundaries
 
negotiations of the Law of the Sea Conference); (3) any boundary that is
 
established in the definition of air space versus outer space may, in
 
fact hamper future space activity; (4) any arbitrary line would, in fact,
 
encourage disputes and complaints on minor technological violations and
 
would be a force for international conflict.
2
 
Currently, however, there is substantial consensus among experts
 
regarding the need for international agreement governing this boundary
 
issue because of the changing nature of space exploration. Because of the
 
current emphasis of the American space program upon resource, climate and
 
geological monitoring satellites (such as ERTS) and other orbiting
 
observatories designed specifically for monitoring natural environment and
 
natural resources required by man, it is quite clear that the countries
 
being observed are much more directly affected by spade activities than
 
they have been in the past. Hence, the issue of air space versus rights
 
is becoming increasingly important to prevent international conflict on
 
the basis of the dissemination of this information so gathered.
 
2The Law Relating to Activities of Man in Space by Lay and Taubenfield,
 
1970. 

1 F 
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Several alternative ways to delineate air space from outer space have
 
been proposed:
 
(1) 	 Establishing a boundary line between the two environments merely on 
a physical or geophysical basis. This would define the upper limit
 
of the atmosphere as air space-. Obviously the technical problems of
 
precisely defining the atmosphere, troposphere, stratosphere, iono­
sphere, and so forth are immense.
 
(2) Relying on the structure and methods of vehicular propulsion as the
 
demarcation line. Hence the demarcation line would be the difference
 
between aeronautics and astronautics.
 
(3) Using the notion of national control over the expanse above its terri­
tory as a position of demarcation. This, of course, has a serious 
ethical deficiency as it implies that air space should be defined by
technological competence of an individual country. There is no ques­
tion that this would be a force for international conflict rather
 
than against it.
 
(4) 	 Viewing space in terms of its functional characteristics. This is the 
most widely accepted approach and places less emphasis on the location 
of the lines to be drawn and more on the character of the activities 
that are to be conducted in space. This approach has led to the sug­
gestion for the establishment of different frontiers for different 
types of activities. 
A second major issue concerning regulation of space is the question of the 
liabilities in space and responsibility for space related injury and damages. 
Concern over this issue led to the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects. This was signed and rctified simultaneously by 
Washington, London and Moscow in early 1972-to cover the resolution
 
of international conflicts over the liability with respect to damages, loss of
 
life, personal injury, impairment of health, property damages that may result
 
from space activity.5 Despite the existence of this convention, it is quite
 
likely that were there to be any damage either from the re-entry of a vehicle
 
or the misfiring of a vehicle, international conflict would inevitably result.
 
3"The Boundary Question and Space Law: A Balance Sheet," 6 Ottawa Law Review
 
266.
 
4J.D. Cooper, "The Legal Problems of Outer Space," Proceedings of the American
 
Society of International Law, 1956, pp. 85-94.
 
5Conference on International Liability Analysis and Background Data, prepared for
 
use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senates May 1972.
 
Those actions which result in pollution are a third major problem.
 
The problem of space debris, in particular, is one of the major issues in the
 
environmental law. As Figure 2 shows, the level of accumulated debris in space is
 
substantial. While the vast majority of space objects completely burn up
 
upon re-entry into the earth's atmosphere, there have been instances where
 
space debris has actually been recovered. With the increasing numbers of
 
objects being launched into space (most of which are operating within 100­
400 miles of the earth's surface), there is concern that space activity may
 
be threatened by congestion. These problems would include collisions,
 
overcrowding of the national defense communications systems, and inter­
6 
ferences with optical astronomy.
 
Another potential source of pollution is biological or chemical
 
contamination of the earth by space probes as well as of external celestial
 
bodies that are explored. Currently, there is no international agreement
 
governing these kinds of considerations. However, the issue is so
 
threatening that individual countries are devoting a great deal of attention
 
to it.
 
One of the major concerns associated with the use of communications
 
satellites is privacy for the individuals as well as for respect for
 
national sovereignty. With the development of ERTS, there has been an
 
increased interest in the right of privacy both internationally and
 
domestically. To date, ERTS have been used primarily to gather environmenta.l,
 
resource and pollution related data and to identify major geological
 
features of the earth. But in order to gather this kind of information
 
about the earth's resources and agriculture, it also gathers substantial
 
other information without technological restrictions. 
"
6Paul Dembling and Swadish Kalsi, "Pollution of Man's Last Frontier: Adequacy
 
of Present Space Environmental Law in Preserving the Resource of Outer Space,"
 
10 Netherlands International Law Review 125 (1973) 
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Figure 2 
ACCUMIATION OF SPACE DEBRIS 
Census of Satellites: Cumulative Statistics
 
Year of Launch 1957 1962 1967 1972
 
Launchings 
 2 150 649 1,218
 
Total Resulting Pieces 5 572 2,994 4,859
 
Of Which:
 
A) Still in Orbit 2 303 1,178 1,810
 
B) Decayed* 3 269 1,816 3,049
 
*i.e. burnt up on earth re-entry, impacted on earth or other celestial bodies
 
and unoperational
 
Compiled from U.K. Ministry of Aviation Supply's Royal Aircraft Establishment
 
Technical Report 68124 (1968), data supplied by Royal Aircraft Establishment
 
by letter of March 6, 1973, and NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center Satellite
 
Situation Report for April 30, 1973. Since compilation is from multiple
 
sources, there may be a small degree of error.
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While there is nothing in international law which specifically
 
prohibits these activities of ERTS, it is quite possible that nations will
 
view the gathering of this information as a threat to their economic, politii­
cal and military security. Some countries have already objected to being
 
surveyed by ERTS as an invasion of their privacy. They have argued that
 
the gathering of this information is a violation of their sovereign rights 
over their air space. As mentioned earlier, no agreement has been made 
as to the delineation of air space and outer space. The ERTS satellite's 
orbit is approximately 560 miles high -- far -beyond any delineation which 
is seriously being considered. Hence, the orbit is located in "outer
 
space" which under the Outer Space Treaty is free for exploration by all
 
states. Under the interpretation, the ERTS satellite is free to collect
 
aiiy information. Despite this interpretation of current-international-law, it is
) 
quite likely that this activity will be a substantial area of international
 
conflict in the future. It may mean that those nations which are
 
technologically superior and have the capability of establishing earth
 
resources satellites have greater access to information regarding the location
 
of scarce natural resources than even those countries possessing the resources.
 
A further source of conflict may result from the need to interpret The 
Outer Space.Treaty. There is-no agency so designated :to-interpret the treaty 
and regulate its use. Hence, even if there is ny international confliet over 
the treaty and the use of air'space versus -outer space, .any resolution -must 
await the creation-of an agency to interpret it and enforce any decision. 
A national security argument has also been made against such remote 
sensing satellites -- the argument being that this information can be used 
for military purposes agatinst a-state. Information concerning weather 
patterns_, resource locations,-and geography can be useful for miLlitary 
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purposes and may constitute espionage. However, the right of a state to
 
protect its national security is not -synonymous with ,the total right to
 
privacy in international law. It does not give a state immunity from obser­
vation. However, it does protect a state from acts.which threatem the stability
 
and existence of its government and economy, and unless this threat can be
 
shown,no violations of national security have occurred under the tenents
 
of international law. There does appear tobe a precedent for the right to
 
privacy argument in international law. It has always been permissible to
 
gather information about another state so long as there is no vioiation of
 
the sovereignty of that state. Thus, gathering information from beyond the
 
territorial sea has always been,legal. Unless there has been a .violation of
 
a nation's air space (such as the U-2 incident) orla violation of its
 
territorial waters (such as the Pueblo incident), a state has no legal
 
basis under current interpretation of international law for prohibiting the
 
gathering of information.
 
There has still been some conflict regarding the dissemination of the
 
information. Assuming that international law continues to allow remote
 
sensing data to be gathered, the question then reverts to what is to be done
 
with it. To date, there has not been an-international procedure established
 
for the dissemination and use-of data~gathered from outer space.
 
The NASA practice of allowing any and all parties access to the
 
information gathered by the satellites has precluded any international
 
friction to date. NASA -contends that the information-is gathered for
 
the benefit of-mankind, and the availability of this information to all who
 
want it proves there is no attempt to gather information for military
 
purposes or economic blackmail. However, this still may become a source of
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of international conflict. Many of the lesser developed countries being sur­
veyed have access to the data but they often do not have the technological and
 
scientific infrastructure necessary to analyze and effectively make use of this
 
data. Hence, once again, the technologically superior nations are in a dominant
 
position and the lesser developed nations may view this as a means to exploit
 
their resources.
 
Under the current regulations, any party conducting activities in outer
 
space is to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of the nature,
 
conduct, locations, and results of activities. The Secretary General is then
 
to disseminate this information immediately and effectively.
 
Some countries have objected to this policy and have argued that the
 
information should be made available only to that nation that is the subject
 
of the survey and from whom the data was gathered. Others have argued that
 
the information and data should be made available to other nations with the
 
express consent of the observed country in question. These arguments are part­
ly based on a Resolution of Natural Resources adopted by the United Nations
 
General Assembly which provides that "the right of peoples and nations of per­
manent sovereignty of their natural wealth and resources must be exercised
 
in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the
 
people of the State concerned .' It dan be argued that the dissemination 
of natural resource -datacould be detrimental to the national interest of a 
state and, therefore, the state itself should govern the dissemination of the 
data to any third parties. This article could be interpreted as requiring the 
consent of state before any information on their natural resources is acquired, 
used or disclosed. / 
7United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 XVII (1962)
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The possibility of misuse of this information is substantial. Informa­
tion could be disclosed for political purposes. It could also be used for
 
industrial purposes giving individual firms an advantage in dealing and
 
bidding for mining or land rights in foreign countries. The possibilities
 
that the information might be withheld from one party and disclosed to another
 
is sufficient to cause international conflict. International agreement on
 
the rules governing the acquisition, dissemination, distribution and use
 
of this remote sensing data is absolutely necessary to prevent such
 
abuses. The existing treaties do. not provide adequately for the kinds of
 
problems caused by remote sensing systems. It is quite likely that ERTS data
 
will have an impact on individual nations which will be economic, political
 
and legal in nature, totally unlike any other space venture. The existing
 
Outer Space Treaty is a very general agreement and its purpose was to provide
 
general guiding principles for space activities.
 
In 1971 the United Nations General Assembly established the Working
 
Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites. The objectives of
 
this Working Group are to promote the optimum utilization of a remote
 
sensing by satellites for the benefit of individual nations. The goal of the
 
Working Group was to formulate a treaty to control the activities of remote
 
sensing satellites. Various proposals have been offered ranging from the
 
establishment of an international data bank, regulations governing a nation's
 
authority over the dissemination of the resource data, and finally, a free
 
dissemination policy. / z
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In sum, it is likely that the lack of a regulatory mechanism to
 
govern the uses of space, especially governing remote sensing data, will be
 
a continual-source of international tension.
 
2. The Oceans: The second major area of dispute leading to inter­
national conflict is the lack of agreement over the world's oceans. The
 
conflict generally revolves around four major issues:
 
the riches of the seas.
1. The ownership of'i 

2. The regulation over the uses of the seas.
 
3. 	The management and environmental protection of
 
the seas.
 
4. 	The military role that the seas play in international
 
security.
 
Each one of these issues is causing substantial international
 
controversy. The controversies over the use of the seas probably originated
 
when man first began sailing upon the seas. Recognizing the conflict,
 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1970 called for a conference that
 
would "establish an equitable international regime including an international
 
machinery for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor
 
"
8

and the subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' This resulted
 
in the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed
 
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The Seabed
 
Committee has been working since its inception in 1972 to explore such
 
issues 	as the regulation of the high seas, the continental shelf, the
 
territorial sea and continuous zone, fishing and conversation of living
 
resources of the seas, and the preservation of the marine environment.
 
This was the first effort to re-evaluate the issues that were originally
 
%nited Nations General Assembly Resolution 2750, 1972.
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raised in the First Law of the Seas Conference in 1958. The Fourth Law
 
of the Seas Conference was recently held in Geneva and many of the issues
 
which were first raised in 1958 have yet to be resolved. It is likely that
 
the seas will become a growing source of international conflict because of
 
the rising importance and use of the sea and the scarcity of resources now
 
available from the sea. The following sections explore the pressures upon
 
the ocean and that are likely to result in international conflict.
 
The delineation of the line of ownership over which a nation can exert
 
sovereignty beyond its shores has been a source of controversy for some period
 
of time. Originally, international laws recognized sovereignty to three
 
miles beyond the shoreline. However, unilaterally nations are now claiming
 
anywhere from three miles to two hundred miles. 
This claim refers to exclu­
sive control over the uses of these territorial waters as well as to the
 
resources that exist within these territorial waters. There appears to be
 
an emerging consensus among the developed and developing countries alike
 
that a twelve mile territorial sea is advantageous.9 The United States'has
 
let it be known that it will accept,-for the first time, new rules governing
 
the national sovereignty of ihe oceans. At the recent conference in Geneva,
 
agreement on the 12-mile limit was reached but the difficult problem of rights
 
and responsibilities has not been defined so as to adequately meet new environ­
mental and economic issues arising.
 
A second agreement was reached at the conference regarding the merits of
 
establishing two stage jurisdiction over the seas. The first jurisdiction, perhaps
 
twelve.miles, would grant total sovereignty to the host country (except that ships
 
could pass through narrow straits). A second zone would constitute "economic
 
jurisdiction" and could extend up to 200 miles beyond the coastal shores.
 
9Much of-the discussion is based on John A. Knouss, "Marine Science, 1974 Law
 
of the Sea Conference," Science, 28 June 1974, Vol. 184, No. 4144, p. 1335.
 
and Richard A. Frank's article on "The Law at Sea" in The New York Times
 
Magazine, May 18, 1975.
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while total sovereignty would not be granted in the economic jurisdiction 
(such as control over transportation and scientific uses of the seas), it 
remains unclear exactly what the economic zone would imply. Several South 
American countries, including Brazil, unilaterally have declared sovereignty 
over 200 miles of the ocean. It is quite likely that the United States and 
countries not bordering the sea will not tolerate sovereignty construed this 
broadly, as it would be economically disadvantageous. For instance, essentially 
it would wipe out the United States tuna fishindustry. In 1973, the United 
States tuna canneries sold more than $1 billion worth of tuna fish, most of 
which was caught off the shores of Mexico, South America and Africa and would 
be unavailable to American fishermen under a 200 mile boundary.1 0 
There is agreement among nations that there should be some delineation of
 
territorial responsibility over which countries are granted total sovereignty,
 
including total control not only over the use of these waters but total control
 
over the iches of these waters as well. Obviously, one basis for disagree­
ment may be the inequitable allocation of resources in coastal waters. Before
 
the "territorial" zone (that is, the total sovereign region of three to
 
twelve miles) can be agreed upon, it is likely that agreement of the size;
 
dimension and meaning of the economic zone will be necessary first. The
 
definition of the economic zone may be geographic, (that is, go many miles from 
shore) or functional .(such as the off-shore range of a particular fish). If a 
functional definition is chose, it will mean that the economic area would be
 
defined variously for different reasons. This approach is analogous to the
 
definitional problems of "air space" and "outer space" previously discussed.
 
10
"Deciding Who Rules fow Much of the Sea," Business Week, March 31, 1975, p.26.
 
/1i
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A major problem in the definition of both the territorial sea and the
 
economic sea is what to do about archipelago nations, islands adjacent
 
to nations, and narrow straits. There are at least 116 straits which are
 
greater than 6 miles in width but -less than 24 miles -- passage through 
which would be substantially affected tya change from the 3 to 12 mile
 
territorial sea. Fortunately, both the United States and the Soviet Union
 
(among other major countries) are insistent that any agreement on the 12
 
mile territorial sea be coupled with free passage through the straits. This
 
may be a point of contention with the lesser developed nations. The applica­
tion of the territorial sovereignty delineation and the economic area delinea­
tion to offshore islands are particularly cumbersome.
 
There will still remain a substantial amount of open seas that would
 
be available for the common use of the world. It is informally well agreed 
that this common territory should be shared by all members of the world, 
although there is no treaty governing this. One suggestion is the establish­
ment of an international fund for the open seas in which all member countries 
would participate. Individual countries mining from the open, commonly 
owned seas would pay a set percentage of the value of whatever is mined into
 
the fund which would then be available for distribution among member nations
 
on the basis of a tet to be determined formula. -This may offer a way of pro­
viding economic development assistance to the lesser developed countries.
 
However, undoubtedly this will require some time to resolve. Several Ameri­
can firms are already attempting to implement ocean mining operations in advance
 
of any established domestic or international policy. In anticipation of these
 
efforts, the Ocean Mining Administration has been established within the
 
Department of the Interior and will issue licenses to American ocean mining
/97 
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firms and provide other incentives to encourage ocean mining. It is quite
 
likely that these licenses will be granted before any international law or
 
agreement is reached. Should the United States initiate an aggressive policy
 
in the absence of international agreement governing the oceans, it may well
 
be viewed unfavorably by the rest of the world and contribute to conflict.
 
The less developed countries feel particularly threatened by these ac­
tivities. Currently, the natural resource base of the lesser developed 
countries is their only foundation for economic viability and method for capi­
tal formation, and any actions which -theyperceive as threatening may aggravate 
the tension between the "have!' and "have not" nations. 
Another stumbling block to-achievement of an international agreement over
 
-
the use and regulation of the oceans is concern for the rights of land 

locked countries who will feel increasingly threatened by the expansion of
 
the territorial waters and creation of the economic zone.
 
Any agreement must ancount for use of the surface-of the seas apart from
 
dwnership of the contents of the seas. The increasing reliance upon the
 
oceans for transport of bulk cargo, especially petroleum necessitates the
 
free passage of these ships.
 
Another source of controversy is likely to be the management of environ­
mental protection and prev&ntion of pollution. Much of the negotl
 
ation of the Law of the Sea Conference has revolved around regulations
 
of the territorial seas and coastal ecdnomic zone. However, the Stockholm
 
Conference, the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,-did
 
address some of the questions of environmental protection. It is quite clear
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that any effort to reduce environmental degradation in this country alone,
 
or in any country alone, will be unsuccessful by itself and, in fact, could
 
even become a source of international conflict. Imagine, for example, the
 
grounding of a supertanker and massive oil spill upon the shores of its polit­
ical enemy. The political implications of such an accident could be profound
 
indeed. The fourth conference was unable to establish any new guidelines for
 
pollution control and Canada's effort to establish a 100-mile pollution juris­
diction was not accepted. In short, the growing problem of ocean pollution
 
has been left for another year to solve.
 
A final consideration is the role that the oceans play in military and polit­
ical security. Some have expressed concern that a 200 mile limit could
 
trigger an escalation in the arms race. These commentators have noted that
 
in South American countries where a unilateral 200 mile delineation has been
 
established, it was immediately followed by an escalation in armament expen­
ditures and the establishmpnt.of fleets of patrol boats to, monitor the 200
 
mile limit. This could further antagonize an extremely volatile situation.
 
At the same time, it is quite clear that if nations are granted an increase
 
in territorial sovereignty, they will, in fact, make efforts to protect it
 
and guard their resources especially since the ocean riches are inequitably
 
allocated. The bulk of the ocean riches are located in the continental
 
shelf adjacent to land masses and the open seas are essentially barren.
 
The open seas have few fish resources and the mineral resources of the
 
ocean depth are currently beyond the reach of even anticipated technology.
 
3.' The Biosphere and Climate: A final concern is the lack of agreement
 
governing the protection of the biosphere and the need for regulations to
 
protect the climatic and weather patterns. This category refers to the effects
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of direct actions (such-as-intentional weather modification) as well
 
as inadvertent biosphere modification. Another section of this
 
report discusses in some detail the role industrial pollution may play in
 
modification of the climate. Here, it is important to note in particular,
 
the "greenhouse effect," caused by an increase in the carbon dioxide content
 
of the atmosphere (resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels, primarily
 
coal) and causing substantial warming of the globe. Recently, this has been
 
counteracted by the increasing concentration of dust and particulate pollu­
tion in the atmosphere which increases the amount of solar radiation reflected
 
off the earth'-- hence, substantially cooling the globe. Both of these activi­
ties are largely influenced by the level and kind of industrial activities on
 
the globe. It becomes quite clear that if the industrial revolution spreads
 
to other countries or the level of industrial activity increases substan­
tially in the developed countries, the negative impacts upon the global
 
ecosystem could be severe indeed. Hence, the need-for internationally agreed
 
upon pollution standards, environmental quality indices, and pollution abate­
ment strategies may become of paramount importance.
 
The protection of the biosphere is hampered by a frequently mentioned pro­
blem: lack of knowledge. The relationship of the oceans, climate and weather
 
patterns, industrialization and atmospheric physics, and the impact of man's
 
activities are not at all well understood. Increasingly, scientists are ex­
perimenting with different ways of modifying the weather with little insight
 
into the short or long term consequences of such activities. Even such hu­
manitarian efforts as increasing the precipitation of the drought plagued areas
 
may be dangerous. The National Academy of Sciences has discovered that
 
efforts to increase the precipitation in any given area may, in fact, result
 
in an increase in precipitation in some areas, while in others a decrease in
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precipitation may occur and in still others the experiment will have to
 
impact whatsoever. However, so little is understood that the results cannot be
 
predicted in advance with any accuracy. 1 1
 
The implication is that individual countries pursuing weather modifi­
cation schemes to improve their particular geographic and environmental
 
problems (such as localized floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornados) may
 
profoundly, and perhaps, permanently change the climate and weather relation­
ships of their region or another region without any insight into the outcome
 
of their efforts or the implications of their activities over the long run.
 
At the same time, there is the legitimate fear that such climate and
 
weather modification programs could be used as a military weapon. This
 
is a legitimate fear, somewhat muted by the inferior state of the art. 
 In
 
any event, this is another area requiring international mechanisms for solution.
 
Some Barriers to International Agreements:
 
Regardless of the area of lack of agreement, there are substantial
 
problems that prevent the implementation of any international agreement.
 
First, there is no institution that is currently perceived internationally as
 
adequate to regulate, oversee, monitor, interpret, and enforce any inter­
national agreement that may come into existence. This is true of both the
 
Outer Space Treaty as well as any resulting treaty of the Law of the Seas
 
Conference. Apparently, The United Nations currently is taking a dominant
 
role in the search for an international agreement; however, The United
 
Nations does not currently demand sufficient international respect to fill
 
this role effectively.
 
"National Academy of Sciences, Weather & Climate Modification: Problems and
 
Progress (Washington, D.C.) 1973
 
National Academy of Sciences, Understanding Climate Change: A Program for
 
Action (Washington, D.C.) 1975 r
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A second problem is that the biological, chemical, geological and
 
physical relationships of the commonly owned resources-are not well under­
stood. Repeatedly, it has been noted that climatic processes are not well
 
understood. Similarly, very little is known about the science of the oceans.
 
In fact, it is essential that-any kind of agreement governing the use of
 
the oceans must not in any way interfere with such research into the funda­
mental dynamics of the oceans. This lack of understanding means that any
 
kind of agreement that is reached must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
 
future increases in understanding of these mechanisms.
 
A final problem refers to inequitable technological achievement among
 
nations which results in technological dominance. While the international
 
consensus is that the open seas and their riches are the common property of
 
the world and therefore available for sharing by all nations of the world;
 
it is also quite clear that the relative technological differences among
 
nations make an equitable sharing highly unlikely. The lesser developed
 
countries who may view these resources as their ticket to economic development or
 
at least temporary accumulation of wealth may not have the technological compe­
tence necessary to take advantage of these marine resources in a competitive
 
fashion. Hence, any kind of international agreement that will benefit the
 
most developed dnd the most technologically sophisticated countries will
 
increase rather than decrease international conflict. Yet, it appears almost
 
impossible to prevent this kind of discrimination. The suggested international
 
fund may make it more equitable. The notion is that a fund would be
 
established from the proceeds of the commonly owned resources of the ocean for
 
the use of the developing countries as a source of capital for development.
 
Some Potential Actions:
 
Quite clearly the first step is the establishment of an international
 
agency which will command sufficient worldwide respect to interpret and : /Iv
 
- 24 ­
enforce existing international laws governing the use of shared resources
 
and would be a forum for future interpretation of any treaties, laws,
 
or regulations. While a necessary step, it is recognized that this would
 
be overwhelmingly difficult. This entity should have the power to levy
 
penalties against nations that violate the agreements. It should also have
 
resources for research, loans for lessor developed countries and monitoring
 
capabilities. As the one world economy intensifies, the importance of
 
international law substaitially increases as a means of maintaining, pre­
serving and increasing international peace and reducing international con­
flict. It will be the function and role of this agency to establish the trust
 
fund previously described as well.
 
Any institutional mechanism created to fill this void must be able to
 
interpret and enforce an agreement. First, the agreement must be made among
 
a host of widely disparate nations. Preliminary efforts are underway
 
currently, witness the Law of the Seas Conference and the Stockholm Conference.
 
Secondly, there must be a body to interpret this treaty or agreement. It
 
is quite clear that existence of the agreement by itself is insufficent.
 
Inevitably events will occur which demand an interpretation and ruling on
 
the agreement; perhaps even the levying of a fine or penalty. Finally, there
 
must be an administrative mechanism that can oversee necessary research and support
 
the compliance with these treaties. The institutional mechanism must be
 
flexible enough so that the agreements can move foiward as scientific under­
standing and international law move forward.
 
There have'been many recommendations and suggestions for the institutional
 
mechanism. In 1970, the United States Senate passed Resolution 399,
 
recommending its support for -the creation of a World Environmental Institute
 
that could act as a global research center to disseminate knowledge of
 
environmental problems and their solutions to all nations'in the world. 
It
 
- 25­
was viewed as an exchange reference center -- a clearing house on environ­
mental information. Close in agreement with this, the ad hoc Committee of
 
the International Council of Scientific Unions and Problems of the Human
 
Environment recommended the establishment of an International Center for the
 
Environment which would serve as both a research center as well as a center for
 
disseminating environmental information. Simultaneously, UN Secretary General
 
General U Thant called for a global authority which would centralize the piece­
meal environmental efforts now being done. Currently, international environmental
 
efforts are conducted in bits and pieces resulting in overlap, omissions and a
 
lack of centralized authority, decision making and responsibility.
 
It is the consensus of most experts that a fundamental requirement is a
 
mechanism for the collection, storage, retrieval processing, analyzing, and
 
dissimination of environmental monitoring data as well as environmental
 
research results. The lack of such an international clearing house serves
 
as a barrier to scientific understanding and progress. A central information
 
resource and data bank is viewed as essential to provide policymakers,
 
legislators, and industry with sufficient scientific data and understanding
 
for informed decision making. Such an institution would also establish an
 
enviable precedent for international cooperation.
 
Figure 3 indicates the piecemeal efforts of international organizations to­
wards environmental regulations and displays the similarity of the piecemeal ap­
proach taken towards environmental problems in the United States prior to the
 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency. The state of international
 
environmental protection is similar to that of the United States two decades
 
12
 
ago.
 
121972 Survey of Environmental Activities of International Organizations,
 
Prepared by Warren G- Magnuson for the use of the Committee on The Commerce, 
United States Senate, February 1972.
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In sun, the use, ownership and protection of the commonly shared
 
resources are likely to be continuing sources of considerable international
 
tension and conflict and will be extremely difficult to remedy. The inter­
national conference on The Law of the Sea reflects the present status of in­
ternational attempts to create "ideal" solutions for the protection of the
 
future environment: such-efforts appear to expand into years while pollution
 
and economic problems reach crises levels and individual countries primarily
 
concentrate on rights which are economically advantageous.
 
c26'7
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THE ISSUE OF WAR
 
The Issue. One of the most important dilemmas of our age is that nu­
clear war is feasible from a technical viewpoint, occasionally impending
 
from a political viewpoint, and unthinkable from a moral, ethical, and
 
genetic viewpoint. Furthermore, .almost all of the socio-economic-political
 
issues which appear on the horizon seem to be politically destabilizing-­
overpopulation, shortages of food, cartelism, terrorism, pressures to re­
distribute wealth to developing countries. War is possible. War is con­
ceivable. Even nuclear war.
 
In striving for a definition of war, Clausewitz, the 19th century
 
military theoretician, said, "War is not merely a political act, but also
 
a political instrument, a continuation of political relationships, a
 
,carrying out of the same by other means." As long as the world's politi­
cal powers maintain the view that war is ultimately "a political instrument"
 
there will be a finite probability of war, large scale or small.
 
The issue, unique in our times, is clearly among the most difficult aid
 
It is unique because of

.dangerous that nations of the world have ever faced. 

the high level of the killing potential now stored in weapons; it is diffi­
cult because disarming, even arms limitation in some instances, is seen as
 
counter to national interests; it is increasingly dangerous for three rea­
sons; first because more nations, and even groups within nations, are going
 
to have vastly increased killing potential in the very near future. Second,
 
new, inexpensive, easy to conceal weapons are at hand. Finally, the danger
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stems from the apparently inevitable clashes between nations over food,
 
minerals, energy, and the distribution-of wealth in the world.
 
Dimensions of the Problem. 
How can the capacity and propensity to
 
wage war and its potential consequences be measured? Certainly the extent
 
of armaments and military-related expenditures can be listed; they are ex­
tensive. The number of military personnel, domestic and foreign installa­
tions, numbers of warheads of various types, countries in conflict or
 
thought likely to be in conflict can be named and counted. These are the
 
statistics of the issue but they only serve to describe it superficially.
 
This description is needed, nevertheless, so 'that the dimensions of the
 
issue are clear; however, this quantitative enumeration should not be con­
fused with the issue itself which eludes quantification. The issue is a
 
human problem, a problem as old and ephemeral as the concept of nationality,
 
tribe, and belonging. Because the issue is so fundamental to the organi­
zation of human affairs, the statistics presented in this section are
 
inevitably the trees of some atavistic forest. 
 But the trees must be des­
cribed because the forest cannotyet be seen.
 
There is, of course, great difficulty in assembling reliable figures
 
on military expenditures throughout the world. Nevertheless, various
 
organizitions within the United Nations and peace institutes throughout
 
the world have gleaned enough data to form an idea of the massive world
 
scope of military spending which now exists:
 
- On a worldwide basis, military expenditures have been in­
treasing about 6 percent per year, in constant dollars, 
since 1950. 
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- The level of militaryT budgets for 1970 totaled 00 bil lion 
dollars. 
- since mtiiet!y axpendituresm, on the-averate, are growing faster 
than either world U1NP or world vOPlation, the absolute burden 
and per capita burden are both increasing.
 
- As an example of the size of the military enterprise, in 1967 
military costs were seven percent of the world - qual to 
the total annual income of one billion people living in Latin 
America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The manpower 
in military service totals some 50 million people, 
World military expenditures exceed expenditures for public 
education, public health, and forelgtm aid; public education 
amounted to about 70 percent of military expenditures, public 
health about 30 percent, and foreign economic aid, about six 
percent. 
- In the United States4 somewhat less than I0 pereant of the 
gross national product has been devoted to military spending. 
- In the late 1960's the developing countries accouated for only 
11 percent of the world's total military expeudituras; $8 per 
capita versus 170 per capita in the developed countries, In 
absoluta tarns theix spending'averaged four percent of gross 
national product versus eight percent in the developea contries. 
- Yet even in the developing countries, military expenditures 
far exceed a eaditzres for public education and public health 
(in 1966, $17 billion for the armed forces, 13 billion for 
public education, and $5 bllion for public health) 1 
- In real terms, military expenditures in daveloe countries 
peaked in 1968, but the growth rate of military spending in
 
developing countries has increased sharply. Since 1961, 
military spending in 93 developing nations has more than don:­
bled.2
 
1 A chibald S. Alexander% "The Cost of Worla Jnmmesto" 1 ientific 
Amerlican (October 1969), pp. 2-27. 
Z,WoY4 1-r _Zxecmdturea; 1971, U. S. Arms Control and fisanma­
memt Agency, July 1972. 
--- 
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Figure I illustrates world expenditures for military and other public
 
purposes for the years 1961 and 1970.
 
WORLD MILITARY AND
 
OTHER PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
 
E1961 	 M1970 
Dmllioncrrent dollars 
200 
F 	 100 
- 	 IO
 
50 
Military Public Public Foreign 
Education Hcalth Economic 
Aid 
*fstimcted for Z961. 
SOURCE: 	World Military Expenditures; 1971, U.S. Arms Control and
 
Disarmament Agency, July 1972.
 
Figure 1. World military and other public expenditures
 
Some nations are carrying an incredible per capita burden to support
 
their military expenditures. Figure 2 shows military expenditures as a
 
percentage of GNP versus gross national product-per capita. In countries
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SOURCE: 	World Military Expenditures: 1971, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma­
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Figure 2. Relative burden of military expenditures, 1970
 
like Laos and North Vietnam, GNP per capita is under $100, yet military ex­
penditures amount to over 10 percent of the GNP of these countries. At the
 
other extreme, Luxembourg has a per capita GNP of over $3000 and yet its
 
military expenditures are below one percent of the GNP of that country.
 
On an absolute basis, the military expenditures of the United States 
and the Soviet Union far outweigh other countries in the world. This situ­
ation is illustrated in Figure 3. N PAGE I 
OF POOR QUAIJ
 
-6-
TEN MAJOR MILITARY POWERS, 1970 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARMED FORCES MILITARY EXPENDITURES PER MAN 
(billion dolrln) (million men) (dollar) 
UNITED STATES 
.SOVIET UNION .- , 
CHINA IC0T 3,000 
WEST GERMANY - 6 0.5 00 
FRANCE 6 0.5 1 000 
UNITED KINGDOM - 6 0.4 
ITALY 2 0.4 6,000 
POLAND 2 0.3 B,000 
EAST GERMANY 2 0.2 .0oo 
CANADA 2 	 0. 
SOURCE: 	Wdrld Military Expenditures: 1971, U.S. Arms Control and
 
Disarmament Agency, July 1972
 
Figure 3. Ten major military powers, 1970
 
The number of nuclear weapons around the world is huge. The United
 
States has over 30,000 located within the United States, at sea, and in
 
foreigncountries.- Of these, -8,500 are strategic and 22,000 tactical.
 
The Soviet Union has approximately 5,500 nuclear weapons, of which 3,000
 
3 Barry Schneider, "Big Bangs from Little Bombs," The Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists, May 1975. 
%fil t 

0,
 
vU-i;~ 
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are tactical.4. The strategic weapons include those capable of being deliv­
ered by land based Minuteman and Titan missiles, submarine launched Polaris
 
and Poseiden missiles located on 41 U.S. ballistic missile submarines,
 
and bombs which can be carried on SAC bombers. The tactical weapons include
 
surface-to-surface missiles such as Lance, Sargeant, HonestJohn, and Persh­
ing, artillery shells (155mm and 203mm) and fighter bombers which can carry
 
air-to-surface missiles and bombs. The tactical weapons carried on ships
 
include bombs, depth charges,,torpedos, and missiles. The Soviet Union has
 
also developed considerable tactical power, but its size is about half the
 
U.S. tactical nuclear capacity.
 
The smaller nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe, the Philippines,.
 
South Korea, Guam, and Wake Island. Figure 4 summarizes the deployment of
 
U.S. nuclear weapons outside of the continental United States.
 
What is the total explosive force available in nuclear weapons through­
out the world? Apparently somewhat more than 50,000 megatons. This is
 
5
 
equivalent to 15 tons of TNT for each person in the 
world.
 
War might next appear in many different places in the world. Figure 5
 
attempts to summarize some of the more important potential conflicts of the
 
next ten years.
 
4
 
Larry Carder,"Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons," Scientific
 
American, May 1974; and Barry Schneider, "Big Bangs from Little Bombs,"
 
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1975.
 
5 Data on the Human Crisis: A Handbook for Inquiry, The University of
 
the State of New York, The State Education Department, Albany, New York
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Figure 4. The far-flung U.S. nuclear weapons arsonal
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POTENTIAL MILITARY CRISIS SITUATIONS IN THE WORLD 
COLNTRY AN7AC-CN'STS STATUS QUO OUTLOOK 
NORITERN IRELAND I.R.A./U.K. TERRORISM GUN RESIDENT BRITISH LITLE O4-4GE IN THE STATUS QUO, 
U.D.LU.K. MILITARY POLICE FORCE. POLITICAL RESOLUTION UNLIKELY; 
I.R.A./U.D.L. LONG TERM BRITISH ARMY PRESENCE 
LIKELY. 
MIDDLE EAST ISRAEL/ARAB NATIONS TEMPORARY TRUCE WITH PRESENCE OF POSSIBILITY OF OPEN WAR WITHIN THE 
ISRAEL/P.L.O. U.N. FORCES; PEACE ACTIVITY BEING YEAR, AND A POSSIBILITY OF OPEN 
LEBANO/P.L.O. SaLrHT ON SEVERAL FRONTS, TERROR-
ISM MAINLY PERPETRATED BY 
PEACE, PALESTINIAN TERRORISM 
LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR DLRATION 
PALESTINIANS. OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF fl-C WEST 
BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP. 
CYPRUS TURKISH CYPRIOTS/ UNEASY TRUCE WITH T DEWRKATICN CONTINUING UIEAS NESS OVER A 
GREEK CYPRIOTS OF THE ISLAND. DIVIDED CYPRUS AND ATTEMPTS AT 
RUNIFJCATION BY MAKARIOS/GREEK 
FACTIONS. 
KOREA SOUIH KOREANS/ AMERICAN PRESENCE SEEMS TO TrE CONTINUING AMERICAN PRESENCE LIKE-
NORTH KOREANS MAIN FORCE KEEPING CMtH.ISTS LY; THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT 
FRO ATEMPTING TO OVERTHROW THE CHINESE ARE RESTRAINING THE NORTH 
PARK REGIME. KOREANS, WISHING U.S. FORCE TO 
REMAIN TO MAINTAIN ThE THREE-
POWER BALANCE IN ASIA. 
TAIWAN REPUBLIC OF CHINA! STALEMATE BETWEEN THE CLAIMS OF DEATH OF CHIANG; MY H-AN THE END 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF .I-E 11, STATES TO THE RIGHTS OF OF PRCIS RESTRAINT IN TAKING 
CHINA OTHER'S TERRITORY. MILITARY ACTION TO GAIN CONTROL 
OF TAIWAN. 
SOVIET UNIOtN U.S.S.R./PEOPLE'S CONTINUING TENSION OVER C0-" CONTINUANCE OF TrE STATUS QLO, 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA BORDER, EXACERBATED BY IDEOLOGICAL NO OPEN WARIN THE NEAR FUTURE. 
DISPUTE OVER 'RIGHIT" PATH FOR THE 
WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEENT. 
PORTUGAL COttIL ITST/SOCIALISTS UNEASY POLITICAL SITUATION WITH 
THE CONTROLLING MILITARY LEADERS 
CIVIL WAR POSSIBLE BUT NOT LIKELY, 
PORTInESE WITHDRAWAL FROM ATO IS 
SUPPORTING THE COMMUNISTS AND-THE VERY POSSIBLE IF THE COt-1&NIST 
POPULACE SUPPORTING THE SOCIAL- PARTY GAINS FULL OINTROLSPANISH/ 
ISTS. PORITGESE SITUATION COULD DEVELOP. 
INDIA INDIA/PAKISTAN PERENIAL TENSION HEIGHTENED BY 
lTE RECENT INDIAN AGGRANDIZEMENT 
OPEN WAR UNLIKELY. 
OF SIKKIM. 
BRAZIL BRAZIL/ARGENTINA SUBTLE RIVALRY OVER LEADERSHIP IN NO OPEN HOSTILITIES PROBABLE IN 
S.A.; BOTH ATICNS CONTINUING TO THE NEAR FUTURE. 
BUILD MAJOR MILITARY ESTABLISH-
VENTS. 
CHILE BOLIVIA/CHILE CCNTINUING DISCUSSION OVER BOLIVI-
AN ACCESS TO A SEAPORT; -EISIONS 
OPEN CONFLICT ONLY LIKELY IF THE 
POLITICAL SITUATION DETERIORATES 
LESSENED WITH T"- ADVENT OF A IN EITl-ER COUNIRY. 
RIGHTEST REGIME IN CHILE. 
EL SALVADOR EL SALVADOR/HONRAS lfi BORDER BETWEEN THE TWONATIONS 
I5 STILL CLOSED AS A RESULT OF T 
NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS MAY RE-
OPEN BORDER, BUT THE POSSIBILITY 
"SOCCER WAR";TENSIONS STILL EXIST, OF THE RESUAATION OF HOSTILITIES 
STILL EXITS. 
PAPS pANA-VU. S. PANMNIANS WISH TO TAKE OVER FIRTHER TENSIONS DEVELOPING IN 
POSSESSION OF THE CANAL ZONEI THE NEAR FUTURE 
NEGOTIATING WITH THE U.S. 
Figure 5. Potential military crisis situations in the world
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Discussion of the Issue. 
The issue of our proximity and propensity to
 
war encompasses most dimensions of national experience: foreign policy, na­
tional aspirations, history, self images, diplomacy, social and economic
 
development, industrial capacity, technology and science, institutions and
 
groups which see conflicts in their interests or against their interests.
 
All of these interact, reinforce or cancel to form the complex structure
 
which while balanced precariously, leans nations of the world toward peace
 
or war. This discussion of the issue is divided into the following elements:
 
- Classical roads to nuclear war.
 
- Proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 
- Verification, the key to weapons treaties.
 
- SALT results.
 
- Changing U.S. Military doctrine.
 
- Two modern problems: terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
 
- Spme ugly weapons: CBW
 
- New forms of warfare.
 
"Classical" Roads to Nuclear War. Escalation describes the gradual
 
expansioniobf a limited or confined conflict into a full-scale war, in terms
 
of both. geography and weaponry. The United States and the Soviet Union have
 
developed small battlefield atomic weapons. These tactical systems are de­
signed for use in the field by troops engaged in close combat. Since our nu­
clear arsenal consists of a continuum of warhead sizes, it is easy to envision
 
a situation which starts as a limited action in which small nuclear weapons
 
are used. 
These include bombs carried by fighter planes, short-range missiles,
 
torpedos, mines, cannon, and tactical rocket launchers like the"favy Crockett."
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As the fighting grows in intensity, larger and larger weapons would be used
 
until finally the biggest were employed. This type of escalation does not
 
require the initial use of nuclear weapons; a conventional war can also grow
 
by steps until a level of conflict results which neither side anticipated or
 
wanted originally.
 
Of course, major war by escalation can also be the result of minor wars
 
occurring between smaller nations aligned with major powers. First France,
 
and then the United States went to war over issues in Vietman; throughout
 
the world there are patterns of alliances and commitments which could bring
 
this kind of conflict again. Certainly, the United States would be less
 
likely to become involved in a Vietnam type situation again without adequate
 
provocation; nevertheless, in the coming decades, provocations may abound.
 
We have no way of knowing how many times we have come close to war
 
through inadvertence. In 1958, at the height of the cold war, Frank H.
 
Bartholomew, then President of United Press, wrote in a wire service story:
 
...You are airborne in six minutes; you have been flying for
 
eight minutes. You believe enemy missiles that must have
 
passed you in flight would be due to strike North America in
 
one minute. Other U.S. bombers are in the air all over the
 
world with reprisal bombs.
 
But this one thing you alone do not know; since your takeoff,
 
foreign objects picked up on the radar scopes turned out to
 
be a shower of meterorites.
 
Other aircraft in your sortie have been turned back by radio. 
... there has been a failure; you did not receive a turn-back 
signal.
 
Do you proceed to your target...no go. You are saved, you and
 
many others, by a powerfully simple plan called "Fail Safe".
 
It is proof against errors, human or mechanical.
 
"Fail Safe,"...instructs you to proceed to your target for a
 
fixed number of nautical miles and then turn back if for any
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reason you do not at that point and at that moment receive
 
coded orders to continue.
 
This has actually happened many times. (Emphasis'added.) 6
 
As weapons systems become more complex chances for human and mechanical fail­
ure increase.
 
The list below recounts 
some accidents involving nuclear weapons. In
 
the past, the Department of Defense has acknowledged eleven such accidents;
 
some details are known about five of them:
 
- Air crash over Palomares, Spain, On January 17, 1966 an American 
B-52 bomber collided with a KC-135 refueling tanker causing the 
death of 5 crew men and the dropping of 4 hydrogen bomb which 
were recovered after an intensive ground and sea search. Radio­
active leakage and coxiventional explosion occurred in the area.
 
- Bomb accidently dropped over South Carolina. On March I1, 1958, 
a B-47 bomber accidently dropped a nuclear weapon in the megaton
 
range over Mars Bluff, South Carolina. The conventional explo­
sive "trigger" of the nuclear bomb detonated leaving a crater
 
seventy feet wide and thirty-five feet deep. A new farmhouse
 
was obliterated. No radiation leakage was detected, no nuclear
 
explosion occurred and noone was killed.
 
- Bomark missile burned in fire. On June 7, 1960, a fire at 
McGuire Air Force Base led to a series of explosions and the 
destruction of one of 56 nuclear armed Bomark missiles. No
 
nuclear explosion occurred but there was a small amount of
 
radioactive leakage creating a temporary health hazard.
 
- 24 megaton bomb safety devices sprung. In 1961, a near catas­
trophe occurred atGoldsboro, North Carolina when a B-52 bomber 
had to jettison a,,24 megaton bomb. Five of the six interlocking 
safety devices wete set off by the fall. The single switch
 
prevented the bomb from exploding, an explosion which would have
 
been over 1800 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.
 
- Greenland air crash scatters plutonium. On January 21, 1968, 
a B-52 attempting an emergency landing at Thule Air Force Base, 
Greenland, crashed and burned on the ice of North Starr Bay. 
The high explosive components of all 4 nuclear weapons aboard
 
detonated, producing a plutonium-contaminated area of at least
 
300-400"feet wide and 2200 feet long.7­
6 Frank H. Bartholomew, UPI, The New York Times (April 19, 1958.) 
 A ;4
 
7 Birry Schneider, "Big Bangs from Little Bombs, "The Bulletin of 
 i
 
Atomic Scientists (May 1975).
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The pre-emptive strike scenario deals with a situation in which one nu­
clear country launches the first attack itself while it is still able to do
 
so. It is this scenario which has led to the long standing military doctrine
 
of the United States and the Soviet Union of mutual assured destruction:
 
Country A will not launch a pre-emptive attack on Country B if enough of
 
Country B's missiles would survive that attack. Therefore, it is politically
 
stabilizing to harden and protect missile launching sites. Such hardening
 
lends credibility to the threat of significant retaliation.
 
This situation is stable enough as long as the world is essentially
 
"bi-polar"--that is, only two nuclear powers are present. When there are
 
several powers, however, the retaliatory threat must be made real for all
 
possible enemies. This becomes increasingly difficult as the number of nu­
clear nations increases. Thus, proliferation of weapons is destabilizing,
 
not only because chances for inadvertness or escalation of an on-going con­
flict increase, but because the precarious stability built on mutual deter­
ence is challenged as well.
 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1970, the Institute for the
 
Future conducted a Delphi study dealing with important societal changes.
 
Among other questions, they asked a group of political scientists, social
 
scientists, natural scientists, politicians, and others', how many nations
 
they believed would possess nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The median
 
opinion was that nine nations would have such weapons by the turn of the
 
century, but the interquartile estimates ranged from seven to thirty­
five.8 Today, barely five years after the study was completed, there are
 
naulde Brigard and Olaf Helmer, Some Potential'Societal Developments-­
1970-2000. Report R-7 (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for the Future, April
 
1970), p. 113
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NUMBER OF NATIONS POSSESSING NUCLEAR
 
WEAPONS
 
China 
Fiance 
- - -Britain 
US.S R. 
U$.A. 
40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 
Source: 	Ranl de Brigard and Olaf Helmer, Some Potential Societal
 
Developments--1970-2000 (Institute for the Future,
 
Middletown, Conn.: April 1970), Report R-7, p. 113
 
six: The United States, Great Britain, France, the USSR, China, and India
 
have nuclear weapons. 
All but India have a strategic delivery capability.
 
Eighty-three nations have become parties to the 1970 Treaty on the
 
Non-Proliferation of Weapons (NPT). China, France, and India are the only
 
non-parties to the NPT which have nuclear capability. There are many non­
party nations which apparently have the technical capability to build nu­
clear weapons and maybe under political pressure to do so. These include:
 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt (Egypt has signed the NPT but not ratified it),
 
Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and Spain.9 There are other countries which
 
could probably, if they wished, develop nuclear weapons but appear to be un­
der no particular political pressure to do so. 
 These nations include:
 
Thomas A. Halsted, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons-Is the Dam About
 
1 1
to Burst?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1975, p. .
 
Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and
 
10
 
Switzerland.
 
By means of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear powers agreed to work
 
toward nuclear disarmament and to help end the spread of nuclear weapons
 
throughout the world. Non-nuclear nations would be recipients of the bene­
fits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy supplied by the nuclear powers
 
themselves. While the treaty has not fallen apart, it clearly has not pro­
duced the results that its authors had hoped for. India became the sixth
 
nuclear power May 18, 1974 wheni a 15-kiloton explosive set off underaround
 
in the Rajasthan Desert in northwestern India. The purpose of nuclear
 
development in India, was ostensibly to pursue peaceful applications.
 
Within India there was-almost universal acclaim for the development; China
 
and the Soviet Union did not voice disapproval and the United States' was
 
quite mild. Major criticism came from Japan, Sweden, and Canada. The crit­
icism from Canada is particularly interesting in view of the fact that
 
Canada had provided the nuclear reactors which generated the nuclear fuel
 
for the Indian explosion.
 
Today, according to Thomas A. Halsted, Director of the Arms Controls
 
Association, there are three major factors which favor proliferation. First,
 
most nations of the world apparently believe that nuclear weapons can 'be
 
equated with greater security. Second, there is a'general expectation that
 
nuclear explosives will prove useful for peaceful purposes. Finally, the ex­
panding use of nuclear generated electric power facilities makes available,
 
through the reprocessing cycle, enriched uranium which can be used in weapons.
 
Thomas A. Halsted, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons-Is the Dam About to
 
Burst?"Bulletin of the'Atomid Scientists, May 1975, p. 11.
 
10 
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This latter point must cause appreciable concern. By 1980 at least 30
 
countries will build nuclear power reactors. These include in order of the
 
amount of 1980 installed capacity: the United States, Japan, West Germany,
 
United Kingdom, USSR, Sweden, France, South Africa, Canada, Switzerland,
 
Taiwan, Korea, Italy, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, India, Argen­
tina, Finland, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Rumania, Bulgaria, Austria, Bra­
zil, Yugoslavia, Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan.
 
In June 1974, the United States offered to sell both Egypt and Israel
 
a 600-megawatt reactor to produce electric power. 
The offer required accep­
tance by Egypt and Israel of stringent safeguards--including, apparently,
 
the requirement that spent fuel be returned to the United States for repro­
cessing to prevent the possibility of accumulation of weapons-grade material
 
within the using countries. Despite this feature of the agreement, many
 
critics see the introduction of such nuclear technology into the volatile
 
Middle East-as dangerous and not in keeping with the spirit of the NPT.
 
The United States is, of course, not the only nation engaged'in the sale
 
of nuclear reactors to foreign countries. For example, France recently an­
nounced that it will sell five large reactors to Iran.
 
Verification, the Key to Weapons Treaties. 
Weapons have been limited by 
a number of treaties including: 
- The Antartic Treaty of 1959. 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, banning nuclear testing
underseas, and outer space, and in the atmosphere. 
- The Outer Space Treaty of 1967. 
- The SEATO Arms Treaty of 1972. 
- SALT I, signed in Moscow in 1972, which established a five
 
year interim agreement on offensive weapons.
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All of these treaties depend on verification. On-site inspection (except
 
for the Antarctic Treaty) has been, and continues to be, a difficult require­
ment. What has made prior agreements possible at all is the advent of a
 
very sophisticated orbital reconnaissance capability in both the USSR and
 
the United States. The current generation of reconnaissance satellites is
 
known as "Big Bird" which first flew in the early 1970's.
 
"Big Bird" i',apable of performing in rapid sequence, both wide­
area surveillance and close-look inspection. Data from the rela­
tively low reduction area--surveillance photographs are relayed
 
from orbit more than one hundred miles above the earth to ground
 
stations by a high capacity transmitter. Film from close-look
 
inspections which reveal objects as small as one foot or so in
 
dimension, is recovered in special capsules which are picked up
 
as they parachute earthward." 11
 
Qrbital surveillance is augmented by other means of intelligence gather­
ing including over-the-horizon radars and ferret aircraft.
 
In treaty negotiations the United States has taken the position that
 
on-site inspection to investigate uncertain seismological events wodld be
 
required. Most countries now agree that seismological detection is sensitive
 
enough to make a complete test ban practical. The detection threshold with
 
current equipment is about one kiloton. The identification threshold is
 
about 5-10 kilotons in hard rock, but about an order of magnitude higher
 
for testing in large cavities which have been designed to deeouple the shock
 
from the earth's crust. An interesting note: Since the test ban treaty went
 
into effect in 1963, more tests have been conducted underground than-were
 
12
 
conducted in the atmosphere prior to that date--the number is well over 1000.
 
11 Strategic Weapons: Verification Keeps Ahead of Arms Control", Science, 
March 14, 1975. 
12 Steven Rowe, "No Halt in th4 Nuclear Arms Race," New Scientist (Feb­
ruary 15, 1973), p. 374. _V) 5 
SALT I talks began in November 1969. Although many hoped that these
 
talks would result in nuclear disarmament, much less was achieved. When the
 
talks began neither multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
 
(MIRV) nor defensive anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's) had been deployed
 
(except for a single small ABM system protecting Moscow). MIRV's and ABM's
 
are reciprocal steps in the process of nuclear escalation: MIRV systems are
 
a threat to hardened ICBH enplacements and therefore upset the balance of
 
land-based deterents. Effective ABM's, on the other hand, would imply that
 
the country in which they Mere enplaced could survive a retaliatory attack-­
therefore, a pre-emptory attack could be seen as plausible. Instead of pro­
posing a joint ban on further KIRV and ABX development, SALT I limited both
 
nations to a single ABM installation (around each capital), and the MIRV issue
 
was essentially removed from the agenda. 
A freeze was set on the number of
 
ICBM's (USSR was allowed a total of 2358 missiles and the United States
 
1710). No more ICBM launchers or silos could be constructed and "light"
 
ICBM's could not be converted to "heavy" delivery vehicles.
 
SALT II began in late 1972; in its first phase a futile search was made
 
for an agreement which would ha4re 
resulted in permanent arms limitation. At
 
the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting of June 1974, the leaders sought to have SALT II
 
extend the interim agreements for two to three years and to add a limitation
 
on MIRV's. However:
 
"A simple freeze on MIRV's, which was discussed, would have
 
meant no more MIRV deployment by the United States and no fur­
ther MIRV testing by the Soviet Union. From the Soviet stand­
point, this was unacceptable because the United States already
 
had many MIRV's where the Soviets had none. What the Soviets
 
wanted was to stop or slow down the U.S. deployment while they
 
carried on the largest deployment program the Soviet Union 
could mount. So the MIRV issue brought this phase of the nego­
tiation to an impasse." 13 
13 Strategic Arms Limitation (II): "Leveling Up Dissymmetry," Science.
 
""
 (February 21, 1975), p. 627. 
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Before SALT II began,.Congress approved a resolution calling for the
 
President to seek equality in strategic forces for the United States during
 
the talks. Equality has turned out to mean an upward adjustment in the num­
ber of delivery vehicles which'either the United States or the Soviet Union
 
can have. Within this ceiling of 2400 delivery vehicles, either side may
 
have whatever force mix they desire--except new ICBM silos and heavy ICBM's
 
are still proscribed. Within the 2400 delivery vehicle total, 1320 missiles
 
may currently have MIRV's. According to Science, this commits the USSR to
 
deploy "an average of at least two additional warheads everyday for the next
 
ten years." 14
 
Thus, SALT has not produced arms reduction--rather it has sanctioned an
 
increase in the level of armaments. Furthermore, new weapons not covered by
 
the agreement can be deployed as additions to the existing forces. A sub­
marine launched cruise missile is an example. Clearly, despite SALT, the
 
arms race is still moving ahead full tilt.
 
Changing U.S. Military Doctrine. In greatly simplified terms, our nu­
clear strategy, as stated publicly, has been one of "mutual assured destruc­
tion" (14A). The size of the U.S. nuclear force has been based on a worst
 
Mutual assured destruc­case scenario of a massive Russian all-out attack. 

tion holds that the U.S. response to a first strike would be a retaliation
 
of sufficient size to wipe out the attacker at sufficient levels of destruc­
tion to inhibit any rational government from initiating a first strike.
 
Only a relatively small portion of our missile arsenal could inflict massive
 
4 Strategic Arms Limitation (II): "Leveling Up Dissymmetry," Science
 
(February 21, 1975), p. 627.
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damage on the USSR: for example, the delivered warheads of 220 Minuteman III
 
ICBM's could "kill about 21 percent of the Russian population from immediate
 
15
 
effects alone, and destroy 72 percent of the Russian industrial capacity.",

We actually have more than 550 Minuteman III missiles. Poseidon missiles-­
could achieve a similar result. Our fleet currently includes some 500
 
Poseidon missiles; only about 170 of these missiles would be required. Fin­
ally, our 400 B-52's and 65 FB-ill's could also inflict heavy damage. The
 
nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the USSR are summarized in
 
Figure 6. This figure illustrates that both the United States and the USSR
 
have secure retalitory capability--most strategists believe enough force to
 
absorb an all-out nuclear attack-and mount a massive retaliatory strike.
 
Within this posture of mutual assured destruction, a new strategy is
 
taking shape. In the Department of Defense's annual report for 1975,
 
Secretary of Defense James Schlessinger said that we are seeking "a wider
 
set 	of much more selected targeting options" and greater "flexibility" in
 
responding to "any kind of nuclear attack." Secretary Schlessinger enumer­
ated "principal features of the proposed posture" as follows:
 
1. "A capability sufficiently large, diversified, and survivable
 
so that it will provide us at all times with high confidence
 
of riding out even a massive surprise attack and of penetrat­
ing enemy defenses, and with the ability to withhold an assured
 
destruction reserve for an extended period of time."
 
2. 	"Sufficient warning to ensure the survival of our heavy bombers
 
together with the bomb alarm systems and command-control capa­
bilities required by our National Command Authorities to direct
 
the employment of the strategic forces in a controlled, selec­
tive? and restrained fashion."
 
15
 
Larry Carter, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,". Scientific Amer­
ican (May 1974).
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Figure 6. 	Strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and
 
USSR. This figure' presents a numerical representa­
tion of the military balance between the United States
 
and USSR and does not take into account qualitative
 
differences in the nuclear weapons: for example, the
 
larger size of Russian ICBM's.
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3. 	"The forces to execute a wide range of options in response
 
to potential actions by an enemy, including a capability for
 
precise attacks on both soft and hard targets, while at the
 
same time minimizing unintended collateral damage."
 
4. "The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be ta­
ken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first­
strike disarming attack against the USSR."
 
5. 	"An offensive capability of such size and composition that
 
all will perceive it as an overall balance with the strate­
gic forces of any potential opponent."
 
6. 	"Offensive and defensive capabilities and programs that con­
form with the provisions of current arms control aggrements
 
and at the same time facilitate the conclusion of more perma­
nent treaties to control and, if possible, reduce the main
 
nuclear arsenals."
 
The third criterion relates to the new doctrine of flexible response. It
 
implies that an escalating nuclear war scenario becomes much more plausible
 
than before. One can imagine an all-out nuclear war beginning with the use
 
of tactical nuclear weapons located in Europe and then escalating to threats
 
or actual exchanges of nuclear weapons designed to incapacitate certain in­
dustries, military installations, or to destroy selected cities. Murmansk
 
for 	Groton, for example.
 
Such a possibility is more "thinkable" than an exchange based on mutu­
al assured destruction. Therefore, flexibility in'response, when equated to
 
flexibility in attack, is inevitably threatening and dangerous.
 
Two ModernoProblems: Terrorism and Guetrilla*Warfare. Terrorism is a
 
violent fact of political life. Terrorists groups in different countries
 
have apparently formed international linkages and arms, ammunition, and
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16
 
personnel flow among them. - With increasing presence of fissionable mater­
ial throughout the world, the possibility of amateur made, nuclear terror
 
weapons Is becoming more plausible and threatening. Nuclear bombs require
 
only a few kilograms of plutonium-enriched uranium 235 or uranium 233.
 
Furthermore, the design and construction of a crude but workable explosive
 
device is apparently not difficult. To test this hypothesis, the Public
 
Broadcasting System recently challenged a physics graduate student to design
 
a workable bomb using only publicly available materials.17 Once the student
 
had completed the design, it was submitted to nuclear physicists associated
 
with the U.S. Weapons Program. Their judgment was, given adequate construc­
tion and fissionable material, the design would have produced a weapon
 
capable of exploding.
 
Despite the fact that terrorist weapons would be of extremely low yield,
 
when compared to weapons currently in the arsenal of the nuclear powers,
 
even inefficient devices would be capable of killing tens of thousands of
 
people and causing enormous damage. When amateur nuclear bombs become
 
plausible, some aspects of our way of life may have to change., For example,
 
joint sessions of Congress may become obsolete; video communications might
 
be used to replace this kind of assembly. Urban centers are vulnerable to
 
terrorist attack; disruptions of communications, water supply, transportation,
 
becomes much easier for small groups to accomplish when nuclear explosive
 
power becomes available to them.
 
16 Mason Willrich, "Terrorist Keep Out",'The Bulletin of the Atomic
 
Scientists, (May 1975), p. 12. (Hereafter called M. Willrich, "Terror­
ist Keep Out".
 
17 "'Nova Series: The Plutonium Connection", (Boston, Mass.: WGBH TV),
 
March 9, 1975. 23
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The key question is whether or not terrorist groups could conceivably
 
obtain an adequate amount of fissionable material to construct a bomb. The
 
fuel used in conventional reactors is not suitable for the construction of
 
weapons. However, during fuel reprocessing, high-grade uranium is produced
 
which could be used in an explosive. Furthermore, high temperature gas-cooled
 
reactors, which are now being introduced, utilize enriched uranium which,
 
contrary to the light water reactors, can be used in explosives. The liquid
 
metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) which is now under construction, produces
 
-more plutonium than it consumes. The reason for the introduction of the
 
LMFBR is to extend our supplies of fissionable material. However, when viewed
 
from the standpoint of the prospects of terrorism, the LMFBR must be regarded
 
as a potential source of illicit explosives. The Atomic Energy Commission
 
has forecasted that by 1980 the U.S. nuclear power industry will use
 
19,000 kilograms of materials that are of quality high enough to be used in
 
nuclear explosivesJ.8
 
Before December 1973, the Atomic Energy Commission reqiirements for
 
safeguarding plutonium' were incredibly lax. Plutonium enriched uranium was
 
shipped in unescorted trucks around the country, driven by single, unarmed
 
drivers. 
The material itself could be stored in locked buildings checked
 
once every four hours by an unarmed guard. In November 1973 the General
 
Accounting Office issued a report describing the laxity of the system and
 
recommending changes be immediately introduced. 19 Shortly thereafter, in
 
April 1974, the Ford Foundation Energy Project released a report which was
 
18 The Atomic Energy Commission, Office of Planning and Policy Analysis,
 
1974 Forecast, Washing.-1139 (Washington, D.C., 1974).

1.9
 
'ComptrollorGeneral of the United States,'improvements Needed in the
 
Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material. Report to the Con­
grdss (Washington, D.C.: November 7, 1973).
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also very critical of the Atomic Energy Commission procedures.20  The re­
port found that even the strengthened safeguards were inadequate but that
 
a satisfactory system could be developed to reduce the risk of theft of nu­
clear materials. The Atomic Energy Commission reviewed this report before
 
its publication, and completed an in-house study which was made public
 
through Senator Ribacoff, in April 1974.21  This report agreed with the
 
Ford Foundation Report; the Atomic Energy Commission author said:
 
"Urban terrorist groups in this country.,,likely to have avail­
able to them the sort of technical knowledge needed to use the
 
now widely disseminated instructions for processing fissile
 
materials in for building a nuclear weapon. There are also li­
able to carry out reasonbly sophisticated attacks on installa­
tions and transportation.. The new regulations are inadequate
 
and...immediate steps should be taken to greatly strengthen the
 
protection of special nuclear materials."
 
The General Accounting Office Study, the Ford Foundation Study, and the
 
Atomic Energy Commission in-house study have apparently produced a new atti­
tude toward' the safeguarding of nuclear material within the United States.
 
However, the funds requested by the Atomic Energy Commission for strengthen­
ing the program during the fiscal year 1975 were cut by about 80 percent by
 
the Office of Management and Budget. Thus, while awareness is growing, the
 
safeguard problem still exists.
 
The international aspects of the problem are most disturbing. While
 
the level of discussion has increased in the United States, little discus­
sion has taken place on a world basis. The plutonium used in India's nuclear
 
20
 
*Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Tayler, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safe­
guards, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publication Company, 1974.
 
21
 
D.4. Rosenbaum, et al, Special Safeguards Study, Atomic Energy Com­
mission, (April 30, 1974. 
 .)I 
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explosion was produced in a reactor provided Indiaby Canada under a "peace­
22
ful uses" guarantee.

Mason Willrich, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, and for­
mer Assisstant General Council of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
 
Agency, had suggested some possible means for reducing the risk of theft.**
 
He believes that safeguards should concentrate on the prevention of theft
 
rather than on detection and discovery of stolen material. Storage areas
 
must be strong enough to withstand attack; co-location of nuclear fuel cycle
 
support facilities such as enrichment fuel fabrication and reprocessing, would
 
reduce the need for transportation of fissionable material; spiking plutonium
 
so that its handling would be extremely dangerous would be another possibili­
ty; guarding of nuclear facilities should be taken over by a nuclear materials
 
security service; and finally, the U.S., Government should pursue the estab­
lishment of safeguard standards with other nations employing nuclear materials.
 
Willrich believes that the problem is basically a human problem--not techno­
logical:
 
Safeguards against nuclear theft and sabotage are intended to
 
deal with the risk of malfunctioning humans. The possibility
 
of nuclear violence using material diverted from civilian in­
dustry is fundamentally a human problem for which there is no
 
technological fix. ,There is no final solution. Nor is there
 
any alternative to dealing with it effectively until the last
 
fissionable atom has been split.'*
 
Guerrilla warfare, of course, is not new. U.S. Marines were sent to
 
Nicaragua in 1912 to impose what the United States considered to be a de­
sirable doniestic order. There was no opposition to them. When they were
 
sent again in 1926, resistance was offered by the Nicaraguan forces under
 
22 m. Willrich, "Terrorist Keep Out". _ 
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General Augustino Sandino. The encounter was protracted and irresolvable.
 
It aroused widespread cirticism within the United States and anti­
23
 
The Marines were withdrawn in 1933.
 Americanism in Latin America. 

Since the end of the Second World War, guerrilla wars have been in
 
progress in one part of the world or another--more or less continously.
 
This form of warfare grew out of the resistance movements which formed
 
against German rule in occupied countries during the Second World War.
 
Guerrilla movements have surfaced in Africa, Southeast Asia, Cuba, Malay­
sia, and South America. A basic reality of this form of warfare is that:
 
"Technical superiority in arms and logistic support possessed
 
by the forces opposing the guerrillas is quite unimportant in
 
determining the outcome of the war... military commanders tend
 
to be blind to the true character of the guerrilla movement
 
that they are fighting, and they make the same political, psy­
chological, and tactical mistakes over and over again.
 
"From a military point of view, the art of guerrilla warfare is
 
largely a matter of improvisation and opportunism...the greater
 
importance attaching to conserving manpower than to holding
 
ground... the guerrilla is always ready to run away and hide.
 
Consequently, when regular ground or air forces attack with pow­
erful modern weapons, the guerrilla makes it his business not to
 
be present.
 
"If the guerrilla movement is supported by a large section of the
 
population, it has a reservoir of manpower on which to draw.
 
Clumsy, destructive, and impatient action by regular forces will
 
always tend to drive civilians into the guerrilla camps.... If
 
some highly, lethal new weapon, such as a nerve gas or an infec­
tious micro organism, were used effectively against the guerril­
las, that local military victory of the regular forces would be
 
bought at a price of moral catastrophe that would make political
 
victory utterly impossible." 24
 
23 Lewis J. Halle, "Does War Have a Future?" Foreign Affairs, (October
 
1973), p. 22.
 
24 Vladimir Dedijer, "The Poor Man's Power,"a chapter in Unless Peace
 
Comes, Nigel Corder (ed.), (Viking Press, New York: March 1970),
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Some Ugly Weapons: CBW. Chemical weapons include nerve agents, blister
 
agents, incapacitants, vomiting agents, and riot control agents.
 
Nerve gases originated during research on insecticides. During the
 
second world war, the Germans manufactured but did not use the toxic chemical
 
known as Pabun which goes under the military symbol GA. This German plant
 
was moved to Russia. The United States has manufactured the related chemical
 
Sarin which is known as GB. It is thought to be four times more lethal than
 
Pabun. Death from this chemical can occur in from one minute to two hours,
 
depending on the amount and means of absorption. VX is the second nerve gas,,
 
which has the same kind of effect as GB, but is longer lasting.
 
The blister agent, HB, is a purified version of mustard gas which was
 
used in World War I.
 
The incapacitants include BZ which produces both physical and mental
 
effects, such as slowing of physical and mental activity, headaches, giddi­
ness, disorientation, hallucinations, drowsiness, and increase in body temp­
erature.
 
The three riot control drugs developed by the Unfted States are DM, a
 
vomiting agent; CS, tear gas; and CN, which is-similar to CS but also causes
 
burning and itching. All three riot control drugs were authorized for use
 
in Vietnam.
 
The United States has developed binary chemical weapons in which com­
paratively innocuous intermediate chemicals are separated from one another by
 
a small explosive device, When the explosive device is detonated, the chem­
icals mix forming a poison such as nerve gas. Using this approach, stock­
piles of the separate chemical agents can be stored safely. This technology
 
072231
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has caused some difficulty in the chemical disarmament talks currently being
 
conducted in Geneva. Binary weapons are exceedingly difficult to describe;
 
in the limit all precursors which are sitting on the laboratory shelf are
 
25
 
potential weapons.
 
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has stated that the ease of pro­
duction of the chemicals used in binary weapons puts this approach easily
 
within the capability of developing nations.
26
 
Biological weapons are now banned, By international treaty. Work on
 
such weapons has ceased in the United States; however, this review of war
 
and weaponry would be incomplete if this field were not at least mentioned.
 
There are a number of reasons why military strategists feel that biological
 
weapons offer very significant offensive potential:
 
- The possibility of choosing micro organisms or toxins tailored
 
to specific military needs--from temporary incapacitation of
 
large segments of the population with certain viruses--to at­
tacks on agriculture.
 
- High levels of the effects on human, animal, or plant targets
 
with respect to weight and costs of the weapons.
 
- A significant psychological effect.
 
- Extremely difficult defense because of the large number of
 
delivery methods.
 
27
 
Absence of physical damage to industry and other structures.
-

Before the convention banning production and stockpiling of biological
 
and toxic weapons, the biological arsenal is thought to have included the
 
25 Dr. Robert Jones, "Chemical Warfare--The Peacetime Legacy," New Scien­
tist (April 24, 1975), p. 202
 
New York Times (March 24, 1974).
 
27 -Car-l-Gorin, "The Infectious Dust Cloud," Unless Peace Comes, Nigel
 
Croder (ed.), (Viking Press, New York: March 1970).
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following diseases: Rabbit Fever, which brings with it mortality of un­
treated victims as high as 30 percent; Rocky Mountain spotted fever, in
 
which mortality can run as high as 80 percent in untreated cases; Psitpacosis,
 
parrot fever, which carries 10 percent mortality; Ciccodioidomycosis, a
 
disabling disease which may affect any or all organs--mortality about 50 per­
cent; and Botulism, in which death occurs in about 65 percent of the cases. 28
 
The micro organisms with which experimental work was being conduqted be
 
fore the ban was extremely potent. A single inhaled particle of Burneti is
 
sufficient to cause infection--three grams of embryonic chicken tissue in­
nocculated with Q fever is thought to hold enough infectious doses for the
 
entire human population of the world. 29 Delivery of such micro organisms is
 
relatively simple--in the form of aerosols or as additives to water or food
 
supplies. Biological agents could be disseminated on a small scale by intro­
ducing them into central ventilation systems in key buildings or vehicles.
 
With this weapon, very small groups could upset the strategic balance.
 
Perhaps most disturbing of all, means have now been developed to create
 
artificial viruses through genetic mutations of natural viruses. In effect,
 
these mutations cause new diseases for which no cures or antidotes have been
 
developed.
 
28
 Chemical and Biological Warfare (II): The Weapons and the Policies,"
 
Science (January 20, 1967).
 
29
 Carl-Gorin, "The Infectious Dust Cloud," Unless Peace Comes, Nigel
 
Corder (ed.), (Viking Press, New York: March 1970).
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Turmoil in Biological Research
 
At a symposium on biological researchers held in Davos, Switzerland in
 
October 1974, Carl Scherrer of the Swiss Institute for Cancer Research said,
 
"we are in the same place as nuclear physicists were in 1938."30 The progress
 
in the field which led to this statement has indeed been impressive. For ex­
ample:
 
- Nils Ringertz of the Swedish Institute for Medical Cell 
-Research and Genetics and others have reported crossing 

genes of different species to obtain live hybrid cells;
 
in particular, he and his colleagues have combined human
 
cells with chromosmes of rats, mice, and insects.
 
-Ear Khorana of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 
has synthesized a 126-unit artificial gene which has the
 
potential of directing the production of transfer RNA
 
within a bacterial cell. 3 1
 
At the Davos meeting, Paul Berg of Stanford University warned that these
 
same techniques might result in the creation of bacteria which could not be
 
cured by any known medical treatment. These artificial genes could be used
 
as a short cut to genetic manipulation and achieve very desirable consequences,
 
such as the introduction of nitrogen fixation capability into various grains,
 
but clearly this capability could also lead to widespread suffering if a
 
bacteria capable of reproducing and causing an uncurable disease were to es­
cape into the environment, or if this technology were to be used as a biological
 
agent in warfare.
 
30
 
*Genetic Engineering: Clashing Views,"Science News (November 2, 1974).
 
31 "On the Brink of a Functioning Artificial Gene," Science News (Sep­
tember 21, 1974). / 
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In July 1974, Berg called for a moratorium on research involving the
 
formation of bacteria resistant to antibiotics and research which linked DNA
 
molecules with tumor-causing viruses. In late February 1974, 140 scientists
 
involved in genetic experiments gathered at Asilomar, California, to discuss
 
how the scientific community might manage this two-edged sword.32 After in­
tense and dramatic discussions, the group agreed to initiate a policy in which
 
certain experiments on the transplantation of foreign genes into bacteria would
 
be deliberately renounced. This decision came about despite concern that any
 
specific document the conference-produced might be codified into law; that
 
police powers did not exist among scientists and cheating might go on; that
 
any such restriction diluted academic freedom; that the issue was more than
 
just scientific--it also hinged on moral and ethical considerations. Yet
 
the judgments were made on the basis of perceived benefits versus perceived
 
risks. How the future consequences of these judgments will fare remains to be
 
seen.
 
One can only hope that the current ban is real, effective, and lasting;
 
inspection is clearly impractical since the manufacturing of viruses is so
 
simple and easy to camouflage. Therefore, the continued effectiveness of the
 
ban depends on good will of all nations.
 
The United States has been criticized as establishing a very hypocritical
 
policy with respect to the use of CBW. For example:
 
"President Nixon's announcement of the U.S. renunciation of
 
biological weapons was essentially deflective. Biological
 
weapons constitute less than 10 percent of the U.S. CB ar­
senal, and'are so poorly understood and indiscriminatory
 
32
.Janet H. Weinberg, "Decision at Asilomar," Science News (March 22, 1975);
and Science News (March 7, 1975). ?3 
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that their use was never seriously contemplated. In the
 
same announcement, the President confirmed the U.S. renun­
ciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons and ex­
tended the renunciation to the first use of incapacitating
 
chemicals. However, early in 1970, the Nixon Administration
 
came up with a new definition of chemical warfare that would
 
permit the use of agents "whose effects are not lasting."
 
Under this definition, American use of tear gas and herbi­
cides in Vietnam is not chemical warfare. Thus, in making
 
his announcement, the President renounced the militarily un­
reliable part of the U.S. CB arsenal and redefined the useful
 
chemical agents-out of it." 33
 
New Forms of Warfare. In past times, international political power was
 
essentially proportional to military strength. This is no longer the case.
 
First of all, when a country has the capability to over-kill its enemy many
 
times, a further increase in force will not necessarily increase political
 
power. Secondly, a small country which gains nuclear weapons may reach a
 
high level of power at a time when its economic conditions, conventional
 
military forces, and population would normally relegate-it to a secondary
 
role. Thirdly, in open societies, public pressures militate against
 
conventional military engagements, thus reducing the ability of such nations
 
to employ force or the threat of force to execute policy. Finally, the use
 
of guerrilla tactics apparently provides military strength which is dispro­
portionate to the political power of guerrillas. For all these reasons,
 
many developed countries in the world find conventional warfare of all types
 
much less a viable option that it was as recently as twenty years ago.
 
Against this background, a new kind of weapon might well come on the
 
scene: the covert weapon, which has the characteristic that only one side
 
33 Kevin J. Kinsella, "Disarmament, The Current State of th? Fraud,"
 
Science Journal (November 1970), pp. 42-43.
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knows when it's being used. Wars could be waged in times of ostensible
 
peace without overt military force. Technology is currently being developed
 
which could provide the basis for covert weaponry. 3-4
 
Some possible covert weapons are: 
- Fertility control drugs which can be added to staples or water 
supplies to lower the fertility rite of a population to some
 
predetermined level.
 
A fertility inducer or twinning drug which would suddenly
 
increase population growth rates in enemy nations. 
- Mass administered drugs which control the level of amine in 
the brain and thus modulate aggressiveness or will to resist. 
- Hallucingens with precisely controlled characteristics, or 
personality control drugs. 
- Drugs which control the sex of babies. 
Weather control, of course, also fits this pattern. Making it rain on
 
command, by seeding certain kinds of clouds is a technology already in hand.
 
For the future, the perfection of this technique could lead to increasing
 
the number and types of clouds which could be manipulated, dissipating or
 
redirecting hurricanes, lightning dissipation, and fog dispersal.
 
In an age of covert weapons, every unusual drought would be suspected
 
of being artifically induced. When floods occur, will retaliatory hurricanes
 
be launched? This is not an accademic issue: between 1967 and 1972 the
 
Department of Defense ran Operation Popeye, attempting to create rainfall over
 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in order to make it so muddy that the North Vietnamese
 
could not move supplies into the South.
35
 
3.4 The Future as a Pattern of Coincidence," prepared for the Institute of
 
Life Insurance, T. Gordon, The Futures Group Report 22-14-01,(Glastonbiry,
 
Conn.: October 1971).
 
35 Phil Stanford, "Is the Pentagon Tinkering Too Much With the Weather?"
 
Parade, May 3, 1975.
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Control of the environment goes beyond weather control: it also might in­
elude climate modification through the introduction of carbon dioxide or par­
ticulate matter in the atmosphere, movement of the polar ice caps, or spraying
 
the polar ice caps with heat absorbant material; creating a "hole" in the ozone
 
layer to permit ultraviolet radiation to penetrate to the surface of the earth;
 
creating earthquakes through the injection of fluids into faults in the earth's
 
crust; and triggering tsunamis, tidal waves, through the use of directed earth­
6
quakes? Add to this unholy list, the possibility of orbiting mirrors which
 
can concentrate solar energy at particular points on the earth in order to
 
raise the temperature beyond the point of survival.
 
Because of the serious implications of weather control used as a weapon,
 
some members of Congress have been considering placing restrictions on the
 
development of weather weapons. In 1973, Senator Claiborne Pell initiated a
 
resolution requesting that the Administration begin negotiations with the USSR
 
to ban weather modification. Representatives Donald Fraser and Gilbert Gude
 
have introduced a similar resolution in the House in the current session.
3 7
 
The age of covert warfare would be the golden age,of paranoia. Countries
 
would always wonder who was attacking or whether there was an attack. In
 
this time, the computer would be the only measureof peace, and nations would
 
judge whether peace or war existed on the basis of how far demographic, econ­
omic, meteorlogical and behaviorial factors seem to be from normal expecta­
tions.
 
36
 Gordon J.F. MacDonald, "How to Wreck the Environment," A chapter in
 
Unless Peace Comes, Nigel Corder. (ed.) (New York: Viking Press, March 1970).

37 SPhil Stanford, "Is the Pentagon Tinkering Too Much With the Weather?" 
Parade, May 3 , 1975 c;.2­
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The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations reads in part:
 
"We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save
 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,
 
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
 
dignity and worth of the human person,...and of nations
 
large and small...to promote-social progress...to practice
 
tolerance...to maintain international peace...and resolve
 
to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."
 
We are enormously distant from this ideal.
 
The 8,000 year history of civilization is a continuum of war. This un­
ending record of battles and ascendancy of one nation over another suggests
 
that war somehow may be intrinsic in man, or at least in groups of men, de­
rived from the primal instinct for self-preservation. War has elements of
 
group psychoses, chauvanism, pride, glory, and mysticism. If such elements
 
are intrinsic, then the successful elimination of war must be based on a
 
solution that satisfies these intrinsic drives. In other words, the solution
 
to war must necessarily be a human, rather than a technological or legal prob­
lem, and control must be found in terms of a human solution.
 
If a human solution is possible, it will have its birth in psychology,
 
which is not fully a science today. It will have its adolescence in the de­
velopment of the sciences of government, economics, and group dynamics. These
 
sciences will provide understanding of group needs and drives, and methods
 
for satisfying them. The human solution will realize maturity in world law
 
which, newly codified, will embody the principles of these sciences of the
 
people. To avoid the catastrophy of war, we must come to work with men of
 
good will and peace throughout the world, limit armaments, and disarm if at
 
all possible, stabilize and defuse the issue which can lead to war, and seek
 
with all possible speed, the sciences which will divine insight into the under­
lying causes for war.
 
WORLD CONCERN: POPULATION AND FOOD 
With only a few reversals because of massive famine or incidence of
 
disease, the world's population since the agricultural revolution has grown
 
steadily; the rate of growth becoming exponential in the last 200 years.
 
At the birth of Christ, estimates place world population at 200 million, by
 
1750 the number had grown to 800 million; by 1975, to 4,000 million and the
 
2000 constant fertility, no global disaster extrapolation is that more than
 
7,000 million humans will occupy this .planet. It is not a question of will 
population growth cease, it is a question of how: will it be voluntarily 
accomplished through control of fertility or will it be involuntarily through 
famine, environmental degradation, and biosphere contamination. 
While world population growth averages 2%, it is essentially a regional 
problem. The growth rates vary from 0.6% for the U.S. and Europe to 2.5 to 
3.0% for the underdeveloped nations - Africa, Latin Ametica, Southern Asia. 
Many nations do not perceive their population growth as a problem; but as a 
means to ensure economic growth and political equality. 
The immediate threat of world population growth is famine. Again, this 
is a regional problem, but on a global scale the most striking fact has been 
the relentless decrease in world grain reserves since 1961. These reserves 
have fallen from 60 days at actual consumption rates to about 20 days in 
1974. And the import-export distribution reveals that only North America is 
a major surplus producing region; however, in the U.S. and elsewhere, the 
reserves of idle cropland have steadily shrunk in that 1961-1974 time period 
until they are essentially zero in the U.S.
C// 
The "Green Revolution" brought about by the introduction of new:
 
strains has stretched the reserves only a few years, but now has been
 
slowed by the limitations (and sharp price increase) on the availability
 
of fertilizers. The margins are so small and the inelasticity in-the
 
demand for food so strong that small changes in weather, and all the other
 
factors contributing to food production, including distribution, produce
 
very large fluctuations in the availability of food, and at times, great
 
potential for massive starvation and disease in India, Bangladesh and the
 
Sahel region. Of significant concern in the agriculture picture is the
 
evidence for adverse climatic change in the Northern Hemisphere, particularly
 
over the Great Plains {n the U.S.
 
Food production throughout the world has kept pace in the long term
 
with population growth; available calories per person have risen in the devel­
oped nations and remained essentialconstant in developing countries. The
 
crucial problems are two: how to effect the global management of the world's
 
grain supplies so that regional variations in production can be avoided and
 
how to increase the productivity of the small farmer in the developing nations.
 
In the-United States the primary issues associated with population are
 
the changing age distribution and the changing demography as urbanization
 
increases. Growth in total numbers is expected to be modest, from 210
 
million in 1975 to between 280 to 300 million in 2000 depending on net
 
reproductive rate.
 
Because of the reduced birth rate, the U.S. population is aging; it
 
is projected that the age group of over 45 will rise from-about 24% in 1975
 
.to 33% in 2000 and the age group 25-44 will increase from 22% to almost
 
30%. The implications of this are largely economic; shifts in demands for
 
goods, services and government expenditures for health care and social
 
security. But society's values (and priorities) may be expected to shift too,
 
because of the different values of different age groups and the observed
 
persistence of values among age cohorts as they age.
 
By 2000 over 80% of the U.S. population will be living in urban areas;
 
the trends in the disruption due to congestion, the pollution, crime, violence
 
and alienation of the individual have all been unfavorable, and show little
 
sign of abating.
 
POPULATION AND FOOD, THE ISSUES
 
Rapid Population Growth in the Fourth World Leads to Massive Deaths
 
Due to Starvation, Malnutrition, and Disease
 
Inadequate Food Supplies in the Fourth World May Lead to Massive
 
Starvation
 
Population Growth in the Lesser Developed Nations Inhibits Economic
 
Growth and Development, Leading to a Growing Disparity of Living
 
Conditions between Developed and Underdeveloped Countries
 
Continued Urbanization of the United States is Causing the
 
Deterioration of the Central City; Costly Suburban Developments;
 
and Increases in Congestion, Pollution, Crime, Violence and
 
Alienation
 
Changing Age Distribution of the U.S. Population Creates Fundamental
 
Attitudinal and Social Changes which Markedly Affect the Demands for
 
Goods, Services, and Resource Expenditures
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ISSUE: 	 RAPID POPULATION GROWTH IN THE FOURTH WORLD LEADS TO MASSIVE 
DEATHS DUE TO STARVATION, MALNUTRITION, ANDDISEASE 
The Issue:
 
1
 
World population growth is currently over 2 percent per year. Population
 
growth throughout the world is not homogeneous, however; the growth rate in
 
developing countries is substantially greater than in developed countries.
 
Recent statistics estimate that, on the whole, developing countries are
 
growing at the rate of 2.5% annually, while developed countries are growing at
 
1.0% per year. Within the developing countries themselves there is also an
 
appreciable difference in population growth rate. Figure 1 presents UN
 
population growth rate estimates for Fourth World and 10 developed countries
 
and demonstrates that these Fourth World countries, which are growing the
 
fastest are also the poorest.
 
The continued disparity in growth rate between the developed and the
 
developing countries will have several significant consequences:
 
The median age in the developed countries will increase
 
while the median age in developing countries will
 
decrease.
 
By the year 2000 only 22% of the world's population will
 
reside in developed countries (versus 30% currently).2
 
World population will te between 5.9 and 6.7 billion by
 
the year 2000, an increase of 62-83% over current world
 
population.3
 
Taken here to include Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia,
 
Gambia, India, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and
 
Upper Volta; these countries are either experiencing malnutrition or signi­
ficant food shortages, or seem likely to have such problems in the future.
 
1UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1973 (Paris; UNESCO Press, 1974), pp. 32-33.
 
2United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Studies,
 
No. 49, The World Population Situation in 1970 (New York: United Nations, 1971),
 
p.46 (Hereafter called World Population Situation 1970).
 
3Wbrld Bank Sector Working Paper, Population Planning, Washington, D.C.,
 
March 1972, p.45 , (Hereafter called Population Planning).
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FIGURE 1 
POPULATION PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND GROWTH RATES 
GIg!CAPITA 
(U. S. DOLLARS) 
POPULATION 
GROWT. RATE 
PERCENTAGE 
OF FOOD 
FOURTH WORLD COUNTRY 1972 1960-72 1965-72 XEQUIREMENTS: 
Bangladesh 70 2.6 2.5 80 
Central African Republic 160 2.2 2.2 98 
Chad 80 1.8 1.8 89 
Ethiopia 80 2.2 2.4 93 
Gambia 140 2.0 1.9 104., 
India 110 2.3 2.3 94 
Mali 80 2.1 2.1 88 
Mauritania 180 1.9 1.9 85 
Niger 90 2.9 2.8 89 
Pakistan 130 3.2 4.1 93 
Senegal 260 2.1 2.2 100 
Sri Lanka 110 2.4 2.3 98 
.Upper Volta 70 2.1 2.1 72 
DEVEIOPED COUNTRY 
(10 top countries in 
GNP/capita) 
United States 5590 1.2 1.0 126 
Sweden 4480 0.7 0.7 104 
Canada 4440 1.7 1.5 129 
Switzerland 3940 1.2 1.0 119 
Denmark 3670 0.7 0.7 120 
France 3620 1.0 0.8 127 
West Germany 3390 0.9 0.6 121 
Norway 3340 0.8 0.8 110 
Belgium 3210 0.5 0.3 128 
Australia 2980 2.0 - 1.9 123 
SOURCE: 	 .WorldBank Atlas, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1974), pp. 6-7
 
and The World Food Conference, Selected Materials for the use of the
 
U.S. Congressional Delegation to the World Food Conference, Committee
 
on Agricultural Forestry, U.S. Senate (October 30, 1974), pp. 37-39.
 
*Revised standards of average requirements (physiological requirements plus
 
10 percent for waste at household level).
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Even if stringent birth control measures were to result in rapid
 
fertility decreases per female of childbearing age, population growth rate
 
would not be curtailed substantially since the future childbearing sector
 
is already born. Even if birth rates could be brought down to replacement
 
level immediately, a most unlikely situation, world population would grow to
 
6.5 billion within the next 75 years. But it is much more likely that birth
 
rates will not diminish appreciably within the next few decades; for example,­
assuming that they drop to replacement level by 1980, world population will
 
reach 8.2 billion by 2050. The world would have added 4 billion people of
 
4
 
whom more than 90 percent would be in the underdeveloped countries. As
 
Figure 2 shows, the countries which comprise the Fourth World are likely to
 
grow from 1 billion people in 1970 to between 2 and 2.5 billion in the year
 
5
 
2000, depending on the assumptions made about birth rate.
 
Ironically, the population growth problem is aggravated by improvements
 
in the quality of life, efforts at improved sanitation, nutrition, control of
 
epidemics and insect borne diseases, and improved vaccination and public health
 
programs all reduce infant mortality rates and improves childhood survival
 
rates. Some small improvement in adult life expectancy occurs as well. These
 
two concurrent forces -- high birth rates and reduced infant mortality -- doom
 
these nations to sustained rates of rapid population growth for some time to
 
come. Figure 3 below shows the disparity between declining mortality rates
 
and rising birth rates. This, then, is the heart of the population problem
 
of the Fourth World.
 
4Thomas Frejka, "The Prospects for a Stationary World Population,"
 
Scientific American (March 1973).
 
5United Nations Population Studies, No. 41, World Population Prospects,
 
1965-2000, UN Document ESP/P/WP.37.
 
- 4 -
FIGURE 2
 
"FOURTH WORLD" AND UNITED STATES POPULATION HISTORY AND PROJECTIONS
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""FOURTH WORLD" = THOSE DESIGNATED U.N. STATISTICAL REGIONS MOST CLOSELY 
APPROXIMATING THE STARVING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. 
INCLUDES INDIA, BANGLADESH, AND SUB-SAHARA AFRICA.
 
SOURCES FOR U.S.: 	 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 
AND BUDGET, SOCIAL INDICATORS, 1973 (WASHINGTON, D.C.: 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1973), P. 249; AND
 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
 
UNITED STATES: 1973 94TH EDITION (WASHINGTON, D.C.,
 
1973), P. 5.
 
SOURCES FOR "FOURTH WORLD": U.N. POPULATION STUDIES, NO. 41- "WORLD 
POPULATION PROSPECTS, 1965-2000," U.N. DOCU,4ENT 
ESP/P/WP.37 AS GIVEN IN PAUL R. EHRLICH AND ANNE H. 
EHRLICH, POPULATIO(N. RESOURCES, ENVIRONti-NT 2ND 
EDITION (SAN FRANCISCO: W. II. FREEMAN & CO., 1972), 
ORIGINAL PAGN] X$ PP. 456, 458, AND 460. 
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FIGURE 3 
MORTALITY RATES VERSUS BIRTH RATES 
1935-1939 1950-1955 1965-1970
 
Region Deaths Births Births
Deaths Deaths Births
 
World Total 24-27 34-38 19.3 36.7 14.0 33.8
 
Developed Regions 14.7 24.9 10.2 22.9 9.1 18.6
 
Developing Regions 29-34 40-45 24.0 43.9 16.1 40.6
 
Crude Death Rates per Thousand
 
Crude Birth Rates Per Thousand
 
Source: Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., World Population and a Global Emergency,
 
(Washington, D. C.: Aspen Institute for Humanities Studies,
 
1973), p.36 .
 
In the First World War, French battlefield physicians devised the system
 
of triage; that is, classifying the wounded according to their chances of
 
survival. They then devoted their resources to those patients who would
 
survive with attention. Some writers advocate a similar policy for the
 
Fourth World: identify those nations which will survive with aid. Viewing
 
triage in the context of the Fourth World problems, some nations may reach
 
self-sufficiency with or without aid. Other nations, given assistance, may
 
reach self-sufficiency. However, the Fourth World is comprised of countries
 
*whose population growth rates are so high and whose food production capacity
 
6
is so precarious that aid could not help attain self-sufficiency. Hence,
 
6William and Paul Paddock, Famine 
-- 1975! (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown
 
& Co., 1967); and Paul R. Erhlich and Ann H. Erhlich, Population, Resources,
 
Environment, Issues in Human Ecology, (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman
 
& Company, 1972). 
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regardless of degree of aid, the Fourth World will have a difficult time
 
ever reaching the transition to economic and agricultural self-sufficiency.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
World Population Growth: In the history of man the explosive growth of
 
world population is a relatively new phenomenom. Over hundreds of centuries,
 
world population growth was very slow, on the order of a tenth of a percent
 
7
 
per year. Only within the last three centuries has the growth rate of
 
population in the world reached relatively high levels (see Figure 4). The
 
current population growth rate of 2% annually implies a doubling time of
 
approximately 35 years, as shown below.
 
POPULATION GROWTH RATE AND DOUBLING TIME
 
Annual percent increase Doubling time (years)
 
0.5 139
 
0.8 87
 
1.0 70
 
2.0 35
 
3.0 23
 
4.0 17
 
SOURCE: Population, Resources, Environment, p. 9.
 
7Ronald 
Freedman and Bernard Berelson, "The Human Population," Scientific
 
American (September 1974), p.37.
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FIGURE 4
 
THE GROWTH OF HUMAN NUMBERS
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The population in the developing countries is soaring as a result of
 
diminishing mortality but high fertility.
 
In the less developed regions, the fertility level, whether
 
measured by birth rates or in other ways, is now twice that
 
in the more developed regions. In fact, few indicators
 
discriminate more sharply between more developed and less
 
developed regions than does the birth rate.8
 
8World Population Situation 1970, op.cit.
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One consequence of this situation is that the age distribution of
 
developed countries is very different from that of developing countries. Where
 
fertility is high, there is a preponderance of young people; as birth rate
 
nears replacement level, the age distribution 'ismore homogeneous (Figure 5).
 
Hence, the labor force of developing countries is constrained by the demands
 
of caring for a large non-productive dependent population.
 
The difference in birth rate between developed regions and developing
 
regions implies a major difference in completed family size; that is, the
 
average number of children born per woman living through reproductive period.
 
In the developed world the average number of children born per women is 2.9,
 
9
 
versus 5.5 in the developingregion.
 
Impetus to Large Family Size in Developing Countries: Why does birth
 
rate remain high in developing countries when the problems of large increases
 
in population are so apparent?
 
- Poverty, extreme and widespread, holds people in "disparing
 
resistance to change."1 0
 
- Religious and cultdral resistance to the birth control
 
movement.11
 
- The slow spread of family planning as an instrument of
 
national population policy.12
 
- The high rate of infant mortality requires additional births
 
in order to ensure survivors.13
 
9World Bank Sector Working Paper, Population Planning, Washington, D. C.,
 
March 1972, p.26 .
 
1 0
"The Human Population," op.cit., p.36.
 
l1Population, Resources, Environment, op.cit.
 
12World Population i970, op.cit.
 
l3"The Human Population," op.cit.
 
FIGURE 8 
AGE STRUCTURE OF POPULATIONS 
1965-72 Population Growth Rates for: Mexico 
United States 
Sweden 
-
-
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0.7 
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. 
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SOURCE, "The Human Population," pp. 38-39, and World Bank Atlas, p. 6.
 
- 10 ­
- Preferences for sons to help in agriculture and to provide 
economic security in old age leads families in impoverished 
countries to "keep trying for a son," thus increasing popu­
lation pressures.14 
The desire for large families is correlated with the level of development 
as indicated by the results of opinion polls taken in both developed and 
developing countries (see Figure 6). The demographic transition theory argues 
that reduced fertility is associated with modernization and economicdevelop­
ment. There is no question that these factors are intimately related.
 
However, as Figure 7 indicates GNP per capita per se as a measure of economic
 
development is not well correlated with reduced birth rates. 
However, when
 
other more meaningful indicators of modernization are accounted for, the
 
correlation is clear. Figure 8 shows the relationship of educational achieve­
ment (clearly a more accurate indicator of advancement in the quality of life
 
than GNP percaptia) and fertility rates.
 
Family Planning Efforts in Developing Countries:, Population policy has
 
recently become a "legitimate" concern of government planning and policy efforts.
 
In 1960, only three countries had anti-natalist policies; by 1971, twenty-six
 
countries had announced such policies and another twenty-four supported family
 
planning programs without giving them "official status. However, there is
 
little evidence that these programs have been effective. According to the
 
World Bank, "performance has been uneven and there has not yet been a signi­
ficant or demonstrable impact on.. .fertility rates."15
 
14Pbi o a g

15Population Plannin$, op.R 
.
, p.18.
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FIGURE 6 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE CONARED TO BIRTH RATE
 
Average Percentagede­
mnhberof siring: 1971 
Size chldren 4 or 5 or birth 
Area Date sample desired more mom rate 
Austria 1960 2.0 4 16.5 
W. Germany 1960 2.2 4 15.0 
Czechoslovakia 1959 3,192 2.3 15.5 
Hungary 1958-1960 6,732 2.4 13 6 15.0 
Great Britain 1960 2.8 23 16.6 
France 1960 2.8 17 16.7 
Japan 1961 2,753 2.8 22 8 18.0 
Switzerland 1960 2.9 22 16.5 
Puerto Rico 1953 888 3.0 19 24.0 
Italy 1960 3.1 18 17.6 
Norway 1960 3.1 25 17.6 
Netherlands 1960 3.3 39 19.2 
U.S.A. 1960 2,414 3.3 40 15 18.2 
Ceyion 1963. 302 3.2 25 12 32.0 
Jamaica 1957 1,368 3.4-4.2 48 19 33.0 
Colombia 1963 3.5 44.0 
Turkey 1963 5,122 3.5 42 25 43.0 
South Africa (white pop,) 1957-1958 1,022 3.6 54 10 
Tgiwan- 1962-1963 2,432 3.9 - 62 22 26.0 
Thailand 1964 1,207 3.8 54 26 A2.0 
Pakistan 1960 2,086 3.9 65 26 50.0 
Chile 1959 1,970 4.1 58 26 34.0 
Canada 1960 4.2 70' 17.6 
lXdia- 1952-1960 5,909 3.7-4.7 57-63 25-34 42.0 
Indonesia 1961-1962 2,208 4.3 66 36 47.0 
S. Korea 1962 1,884 4.4 77 44 XL0 
Ghana 1963 637 5.3 88 56 48.0 
Philippines 1963 7,807 5.0 71 53 46.0 
SOURCE: Data from Studies in Family Planning No. 7, Population
 
Council,_ 1965. :,Birth rates from.1971 World Population
 
Sheet, Population Reference Bureau.
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FIGURE 7
 
WEALTH VS. BIRTH RATE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
 
(with more than 10 million population)
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FIGURE 8
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL AND FERTILITY LEVELS
 
IN GHANA, JORDAN, AND CHILE
 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN 
Ghana Jordan Chile 
No education 5.7 8.7 4.9 
Elementary education 5.2 7.3 1.3 
Secondary education 2.5 4.5 1.7 
At least one university degree 0.5 4.0 n.a. 
Source: 	 Lester R. Brown, In the Human Interest A Strategy to
 
Stabilize World Population (New York: W. W. Norton
 
& Company, Inc., 1974), p.'15 .
 
The Consequences of Population Growth on Food Availability. A study
 
recently conducted at Iowa State University projected the prospect for world
 
food; it included projections for 96 tountries to the year 2000. The study
 
assumed high and low per capita income, crop acreage, and crop yield and then
 
the assumptions about population and other factors were permuted in order to
 
obtain estimates of the food availability in different regions of the world.
 
While there is considerably unaertainty, the results indicated a food deficit
 
regardless of whether low or high populations are assumed.1 6 In any event,
 
the high income countries must anticipate supplying the lower income
 
countries, and even if all surpluses of the high income countries flow to the
 
16Leroy L. Blakeslee, Earl 0. Heady, and Charles F. Framingham, World Food
 
Production, Demand, and Trade (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1973),
 
(Hereafter called World Food Production.)
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others, there may be significant shortages until population growth slows. The
 
study makes it apparent that if the low income and medium income countries
 
studied are to survive, it is imperative that they limit their population
 
growth.
 
At the heart of such forecasts is the question of whether or not
 
developing countries can increase their food productivity at a rate equivalent
 
to their population.
 
The developing countries have made herculean efforts to increase their
 
ownfood production. In the years 1948-1960, the results were especially
 
impressive. In some cases, total production was increased by 50 percent or
 
more; and per capita increases over the same time period were as high as 5
 
percent.17 But by 1960, agricultural growth in developing countries began
 
to falter in its race with population: per capita production of food leveled
 
off even though total production continued to grow. In some areas, notably
 
Africa, per capita production declined. Figure 9 demonstrates the precarious
 
race between food production and population in the less developed countries
 
over the last decade, and Figure 10 presents the same data for developed
 
countries over this interval.
 
Some Controversial Views about Population. There is not universal
 
agreement regarding the desirability of lowering fertility. Francis Olu Okediji,
 
Head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria,
 
argues that the prevailing opinion among officials and decisionmakers in his
 
17World Population Production, op.cit.
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country is that "most African countries would benefit from having at least
 
double their present population." 18 He says such growth is necessary for
 
industrialization in order to create purchasing power that can absorb
 
products to be manufactured locally. Similarly, Otoniel Valasco, Tech­
nical Director of the National Planning Institute of Lima, Peru, argues
 
that:
 
There are undoubtedly limits to population growth in
 
this finite world, but the limits will not be a con­
straint for several generations. Meanwhile, we are
 
suffering from artificial limits to growth resulting
 
from unjust economic and political structures. There
 
would be more than enough for everyone if income dis­
tribution were not so uneven, if technology were not
 
so irrational, if social and political structures were
 
not so inhuman ....Why are the developing countries so
 
worried about population growth in the third world?
 
If they are so concerned about the poverty of our
 
people, why don't they allocate at least 1 percent of
 
their national incomes for development projects? Are 
they motivated by humanitarian considerations or are 
they really afraid of our large populations? 19 
Potential Actions
 
The dilemma is simply this: the population limiting policies of
 
countries cannot have a major effect on population size within the next
 
two and a half or three decades. The implications of population growth'
 
are therefore especially serious in Fourth World countries: the food re­
quired may well exceed the capability of the countries to produce the food
 
required. Yet unless voluntary means for reducing birth rate are pursued
 
18Population Dynamics Quarterly: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Population
 
Programs and Policies (Winter 1974), p.10., op.cit.
 
9Ibid i
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now, the problem will become immeasurably more difficult in the future.
 
And without inspired and arduous activity devoted to increasing agricul­
tural production, starvation seems a plausible outcome. What can be done?
 
- Freedman and Berrelson suggest five couirses of action:
 
Persuade, manipulate services, change incentives,
 
transform social institutions, and coerce. For
 
example, Taiwan offers a positive incentive in the
 
form of educational bonds for parents who stop at
 
three children. In Bangladesh, the possibility of
 
coersive measures such as limitations on ration
 
cards and compulsory sterilization for parents who
 
have-two or more children, has been discussed openly.
20
 
- Mesarovic and Pestel propose these solutions:
 
A global approach to the problem of world food;
 
investment aid rather than commodity aid, except
 
for food; a balanced economic development program
 
for all regions; effective population policy (with
 
all of the problems implicit); worldwide diversi­
fication of industry, leading to a truly global
 
economic system.2 1
 
The World Bank has established certain areas of emphasis in its own
 
work. These include training--filling shortages of adequately trained
 
personnel in medical, paramedical, and social services in the developing
 
countries; physical facilities--health services and institutions for training,
 
education, and research; communication strategy--including providing
 
information to individuals about family-planning, group motivation, and
 
family life education; reducing infant mortality--in the hope that lowered
 
20
"The Human Population," op.cit.
 
2tihajlo Mesdrovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the Turning Point
 
(New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc./Reader's Digest Press, 1974).
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infant mortality will provide an effective motivation to the practice of
 
family planning; and research in all areas involving population questions.22
 
There are some more distant possibilities. While clearly not currently
 
feasible nor desirablemass administered fertility control agents added to
 
water supplies or food is a potential technological innovation.
 
Parental licensing is another possibility. No doubt advances in contraception
 
technology are on the horizon, including time-release contraceptives and
 
reversible vasectomies. Policies to encourage late marriages and fewer children
 
are legend. Rewards might be given for sterilization and for appropriate
 
child spacing. Maternity benefits could be withdrawn or taxes levied-on all
 
births after the nth child. Pensions might be initiated in certain countries
 
to provide more adequately for poor parents with a low number of children and
 
for the elderly. Two types of marriage licenses might be initiated: one
 
which permits children and the other which does not. Finally, the minimum
 
age at marriage could be raised by legislation.23
 
Robert MacNamara, President of the World Bank, related the unforgiving
 
truth of the situation when he said, "the population problem will be solved
 
one way or another. Our only option is whether it is to be solved rationally
 
and humanely, or irrationally and inhumanely."
 
Perhaps the most powerful means of creating a voluntary reduction in
 
birth rate in any nation may be through ways which provide financial
 
•security to the population and largely increase the level of affluence. It
 
22Population Planning.
 
23 Shirley Foster Hartley, Population: Quantity Versus Quality (Englewood
 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-all, 1972 32.
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is not clear that such conditions are reasonably attainable for fourth world
 
countries within this century -- at least for a significant percentage of the:
 
population within these countries.
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ISSUE: 	 INADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLIES IN THE FOURTH WORLD MAY LEAD TO 
MASSIVE STARVATION 
The Issue:*
 
Since the end of World War II, developing countries have made enormous
 
gains in increasing their total food production: from 1954 to 1973 developing
 
countries' food productivity increased 75%, as compared to world-wide
 
increases of 69%.1 However, because of population growth, this represents
 
only a per capita increase of 3% in contrast to a 30% increase which occurred.
 
in the developed world.2 Furthermore, food supplies per capita in the Fourth
 
World remain below minimum nutritional requirements, averaging about 60-85%
 
of the per capita food supplies available in the developed nations.
 
Available food supplies in the Fourth World are largely domestically
 
produced. Because of balance of trade problems; rising prices of energy,
 
pesticides, fertilizers, etc.; and projected food shortages within the
 
developed countries, Fourth World areas must produce, in large measure, their
 
own food supplies for the future. Unfortunately, the bulk of arable land
 
is already under cultivation so that future food supplies basically depent
 
on decreases in population, overall economic education and development, and
 
localized technological'improvements.
 
The Fourth World, for the purposes of this discussion includes Bangladesh,
 
Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, India, Mali, Mauritania,
 
Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Upper Volta, countries experiencing
 
malnutrition, significant food shortages, or likely to in the future..
 
lPhilip H. Abelson, "The World's Disparate Food Supplies," Science, Vol. 187,
 
No. 4173 (January 24, 1975), p.21 7 .
 
2U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1974 Handbook of Agricultural Charts,
 
Agricultural Handbook No. 477 (October 1974) p.50 .
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Development of new hybrid strains of grains has increased productivity
 
of existing land under cultivation in Asian areas; but our belief that
 
technological improvements in agriculture would answer our world food
 
problems, and particularly prevent starvation in the Fourth World nations,
 
appears in question. Hybrid strains develop epidemics easily and require
 
irrigation, pesticides, fertilizer and herbicides -- all of which cost
 
money. The emphasis of the following issue is an effort to capture the
 
circular dilemma Fourth World areas face in terms of critical food supplies
 
in the future: in short, advanced agriculture provides economic development
 
and lower population; but as is shown here, technology costs for agriculture
 
have become a serious obstacle to the production of even minimal food
 
supplies.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
Growth in Food Production: There has been substantial growth in good pro­
ductionin the developing world. (See Figure 1) In fact, the developing
 
tworld accounts for half of the world's grain and cereal crop in the 1951-1971
 
period. ,During this time total world production of grain and cereals doulled.
 
However, because the developing world accounts for 2.6 billion people versus
 
the 1.1 billion of the developed world, the per capita production (see Figure 2)
 
of the developing world is only 40% of that in the'developed world.3 It is
 
important to note the developing world has been able to maintain unprecedented
 
increases in total output. Even during the decline in food production due
 
to bad weather in 1972, food production in the developing countries was 20%
 
higher than 1966, the most recent year that such conditions had occurred.4
 
3Roger Revelle, "Food and Population," Scientific American, Vol.231-, No.3
 
(September 1974) p.165. I .
-.
 
4The World Food Conference, Selected materials for th'e Use of the U.S.
 
Congressional Delegation to the World Food Conference Committee on
 
Agricultural Forestry, U.S. Senate (October 30, 1974)*p.22.
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Many have suggested that we merely need repeat the process that resulted
 
in substantial productivity gains in U.S. agriculture and the Fourth World food
 
shortages will be solved. However, methods used to increase productivity in
 
developing countries, such as India and Pakistan, have not closely
 
paralleled the techniques used in the developed nations, especially since
 
the end of World War II.
 
Let us review the history of American agriculture. Output per acre of
 
the American farmer was essentially constant from the formation of the nation
 
until about 1940. Until then, increases in total production occurred through
 
increases in land under cultivation. By 1866, land devoted to grain surpassed
 
50 million acres and by 1877, had exceeded 100 million acres. This expansion
 
continued until 1899 when the acreage devoted to raising grain leveled off at
 
about 17 million acres for about 10 years. Another expansion began in 1909
 
and grain acreage reached 211 million acres in 1915.5 During this
 
period, a small amount of capital was invested in American agriculture. It
 
was not until World War II that American agriculture became highly capital
 
intensive. The war demanded increases in production of food and fiber but
 
the nation had largely used up its frontier land, Although agricultural out­
put in America increased steadily through the war, dramatic increases did
 
not really occur until the early 1950's.
 
U.S. agriculture is now highly capital intensive, energy intensive,
 
chemical intensive and technology intensive. Like every other industry in
 
America it has benefited from the fruits of R&D, high technology and advanced
 
entrepreneurial and management skills all characteristics and behavior
 
traits that are, by definition, lacking in the lesser developed countries.
 
lester R. Brown, Increasing World Food Output, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Regional
 
Analysis Division, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. [Hereafter
 
called Increasing World Food Output.] 
 7 7 
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To repeat the agricultural success of the United States,means to repeat the
 
Industrial Revolution and speed the process of modernization, clearly an
 
elusive goal for the lesser developed countries.
 
Lester Brown argues that four factors are essential prerequisites
 
for a "yield takeoff" in any nation's agricultural-output: (1) reasonably
 
high levels of literacy, (2) reasonably high per capita income, (3) a market
 
oriented agriculture, and (4) an economy which supports agriculture through
 
a variety of goods and services. Brown believes that literacy is an
 
important factor in the equation as it enables the farmer to practice
 
management skills which are necessary to successful, highly efficient
 
agricultural production. 
Some argue that merely the development of an
 
adequate market structure in the lesser developed countires would contribute
 
significantly to the solution of the food shortage. 
Much of the agricultural
 
surplus of a given farmer is lost, Is is argued, because of an inadequate
 
marketing, storage and distribution network in the developing countries.
 
How, then, has the developing world managed to increase its agricultural
 
output? Several factors have contributed to this increase in production.
 
One, over the past two decades the amount of land under cultivation has
 
increased. During the past two decades, for instance, India has increased
 
the amount of land under cultivation by 20%. However, it will be difficult
 
to increase the amount of land under cultivation much beyond the current
 
level without substantial capital investment. For example, most "potential"
 
arable land in Asia could not support even one four-month growing season
 
without significant irrigation. It has been estimated that an additional
 
1.5 million square miles of land could be brought into cultivation, an
 
increase of 26%. 
However, to bring this land just up to today's productivity
 
levels could take 50 years and $500 billion of investment. 7Y
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Increases in output per acre have been accomplished through hybrid
 
grain varieties specifically developed for the tropical and subtropical
 
climates.- While these hybrid varieties have resulted in spectacular
 
increases in output per acre, especially in wheat and rice, it has been
 
accomplished at a cost of increased dependency on energy, fertilizers,
 
pesticides and irrigation support. India, for instance, has increased its
 
utilization of fertilizer by a factor of 30 since 1951,6 With increasing
 
cost pressures on both energy and agricultural chemicals, it becomes
 
increasingly difficult for the poorest nations to adopt this technology.
 
While the consequences of adoption of the high yield hybrids have been
 
dramatic, the hybrids are not intensively cultivated. It has been estimated
 
that only 12% of the rice growing land outside of the developed countries
 
(U.S., Europe, Japan, Taiwan) and China (about whom there is no data) is
 
devoted to the high yield hybrids. While this seems insignificant, the
 
amount becomes substantial when one realizes this percentage was zero before
 
7
 
1967.
 
Substantial improvements in agriculture production in the developing
 
world have also been achieved through irrigation. For instance, since 1951
 
8
 
India has doubled the amount of land under irrigation,

Demand and Consumption of Foodstuffs: Americans are freely accused of
 
food waste because of their high consumption of beef, an extremely inefficien
t
 
source of protein because it requires 8 1/2 pounds of grain to produce I
 
pound of beef. It has been suggested that if the United States were to
 
reduce its consumption of beef, or merely adapt tp grass fed beef rather
 
6 Revelle, op.cit.
 
KRobert F. Chandler, Jr., "The Scientific Basis for the Increased Yield
 
Capacity of Rice and Wheat, and Its Present and Potential Impact on Food
 
Production in the Developing Countries," in T.T. Poleman and D. K. Freebairn,
 
Food, Population and Employment: The Impact of the Green Revolution
 
2 6 2 7
(Praeger Publishers: New York) 1973, p. - .
 
Revelle, op.cit.
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than grain fed beef that two purposes would be served: it would free enough
 
grain in the United States to meet the Fourth World's shortage and the animals
 
themselves would serve as "factories" for converting marginal "grassy protein"
 
into high-grade protein for human food. 
While contentions such as these must
 
be questioned, it is quite clear that worldwide affluence is increasing the
 
demand for beef and other foodstuffs higher up on the food chain, which in
 
turn is further aggravating worldwide food supplies.
 
The developing world, on the other hand, primarily consumes vegetable
 
protein and starch (see Figure 3). This protein base does not meet minimum
 
dietary requirements. By contrast, in-the period 1969 to 1971, the supply
 
of food energy available to persons in the developed countries was estimated
 
to be 23 percent above minimal requirements and protein supplied 12 percent
 
of the available food energy, 
In terms of energy, the developed countries
 
averaged over 3100 kilocalories per capita per day while the developing
 
countries averaged only 2200 kilocalories per capita daily.. In terms of
 
protein, the developing nations on the average-consumed only 60 percent
 
of that Available to the developed nations (see Figure 4)X9
 
Imports as a Solution to Food Shortages: In the past, the growing
 
agricultural surpluses in the West, predominantly the U.S., Canada, Australia
 
and New Zealand, have managed to forestall any regional food shortage. In
 
fact, agricultural surpluses were such that the American farmer was paid.not
 
to grow food and the government absorbed the costs of food storage of
 
surpluses. These programs were not.undertaken to feed the hungry, but
 
rather to provide price support to the American farmer. All hopes of winning
 
the age old struggle against hunger ended with the dismal world harvest of
 
1972, when the harvest was 3% below demand. The international imbalance
 
9 The World Food Conference, op.cit., pp 37,38,42243.­
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FIGURE 4
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between demand and supply preclude importing as an effective policy for' 
the foreign exchange poor developing nations.
 
Currently, the developed world provides little to the food supplies
 
of the developing world. While more than 60% of the wheat produced in the
 
U.S. is exported as is more than 502 of the rice and soybeans, the bulk of
 
this is exported to the developed world. The leading recipients of U.S.
 
agricultural exports are the most developed nations: Japan, West Germany
 
(see Figure 5).1 0 The developing countries largely grow their own foodstuffs.
 
Only 20% of the wheat and rye consumed in India and Pakistan is imported.
 
But because wheat and rye in these countries comprised 15% to 30% of the
 
food consumed, the total amount of food imported typically comprises only 4%
 
I I
 
to 6% of 	the diet in the developing countries.

FIGURE 5 
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The international commerce in food has changed drastically since the 
end of World War II. From the mid-19301s to the late 1940's almost all 
regions of the world exported grain. Only western Europe was an importer. 
The situation has changed substantially since then, as only the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand currently export grain. All other
 
regions import grain as shown in Figure 6. 
In 1972 more than 75% of
 
this export trade was from the United States, about 15% from Canada, and the
 
remainder from Australia and New Zealand.12
 
As shown in Figure 7, exports comprise a relatively small and decreasing
 
portion of the total grain produced in the world. However, they may make
 
an extremely important contribution. If the world continues to consume
 
grain at the current worldwide average, the addition of about 70 million
 
people anticipated annually in the next few years 
would require about 306
 
million tons of grain yearly. 
That amount is roughly equivalent to about
 
40 percent of U.S. exports or the total sales of Canada, Australia, Argentia,
 
and South Africa in 1973. Any external event which might reduce grain
 
exports from the U.S. and Canada would diminish grain imports elsewhere in
 
the world and, hence, could aggravate food shortages in specific areas.
 
Such events might include unfavorable weather or even continued consumer
 
resistance against the exportation by the U.S. as a result of higher food
 
'prices in America.
 
Because of the dominant role the U.S. plays in the worldwide production
 
of grain, changes in the pattern of world trade in grain seem to hinge upon
 
decisi6ns which are made in the U.S. 
As noted earlier, at about the time
 
Theodore J, Gordon and R. Richmond, A Preliminary Technology Assessment 
of Agricultural Information Systems, Report 166-6702 (Novrember 20, 1974), 
p. 2 7. 
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of World War I, the U.S. initiated a policy of increasing the output per
 
acre rather than merely increasing the acreage under cultivation.i This
 
policy resulted in the generation and storage of enormous food surpluses by
 
the U.S. As population in developing areas of the world began to increase
 
faster than food production, Americans responded to their needs by ebcport­
ing the surpluses. Clearly, one of the incentives for exporting food to
 
parts of Asia and Europe after World War II was to influence those regions
 
politically. No doubt these programs also had important humanitarian moti­
vations. The motives of the Marshall Plan and the United Nations Relief
 
and Rehabilitation Administration were certainly directed along such lines.
 
But productivity increases also occurred in Argentina, Canada, Australia,
 
New Zealand, South Africa and other countries with advanced agricultural
 
technology. These increases led the United States to initiate tariff
 
barriers to imported foodsand it grouped various relief programs under
 
Public Law 480, the "Food for Peace" program. Under this program, food
 
would be shipped to political allies under highly attractive terms whereby
 
the buyers could pay in local currency or borrow over a 40 year interval at
 
low interest rates. Other aspects of the program provided for the donation
 
of food to various nations. This program in effect reduced surpluses in
 
the U.S. and provided an economic boost to farm incomes and even reduced
 
government costs for storage of food. It also helped the Merchant Marine,
 
as foodstuffs were shipped in American flag carriers.
1 4
 
13Increasing World Food Output, op.cit.
 
14Gordon and Richmond, op.cit., p.212. 0 7
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Ultimately, transporting and overseeing distribution of these foodstuffs
 
stretched American capabilities to the point where the U.S. gradually shifted
 
its emphasis and began to encourage the growth of better systems of agriculture
 
in the developing nations,while supplying emergency needs from its own
 
surpluses. Currently there are indications that the U.S. is now ending, or
 
at least slowing, the Food for Peace program. For example, there were no
 
shipments of powdered milk in the fiscal year 1974. The amounts of food
 
supplied under this program were not insignificant 
-- comprising about 30%
 
of wor'ld agricultural exports during the 1950's and 1960's.15
 
However, without further substantial production increases in the major
 
grain producers of the world, U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand,
 
imports are not a feasible solution to the Fourth World food shortages.
 
A return to the agricultural surpluses of the fifties are not likely in
 
the U.S. either. In fact, there is some concern in the U.S. that land
 
shortages, fuel shortages, fbrtilizer shortages, rail car shortages in the
 
face of ever increasing demand for food and fiber may mean that the U.S. is
 
facing a potential food shortage: projected production of food and fiber
 
lags behind piojected 1985 consumption by as much as 7% to 12% under current
 
1 6
 
extrapolations in the opinion of some experts.

Availability of Fertilizers and Pesticides: 
 The worldwide increases in
 
output per acre have odcurred as a result of increasing dependence upon
 
fertilizers and pesticides. Changes in world commerce have resulted in
 
serious concerns over the long run availability and price of both fertilizers
 
and pesticides.
 
15Willard W. Cochrane, The World Food Problem (New York: 
 Thomas W. Crowle,
 
1969),p.135 .
 
16Norman H. Ficher, "Growing Enough Foods for the Future May Tax U.S. Farm's
 
Capacity," The Wall Street Journal (November 19, 1973) p.l.
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The developing countries import the bulk of the fertilizer they consume.
 
Until just recently, the United States was one of the major producers and
 
exporters of fertilizers in the world -- producing about three times more
 
fertilizer than it consumed. Likewise, Japan produced about 10% or 15%
 
more fertilizer than it consumed, India imported all of its fertilizers
 
during the 1960's and it was not until the early 1970's that India began
 
producing about one-third of the fertilizer it consumed.
 
The five-fold increase in oil prices has had substantial impact upon
 
the cost and availability of fertilizers. Japan has decided, at least
 
temporarily, to cease exporting fertilizers. The FAO estimated that from
 
July 1973 to June 1974, developing countries received about 1.5 million
 
tons (in terms of nutrient content) of fertilizer less than the quantity
 
that would have been required to match recent rates of increase in fertilizer
 
utilization.17 This reduction represented about 15% of the total fertilizer
 
consumption of the developing countries. It was estimated that this would
 
reduce cereal production by about 12 million tons. Some fertilizer prices
 
have risen by a factor of 3 over the 1971 levels -- primarily as a result
 
of the scarcity of nitrogenous and phosphate fertilizers. And, because of
 
increasing balance of payments difficulties, the world fertilizer supply
 
will be increasingly difficult for the developing nations to purchase. It
 
is estimated that in 1974-1975, developing countries again will be short
 
at least 1.5 million tons of fertilizer.
 
High prices of materials also have influenced the production of pesticides,
 
resulting in a slight reduction in output. A 20-30% shortfall in worldwide
 
production of pesticides is expected during 1974-1975, while at the same
 
17The World Food Conference, op.cit., p.20. cYr
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time high prices and scarcities of diesel fuel are creating difficulty in
 
food production for developing countries, particularly in pumping of irriga­
tion water.- It is likely that cost and accessibility problems will continue
 
18
to effect fertilizer and pesticide availability for several years.

Impact of Weather and Environment Constraints: By the beginning of
 
the 1970's, it-appeared the world might have solved its food problem. 
World
 
grain production reached a record 1.2 billion metric tons and for six years
 
hadroutpaced population growth.1 9 
 But in 1972, for the second time in a
 
-decade, grain production declined. Weather affected crops that year in the
 
Soviet Union, China, India, Australia, Sahelian Africa, and Southeast Asia
 
and reduced production by 33 million tons.20 
 Food output in the developing
 
nations declined by more than 3 percent from their previous level.21
 
As another section discusses in some detail, there is a great deal
 
of evidence to suggest that there are profound global climatic changes
 
taking place. 
It now appears that the first half of the twentieth century
 
provided better weather conditions than have prevailed in at least a
 
thousand years.
 
18 The World Food Conference, S.cit.,
pp.20-21.
 
19 Task Force of the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, The
 
Impact of an International Food Bank (December 1973).
 
20United Nations Preparatory Committee of the World Food Conference, Second
 
Session:, Preliminary Assessment of the World Food Situation, Present and
 
Future (New York: April 1974).
 
21Quentin M. West, Administrator of U.S. Department of Agriculture Economics
 
Research Service, The World Food Situation and How Others See It, speech

presented at the Conference to International Agricultural Training
 
(Virginia: 
-April 3, 1973).
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These favorable weather conditions resulted in warmer weather during
 
the summer growing seasons, a longer growing season (2-3 weeks longer),
 
and consistent and predictable weather patterns. This unprecedented period
 
of good weather had two effects. One, it contributed to the tremendous
 
increases in agriculture production. But, two, the favorable weather
 
conditions also contributed to the substantial increases in world population,
 
especially in the lesser developed areas. A world-wide cooling trend
 
in the 1940's, which influenced the world's atmospheric
apparently began 

circulation. The current prolonged droughts in Africa, India, and other
 
countries in the earth's so-called warm zone seem to be the result of this
 
change -- as were floods and other unusual conditions in the United States
 
22
 
and elsewhere in recent years.
 
Exacerbating the weather problem are other environmentally imposed
 
Much of the developing
constraints upon the lesser developed countries. 

world lies in tropical or semi-tropical areas which have soils of poor
 
quality. They contain little organic matter, their mineral content is
 
frequently low, and they are vulnerable to high erosion losses because of
 
heavy rainfall and erratic winds.23 This may seem counterintuitive since
 
many tropical regions are covered with lush vegetation. However, these
 
tropical soils are mineral rich and when exposed to air turn into a
 
bricklike form of rock, called laterite which has been an important
 
building material since prehistoric times. Hence, clearing the area of
 
vegetation for agricultural purposes could turn much of that region into a
 
wasteland. At Iata, an equatorial site in the heartland of the Amazon
 
'MartinWalker, "Drought," The New York Times Magazine (June 9, 1974),
 
pp.11-13,43-46.
 
23 George Borgstrom, "The World Food Crisis," Futures, Vol, 1, No. 4
 
(June 1969), p.343. 
 7/ 
22 
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basin, the Brazilian government established an agricultural colony. The
 
forest was cleared and crops were planted, but the soil disintegrated
 
after the first or second planting. The equatorial sun turned the iron­
rich soil into brick and in less than five years the cleared fields
 
virtually became pavements of rock.24
 
Other developing countries have experienced similar disasters. India,
 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh during the past two decades cleared large areas in
 
the Himilayan foot hills for farming. Without the forest, rain water rapidly
 
ran off the slopes, causing disasterous floods over the past several years.
 
In other areas such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Brazil, heavy rains quickly
 
leached the nutrients in the small layer of top soil and effectively
 
rendered the land infertile within a year or two after the land had been
 
cleared for planting.25
 
Indeed, major portions of the world seem to be losing
 
large acreages of crop land each year because of severe soil erosion,
 
industrialization and residential development. Estimates have been made
 
that it is only a matter of decades before conventional agriculture will
 
no longer be able to supply the food the world needs due to the loss of
 
agricultural land. It is argued that this situation is valid even if the
 
number of acres in cultivation increases markedly and if productivity .increases
 
by a factor of 2 to 4 as shown Figure 8.26 Few countries have established
 
clearcut land use policy to protect agricultural land. For example, in the
 
Mary McNeil, Scientific American (November 1964).

2 5
"The World Food Crisis," Time (November 11, 1974), p.7 9.
 
2 6Oonella H. Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: 
 Universe
 
Books, 1972).
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U.S., large areas of farmland have been diverted ,to other purposes in recent
 
years with little thought about potential long-term consequences. Japan and
 
several western European countries have experienced reductions in the land
 
used for crop production for several decades.27
 
The availability of water may prove to be even more important for the
 
future. Effective agriculture production could be accomplished in many
 
regions of the world if water were available. However, most of the rivers
 
that can be dammed for irrigation purposes have already been turned to
 
such uses. The growth in irrigation is now slowing markedly,and further
 
efforts to expand fresh water supplies for agricultural use will emphasize
 
the diversion of rivers (as in the U.S.S.R.), the manipulation of rainfall
 
patterns and eventually desalination of sea water, depending upon the cost.
28
 
The Oceans as a Source of Food: There is marked controversy concerning
 
the possible role of the oceans to provide a significant source of the
 
world's food supply. On the one hand are those who believe that, with
 
proper technology and management, the oceans can supply an increasing
 
percentage of the world's food supply. On the other hand, there are those who
 
believe that "the most pervasive myth of the population food crisis is.
 
that mankind will be saved by harvesting the immeasurable riches of the
 
2 9
 
sea.,
 
In a committee report prepared for the U.S. Senate in preparation
 
for the World Food Conference it was noted that the level of output of food
 
production from the oceans that might be reached in 10 or 20 years is
 
27Lester R. Brown, In the Human Interest (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
 
Inc., 1974), p.48.
 
28

Ibid.
 
29Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit., p.125.
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difficult to forecast. But the report went on to state that appropriate
 
economic incentives accompanied by proper investment would allow technology
 
to meet foreseeable future demand. This report notes that, in 1972, the
 
world's catch had increased to the point where about 50% of the potential
 
(estimated at 100 to 118 million tons) was being harvested, It was
 
cautioned, however, that doubling of the world's seafood catch is not
 
possible for all species, as an increasing number are becoming fully or
 
overly exploited and thus still yield less than their full potential. Also,
 
several species have largely disappeared from commercial fishing, due
 
primarily to excess fishing. It is argued, however, that species that have
 
not yet been exploited do exist. For example, some stocks within the
 
Indonesian archipelago might be harvested with new techniques and vessels.
 
It is also noted that species in the northwest Indian Ocean of the south­
western Atlantic are too distant from the main consuming centers and that
 
the burden of license fees currently makes working these areas uneconomical.
 
Cultural differences, although they allow certain species to be consumed in
 
one area, preclude consumption of those species in other areas. Squid and
 
other cephalopods are examples.
 
Species which are now used in the production of fish meal for animal
 
feed might be directed for human consumption, although trends in this area
 
have already begun, e.g., herring, Alaska pollack, etc. Reductions in waste
 
are offered as another possible means of increasing production, including
 
retention of "trash" fish, which are currently thrown back into the sea,
 
In the longer run, it may be possible to increase world supplies of food
 
by harvesting less familiar marine animals, such as krill in the
 
Antarctic and lantern fish in warmer oceanic waters. Technical problems
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exist here which could be overcome if the catch were to prove economically
 
viable. -
For the developing countries, especially in the foreseeable future,
 
it seems likely that supplies will be comprised of more conventional types
 
of fish. But improved management schemes are required to maintain yields
 
of the more heavily fished species. Finally, the Senate report mentions
 
the possibility of increasing food production through the cultivation of
 
fish, especially in the tropical areas of Africa and Asia, and in particular,
 
in the latter where aquaculture is already well established, 0
 
Others are skeptical of the role that fish can play. While fish
 
provide._on3ra small portion of world caloric intake, their contribution
 
is substantial in some countries and extremely important as feed for
 
agricultural animals. The period 1950-1970 saw substantial growth in
 
world fish catch from about 20 million tons annual yield to about 70 million
 
(see Figure 9 ). While this growth is attributed to technological improve­
ments and capital investment, Ehrlich suggests a large part of the growth
 
may be due to more accurate and complete reporting of the existing catch
 
rather than from actual increases in yieid.
31
 
There is equal skepticism regarding the further role the oceans can
 
make. Estimates of the additional fish yield that the oceans could provide
 
vary significantly. Recent investigations of the fish producing capabilities
 
of the oceans reveal that the open seas (90% of the oceans) are essentially
 
a "biological desert," producing a negligible fraction of the world fish
 
0The Wifld Food Conference, pp.85-86.
 
hrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit.
 3 
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catch at present with little or not pptential for yielding more in the
 
future.32 Estimates of the productivity of the upswells and coastal
 
regions vary, however. The Woods Hole Oceanographic Laboratory has estimated
 
that the amount of fish available for sustained harvesting (that is, leaving
 
an adequate reproductive population- sufficient to sustain the species and
 
continued harvesting) is approximately 100 million metric tons;33 the FAO
 
:34
 
suggests that the upper limit may be 110 million tons; and still another
 
estimated suggests that the upper limit is 200 million tons.35  To increase
 
32John H. Ryther, "Photosynthesis and Fish Broduction in the Sea," Science
 
(Vol. 166, pp.72-76) 1969.

~33­3Ibid.
 
34j. A. Gulland, The Fish Resources of the Oceans (United Nations Food and
 
Agricultural Organization: 1971). 1i
 
35George A. Doumani, Science, TechnologTand American Diplomacy, 'Exploiting
 
the Resources of the Seabed, Prepared for the Subcommittee on National
 
Security Policy and 'Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign
 
Affairs U.S. House of Representatives- by the Congressional Research
 
Service (July 1971). f
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the yield by several tens of tons appears to be possible through exploitation
 
of current species, productivity improvements and improved fish resource
 
management. However, to substantially increase the production beyond this
 
level does not seem possible. Ehrlich points out that "to surpass the
 
potential annual fish production of 100-150 million metric tons would require
 
moving down the food chain from the big fish ordinarily found in fish
 
markets to the harvesting of plankton. All signs at the moment indicate that
 
this will not be feasible or profitable in the foreseeable future, if ever.
 
More calories of fuel and human energy would be spent on harvesting the
 
plankton than could be gained, the expenditure of money would be colossal in
 
relation to yield, and the product would require considerable processing to
 
be made palatable as human food.
36
 
Some Positive Actions:
 
Clearly, a great deal of worldwide attention has been devoted to the
 
question: well, what do we do'now? Before discussion of specific strategies
 
and actions it is important to note the cultural taboos that apply to
 
agriculture and the role of economic development in improving agricultural
 
productivity. Agricultural productivity in lesser developed countries is
 
low because they are lesser developed; the mammoth improvements in agriculture
 
in the United States exist because it is a capital and technology intensive
 
industry, rather than a labor and tradition bound society. Hence, the
 
agriculture problem is but a part of the fundamental condition of economic
 
underdevelopment.
 
36Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit., p.125-127.
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In traditional agrarian societies, agriculture is more than an
 
occupation, it is a way of life and many cultural, religious and mythical
 
taboos, superstitions, and beliefs dictate agricultural practices. Hence,
 
any strategy must be cognizant of these cultural values and must recognize
 
that cultural change is slow, gradual and disruptive. Any action implemented
 
by a given nation or any action that becomes the basis of a nation's
 
foreign aid program must reflect and incorporate these cultural biases.
 
Many writers on the subject of the world food problem have advocated
 
an immediate application of western technology as the.solution. If one
 
examines the underlying causes of the food problem in the .developing world,
 
the futility of this approach bec6mes manifest. As Figure 10 indicates,
 
very few of the causative factors are amenable to technological interventions,
 
rather it is the problem of modernization and economic development that is
 
facing the starving nations. Hasan Ozbekhan has observed: "The problem of hunger'
 
and undernourishment itself emerges as but one of,the manifestations of the
 
general problem of underdeveZopment -- albeit one of the most constant and
 
,37
 
tragic.
 
Despite this, most of what we know is technology based; despite years
 
of study we have little insight into how.to trigger an Industrial Revolution
 
in an underdeveloped country. Hence, much of the discussion below concentrates
 
on technological solutions, while admitting that the problem is not primarily
 
technological in origin.
 
37 Hasan czbekhah, "The Role of Goals and Planning in the Solution of the World
 
Food Problem, "in R. Jungk and J. Galtung, Eds., Mankind 2000 (International
 
Peace Research Institute: Oslo) 1969 p.127.
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While the successive introduction of many new varieties has reduced the
 
danger, it still exists. The danger lies in the possibility that all
 
strains have a common recessive gene that confers susceptibility to a
 
given pathogen. As farfetched as this may sound, it has already happened
 
once. The epidemic of southern corn blight that destroyed 20% of the U.S.
 
crop in 1970 was caused by a genetic linkage of this sort. That the toll was
 
limited was due to the expertise of American agribusiness. "If a thing­
like that should happen in places like India or Nigeria, it would really be
 
a disaster," says J. M. Deller of the Crops Evolution Laboratory at the
 
39
 
University of Illinois.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the new high yield varieties
 
do well only under limited ecological conditions. The over-reliance upon
 
the expectations of the Green Revolution is best exemplified by the
 
Philippines. It was the first Asian nation to make extensive use of the
 
high yield varieties (HYV) of rice and convinced 60% of its farmers to use
 
them. By 1971 the Philippines was self-sufficient in rice. But by the
 
end of 1971-72 the nation had been struck by storms, floods, then a drought
 
and then a disease against which the IYV had no resistence. Soon the
 
nation faced famine. Recognizing the failure of the domestic Green
 
Revolution, the nation then began a program aimed at becoming self-sufficient
 
while teaching agricultural science, management techniques and some basic
 
economics along the way. The program, "Masagana 99," is so successful it is
 
becoming the model for other nations for the efficacious administration of
 
Western technology.40
 
39Nicholas Wade, "Green Revolution CI): Problems of Adapting a Western
 
Technology," Science CVol. 186) December 27, 1974, p. .
 1 18 6
 
4Peter R. Kann,"Green Revolution is Easing Hunger Slower Than Had Been
 
Hoped," The Wall Street Journal (November 18, 1974) p.l.
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So what was wrong with the Green Revolution (the popular name for
 
the HYVs)? While the hybrids could result in unprecedented yields under
 
the proper growing conditions, these conditions were difficult to maintain.
 
The strains were, as noted,genetically vulnerable. They were also more
 
vulnerable to pests than the traditional varieties, partly due to the
 
practice of transplanting Ml's developed in one part of the world to
 
another without adapting them to local conditions.41 The recommended
 
growing practices (close planting, luxuriant foliage) also made them more
 
susceptible to pests.
 
A very serious problem was the genetic erosion of plant species. The
 
rapid proliferation of HYV's destroyed many local varieties of crop 
plants.42
 
Finally, the Green Revolution hybrids are reliant upon high energy
 
inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and fuel for their high yields. The
 
astounding energy dependence of American agriculture has recently been
 
indicated: to raise an acre of corn in the U.S. in 1970 required 80 gallons
 
(2.5 barrels) of gasoline.43  Because of this dependency, Pimentel quite
 
correctly wonders "...if many developing nations will be able to afford the
 
44
 
technology of U.S. agriculture."
 
Improved Plant Genetics: Preliminary experience with the high yield
 
varieties indicate that the essential next step is to develop species with
 
resistence to insects and diseasds. Other research is currently being
 
devoted to improving the protein dontent of grain. The original hybrids
 
4 1Wade' op.cit.
 
421 id.
 
43David Pimentel, et al,."Food Production and the Energy Crisis," Science
 
(Vol. 182) November 2, 1973, p.447 .
 
4 4Pimentel, op.cit., p.448
 .
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primarily were developed to increase yields, regardless of protein
 
content.- However, it is estimated that such research is lengthy and
 
the rewards may be so far in the future as to be irrelevant to th6 Fourth
 
World requirements.
 
Energy, Fertilizers and Pesticides: We have indicated that substantial
 
increases in output per acre are dependent on energy and chemical inputs.
 
In the near term, chemical fertilizers represent the most significant 
means of improving crop yields. It has been estimated that each ton Pf ­
fertilizer applied to an underdeveloped country's grain crops could increase
 
the harvest by ten tons.45 The use of fertilizers in developing countries
 
currently ranges from less than one-tenth to a quarter of that used per
 
hectare in most developed nations. Even so, fertilizer consumption in
 
developing countries has doubled every five years and will probably continue
 
to increase at about 11 percent annually for the next several years. But,
 
fertilizer prices have increased by factors of 3 and 4 in the past three
 
to four years, and significant shortages of fertilizers currently
 
46
 
prevail and are expected to last at least five years. The developing
 
countries currently import at least half of their fertilizer needs
 
(including materials from which fertilizers are produced). Wide-scale
 
expansion of fertilizer production capacity in developing countries is
 
necessary in order to provide sufficient amounts, especially to take full
 
advantage of the high yield varieties and to capitalize on potential
 
advancements in irrigation.
 
45
"The World Food Crisis," Time, November 11, 1974. 
 3 
46Ibid.
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Fertilizers themselves can be improved and, in light of likely price
 
increases, such advancements should prove highly desirable. Here, concepts
 
include slow-release mechanisms, use of nitrogenous inhibitors, nitrogen­
fixing legumes, and more efficient use of organic manure supplies. Improve­
ments are also possible in the use and formulation of other agricultural
 
chemicals for control of pests, fungus, and weeds.
 
Clearly, efficient use of seeds, fertilizers, and plant protection
 
items in many developing countries is hindered because the farmer does not
 
have sufficient funds to purchase them. It has been noted that, in southern
 
Asia, the average farmer spends $6 per hectare annually when $20-80
 
(depending upon the crop) should be spent.. Improved means of providing
 
credit on attractive terms could make large inroads into the farmer's
 
ability to purchase equipment, to level and clear land, and to improve
 
utilization of irrigation water by purchasing various equipment and tools.
 
In the aforementioned Phillippine program "Masagana 99" it was the
 
provision of low interest loans and subsidies by the government that
 
guaranteed the success of the program. In fact, in areas where there
 
were no banks the Philippine National Bank provided the money -- in
 
remote areas, banks provided cash by Jeeps carrying credit supervisors and
 
cashboxes.
 
Improving Land and Water Resources: Less than 13% of the arable land
 
in the developing world is currently irrigated. It has been suggested by one
 
wTriter that "the improvement of existing irrigation systems in the tropics
 
and the installation of new ones is probably the most profitable single 
enterprise that man can engage in." 4 8 Some writers indicate that the primary 
48Chandler, op.cit., p.39.
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barrier to the Green Revolution is the lack of water,49 The FAO estimates
 
that the global demand for water will increase 240% by the year 2000, yet
 
the "easiest" big dam and irrigation projects have already been constructed.
 
In parts of the developing world, significant amounts of land are still
 
left idle or are under-utilized. These areas are primarily im.South America,
 
Africa, and parts of southeast Asia and this under-utilization :st from,
 
rainfall and high temperatures. It has been suggested by the FAO that
 
there are promising agriculture lands available in:
 
" 	The Amazon River Basin
 
* 	The Savannahs of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador
 
and Brazil
 
* 	A broad band of 1.7 billion acres across
 
Central Africa now infested with the tsetse fly
 
o 	Areas in Malyasia, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia 0
 
Others suggest that any use of this land requires road construction,
 
installation of irrigation systems, warehouse construction, as well as
 
expansion and modernization of the food expansion system -- at a cost of
 
$500 billion.
 
Development of new lands must, of course, be associated with
 
adequate means of access. Remote sensing techniques can be applied here,
 
including their application to land management schemes. It has been
 
estimated that arable land in developing countries can be increased
 
over 20% by 1985 from the 1970 level. In addition, it has been estimated
 
that $90 billion (see Figure 11) would be required to upgrade existing
 
irrigated areas, to develop new irrigation approaches, and to bring new
 
land under cultivation.
 
4 9 
,The World Food Crisis," op.cit.A 
5 0
"The World Food Crisis," op.cit.
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FIGURE 11
 
ESTIMATED COST OF WATER AND LAND DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PERIOD 1974-1985
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Improvements in Livestock: Forecasts of demand for livestock products
 
in the developing countries show demand rising by 4.4% annually into the 1980's.
 
Efficiency in livestock production is quite low in the developing countries,
 
with some few exceptions. Improvements in veterinary services, including
 
In the long term, genetic
advice to farmers, are needed in the short term. 

improvements of all animal stocks are appropriate. A major part of the
 
improvement in feeds relates to improved methods of using natural grasslands.
 
Any freeing of grain supplies would improve the international food supply
 
situatioi, at least in the short run.
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Control of pests, such as the tsetse fly,coul& markedly increase
 
aras of livestock production, African animal trypanosomiasis, which is
 
a disease borne by the tsetse fly, is one of the primary causes of under­
utilization of certain African lands. If this disease were brought under
 
control, the area could support an additional cattle population of about
 
120 million, producing approximately 1.5 million tons of meat annually.
 
Methods of controlling the disease include cattle breeding, insect spraying,
 
preventative and remedial treatment of animals, and ultimately immunization
 
of animals. Any methods ultimately will have to be adapted to local
 
conditions, but such programs will require research in many areas in order
 
to develop effective approaches. Total program costs are estimated to run
 
between $2 and $2.5 billion (U.S. dollars), although admittedly cost
 
estimates are difficult in this area.
 
Reduction in Post-Harvest Losses: Losses in food which occur between
 
harvest and availability to the consumer range between 20% and 40%, depending
 
upon the crop and country involved. "At least one quarter of the worli's
 
food disappears between the field and the table."51 Losses occur from poor
 
management in harvesting; insect, rodent, and fungus damage during storage;
 
inadequate packaging; inefficient handling during transportation; inadequate
 
functioning of milling equipment; and improper distribution of milled
 
products. These items are exemplary and suggest that a single program would
 
not have significant impact on the overall problem. Ways of attacking the
 
problem include improvement in storage of grains and other crops,in both
 
small villages and large centers, improved packing materials and transportation
 
facilities, and improvements in the milling of cereals and oil seeds, and
 
improvements in the organization of both wholesale and retail distribution.
191 
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Agricultural Research Institutes: The collection, storage and
 
dissemination of agricultural information, both in terms of basic research
 
and monitoring of current crops is essential to international agriculture.
 
The technical institutional mechanism for such sharing, especially for
 
sharing of remote sensing data does not exist.
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ISSUE: POPULATION GROWTH IN THE LESSER DEVELOPED NATIONS INHIBITS ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, LEADING TO A GROWING DISPARITY OF LIVING 
CONDITIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The Issue:
 
The population growth rate in the lesser developed countries has increased
 
enormously in the last several years. The population of developing countries
 
is growing at a rate of about 2.5% annually, as contrasted to a growth rate
 
in the developed countries of about 1%.1 As Figure 1 shows, about 70% of the
 
world's population lives in "less developed" regions, up from about 64% in
 
1920. Thus, while output is increasing worldwide, the relative position of
 
the lesser developed countries with regard to the more advanced nations has
 
deteriorated considerably over the past 40 years. Present patterns of
 
population growth have increased the imbalance between the distribution of
 
2

the world's population and wealth. If these rates of population growth
 
continue, the underdeveloped nations will increase their share of the
 
world's population and underdevelopment will spread further.
 
The concern is not with population growth per se, but the inability
 
of the host country to adequately provide for its population. Hence, popu­
lation growth becomes a major concern only if economic development has not
 
progressed. However, in areas of high levels of economic development and
 
industrialization, the rate of population growth is low. This correlation
 
has led to an interesting inquiry of economic development theorists: does
 
industiialization and economic development result in lower birth rates or
 
'UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1973 (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1974), pp.32-33 .
 
2Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Determinants and Consequence
 
of Population Trends: New Summaty on Findings on Interaction of Demographic,
 
Economic and Social Factors, (United Nations: New York) 1973, p.5 29 .
2/
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Figure 1 
THE SPREAD OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
 
Percentage of Total Population
 
More Developed Less Developed 
Year Regions * Nations 
1920 36.2% 63.8
 
1930 36.7 
 63.3
 
1940 35.8 
 64.2
 
1950 34.5 
 65.5
 
1960 32.1 
 67.9
 
1970 30.0 
 70.0
 
Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Determinants and
 
Consequence of Population Trends: New Summary on Findings on
 
Interaction of Demographic, Economic and Social Factors, (United
 
Nations: New York) 1973, p.529.
 
are decreases in birth rates a necessary pre-requisite for economic develop­
ment? The current consensus appears to reflect the latter viewpoint: control
 
over birth rates is essential to achieve economic growth and development in
 
the twentieth century. While the prior argument may have explained the
 
population behavior of previous centuries, it does not appear.to be valid
 
today.
 
Economic advancement in developing countries is clearly hampered by
 
the increasing number of people sharing present jobs, facilities, etc.; but
 
unfortunately, initial successes in economic development tend to temporarily
 
retard development. New health programs decrease infant mortality rates
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and present epidemics; but unless comparable advances are made in
 
agriculture, education, etc., the result is only more mouths to feed on
 
the same quantity produced. Furthermore, economic development increases
 
consumer demands instead of encouraging savings for much needed.capital
 
investment and provides a s6urce for social unrest and migration to cities,
 
not yet ready to accept an increased labor force.
 
The problems of economic development associated with population
 
growth in developing countries are based upon conditions both inherited
 
from the past and created by the process of change itself.3 However, the
 
central issue for the developing country is the lack of funds for growth
 
investment which is essential to economic advancement.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
Impacts of Population Growth on Per Capita Income. GNP growth in
 
underdeveloped countries has not been insignificant. During the 1960's,
 
world GNP growth was in excess of 30%. During the same period of time,
 
GNP growth in the lesser developed nations approached 40% (Figure 2).
 
However, population growth in developing countries outstripped growth in
 
GNP; as GNP growth per capita rose less than 20% in the underdeveloped
 
countries, it approximated 25% in the developed countries.4 If population
 
and economic growth trends continue, the problem will become worse, as
 
shown in Figure 3.
 
The differences in growth rates become more significant when a
 
comparison is made of the levels of per capita income in the developed
 
nations with the lesser developed nations. In the case of the developed
 
3Irving S. Friedman, "Dilemmas of the Developing Countries: The Sword of
 
Damacles," Finance and Development, Vol. 10, No.1 (March 1973), p.13. 51Z
 
Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment
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 (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1972), p. .
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Figure 2
 
GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA
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vironment: Issues in Human Ecology (San-Francisco, Calif.: W.H.
 
Freeman & Co., 1972), p. 433.
 
5
 
countries, GNP per capita (current U.S. 1972 dollars) ranges from about $3,000
 
to almost $6000 per capita, with the United States heading-the list. In the
 
lesser developed nations, per capita income ranges to below $100.
 
Figure 3 
WORLD POPULATION AND WEALTH 
(in billions of peope / trillions of U.S dollars) 
0I 0 I,
 
9 9 A/o-9 -
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A 
A 
,"<GNP 
5 5 A 
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St0iice: John McHale, World Facts and Trends (Collier Books: New York) 1972
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Quite clearly, since the developing countries have,in fact, undergone
 
economic growth and development, per capita income would have increased if
 
population growth had been lower. The relationship in recent times between
 
economic growth and population growth is not clear. However, there is no
 
question that,in moderntimes (beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the
 
18th Century) economic growth has been accompanied by rapid growth in population
 
In fact, it was thought that population growth was necessary for economic growth
 
to continue as a source of increasing markets. This position is still advocated
 
by many lesser developed countries as well as by many individuals in this country
 
who are fearful of the implications of our low birth rate. However, a study
 
of the recent data led one study to conclude that the data on population and
 
economic growth implies "either a negative association or the absence of a sys­
tematic relationship." 5
 
Another student of the problem, Shirley Hartley, concludes that "numerous
 
economists are convinced that a 2 
 or 3 percent rate of natural increase [in
 
population] is a principal barrier to development. There is evidence that
 
.rapid population growth lowers the potential economic development of the less
 
developed nations.... 6 Rapid population growth simply attracts resources
 
away from savings and capital accumulation, profoundly affecting the level
 
of capital investment that is possible, and requires a smaller amount of
 
economid'wealth to support a larger and burgeoning population.
 
Lincoln Gordon notes that in almost all countries where per capita annual
 
income exceeds the $600-800 range, the population increases no more than 1.5 %
 
annudlly; Under the assumption that lower birth rates are in fact
 
correlated with per capita incomes 6f $600 or more (a disputed assumptfon),
 
then countries with average income levels of $100 and annual population growth
 
5The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends (op.cit.), p.514.
 
6Shirley Foster Hartley, Population Quantity vs. Quality(Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972). 
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of 2.5% would have to sustain overall economic growth rates of 5% for more
 
than 72 years before incomes reached the level of lower fertility. Under
 
those conditions, such a country would have a population six times its present
 
size. Gordon states that the chances of maintaining a 5% growth rate under
 
such conditions would be minimal.7
 
Unemployment, Underemployment and Labor Productivity: Unemployment and
 
underemployment are typical characteristics of lesser developed countries.
 
A dominant characteristic of lesser developed countries is the existence of
 
dual economies. The vast majority (70-80%) of the population is involved in
 
labor intensive traditional agriculture characterized by peasant traditions
 
and reliance upon a barter system of exchange. ,This exists in parallel
 
with the smaller portion of the labor force employed in the westernized
 
and industrialized modern sector. Open unemployment is not a prevalent
 
problem in such economies; rather, pervasive underemployment in the
 
traditional sector is.thenmajor-problem. -Underemployment referstto
 
employment at less than full time and well below full capacity. Character­
istically, in conditions of underemployment the number of employees in a
 
given task can be reduced without a concomitant reduction in total output.
 
This is typical in the agrarian societies where the family five acre plot
 
can employ almost unlimited and constantly varying numbers of friends and
 
family members without any appreciable change in farm: output. Even if
 
this underemployed population were sufficiently skilled, employment opportun­
ities do not exist in the modern sector as shortages of capital for plant
 
and equipment investment constrain the rate at which these sectors can be
 
expanded.8
 
7Lincoln Gordon in-Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., World Population and a Global
 
Emergency (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies,/7
 
1973), p. 53.3 

8Bruce F. Johnston, "Unemployment and Underemployment," in Brown & Hutchings,
 
Eds., Are Our Descendants Doomed? (The Viking Press: New York),.1972.
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The rapid growth of the labor force only aggravates the problem as
 
the economy is unable to provide job opportunities for the new entrants.
 
Nor can the economy adequately train an increasing labor force for modern
 
industrial jobs. However, efforts to reduce the rate of population growth
 
will not affect the labor force size for some period of time. A decrease in
 
the birth rate today would not have an effect upon the labor force until those
 
infants enteredthe labor force, fifteen or twenty years hence.
 
Impact on Urbanization: One aspect of population growth is its impact
 
on rapid urbanization. As mentioned earlier, the growth of urban areas in
 
the lesser developed countries is accelerated by the total lack of job
 
opportunities in the rural areas. Economic development has not occurred in
 
any country without massive population redistribution and urbanization. While
 
it does give the modern sector,- usually located in urban areas, a pool of
 
cheap labor from which to choose, the urbanization process is also likely to
 
cause severe societal disruption. The extended family network and reliance
 
on agricultural underemployment in rural areas at least provided minimum
 
levels of subsistence for the population. No such network or "living off the 
land" is possible in the city. There is little evidence that any city in 
,a lesser developed country exists that has a sufficient absorptive capacity 
to accommodate the volume of in-migration.
 
Consider the impact of the immigration process and population growth
 
merely on the demand for housing. This is a problem which even the United States
 
has been unable to solve. Figure 4 presents an estimation of the level of housing
 
needed in the three less developed continents, Africa, Asia,.and.Latin.America. 
Meeting this demand is clearly impossible under current capital shortages. 
Despite the short term problems of unemployment'and"the temendous 
strains placed upon municipal services, some experts believe that any effort
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Figure 4 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL HOUSING NEEDS 
(in millions of dweling units) 
LATILASIAA FRICA 
.AMERICA
1960 1975 1960 1975 1960 1975 
1.10 1.700.84 1.50 5.30 9.40Due to population increase: 

To eliminate the deficit or
 
.73 .73 4.80 4.80 .60 .60 shortage in 30 years: 
.90 .901.03 1.03 7.10 7.10To rephice the stock:r 
2.60 3.20otal new housing i.ceded: 2.60' 3.26 17.20 si.30 
* Average life of a dwelling allit :s assumt IO e 30 ycan. in urban ,nd 20 years in, rural areds Tile 
rlgurcs do not t.ke into aceont incrnements of stock bctween 1960 and 1975.1975 
John MeHale, World Facts and Trends (Collier Books: New York) 1972
 Source: 
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to retard the urbanization process in lesser developed countries will
 
actually have long term negative consequences. It has-been noted that "the
 
long-run consequences of retaining people in rural environments are
 
unfortunate. Policies restricting migration may have near-tern ameliorative
 
effects, but in time they will become negative. The numerous changes
 
required to bring about the transition to a "developed" status are best
 
made in an urban environment." 9
 
In addition, it has been observed that lower fertility is typically
 
associated with urbanization;10 hence, the migratory process may be an
 
essential part of demographic transition.
 
Economic Growth and Population Growth: Previously it was noted that the
 
Industrial Revolution and the tremendous increases in wealth and economic
 
growth and development that accompanied it was also accompanied by huge increases
 
in population. It is argued by some economists that a growing population is
 
necessary to sustain an economy through ever increasing demand and capital
 
investment. However, this says nothing about underdeveloped countries where
 
the problem is insatiable demand, lack of capital and total lack of familiarity
 
with modern industrial and managerial procedures. It is also dangerous to use the
 
British and American experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
 
as an economic development model for completely different cultures in a
 
completely different time. Because of the contingencies of today's economic
 
situation, it is quite clear that by and large unrestrained population growth
 
9Harley L. Browning, "Migrant Selectivity and the Growth of Large Cities in
 
Developing Societies," in Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy

Implications, Volume II: Research Papers, (National Academy of Sciences:
 
Johns Hopkins Press) 1971, p.311.
 
101n Search of Population Policy: Views from the Developing World,(National
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 Academy of Sciences: Wabhington, D.C.) , p.35.
 
is a substantial barrier to economic growth. However, there are many parts
 
of the world that do not agree with the need to control population growth;
 
and, in fact, feel threatened by the concept. Because population densities
 
are not uniformly high by any means, many African and Latin American nations
 
use their low population densities as evidence that they need not limit their
 
population growth. Of course, large portions of both of these continents
 
are not suitable for habitation.
 
During a recent conference on population growth, it was quite evident
 
that the representatives of the Latin American countries did not perceive
 
that they were hampered by population growth. Population size was not
 
viewed as a problem but distribution of the population is a problem. "Almost
 
all the participants viewed population questions as integral, but subsidiary,
 
to economic and social development... In many Latin American countries a
 
larger population would help development, because it would provide larger
 
markets for locally manufactured goods and make possible a more effective
 
exploitation of natural resources, including land, water, energy, forests,
 
and minerals... With the possible exception of rapid urbanization, the
 
macro-economic effects of population changes including population growth
 
on development are fairly small."
11
 
Capital Formation: Clearly, one of the fundamental problems facing a
 
lesser developed country is the problem of capital accumulation so that current
 
consumption can be postponed to free capital for essential investment in infra­
structure (i.e., communication and transportation networks, municipal services, etc.)
 
1 1In Search of Population Policy: Views from the Developing World,__p.cit.
 
p.43.34
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and basic industries (energy, steel, extractive, industrial machinery and heavy
 
durables). It is essential todivert scarce capital for plant and equipment from
 
non-essentials such as luxury goods, small appliances, consumer durables, and so forth.
 
The primary source of capital for investment purposes is savings; that
 
is, those resources which could be allocated to current consumption but are
 
not and'hence, are "freed" for other purposes. Investment, then, is the
 
all6cation of these resources to productive putposes. Traditional economic
 
theory asserts that savings must equal investment; therefore, investment
 
capital cannot exceed the level of savings available (recognizing that firms
 
as well as individuals may have savings). While this equality ignores capital
 
that is available from gifts, loans, and foreign investments, developed nations
 
by and large reiy on the savings of its people for investment purposes; and-it is
 
argued that lesser developed nations must rely on foreign sources for start-up
 
capital.
 
Quite clearly, one can see that high fertility contributes, all other
 
things being equal, to reduced per capita income. While these rapid rates
 
of population growth will increase the size of households and their demand
 
for goods and services, it is unlikely that the number of wage earnerd will
 
be increased. In fact, the large number of children reduce the number of
 
family members that are available for employment because of child care
 
necessities. 
Hence, while the size of the family unit increases, the 
income does not. Savings, for the purposes of this discussion, may be 
defined as the excess of income over consumption. Quite clearly, then, 
rapid population growth, especially in poorer countries, dramatically 
reduces savings. j 
13
 
Within the lesser developed countries wealth is especially inequitably
 
allocated and only the wealthy can "afford" the luxury of savings. While a
 
variety of incentives exist to manipulate the level of consupmtion to increase
 
the savings available for investment, the value of these incentives is, of
 
course, related to the level of income. Per capita incomes in the range of
 
several hundred dollars clearly is not adequate foundation for capital forma­
tion, whatever the incentives are. Therefore, in these countries the most
 
realistic strategy is to iinimize consumption (not so much to encourage savings
 
but to control demand) and to rely on industry and the wealthy elite for the
 
domestic capital sources.
 
Capital, of course, can also come from gifts, loans, and foreign invest­
ment. Historically, unconditional grants of money from one nation to another
 
have been rare; and Israel is the only modern day example of such largesse.
 
Most often foreign assistance is in the form of foreign aid and this
 
is often tied to certain purchasing requirements. Of course, such foreign
 
aid is often granted more on the basis of political and military
 
considerations than the economic deyelopment requirements of the recipient
 
nation.
 
Foreign aid as a percentage of GNP has been decreasing in all the 
major non-Soviet nations except for Sweden (see Figure 5- ). During this 
period there has been some increase in absolute levels of foreign aid but 
clearly this has not been increasing concurrently with the rates of economic
 
growth experienced by the developed nations or with the worldwide
 
inflationary trends.
 
__ 
_ _ 
__ 
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Figure 5 
NET FLOW OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM SELECTED DAC
 
COUNTRIES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND MULTILATERAL AGENCIES
 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1961-1971
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*"DAC" stands for Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for
 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); the 16 DAC countries are
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
 
Kingdom, and the United States.
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A recent source of capital for the lesser developed countries is
 
the growing concentration of petro-dollars in the petroleum exporting
 
countries. Venezuela has already offered to make available some of its
 
petro-receipts to its Latin American neighbors. However, a severe problem
 
with relying on loans for capital investment is the tremendous burden of
 
debt servicing upon the economy.
 
Finally, foreign investment, usually by private industry, is a basic
 
capital source and probably considerably more significant than the largesse
 
of governments. U.S. firms had over $25- billion in direct investments in
 
lesser developed countries in 1972, about the about the same total level of investment
 
as the U.S. has in Canada. The bulk (about one third) of the foreign
 
investment in the lesser developed countries was in the petroleum industry.
1 2
 
There is no doubt that this level of'investment will increase as the developed
 
nations try to ensure material and energy supplies as well as guarantee
 
markets for products which were domestically produced and have saturated their
 
domestic markets. Through foreign production (to minimize costs), foreign
 
markets may be exploited. Quite clearly, these investment decisions are made
 
on the basis of expected returns for the investing firm, yet they can be
 
equally advantageous to the receiving country. Increasing fears of exploitation
 
by the lesser developed countries and increasing fears of nationalization or
 
expropriation by the host country have changed the picture of foreign investment
 
However, there is no doubt that the rate of foreign investment
somewhat. 

by the developed countries will increase.
 
12U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1974
 
(95th edition) (Washington, D.C.), p. 781.
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The role of the multinational firm in international capital flows
 
cannot be underestimated. The multinational firm truly views the world as its
 
marketplace irrespective of political boundaries and it can participate in
 
capital markets essentially outside of central banking authority. The multi­
national firm is likely to be the most dominant force upon the economic
 
development of the lesser developed countries in the next several decades.
 
One economic development specialist, Professor Albert Hirschman,
 
suggests that foreign capital is absolutely essential "to enable and to embold'en
 
a country to set out on the path of unbalanced growth."13 This theory of
 
development argues against balanced growth, on the grounds that unbalanced
 
growth, because of its inherently unstable nature, continually provides
 
incentives for sectors of the economy to "catch up" and growth continues to
 
occur. Foreign capital, Hirschman argues, has more freedom, is less inhibited
 
in its investment decisions and can avoid parochial investment areas. Foreign
 
capital also can replace the "scatter" approach of domestic investment with
 
concentration.
 
As important and fundamental as capital is to economic development, the
 
role of entrepreneurial capability is probably more important. Hirschman
 
notes that "among the proximate causes of economic development, the supply
 
of entrepreneurial and managerial abilities now occupies in official documents
 
a position of preeminence at least equal to that of capital. 1 4
 
Of course, it is quite clear that those nations most requiring capital
 
investment are those which least have the domestic resources and are least
 
attractive to foreign investment.
 
13Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale University
 
2 05
 Press: New Haven) 1958, p. .
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Impact of Population Growth Upon Social Overhead Capital: As the
 
discussion has indicated, a fundamental step in the economic development
 
process is to reduce consumer demand for goods and services to "free" capital.
 
Unfortunately, population growth, especially when combined with increasing
 
urbanization, renders this increasingly difficult to accomplish.
 
Rising population growth puts phenomenal strain on the education, 
health, communication, transportation, public water and sewage systems, 
utilities -- all of which are already underdeveloped, badly managed, 
poorly maintained and randomly located. Especially hard hit is the education 
structure. Education, both in the sense of academic training-and acclimation 
to modern methods and culture, is an essential part of economic development.
 
Yet most lesser developed countries have high rates of adult illiteracy, a
 
shortage of teachers, and lack of educational plant equipment. UNESCO has estimated
 
that more than 40% of the global adult population cannot read or write
 
(see Figure 6). The cost of educating this population which, of course,
 
is ever increasing would be overwhelming. The lack of higher education
 
facilities induces the educated elite to leave the country for higher
 
education.
 
Capital diverted from productive purposes for any sort of social
 
overhead structure, while necessary, will merely aggravate the short
 
run economic development problems.
 
Potential Actions: While the causal relationship between population
 
growth and economic development is not precisely understood, it is quite
 
obvious that effective population policy is necessary if the lesser developed
 
countries are to have any chance of success at economic development.
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Figure 6
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Population policy reduces to only two approaches: (1) reducing
 
population growth by reducing fertility or (2) accommodating and adapting
 
to and providing for the existing population. The essential and mQst
 
efficacious method is to drastically lower the birth rate.
 
Unfortunately, many of the social welfare programs that an under­
developed country is likely to immediately implement for humanitarian purposes
 
can aggravate the population problem in the short-run however socially 
advantageous their effects may be. For instance, any public health programs
 
which significantly reduce infant mortality and increase life expectancy
 
without concomitant reduction in birth rates will accelerate population
 
growth and contribute to starvation, all other things being equal.
 
Alternative ways of reducing fertility are discussed in another
 
chapter, and any policy chosen will be a function of the unique social and
 
cultural pattern of that country.
 
One of the contributing social problems to both population growth and
 
lack of economic development is the social barriers in the education and
 
employment of women. The educationai infrastructure of the lesser developed
 
countries is inadequate and contributes to the problems of the labor force.
 
Population pressures, of course, exacerbate this difficulty. Education has
 
a particularly important role in economic development and provides three
 
functions. First, it generates the skills that a developing modern economy
 
requires. One of the historical problems of developing countries has been
 
the lack of administrative, bureaucratic, managerial, and 
technical skills. Hence, government ,officials have discovered that mere 
construction of basic industries -- electric power plants, for instance -­
is not sufficient if the necessary manpower to manage and maintain them is 
lacking. However, "overtraining" of the domestic labor force should be 
20
 
discouraged as well. A large group of professionally, rather than technically,
 
trained personnel are unlikely to find alternative employment opportunities
 
in their native land and will seek careers elsewhere, drawing away some of
 
the potentially most valuable members of the labor force.
 
A second function that education provides is its impact on birth rates.
 
Low fertility is correlated with educational achievement. Sri Lanka has the
 
lowest fertility rate in South Asia, as well as the highest (82%) rate of
 
literacy. Even if education per se does not immediately reduce the birth
 
rate, universal literacy will make any public education and information
 
program more successful.
 
A third function that education plays is to keep people out of the
 
labor force. As previously discussed, one of the problems of lesser developed
 
countries is unemployment and underemployment. The longer that the burgeoning
 
population can be kept out of the labor force, the more time the economy has
 
to generate employment opportunities for the population.
 
Finally, education for women is especially necessary if they are to
 
become productive members of the labor force. Those countries which have
 
made effective use of their female population have made the greatest strides
 
(witness Israel and Japan).
 
To improve the quality of its labor force, a developing country can:
 
1. 	Emphasize basic technical training, including vocational
 
instruction in primary and secondary schools and on-the­
job training in such fields as agriculture, commerce,
 
industry and construction.
 
2. 	Develop middle level skills such as and including draftsmen
 
and technicians.
 
3. 	Utilize foreign experts, especially to offset "the brain
 
drain." 
 33 
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One roadblock is the lack of teachers. During the 1960's, Iran
 
established a "literacy corps" which encouraged men of military age to serve
 
as teachers in rural areas instead of undertaking conventional military
 
service. The country also introduced short-term teacher training programs
 
and employed a large number of high school and university graduates.
 
One of the characteristics of an underdeveloped country is the existence
 
of a-dual economy: a large traditional agrarian economy functioning in parallel
 
to a-smaller modern sector. It is essential that agricultural productivity
 
improve to permit capital accumulation and to free members of the agrarian
 
society for industrial employment. Because the "Green Revolution" requires
 
substantial technical backup, its benefits can often not be adequately
 
realized because it is as technologically sophisticated as industrialization.
 
A first step often advocated to the modernization of agriculture is the
 
Even this is likely to be unsuccessful without
introduction of the tractor. 

An intermediate step
adequate maintenance, repair and fuel facilities. 

(which the Soviets have successfully implemented in their aid programs)
 
The substitution
is the introduction of advanced horse drawn equipment. 

of horse for human power would"dramatically increase productivity and would
 
be an important step in the industrialization of agriculture.
 
In sum, any economic or social development plan must incorporate
 
population growth policies if there is to be any chance of economic
 
success.
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ISSUE: 4 CONTINUED URBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES IS CAUSING THE
 
DETERIORATION OF THE CENTRAL CITY; COSTLY SUBURBAN DEVELOP-

BENTS; AND INCREASES IN CONGESTION, POLLUTION, CRIME,
 
VIOLENCE ANDALIENATION
 
The Issue!
 
The Current Urban Dilemma: The rise of modern cities is associated with
 
economic advantages such as the following:
 
" economies of scale that would accrue through high
 
density and specialization, such as the develop­
ment of a financial infrastructure and marketplace;
 
* 	economies of scale so substantial that without
 
attainment of a minimum market size a given service
 
would not be implemented, such as a communications
 
network or utilities network;
 
* 	locational advantages necessary for a given endeavor
 
such as water transportation, raw material supplies,
 
access to a market.
 
One theory of urban growth is based on the concept of the city as a
 
center for human interaction and offers the notion that cities grew and
 
developed because of the opportunities for face-to-face transactions.
 
However, technological advances in communication decreased the necessity
 
of face-to-face contact,-and urban problems such as traffic congestion are 
encouraging costly suburban growth and deterioration of the older central 
city. The dilemma which the U.S. now faces is two-fold:' central cities 
of extremely high density do cause increases in pollution, crime, alienation 
and bankrupt local governments but the "urban sprawl" outward to the fringes 
of metropolitan areas oftev causes a new set of economic and environmental 
problems. Furthermore, urbanization is such an important part of modernization
 
'ichard L. Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth (MIT Press: 
Cambridge) 1962. 3 P3 
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that some development theorists believe that any efforts to retard the growth
 
and spread of urbanization will, in fact, retard the growth and spread of
 
economic development. Many of the characteristics deemed requisite for
 
modern industrialization such as lower fertility rates, maintenance of a
 
bureaucracy, establishment of a political infrastructure and a money based
 
economy are correlated with the historical development of cities.
 
The Origin of Cities: Archaeological evidence from studies of the
 
earliest Mesopotamian cities indicate that the origin of cities may have been
 
a sociaZ process reflecting more of a change in man's interaction with man
 
than man's interaction with his environment. While the development of cities
 
rested ultimately on agricultural advances that made it possible for farmers
 
to produce more than they required and to make this surplus available to
 
city dwellers engaged in other activities, the essential element of urbani­
zation was a whole series of new institutions and the vastly greater size
 
and complexity of the social unit, rather than innovations in basic sub­
sistence.
 
The first cities appeared in Mesopotamia at about 3500 B.C. (see
 
Figure 1).3 The origin of cities was a profound social and cultural process
 
and reflects a first step of the modernization process: the shift from
 
nomadism, hunting and gathering to settled agriculture. Cities provided a
 
mechanism for meeting some of the basic needs that were generated by the
 
introduction of modern agriculture: defense, early manufacturing and
 
processing ("cottage industry"), commerce, recreation, political and
 
religious centers.4
 
2Robert M. Adams, "The Origins of Cities," Scientific American (September
 
1960), pp.156-168.
 
3Gideon Sjoberg, "The Origin and Evolution of Cities," in Cities by
 
Scientific American (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p.29 .
 
Ralph Thomlinson, Population Dynamcs: Causes and Consequences of World
 
Dem'ographic Change (Random H~ouse: NXew _Yrk) 1965, p. 2 71. 
ii 
FIGURE 1 
.THE ORIGIN OF CITIES
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SOURCE: GIDEON SJOBERG, "THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CITIES", IN CITIES BY SCIENTIFIC
 
AMERICAN (NEW YORK: ALFRED A KNOPF,, 1967), P. 29.
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While economic development was made possible by the cultural and social
 
changes that resulted from urbanization, immediate economic change was not
 
the central characteristic of the earliest cities, rather this was a result
 
of another trend. The first trend that is apparent from the archaeological
 
record is the rise of temples. It has been suggested that as new patterns
 
of thought and social organization developed within the temples, the
 
religious institution served as the primary force in bring people together
 
and setting the modernization process in motion. Priests were the first
 
persons freed from direct subsistence labor and the first to develop
 
administrative and bureaucratic skills.
 
It is further evident from Mesopotamian archaeological evidence that
 
contrary to modern thinking, technological advance was (in this case the
 
development of metallurgy) not a precondition or even a stimulant for urban
 
growth, but rather a consequence of city growth, which in turn contributed
 
to the growth of militarism and social stratification.6
 
The modifications and changes in the social order and the development
 
of new skills that occurred with the rise of early cities made possible
 
the industrialization, economic development and the rise of a modern
 
economy. Among these fundamental changes were:
 
1. 	The increase in occupational specialization.
 
2. 	The release of a few persons from direct sub­
sistence labor and their emergence as a priest­
hood and religious infrastructure.
 
3. 	The transformation of traditional religious
 
activities related to fertility, rainfall and
 
the streams into the administration of the water
 
supply (the introduction of irrigation made
 
possible the produbtion of an agricultural
 
surplus) and the management of lands and herds.
 
5 	 670
 
6Adams o.cit. 
Ibid.
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4. 	The emergence of a political leadership and
 
organization of the work force..
 
5. 	The increased differentiation of rewards for
 
diversified tasks.
 
6. 	The development of a defense force to protect
 
the food supply and guarantee the security of
 
the city.
 
7. 	The development of a marketplace for the exchange
 
of goods.
 
8. 	The development of regional specialization (while
 
this did not occur until the rise of medieval
 
cities, it was a precondition to the modern city).
 
9. 	The gradual collapse of a feudal class structure
 
and the rise of a middle class bourgeoisie contri­
buted to the evolution to modern cities.
7
 
These fundamental institutional and social changes (characterized
 
by increasing complexity and specialization through the division of labor,
 
development of an economic surplus, and the rise in administrative skills)
 
made economic innovation and industrialization possible. The development
 
of cities and the creation of an economic surplus encouraged the rise of
 
trade. Historically, trade has served as a tremendous channel for the transfer
 
and dissemination of knowledge and innovation and provides a strong impetus
 
to economic development.
 
While much of the discussion which follows will stress the "problems"
 
of present urbanization, it is important to note the historical role of cities
 
in the current standard of living that the nation enjoys. The proliferation
 
of cities and widespread urbanization made possible the Industrial Revolution
 
and economic development and the high standard of living that £he developed
 
world enjoys.3 
 7 
7Adapted from Thomlinson, op.cit. and Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick,
 
"Urban Man," in Sociology (Harper & Row: New York) 1955.
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Dimensions of the Problem:
 
The Evolution and Growth of American Cities: 
 The first census of the
 
United States, taken in 1790, showed that 95% of the population resided in
 
rural areas (defined as less than 2500 persons). At that time, only 24 urban
 
sites existed, and only 2 had populations in excess of 25,000 people.8
 
By 1900, the number of urban areas had increased to more than 1700 and by
 
1970, the number had risen to almost 7100. While some of this urban growth
 
was due to naturally occurring population growth, much of it was the result
 
of large shifts in population from the agricultural and rural areas to the
 
cities, as well as the hugh influx of foreign immigration to this country
 
prior to World War I. 
As Figure 4 shows, at the turn of the century during the
 
fastest growth period of the East Coast "old cities," a substantial portion
 
of the American population was of foreign origin, While Figure 2 does not
 
indicate the degree to which this population was urban, the vast-majority of
 
the immigrants at least originally settled in the East Coast cities. In fact,
 
from 1900 to 1914, the population of the United States increased by about
 
24 million people; and almost 50 percent of this increase ,stemmed from
 
9
 
immigration. 

'PhilipM. Hauser, "Urbanization: Problems of High Density Living," Paper
 
prepared for Conference on World Population Problems, School of Business
 
and the International Affairs Center, Indiana University, May 1967.
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,

Colonial'Times to 1957 (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office),
 
p.56. 
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FIGURE 2
 
NATIVITY OF THE WHITE POPULATION
 
FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1850 TO 1960
 
Natiae
 
Population
Year 	 (in millions) Foreign Forigi or 
born mixed Nat".e 
pa~enta{:e parentage 
19 .0 .. ... ......................... 	 159 5.8, 150 79.)
...... 
1950 ......... ... ......................... 134 7.5 175 75.0 
194".. ....... ......................... 119 9.6 19 5 7,O 
1930 " ..................... 110 12.7 23.5 63e 
1920 . ..... .. ........ ... .. .. 95 14 6 239 61.c
 
1910 ......... .... ......................... 82 16.3 23.1 605
 
1900 ......... .... ......................... 67 15.3 234 . 613
 
1890 .......... ........................ 55 16.6 20.9 62C
 
1880 ......................... 43 15.1 19.1 S5
 
1870 ............................... 34 16.4 Q .7fj
 
1860 ...... .. ... ........................ 27 15.2 84.8
 
195U ......... .... ......................... 20 11.5 88.5
 
Source: 	Richard Irwin and Robert Warren, "Demographic Aspects of Ameirlcan 
Immigration, in Charles F. Westoff and Robert Parke, Jr.,(Eds.), 
Demographic and Social Aspects of Population Growth, Vol. 1, 
The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO) 1972, p.1 6 9 . 
The contribution of the rural population shift was substantial as well.
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, about 40% of the American population
 
resided in urban areas. In 1920 the country crossed the threshold from a
 
rural to 	an urban population, and by 1970 almost 74% of the population was
 
living in urban areas. 10
 
'Pfrene B. Taeuber, "The Changing Distribution of the Population of the
 
United States in the Twentieth Century," in Sara Mills Mazie (ed.)
 
Population, Distribution and Policy, Vol.5, The Commission on Population
 
Growth and the American Future (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
 
Office, 1972).
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Viewed another way, almost the entire gain in the U.S. population
 
during the 1960's (almost 24 million peisons) took place in metropolitan
 
areas and occurred in those areas with populations greater than I00,000.ll
 
As Figure 3 shows, the fastest growing cities proportionately have been the
 
moderate sized cities, while the largest cities have declined proportionally.
 
Of course, it is extremely important to differentiate between population
 
growth in a metropolitan area and growth in the center city. Since World
 
War II the predominant growth has been in the suburban outer ring areas,
 
while the central city has often actually Zost population. Figure 4 shows
 
the regional growth in the New York Metropolitan Area since 1900. The
 
figure indicates that the center city population was stable during the 
decade of the fifrties. Later data indicates that the population of the
 
center city of New York, as contrasted to the metropolitan area, declined
 
5.6% by 1970 from its level in 1960.12
 
This behavior is typical of most older cities. Resident population
 
of the older center cities is declining, especially among the middle income
 
groups. However, the demand for services in the city is continuing unabated
 
as the older city's plant becomes obsolete and poorly maintained; the demand
 
for services by the remaining population (which is dominated by lower income 
groups) increases even on a per capita basis; and the demand for services
 
by the labor force, employers and industries increases. This loss of .the, 
llJames L. Sundquist, "Europe Stops the Urban Swarm," The'Brbokings Bulletin 
(Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 1974), p.7. 
12 Statistical Abstract of the United States, gp. cit. 
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FIGURE 3 
POPULATION BY SIZE OF PLACE 
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FIGURE 4
 
POPULATION GROWTH IN NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION, 1900-1957 
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Source: 	 Raymond Vernon, Metropolis 1985: An Interpretation-of-the.New
 
York Metropolitan Region Study,-(Harvard University Press) 1960, p.2 2 .
 
upwardly 	mobile middle class, and with them their tax revenue, partly
 
accounts 	for the precarious financial position of most cities.
 
The differential growth rates within a metropolitan area results in a
 
somewhat confusing data base. For instance, population density figures are
 
not likely to reflect accurately the population patterns as an extremely
 
dense central city can be surrounded by suburban developments that are zoned
 
for anywhere up to five acre residential lots.
 
While high population density was periodically found in the ancient
 
cities, by and large ancient cities were small. It has been estimated that
 
hardly more than a few ancient Greek city states ever had more than 10,000
 
citizens or a free population beyond 40,000.13 The huge (greater than one
 
million) 	cities of high population density are a fairly recent phenomenon.
 
However, 	a few historical cities have rivaled the current population density.
 
It has been estimated that Ur in Mesopotamia had a density of about 125,000
 
persons per square mile (out of a total population of 500,000)-by the year
 
200 B.C., and the population density of the center of Paris may have reached
 
142,000 per square mile in 1329.14
 
1 3Richard F. Wycherly, How the Greeks Built Cities,(MacMillan: 
-London)
 
1962, p.14 .
 
T
14thomlinson, op
*cit.
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American cities generally do not exceed a population density of about
 
17,000 persons per square mile; excepting, of course, New York City with a
 
population density approaching 28,000 (see Figure 5). Manhattan Island
 
itself has a population density of almost 70,000 persons per square mile.
15
 
The highest population density in the U.S. (and, in fact, in the Western
 
world) was 350,000 per square mile, reportedly in the poorest districts of
 
the Lower East Side of New York around 1900.16 Hong Kong, of course, has
 
the world's highest population density, estimated to be 800,000 persons
 
1 7
 
per square mile.

Despite these massive numbers, to a large degree population densities
 
are limited by technology. While high-rise apartment dwellings and under­
ground habitats increase the carrying capacity of an acre of land, the
 
diseconomies associated with it (congestion, pollution, etc.) are likely to
 
limit the feasible population density, at least in a wealthy country with
 
high consumer expectations such as the United States.
 
Transportation and communications technology have permitted cities to
 
"sprawl" in land mass. Lewis Mumford noted that "early cities did not grow
 
beyond walking distance.18 As means of communication and transportation have
 
improved, areas of high density living have expanded in size. Such
 
developments .have contributed to the growth of the suburban ring at the
 
expense of center city locations (see Figure 6). The speculation in land
 
and real estate has escalated the land costs in the center city, and the
 
reliance upon property tax financing of a growing urban debt has further
 
15 -U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1974,
 
95th Edition (Washington, D.C.: 1974), p,25 .
 
oThmlinson, op.cit., p.272,
 
17Ibid.
 
n
8 Hauser, op.cit., p.
 
16 
-12 -

FIGURE 5 
POPULATION DENSITY AS A FUNCTION OF CITY SIZE 
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FIGURE 6
 
Percentage of Total Metropolitan
 
Area Population Growth in Central
 
Cities and Suburbs* 
Decade Central Cities Suburbs 
1900-1910 72.1% 27.9% 
1910-1920 71.6% 28.4% 
1920-1930 59.3% 40.7% 
1930-1940 40.8% 59.2% 
1040-1950 40.7% 5Q.3% 
1950-1960 23.8% 76.2% 
1960-1970 16.0% 84.0% 
*Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs (New Haven: Yale
 
University Press, 1973), p. 199. The central city and suburbs
 
are divided out of the Census Bureau's Standard Metropolitan
 
Statistical Area (SNSA). 212 SMNSA's were identified from
 
1920-1960; 230 areas from 1960-1970. The table appears in
 
the statement by Anthony Downs before the Subcommittee on
 
Economic Developments of the Committee of Public Works,
 
House of Reprlsentatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session,
 
November 1, 1973.
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aggravated the economics of center city business. Hence, the suburbs have
 
been growing at the expense of the center city. The noted transportation
 
economist, Anthony Downs, observes that (a) most new jobs are now being
 
created in suburbs, (b) central cities have,far less usable land available
 
for development than suburbs, and (c) locating new housing and other urban
 
facilities on vacant land at the periphery of built-up areas tends to be
 
much less expensive and less difficult that locating such new construction
 
in older areas that have to be redeveloped.1
9
 
However, there 'issome evidence of countervailing trends. Continuation
 
of "urban sprawl" development patterns result in substantial environmental
 
and economic costs. Contrary to some expectations, low density de­
velopments mhy actually be more harmful to the environment than
 
higher density complexes. A recent study supported by the Council on
 
Environmental Quality, The Cost of Urban Sprawl, investigated the
 
comparative cost of low, medium and high density communities. They concluded
 
that low density urban sprawl comnunities traditionally made up of single
 
family homes on quarter acre lots that "leap frog" the suburban area
 
consumed more than twice as much land as the high density communities. 20
 
Low density communities also contribute to land abuse by increasing the pro­
portion of land allocated to vacant-improved and semi-improved uses -- at best,
 
an-inefficient use of land, at worst, a waste of land. Because this land is
 
1 9Anthony A. Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University

Press, 1973), p.199; and Anthony A. Downs, Testimony before Hearings of the
 
Subcommittee on Economic Development of the Committee on Public Works,
 
House of Representatives, November-December 1973, pp. 27 and 28.
 
2 0Real Estate Research Corporation, The Costs of'Sprawl: Executive Summary
 
(Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974).
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scattered between housingunits, housing development and community develop­
ments, it is essentially unusable. In addition, low density urban sprawl
 
development actually increases air pollution because of the increased
 
requirements for automobiles and residential heating. The Costs of Urban
 
Sprawl determined that high density planned communities generated about 45%
 
Zess air pollution than the low density sprawl community (assuming the same
 
population) as shown in Figure 7. The simple shift of housing density alone
 
could result in reduction of air pollution from automobiles from 20 to
 
21
30 percent.
 
FIGURE 7
 
COMUNITY COST ANALYSIS ANNUAL AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS
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Source: The Costs of Sprawl: Executive Summary, p,4.
 
21bid.2 7 
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Water pollution problems also vary with the kind of urban development
 
that is permitted. The Costs of Urban Sprawl analyzed the types of water
 
pollution problems that are generated by alternative housing and density
 
communities. Figure 8 indicates that low density areas actually contribute
 
higher levels of water pollution than high density areas (again, assuming
 
the same population levels)i This somewhat counterintuitive result is
 
largely the result of increased sediment pollution which occurs when large
 
amounts of land are disturbed.
 
FIGURE 8
 
COMMUNITY COST ANALYSIS ANNUAL WATER POLLUTION GENERATION
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Such environmental costs suggest that urban sprawl cannot be allowed
 
to continue. In addition, single family housing, the most expensive
 
method of housing the nation's population, is extremely wasteful of materials,
 
does not permit economies-of scale (such as through shared heating, air
 
conditioning, sanitation, water, utility systems) and is not easily amenable
 
to industrialized housing technologies. The recognition that this urban
 
sprawl is inherently inefficient is leading to a host of "no growth"
 
legislation in suburban communities. While many of these are slowly being
 
rejected as unconstitutional, it does reflect a growing demand to limit
 
growth. Fairfax County, Virginia, a suburb of Washington,D.C., is attempting
 
to regulate its growth through regulation of the sewer system.
 
The growing costs of energy is another trend that may inhibit the growth
 
of the surrounding suburbs. The costs of commuting, and the potential
 
insecurity of gasoline supplies,. may result in shifting the comparative
 
advantage to the central city. The savings that once accrued through
 
lower land prices and lower taxes are now being erased by increasing energy
 
costs and equalization of property tax structures.
 
The Problems of the City: While the economies of scale; the easy
 
exchange of goods, information, and labor and the concentration of resources
 
all accrue from urbanization, the urban process contributes to crime,
 
pollutioq congestion, and alienation. Some theorists argue that the
 
process of modernization and urbanization inevitably leads to such disruption.
 
"This disintegration of traditional norms and values is apparent in many
 
forms of pathology that characterize modern societies. It is generally
 
believed, although it is difficult to prove, that all categories of social
 
disorganization -- crime, deliquency, divorce, suicide? mental illness -­
have seen an increase in frequency as societies have become more modern.
 
Underlying this trend is the circumstance that the close ties of individuals
 
to others in the immediate environment are loosened as individuals by-the
 
millions migrate from rural to urban areasand the conformity to norms and
 
effectiveness of sanctions characteristic of traditional societies are
 
weakened. In a general sense this isolation of the individual is referred to
 
22
 
as alienation.t

The problems of the city generally fall into the following categories:
 
(1) behavior characteristics of social dis­
organization including crime, family break­
down, mental illness, etc;
 
(2) 	diseconomies resulting from high density living
 
such as congestion, pollution, breakdown of
 
urban services;
 
(3) 	financial collapse of the urban government.
 
(1) Social Disorganization: The indicators of social disorgani­
zation suggest that overcrowding contributes to anti-social behavior. Animal
 
experiments indicate that sexual perversion, irrational and excessive aggression,
 
increased mortality rates, lowered fertility rates, maternal neglect of the
 
young, withdrawal and other psychotic behavior all result when animals are
 
forced to live in crowded conditions 3 3  High population density in American
 
and European cities has been positively correlated with deaths due to heart
 
disease, admissions to hospitals and mental hospitals, juvenile deliquency,
 
divorce, infant mortality, prison rates, and TB and VD rates.24 Any inhabitant
 
22C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History
 
32
(Harper and Row: New York) 1966, p. .
 
23 Robert J. Trotter, "Cities, Crowding and Crime," Science News (Vol. 106)
 
November 2, 1974, p.28 2 ..
1J~24 1bid.
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of American cities is aware of the phenomenon: violent crime is five
 
times more prevalent in cities over 250,000 than under 10,000 (see
 
Figure 9.), and crime rates are increasing at 11-12% for cities of all sizes.
 
Rapidly rising expenditures in the criminal justice system have had little
 
effect: the nation currently spends about $15 billion annually on criminal
 
justice.
 
At the same time, the recession is contributing to a further increase
 
in crime. Urban areas with the greatest unemployment are experiencing the
 
greatest increases in crime.25 In addition, there is evidence that teenagers
 
are becoming the most likely victims of suicide. Suicide is the second
 
leading cause of death for teenagers and the suicide rate for the young
 
has doubled in the past decade.26
 
Why is this happening despite massive efforts to curtail it? Sociologists
 
and psychologists indicate that traditional cultural patterns are destroyed
 
in cities and that high number of contacts with individuals not a part of
 
one's normal social circle may lead to mental disturbances. Others have
 
indicated that the extent to which urban environment is an underlying
 
cause of these behavior patterns is not known; nor is the extent to which
 
the urban environment precipitates a behavior pattern that may have long been latent
 
in the individual. Deviant personalities may tend to drift toward some
 
areas where their breakdowns finally occur, although their difficulties may
 
27
 
have begun in other areas.
 
5B. E. Calame and E. Morgenthaler, "Crime Rate is Rising as Joblessness
 
Spreads and Economy Recedes," Wall Street Journal (February 25, 1975), p.l.
 
26Richard M. Cohen, "Suicide Rate for Young Rises Sharply," Washington Post
 
(April 28, 1975) p.l.
 
27Broom and Selznick, ap.cit.
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FIGURE 9
 
INCIDENCE OF VIOLENT CRIME*IN THE UNITED STATES BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY
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SOURCE: 	EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
 
BUDGET, SOCIAL. INDICATORS, 1973 (WASHINGTON, D.C.: U.S. GOVERN-

MENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1973), P. 65.
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Several theories to explain the behavior patterns have been offered. One
 
is the notion of infringement of interpersonal physical distance (the area
 
surrounding a person's body into which intruders may not come) as a cause
 
of anxiety, stress and tension. Continual infringement of this space can
 
regult in anti-social, violent behavior.
 
A second theory refers to sensory overload. The urban population is
 
subjected to such a large number of sensory stimuli that all stimuli
 
cannot be processed. To adapt to this overload, urban people tend to
 
allocate less time to each input, disregard certain low priority inputs
 
and decrease involvement with other people. This lower rate of social
 
responsibility, and hence, lower rate of intervention in criminal activity,
 
results in higher crime rates. Experimental evidence gives some
 
support to this: people raised in small towns reported shoplifting at
 
about twice the rate of people raised in large cities (those accustomed
 
28
 
to sensory overload).
 
Finally, there is growing evidence that biochemical changes in the
 
brain, resulting in permanent brain damage, lead to violent and aggressive
 
behavior. 29 Studies of repeated violent crime offenders indicate that they
 
have a much higher rate of brain damage than the general population. Research
 
is now trying to determine the underlying causes of such brain damage.
 
Preliminary evidence- suggests that isolation during infancy and somatosensory
 
deprivation during infancy cause central nervous system damage. It could be
 
that the rush, congestion and turmoil of urbanization contribute-tO this
 
infant deprivation.
 
28Trotter, op.cit.
 
2 Gene Bylinsky, "New Clues to the Causes of Violence," Fortune
 
(January 1973) p.1 35 .
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(2) Diseconomies from Congestion: Any person living or working
 
within or in close proximity to a large American city has experienced the
 
costs of congestion. The speed of any transportation system decreases
 
rapidly, as traffic exceeds a given level. 
Beyond that point, each additional
 
traveler reduces the speed at which other travelers can move. It has been
 
suggested that one could move more quickly through the nation's capital in
 
George Washington's time than today.
 
The problems of urban transportation which the world is now experiencing
 
are not new. In the 1st century A.D., the government of Rome reduced
 
congestion in the streets by restricting vehicular traffic (excepting
 
chariots and state vehicles) to nighttime hours. However, with the exception
 
of ancient Rome, vehicular traffic had not presented a problem until
 
industrialization was well underway during the 19th century. Indeed, the
 
problems of congestion are many, including the overloading of routes and
 
facilities, excessive time of commuting trips, irregularity and inconvenience
 
of public transportation services, and the difficulty in finding parking
 
facilities for private vehicles. These problems arise not only from the
 
size and density of modern cities, but also from the way in which land is
 
used, from the balance between public services and private rights of access
 
and travel and from the-choices remaining to the citizen in terms of mode
 
30

of travel, route, comfort, and cost.
 
Various experiments have been tried to reduce traffic congestion
 
from staggered working hours to car pooling incentives. However, once a
 
given level of population density is reached, traffic congestion inevitably
 
results.
 
John W. Dyckman, "Transportation in Cities," in Cities, Scientific
 
American (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p.13 3 134
 - .
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Environmental deterioration, both physical and aesthetic, is readily
 
apparent in large cities. Pollution levels increase with city size (see
 
Figure 10). Noise is another form of pollution which increases with city size.
 
It has long been known that manual labor and intellectual efficiency
 
deteriorate with exposure to increasing levels of noise. It recently has
 
been demonstrated that some teenagers have suffered permanent hearing
 
loss due to long exposure to amplified rock music. Permanent hearing loss
 
results from chronic exposure to high noise levels,and levels as low as
 
50-55 decibels delay or interfere with sleep.and result in fatigue on
 
awakening. Recent evidence also has indicated that noise of about 90
 
decibels may cause permanent damage to the autonomic nervous system.
 
Furthermore, noise may be a factor in many stress-related illnesses such
 
as ulcers and hypertension, although this has not been proven conclusively.
 
Noise has also been associated with the incidence of premature infants.
 
Noise is only recently become of concern to the public and the EPA is in
 
the early stages of establishing noise limits.
 
The delivery of essential urban services is declining, Recent
 
destruction of the telephone exchange building in Manhattan, reportedly by
 
arson, indicated the vulnerability of large scale systems. Similarly,
 
interruption of electrical power in the Northeast due to the famous
 
blackout of November 4, 1965, emphasized the enormous dependence upon
 
uninterrupted electrical service.
 
The ability of the urban government to provide essential services such
 
as sanitation, police and fire protection, social welfare services, and the
 
like is decliiing. This is partly due to the difficulty of achieving
26¢5 
- -
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FIGURE 10 
PARTICULAR MATTER AS A FUNCTION OF CITY SIZE 
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SOURCE: 	 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
 
States: 1973 (94th Edition), Washington, D.C. 1973
 
productivity increases in services, as well as the tremendous increases
 
in the cost of labor. For .instance, the technology of trash collecting
 
certainly has not changed significantly over the past several centuries.
 
It may well be that there is a maximum ceiling to urban size and urban
 
density,-beyond which the city cannot effectively function.
 
ORIGINAy PAGE IS
 
OF POOR QUALIY
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(3) Financial Collapse Many of the problems of the city
 
are aggravated by the concentration of low income population groups in the
 
city and the middle and high income groups in the suburbs. This aggravates
 
the deterioration of the ghetto, encourages "slum landlordism," building
 
abandonment, and capital deterioration. And most fundamentally, the flight
 
of the middle class, and the growing flight of employment centers, increasingly
 
render the city bankrupt. The center city must provide services to a wide
 
variety of residents and visitors who do not generate compensating revenue
 
to the city. The fiscal bankruptcy of the city is inevitable, if the
 
pattern progresses.
 
The present structural forms of local government in large metropolitan
 
areas encourage the exploitation of the center city, Because of unrealistic
 
political boundaries and the use of zoning practices to misallocate land
 
resources, residents of the centrdl city have been forced to carry:
 
the financial burden of an elaborate and costly
 
service installation, i.e,, the central city, which
 
is used daily by a noncontributing population in
 
some instances more than twice the size of the
 
contributing population, 31,
 
Encouraged by the general lack of overall authority in a metropolitan
 
region, the suburban municipalities lack incentive to fully compensate the
 
central city for the benefits it supplies. While major metropolitan
 
expenditures have been partially offset by the large commercial and
 
industrial tax base of the city, the demands of modern-day society stress
 
the need for the development of more modern, effective police departments
 
and the assurance of inhabitable communities. The city must satisfy these
 
31Amos Harvely, "Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government
 
Expenditures in Central Cities," Journal of Social Issues, VII, 1951, p.107.
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demands with an eroding tax base and in accordance with constitutional
 
and statutory limitations. It is apparent that the central cities of
 
metropolitan regions face impending financial crises.
 
The inequities that have developed between the city and its
 
surrounding areas cannot be resolved without attention to structural and
 
institutional change that would permit sharing of financial revenues as
 
well as sharing of fiscal responsibilities. Only if the provision of
 
public services as well as their payment are viewed from a regionaZ context
 
can the city survive.
 
"A metropolitan area, both central city and suburban, is a natural
 
economic and social unit.",32 Most of the central city's difficulties are
 
inherently complex in nature and cannot be constrained by artificial geo­
graphical boundaries. These problems are compounded by the extreme
 
fragmentation of governments in large metropolitan areas. The enormous
 
number of local governments within-a metropolitan area increases the lack
 
of coordination among various municipal jurisdictions in the development of
 
rational policy for solving societal problems.
 
Hence, a mechanism must be found to insure that the city is
 
recompensed for the services it provides through a mechanism other than 
property taxation. While the imposition of an income tax on non-residents 
may provide short-term stop gap solution, it does not address the basic 
inequity of the city/suburb structure. The essential problem -- and the 
cause of the city/suburb conflict -- is the disparity between services 
provided and revenues received. While a revenue sharing mechanism could be 
'William Neeman, "Suburban-Central City Exploitation Thesis: One City's
 
Tale," National Tax Journal, Vol. 23, No, 2, June 1970, p.117,
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created which would provide for intergovernment revenue transfers, a better
 
solution would seem to be the convergence of the boundaries defining an area
 
in which services are provided and revenues are generated. The only solution
 
is to restructure metropolitan government. Many mechanisms have been
 
identified as a way of restructuring municipal government -- metropolitan
 
councils, county government, city-county consolidation, city-city consoli­
dation, annexation, single or multipurpose special districts and federation
 
of urban functions. The true rejuvenation of Toronto, Ontario following
 
implementation of the metropolitan form of government attests to the efficacy
 
of the approach.
 
Potential Actions:
 
According to a survey by the Commission on Population Growth and the
 
American Future, 54% of Americans think that population distribution is a
 
serious problem. Half of those surveyed believe that, during the next 30
 
years, it will be a problem at least as great as population growth.
 
The survey also found that only 55% of respondents were satisfied with
 
the size of the communities where they live, and of the 45% who were unsatis­
fied, most would prefer to live in a smaller community, For those who
 
lived in the very large cities, only 39% expressed satisfaction with their
 
situation. Also, the vote was 52:33 in favor of the Federal Government
 
discouraging further growth of large cities. Calls for government inter­
vention are arising from many quarters. In 1970, Congress committed itself
 
to "a sound balance between urban and rural America." and the 1972
 
Democratic platform included a similar declaration. The National Governor's
 
Conference, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and the
 
National League of Cities, have adopted measures calling for a national growth
 
policy that would encourage a degree of population decentralization.
 
35 4 I 
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Proponents of such programs have yet to produce a cohesive program.
 
James L. Sundquist notes that "nobody has defined the population distri­
bution pattern or proposed the measures that would influence the location
 
of people according to that pattern., 33
 
Sundquist proposes that measures taken in Europe might provide some
 
ideas as to how to proceed. He notes that Great Britain, France, Italy,
 
the Netherlands, and Sweden have policies intended to dispurse the national
 
population by stemming migration, and, hence, reducing the congestion of
 
the larger cities. Basically the programs consist of various economic
 
incentives to encourage growth in desirable areas. In italy these grants
 
and subsidies range from 20% to 50% of total industrial costs.
 
Industrial incentives in Europe, reports Sundquist, are accompanied
 
by programs to move government organizations to desired areas and to
 
provide extra funds in development regions for roads, ports, utilities, etc.
 
Sweden is presently moving one-fourth of its national government from
 
Stockholm to 13 centers around the country. In France the government has
 
prompted policies whereby potentiai leasers of Paris office space are
 
provided space if they will, for example, move major portions of their
 
people outside of Paris. They report that a significant number of jobs
 
have been decentralized through such bargaining.
 
The European countries have apparently been successful in interfacing
 
with the normal economy. Migration has been reduced and population stabilized
 
in areas previously experiencing out-migrations. Sundquist reports that
 
there is now a net migration from the London region and the Paris region
 
33 Europe Stops the Urban Swarm, op.cit., p.8.
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and from Provinces of North Holland and South Holland containing Amsterdam,
 
the Hague, and Rotterdam. He notes, however, that some of this may have
 
occurred without government intervention as cities are becoming extremely
 
expensive places in which to do business. He also notes, however, that
 
shifts in demographic patterns followed rapidly and abruptly when the
 
national policies were implemented.
 
The United States might adopt such policies and also might try to
 
undertake a program of technological advancement which could markedly improve
 
working and living conditions in major metropolitan areas. In fact,
 
requirements to conserve energy and minimize transportation ultimately might
 
make such moves highly desirable and in certain cases, essentially mandatory.
 
There are even those who argue that such a program of new city development
 
and urban renewal in America could provide a focus for marshalling national
 
interest and stimulating the-economy.
 
However beneficial a program this is for Europe, it is unlikely to be
 
adopted in the near future in the U.S. The recent collapse of the HUD
 
sponsored New Towns program And the government proclamation that the urban
 
crisis is over,34 do not portend well for the cities.
 
Institutional change in the form of metropolitan government and urban 
tax reform could do much to alleviate the financial breakdown of the city, and 
may do more in the short run to improve the quality of life in the city. 
Current property tax structure punishes property improvements and is a 
fundamental cause of deteriorating plant and building abandonment in the 
central city. 
34Ernest Holsendolph, "Urban Crisis of the 1960's is Over, Ford Aides Say,"
 
The New York Times, (March 23, 1975) p.1 .
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Policies to improve the city may be more feasible in the short run than
 
policies aimed at fundamental population shifts and relocation -- a much longer
 
run 	goal. Anthony Downs offers some cogent arguments which should not be
 
ignored in considering the attractiveness of various policies. These
 
35
 
include;
 
1. 	Proposed future patterns for American population growth
 
will be feasible only if they offer the majority of
 
Americans the possibility of continuing to benefit from
 
economies of scale offered by large metropolitan areas.
 
2. 	Great uncertainty remains as to whether there is some
 
"critical mass" or urban population size above which
 
pollution effects become much more severe and much
 
harder to control.
 
3. 	If we are to generate economic development in "unnatural"
 
areas, it will require intensive concentration of economic
 
activities and incentives on a limited number of locations;
 
such concentration i incompatible with the geographically
 
decentralized, demographic political system in the United
 
States.
 
4. 	It is probably impossible to achieve effective coordination
 
among the various federal agencies that would be involved.
 
5. 	Initial steps toward encouraging decentralization of economic
 
development would depend upon recognition of a host of impacts
 
from present public decisions and policies and few, if any,
 
political or government bureaucratic leaders which to see such
 
impacts clearly revealed, as it would reduce the scope of the
 
present decisionmaking authority and also would require that they
 
accept responsibility for effects many now argue are accidental
 
and unknown.
 
Although this is a partial list of concerns offered by Downs, he
 
notes that such considerations do not make it wholly impossible to shift
 
future urban growth-from metropolitan areas to other locations outside such
 
areas. But, as he puts it, these cautions indicate that any actions will
 
not 	be acceptable if they "swim against the tide" of American sentiment.
 
35fDowns Hearings, op.cit., pp.32-37, 
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ISSUE: 	 CHANGING AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE U.S. POPULATION CREATES FUNDA-
MENTAL ATTITUDINAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES WHICH MARKEDLY AFFECT 
THE DEMANDS FOR GOODS, SERVICES, AND RESOURCE EXPENDITURES. 
The Issue:
 
Many factors are important in shaping the national demand for
 
products and services: incomes, prices, expectations about tne future, as
 
well as the sex and age distribution of the population. The issue
 
of the changing age distribution of
 of concern here is the potential impact 
the national population on the attitudes, values and social structure of the 
country, as well as the effect on the demands for goods, services and re­
source expenditures. The consumption patterns of a household are governed
 
by the income level, age and number of children, but fundamentally by
 
the age of the heads of households. Thus, all other things being equal
 
we can expect that as the population distribution of the American population
 
changes, so will the demands for goods and services.
 
If the Age
Attitudes and social mores differ as a function of age. 
structure of the country changes, will this have any impact upon the nation's 
willingness to take risks? On the level of innovative activity? On the 
political principles the country adheres to? 
Further, there is the additional problem that may increase because 
of the increasing proportion of elderly citizens, requiring a smaller pro­
portion of the population to care for a rising proportion of dependents. 
It has been suggested that the elderly are less adaptable to political and 
social change and the United States could be faced with "social stagnation."
 
As the population of a nation becomes older, job advancement opportunities
 
may diminish as a larger proportion of the labor force is in the older 
age groups and, hence, occupies higher positions for a longer period of time.
 
2
 
There is a growing body of opinion in the United States that a
 
stable population is a desirable goal for the nation; specifically, a wide­
range of academic, business, and public interests have expressed support
 
for a stable population. While this cannot be interpreted as an effective
 
consensus for the cause, it is interesting to note that the U.S. birth
 
rate maintains its lowest level in history. Business leaders today are 
saying that if the population stops growing, goods will be consumed ­
primarily to replace existing household inventory rather than establish new 
households. Therefore, it is increasingly suggested that the private 
sector must grow through the provision of services which can be consumed 
' 
"infinitely." It may be noted that this will tend to "favor products or
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activities with a 'luxury' connotation, since growing demand may not be
 
linked to increases in the number of people to feed and shelter. Further­
more, the recent severe energy and materiel shortages and the need to
 
contribute to the global food supply may give added impetus to the establish­
ment of national policies which encourage a stable population.
 
A wide range of interests and organizations appear to share the view
 
that reducing population growth (or mdintaining a very low rate of growth)
 
is a desirable end. Although the widespread and apparently growing support
 
for maintaining a stable population suggests a solidarity of purpose, there
 
is reason to believe that some of this may be based ,upon shaky foundations.
 
The rationale for lowered birth rates is often couched in terms of
 
"doomsday" scenarios of doubtful validity, rather than on a reasoned
 
1P. M. Hauser, "Our.Population: Trends and Implications," The Conference
 
Board Record, May 1971, p.19.
 
2. 	B. Weiss, "Marketing's Challenge: Dwindling Population and Production
 
Growth," Advertising Age, February 1,. 1971.
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assessment of alternative societal patterns associated with rapid vs. slow
 
,(or no) growth. The critical questions which are associated with the
 
changing population configuration include the following­
* 	implications of the changing relationships among age groups
 
(the "age pyramid"), particularly with regard to life style
 
and economic dependency;
 
* 	implications for employment and overall economic productivity;
 
* 	legislative and legal trends, particularly as they affect
 
institutional and individual behavior; and
 
* 	implications of technological trends, particularly as they
 
pertain to productivity and the introduction of new goods and
 
services.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
What are these changing population configurations? What are the forces
 
at 	play and what are the likely consequences?
 
Zero Population Growth (ZPG) means, literally, that the total population
 
remains constant; i.e., the total size remains the same as well as sex and
 
age composition of the population. Births, deaths, emigration and immigration
 
balance each other so that the population remains stable. The population,
 
of 	course, will continue to grow until that point of stability when births
 
and immigration equal deaths and emigration. The rapidity with which a
 
stable population is achieved is primarily a function, of course, of
 
the birth rate. The stable population can be achieved "3.Owly," that S, 
by 	the year 2040, if beginning now, all married couples have 2.1 children.
 
By 	2040 then, the natural population (assuming a constant net immigration
 
of 	400,000 per year) would stabilize at 335 million, as compared to today's
 
205 million.
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Of course, a state of ZPG could be achieved more quickly if the
 
fertility rates were to drop even further. If married couples were to
 
average only 1.2 children (contrary to 2.1) each for the next several
 
decades, a stable population would soon be achieved. Inasmuch as the
 
most recent survey on family size expectations reports that women between
 
the ages of 18 and 24 expect to have an average of 2.1 children, there is
 
little reason to believe that this might occur.
 
This population shift can be dramatically shown by comparing these
 
results with a population where women bear an average of three children
 
each. In this case, the U.S. population would approximate 300 million
 
by the year 2000, 400 million by 2015 and one billion by the end of the
 
21st century. These alternative populations are graphically presented
 
in Figure 1.
 
As indicated, even under the current birth rates, Zero Population
 
Growth will not be reached for a considerable time. Today, the U.S.
 
population is relatively young, with a large proportion of females just
 
entering their child bearing years. Even if these couples average only
 
2.1 children apiece, these additions will result in a 40% increase in
 
the aggregate size of the population before stability is reached.
 
These population projections include annual immigration to the
 
United States. Net immigration to the U.S. presently averages 400,000
 
per year, and is not expected to decline. This means that to achieve
 
ZPG quickly, the number of births must be less than the number of deaths
 
by this amount. Immigration of young adults not only replaces births, but
 
it also adds to the stock of women of child bearing age, so that the
 
impact on population growth is greater than the actual number of immigrants
 
would suggest. 7
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Factors Which Influence Population Change:- There are three basic
 
forces which determine the population growth rate: mortality, migration,
 
and fertility. Immigration has in the past had a great impact upon the
 
growth in population in the United States, accounting for 40% of the 1880­
1890 population increase. However, this is primarily a function of political
 
decisions rather than individual behavior. At one time (1890) foreign
 
born residents accounted for over 16% of the total population, but since
 
political regulations of the immigration process have been established, the
 
contribution has been increasingly less significant. By 1960, less than
 
3 
6% of the resident white population was foreign born. Figure 2 displays 
the decreasing role that immigration has played in shaping American popula­
tion. It is not probable that a major change in U.S. attitudes and policies 
will occur to change this influence. 
FIGURE 2 
NATIVITY OF THE WHITE POPULATION, FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1850 TO 1960 
Nativity (percent) 
NativePopulationYear 
(in millions) Foreign 
born Foreign or
mixed Native 
parentageparentage 
1960 .......... ......................... 159 5.8 15.0 79.2
 
1950 ....... .. ......................... 134 7.5 17.5 
 75.0 
1940 .......... ......................... 119 9.6 19.5 70,9
 
1930 . ...... ... ........................ 110 12.7 23.5 63.8
 
1920 ........... .. .......... . . . .. . 95 23.9
14.5 61.6
 
1910 ....... ........... ................. 82 16.3 23.1 60.5
 
1900 ........... ......................... 67 15.3 23.4 61.3
 
1890 ........... ....................... 55 166 20.9 
 62.6 
1880 ............ .. .. . 15.1 19.1 658..................... 43 

1870 ........... ..... .................... 34 16.4 j5_9 17,8

1860 .... ............. ............. .... 27 15.2 84.8
 
1850 ........... ......................... 20 11.5 88.5
 
Note: A recent estimate indicates that since 1960 the Sources: US.'Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census ofPopula­proportion foreign born of- the total population'decreased nion, and HistoricalStatistics of the United States, Series A 
slightly, from 5.4 percent in 1960 to 5.3 percent in 1969. 51-58. 
3
 
-Richard Irwin and Robert Warren, "Demographic Aspects of American Immigra­
tion," in U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Futur _* 
Demographic and Social Aspects of Population Growth, Charles F. Westoff 
 "
 
and Robert Parke, Jr., eds., Vol. 1 of Commission Research Reports. Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
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Mfortality refers to both infant mortality, as well as life expectancy.
 
Infant mortality affects population size in two ways: one, by the obvious
 
decrease resulting from the death of an individual, and secondly, by
 
reducing the number of females who reach child-bearing age.
 
The death rate has fallen from about 17 per 1000 persons at the turn
 
of the century to its present level of about 9 per 1000, and average life
 
expectancy is currently about 70 years (23 years longer than in 1900).
 
Major reductions in mortality were achieved prior to 1960, due largely to
 
reductions in infant mortality and advances in medical science such as the
 
introduction of penicillin, broad spectrum antibiotics and vaccines (see
 
Figures 3 and 4). As mortality during the early years of life is now low,
 
any significant improvements in life expectancy will have to come primarily
 
from extending the life of persons over the age of 50 (See Figure 5)-

I 
FIGURE 3 
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH: 
I 
i901-1971 BY SEX Years 
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Source: 	 Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and
 
Budget Soclal Indicators, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 2
 
FIGURE 4 
INFANT MORTALITY RATES: 1940-1971
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1974 (W~ash ington, D.C.: U.S. Covcrhnmecnt PlrinLtingCOfice, 1974); and SLjrtiSti­
cal Yearbook of the United N.ations, 2501 Issue (New York 1971j). pp. 80-85. 
United Nation,%Statistical Yearbook, 1973, 25th Issue (New York 2974), pp.30-85. 
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FIGURE 5
 
DEATH RATES, BY AGE,AID SEX: 1971
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The largest single cause of death in the United States currently is
 
heart disease, claiming about 250 persons per 100,000 population; some
 
improvements have been made and death rates have been reduced by about 17
 
percent since 1950. (See Figure 6.) Mortality rates of cancer have
 
remained essentially constant, perhaps even increasing. There is a
 
growing concern that this may beorelated to widespread environmental
 
contamination.4 If mortality from heart disease and cancer were largely
 
eliminated, it would only extend life expectancy seven years, a relatively
 
small increase compared with the advances which have been made since the
 
5
'
6
 
turn of the century.

One of the interesting aspects of life span is its constancy through
 
cultures. Dr. Leonard Hayflich of Stanford University's School of Medicine
 
has noted that "indeed, regardless of the state of technological progress
 
within a country, the human life span of 90 years or so is similar in all
 
societies and appears to be fixed. What has changed is the probability of
 
dying in younger age groups." 7
 
Major advances now depend upon understanding and controlling the
 
aging process. Again, this would have a relatively small impact on life
 
expectancy as the major gains would come from starting treatment in early
 
life, at about age 20.8
 
4 Peter J. Bernstein, "Cancer Pollution Link is Seen," The Washington Post,
 
February 16, 1975, p.kl.
 
5 Johan Bjorksten, "Why Grow Old?" Chemistry, Vol. 37, No. 6, (June 1964) p.11
 .
 
6 "Scientists Weigh Facts; Theories on Aging," Chemical and Enineering News,
 
(March 18, 1974), p.14.
 
7Ibid. 
8 Industrial Research, (November, 1971), p.9.
 
FIGURE 6
 
DEATH RATES, FOR SELECTED CAUSES: 1940-1971
 
(Adjusted to the .dge distribution
 
of the 1940 population)
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Clearly; considerable health and medical advances as well as advances
 
in the basic biological sciences must precede any significant decline in
 
mortality rates. Hence, effective and practical policies to influence
 
population growth must essentially reduce fertility; that is, the
 
ratio of the number of children born to the female population of child­
bearing age.
 
There are two separate components of fertility, each of which is 
amenable to policy intervention. One aspect of fertility refers to 
the number of children desired by women and the second deals with the 
number of children actually born to these women. Figure 7 shows the disparity
 
between these two numbers: the number born always exceeds the number
 
desired. It is interesting to note that the degree of disparity between
 
these two figures is a function of socio-economic characteristics.
 
Upper income groups historically have been able to control their own
 
fertility somewhat independently of the availability of technological
 
means of contraception. As Figure 8 indicates, fertility decreases as
 
education, income, and degree of urbanization increase. Responses to a
 
fertility policy, as well, may differ with respect to these same variables.
 
Hence, population policies are largely directed towards influencing
 
attitudes about child bearing (socio-economic incentives and educational
 
programs) or towards influencing the technological means of controlling
 
family size. These will be addressed separately.
 
Attitudes About Child Bearing: Demographic theory indicates
 
that this may well be the most important item in determining a country's
 
31s 
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FIGURE 7 
THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED 
VERSUS
 
THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN 
Average number of children expected and wanted by married 
women, by wife's education and family income: 1965 
Characteristic Born Desired Difference 
ALL WIVES IN STUDY 3.4 2.7 0.7 
Wife's Education
 
College 4 	 3.0 2.7 0.3 
College 1-3 	 2.9 2.6 0.3
 
High school 4 3.1 2.6 0.5 
High school 1-3 3.6 2.8 0.8 
Less 	 4.5 3.2 1.3
 
Famtly Income 
$15,000 or more 3.0 2.6 0.4 
$10,000-$14,999 3.0 2.6 0.4 
$ 8,000-$ 9,999 3.3 2.8 0.5 
$ 7,000-$ 7,999 3.3 2.7 0.6 
$ 6,000-$ 6,999 3.4 2.7 0.7 
$ 5,000-$ 5,999 3.5 2.8 0.7 
$ 4,000-$ 4,999 3.7 2.8 0.9 
$ 3,000-$ 3,999 4.1 2.8 1.3 
Under $3,000 	 4.6 2.9 1.7 
Source: 	Leslie A. Westoff and Charles 1. Weastoff, From Now to Zero:
 
Fertility, Contraception and Abortion in America (Little
 
Brown & Co: Boston) 1971, p. 231
 
FIGURE 8 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FERTILITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
 
Average number of children ever born to women 35-44 years of age, 
by education, income, and residence: January 1969
 
ALL WOMEN 	 3.0
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College 4 2.4
 
College 1-3 2.8
 
High school 4 2.8 
High school 1-3 3.3 
Elementary 8 3.5 
Less 3.9 
Family Income (dollars)
 
$15,000 or more 2.8
 
$10,000-$14,999 2.9
 
$ 7,500-$ 9,999 3.1
 
$ 5,000-$ 7,499 3.3
 
$ 4,000-$ 4,999 3.7
 
$ 3,000-$ 3,999 3.8
 
Under $3,000 3.7
 
Farm kesidence
 
Non-farm 	 3.0 ARGBT6ALPAGE Farn 	 3.7 
Region of Residence 
Northeast 2.8
 
North Central 3,2
 
South 	 3.0 
West 	 3.o
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fertility rate, irrespective of the technology available to control
 
fertility. European countries demonstrate this principle. As a whole, the
 
continent of Europe has birth rates which are lower than any comparable
 
area in the world, and these conditions have existed for at least two
 
generations. The European population is growing at a rate significantly 
less than 1 percent per year, even in the absence of modern contraceptives.
 
The use of devices and availability of information are totally banned in
 
several countries and largely restricted in others. Still, birth rates
 
are as low in such countries as in those where information and devices
 
are widely used and largely available.9
 
Richard A. Easterlin argues that fertility behavior is the result 
of household choices where resources are weighed against preferences., He
 
cites three factors (income, tastes, and prices) as those most significant
 
in determining household behavior. 1 0 This is a common explanation of the
 
differences among socio-economic group fertility differences and is the basis
 
for the Demographic Transition theory which argues that as economic development
 
and wealth increase, fertility declines. It can be argued that growth in
 
social security and other government and industrial-sponsored pension
 
and retirement benefits, coupled with increases in real income, have
 
reduced the "economic need" for children -in this country and children are 
now viewed as economic costs. However, much of the recent success in 
achieving the present low fertility rate of 2.04 in the United States can 
be attributed to the advances in contraceptive technology in the late 
9
 
Paul R. Erhlich and Anne H. Erhlich, Population, Resources, Environment:
 
Issues in Human Ecology (San Francisco, California: W.H. Freeman &
 
Company, 1972) p. 318
 
10 
Richard A. Easterlin, "Towards a Socio-Economic Theory of Fertility:
 
Survey of Recent Research on Economic Factors in American Fertility,"
 
in S.J. Behrman, Leslie C6rsa, Jr., and Ronald Freedman (eds.),

Fertility and Family Pl~nning (Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan
 
Press, 1971), p. 128 J 7
7 
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1950's and early 1960's.
 
Other socio-economic factors previously mentioned affect attitudes
 
about child bearing -- including the general educational level, degree
 
of urbanization, the social status of women, opportunities for employment
 
for women outside the home, costs of raising and educating children,
 
and age of marriage. As the factors correlated with low fertility
 
increase, fertility rates typically decline. In their aggregate, these
 
trends all support maintenance of a continued low birth rate in the United
 
States.
 
Recent public opinion polls support this hypothesis. Those preferring 
four or more children per family have declined about 60 percent since 
the end of World War II, with the bulk of this decline occurring in 
roughly the last decade, as shown in Figure 9 . These data are supported 
by a Census Bureau Survey of the number of children which married women 
in various age groups wish to have in their lifetimes. In the younger 
age groups, which are most fmportant for future trends, the number of 
FIGURE 9
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children desired has declined considerably in the last several years,
 
as shown in Figure 10.
 
FIGURE 10
 
LIFETIME BIRTH EXPECTATIONS OF WIVES 18 TO 39 YEARS OLD 
j967 147 197W3 
173
 
2 0 
J -2 ~5-29 -3 53II K 
Source' 	U.S. Bureau.of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
 
States, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
 
Office, 1974), p. 54
 
However, 	there are wo factors which may actually cause birth rates to
 
increase. One refers to the effect of postponement of child bearing, the
 
second to the role that career opportunities for women,plays in attitudes
 
toward child bearing.
 
It may well be that the decline in birth rates is only temporary as
 
women may have merely postponed child bearing. Paul Jacobson, of Metro­
politan Life, estimates that more than 2.25 million births were postponed
 
between'1971 and 1975, and that about four-fifths of these will take place
 
by the early 1980's. He points out that the gradual numerical rise in
 
marriages which can be expected among the growing young adult group which
 
represent the post-World War II baby boom, is likely to be followed by
 
increases in the number of births. His overall prediction, however, is
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that "neither a return to the large families of former years nor zero
 
population growth is on the horizon; the two or three child family will
 
continue to be popular."1 1
 
It may also be that women are making an explicit choice of a career
 
in lieu of child bearing. While female participation in the labor force
 
has been increasing, the traditional female career areas -- teaching,
 
clerical and sales -- are becoming saturated. Should presently male­
dominated employment opportunities not become accessible to the female
 
population on an equal basis, the difficulties associated with joining
 
the labor force could discourage female attempts to enter the labor
 
force. Frustration could persuade other women to leave. This could
 
contribute significantly to an increase in birth rates.
 
Contraception and Abortion: Changing attitudes about child
 
bearing in the United States have largely coincided with increased availa­
bility of information about and improvement in techniques of contraception,
 
.including abortion. The debate about contraception and abortion is certain­
ly not new. In modern times the debate on these subjects can be traced
 
to developments in England at the time of the Industrial Revolution.
 
Francis Place, a labor leader and early advocate of limiting the size of
 
families through-contraception, believed that a limited labor pool would
 
be likelier to *in higher wages and better working conditions from employ­
ers than would an abundant supply of workers. His views were aired in
 
Illustrations and Proof of the Principle of Population published in 1822.
 
In January 1971, Congress repealed the Comstock Law of 1873 (banning
 
the mailing 6f birth control information as obscene). To date contraception
 
Paul H. Jacobson, "Birth Trends in the United States," Statistical
 
Bulletin, Metropolitan Life, Vol. 55 (October 1974), p. 6.
 
11 
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is legal for adults in every state (possibly with the exception of Massa­
chusetts and Wisconsin, which require marriage of adults howeverA sales
 
and advertising of contraceptives are widely regulated.
 
The debate on abortion is currently reaching new levels in the United
 
States. The 1973 .Supreme Court decision striking down anti-abortion laws
 
in many states is coming under increased fire, especially in light of the
 
recent conviction of.a doctor in Boston on manslaughter charges.. On balance,
 
however, the availability and increased willingness to use means of preventing
 
or terminating pregnancy are likely to continue to grow. Government policy
 
appears to be contributing to such trends. The 91st Congress authorized
 
the first significant federal expenditures for birth control, allowing the
 
government to spend $235 million over a three-year period for establishment
 
and expansion of family planning services operated by local agencies and­
by non-profit hospitals and other organizations. Research to seek better
 
and cheaper methods of birth control were also funded at that time at a
 
level of $145 million.
12
 
Implications of a Changing Population Configuration: The following 
four age pyramids by Charles Westoff (see Figure 11 and lla) illustrate 
the characteristic changes occurring in age group percentages as the popu­
lation moves toward a stabilized growth rdtet depicted beyond the year 2000.?".'
 
The most apparent trend of the stable population is the aging of the
 
population. As Westoff points out, those people over 65 years of age will
 
represent 19% of the population instead oftthe present 11%, and the number
 
1 2Lawrence A. Mayer, "New Questions about the U.S. Population," in Eugene
 
B. Jafe (ed.), Social, Cultural, and Economic Changes in the 1970's.:
 
Interpreting the Trends (Rochelle Park, N.J.: Edward E. Emanual ad Co.,
 
1972) p. 50.p 
 ar s
 
*Note that "stabilized" population and "ZPG" populationtart synonymous.
 
CHANGING AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION
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of young people under 20 will decrease percentage-wise but because of the 
overall growth in population remain constant in terms of actual numbers. 
A stable population results in an approximate 40% of the population 
dependent on those actually in the labor force. 
The impact of a 40% dependent population will be largely a function
 
of the health of that population. Technological forecasters and demographers
 
alike speculate on tremendous advances in gerontology that will increase
 
the chronological longevity of man; some are predicting advances in the
 
control of the aging process that would increase longevity by as much as
 
twenty or thirty years. However, the impact upon society of this advance­
ment will reflect whether chronological age is extended with or without
 
a concomitant increase in functional age. This is an extremely important.
 
distinction with respect to the impact of an increasing aged population.
 
As the population ages, the percentage of feeble and infirm will probably
 
increase and present widely different problems than .the younger cohort of
 
the population which is alert and active. While it is likely that some
 
improvements in lengthening functional life expectancy can be expected, it
 
is also likely that an individual's period of relative incapacity may be
 
extended. Hence, it is necessary to be cognizant of the issues associated
 
with both the infirm and healthy of an aging population.
 
Caring for a large infirm and possibly dependent population may be a
 
major societal problem. Serious problems will arise even if the aged are
 
healthy and functional. Retirement is now mandatory in most organizations
 
at age 65, and the trend is for earlier retirement at age 60 or 55 with
 
full benefits. Should these trends continue, by 2050 as much as 27% of
 
the population (those over the age of 55) might be in an unemployed or
 
retired status.
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The non-productive status of the aged may, in fact, be accelerated
 
due to present employment policies which encourage early or require mandatory
 
retirement. If retirement at age 55 is universal by 2050, fully 26% of
 
the population might be in an unemployed or retired status. The political,
 
economic, and social implications of having 33% of the nation's mature
 
population dependent upon the rest could be considerable.
 
Concerns about the income, employment, and health problems of the
 
aged are well founded as poverty is more prevalent among the elderly than
 
any other age group. (See Figure 12) The income of the aged in the
 
future is likely to be improved due to increased private retirement
 
benefits and the large accumulated personal resources which have been
 
possible as a result of the growth and affluence in America,and also due
 
to the increased coverage through government insurance plans.
 
The aged will clearly have more political clout than they do today.
 
The influence of the youth will be reduced in the coming decades, however,
 
notwithstanding the recent reduction of voting age from 21 to 18. Assuming
 
that the propensity to vote as a function of age-group remains constant,
 
at current levels, and taking into account the new voting age of 18, the
 
over-65 population will have 21% of the total vote versus 15% today;
 
and those over 45 will have a clear majority of 54%.
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FIGURE 12
 
PERSONS BELOW THE LOW-INCOME LEVEL, BY AGE: 1959-1971
 
Number Percet of (millions) age group 
40 -40 
. .65 years and o r 
30 -130
 
20 - 20 
Under 22 years 
II 
00
 
1959 'GI '63 'G5 '67 '69 '71
 
Source: Dorothy P. Rice and Barbara S..Cooper, "National Health Expendi­
tures 1929-1971," Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 1
 
(January 1972), p. 6; and Barbara S. Cooper, Nancy L. Worthington,
 
and Paula A. Piro, "National Health Expenditures, 1929-1973,"'
 
Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 2 (February 1974), p. 6.
 
Historical trends would suggest that this would be a conservative
 
influence and that liberalizing efforts with respect to such things as
 
the use of drugs, pornography, new forms of marriage, and so on, would
 
meet resistance. Yet the elderly population of the first decades of the
 
next century will include the "pill poppers" of today, so the "conservative/
 
liberal" balance in conventional terms is unclear. What is clear is that
 
political power will be increasingly in the hands of the older members of
 
society.
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In sum, the primary implication of ZPG is simply that the population
 
becomes older and that the value and interests associated with age may
 
become predominant. If older segments of the population exercise their
 
political influence with some solidarity, there could be considerable
 
shifts in both domestic and international policies.
 
Employment and Labor Force Consequences: By the end of this century
 
about 127 million people will be in the labor force, a growth of about 39
 
percent from the 1973 level. In the latter part of the 1970's and early
 
part of the 1980's, the bulk of this growth will be comprised of those 20
 
to 34 years old, who largely represent the post-World War II baby boom
 
children.
 
The stabilized labor force will be larger than today's by a factor
 
of 1.3, while the projected population is larger by a factor of 1.6. The
 
most significant consequence of a stabilized population upon the labor
 
force is the expected increase in labor force participation by women and
 
a decrease in participation by the older members of the population of both
 
sexes. In aggregate terms, participation rates are projected to increase
 
from 60.3% to 62% in the next few decades, and then decline to 59% by 2050.
 
The large increase in the number of younger workers will create
 
competition among them for places in the labor force, especially in the
 
later 1970's and early 1980's. Concomitantly, the educational level o the
 
work force will be increasing. (See Figure 13) The less educated will
 
then become increasingly concentrated in the older age groups. A problem
 
of an over-edhcated, miseducated labor force would evolve into a body of
 
workers with unneeded skills. -2f
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FIGURE 13
 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE CIVILIAN 
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AVERAGE 	 AVERAGE PROJECTED PROJECTED 
SOURCE: 	 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ?CNTHLY-LABOR REVIEW. 
NOVEMBER 1973 
An increased percentage of younger, higher educated workers is likely
 
to have significant impacts on the work force, resulting in greater demands
 
for a satisfying job.1 3  A recent Department of Health, Education and Wel­
fare study concludes that a large number of workers are dissatisfied with
 
their work because they are dull and meaningless jobs without chailenge.
 
The study contends that there is a revolutionary change in attitudes,
 
particularly among the young, minority groups, and women, and that they­
are putting less emphasis on material rewards and more on the challenge and
 
interest of their work.1 4
 
The declining participation by older workers that would occur if
 
trends toward earlier retirement continue may have substantial negative
 
impacts. The nation may undergo a shortage of experienced and productive
 
13 "Volvo Bets on Team Assembly," Business Week (April 20, 1974), p. 78C.
 
14Hiroshi Imamura, "How Can Automation Be Applied in Shipbuilding?'-' 
The Motor Ship, Vol. 51, No. 605 (December 1970), p. 45 ­
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skilled workers, professionals, and managers. Because of the forecast
 
increase in the average years of schooling, entry into the labor force is
 
likely to occur at a later age than at present. This could further exacer­
bate the shortage of experienced personnel. However, if older workers
 
are encouraged t6 remain in the labor force, particularly in areas of high­
status and high-earnings, younger workers may perceive that their oppor­
tunities for advancement are limited. This could, perhaps, result in antagon­
isms between the younger and older segments of the population, particularly
 
if older members protect their advantageous positions through political
 
influence.
 
The increase in labor force participation by women is based upon
 
the assumption that the positions and opportunities which are made avail­
able to men will increasingly be available to women. An argument has been
 
advanced which suggests that much of the recent decrease in fertility is
 
due to either the availability of career opportunities for women or the
 
expectation that such opportunities will occur. This is thought by some
 
to be an acceptable and desirable alternative to bearing several or many
 
children. For the next few decades, women can be expected to continue 
- their demands for protection against discrimination through demands for
 
legislation, court actions, and regulatory decisions. 
At-a lower level
 
of impact, perhaps, efforts are underway to protect pregnant women,
 
whether married or unmarried, from employment discrimination and to
 
require that group medical insurance should pay for child birth for
 
unmarried women and legal abortions.
 
Another development affecting our labor force is the projected
 
decline in the availability of low-skilled jobs for women, especially
 
those that can be re-entered upon completion of child raising. These
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jobs include retail clerks, typists and desk clerks. Many of these jobs
 
are being eliminated due to technological advances. Some professional
 
jobs, which permit exit and entry according to family pressures, such as 
teachers, may also be adversely affected by technological advances. The
 
reduction of these jobs due to technological advances emphasizes the
 
need to guarantee worthwhile career opportunities for women.
 
The Impact of Youth -- Past and Future Generations: The post-
World War IT baby boom had a major impact on institutions and lifestyle 
in America. Enormous demand was created for housing, education, and 
products and services to satisfy teenage needs. The age group of those 
families who are supporting children historically has-represented a 
contribution to spending in America which was proportionately larger 
than their contribution to the population. (See Figure 13) 
FIGURE 15 
AGE DISTRIBUTIOW AND SPENDING - 1966 
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REPORT NO. 528 (REWYORK, 1971), P. 149. 
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By the early part of 1974 enrollment in elementary schools had
 
declined for three consecutive years as a result of the reduction of
 
birth rate. Public school enrollment had dropped to the level of 1966
 
and total enrollment in elementary schools had declined over 7 percent from
 
its high in 1970. This downward trend in elementary school enrollment
 
is expected to continue until at least into the early part of the 1980's,
 
or until the post-World War II baby boom children begin having children
 
of their own. Dr. William Farris, Executive Director of the National Asso­
ciation of Elementary School Principals, noted that potential savings from
 
reduced enrollment might be offset by demands for higher teachers'-salaries 
15
 
In contrast to the serious teacher shortage of the 1950's, the United
 
.States is faced with a greater number of teachers than the present system
 
can utilize.
 
The post-World War II baby boom children are now about to place new
 
demands on America -- household formations. It is anticipated that 1.5
 
million households will be formed each year until about 1985. These
 
new household formations will require new housing, which in addition to
 
the need to replace older housing stock, will aggravate the current under­
supply of housing.
 
- "Reduced Birth Rate Cuts Enrollments in Lower Grades," The New York Times 
(March 26, 1974), p. 37. -_D, 
WORLD CONCERN: ENVIRONMENT
 
Introduction:
 
While concern with degradation of the environment and the global
 
ecosystem is not new, recognition of the complex and possibly synergistic
 
relationships among a host of seemingly disparate activities and variables
 
is.
 
It was only a few decades ago that the internationally recognized
 
symbol of economic progress and wealth was the sight of clouds of smoke and
 
steam billowing forth from tall smokestacks. The health consequences of
 
inadequate municipal waste and water treatment have been known for centuries.
 
The civilization of Crete first established municipal water and sewage
 
systems almost 5000 years ago. 
It is only recently that research has
 
discovered the far reaching health, ecological and climatic effects of
 
continuous and unregulated disposal of wastes into the global environment.
 
The health effects of such materials as lead, mercury, and carbon monoxide
 
have been known for some time. 
As early as 1923 the Journal of the American
 
Medical Association warned: "The contamination of the air in the more
 
congested streets of American cities during hours of heavy traffic reaches
 
the upper limit and for a shorter period even exceeds the upper limit of
 
well-founded health standards." 
 Research is continually identifying new
 
materials which are toxic or carcinogenic; concern for polyvinyl chlorides,
 
abestos, chlorinated hydrocarbons and many others is recent. As research
 
progresses, the hysteria generated by the press further enflames and
 
confuses the issue -- witness the present controversy over the destruction
 
of the protective ozone layer by unregulated use of aerosol propellants.
 
IStatement of Dr. Handler inProceedings of the Conference on the Health
 
Effects of Air Pollutants, Assembly of Life Sciences, National Academy of
 
Sciences (October 3-5, 1973) prepared for the Committee on Public Works,
 
U. S. Senate, November 1973.
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Recognition of the health consequences of widespread environmental
 
contaminants has led to legislative restriction. The history of federal
 
environmental protection is not long; it essentially began in 1963 with a
 
congressional mandate to identify pollution related health problems.
 
Since then the legal and regulatory position of the federal government has
 
evolved. Recognition of the problem has led to the establishment of the
 
President's Council of Environmental Quality and the.Environmental Protection
 
Agency as well as a host of quickly imposed restrictions and regulations.
 
Originally, concern was with cleaning up the "most" polluted areas at a
 
price that industry was willing to pay. Meanwhile environmental quality
 
continued to deteriorate as industry and government battled it out.
 
In 1969-1970, the approach was drastically changed, based on the
 
recognition that the concept of economic feasibility had become an excuse
 
for doing nothing,and the dangers to health were sufficiently grave to
 
warrant regulation based solely on the degree of control needed to protect
 
the public health. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 has
 
mandated the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements in connection
 
with every major action which may significantly affect the environment -­
in advance of that action. Despite the protests of industry, conservationists
 
and consumers alike, some advances have been made in improving environmental
 
quality. Discharges of some polluting wastes into both water and air in
 
' 
some parts of the country have been reduced. Yet the recency of the issue
 
and the inadequate state-of-the-art of control, abatement, measuring and
 
monitoring technology as well as inadequate insight into the chemical and
 
biological basis of the interactionsare retarding efforts to mount an
 
effective campaign for environmental protection. In short, despite the
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household familiarity with the "ecology movement' of the early 70's
 
(community improvement programs, recycling emphasis and general awareness of
 
the supposedly new problem), the U.S. still is faced with a mammoth issue:
 
how effectively and quickly can we control pollution when industry alone
 
contributes some 55,000 individual water polluting substances?"
 
One school of thought advocates a laissez falre attitude until research
 
effectively proves a causal relationship between a given pollutant and an
 
undesirable health or ecological consequence. The second school of thought
 
is willing to admit that the durrent biological and chemical understanding
 
is inadequate, yet the recognition of at least correlational evidence
 
between unregulated waste disposal and health consequences is sufficient
 
to warrant regulation and restriction. This latter school of thought has
 
dominated environmental protection policy for the last several years.
 
However, there is some concern that the "proof of cause" advocates may be
 
gaining dominance especially during this current era of energy, material
 
and capital shortages.
 
The recent controversy over the use of catalytic converters in auto­
mobiles is used as evidence for almost all sides of the environmental
 
argument. Recognizing that the discharge of carbon monoxide into the
 
atmosphere is a significant health hazard, the Clean Air Act of 1970 man­
dated that automobile emissions be restricted at increasingly high stand4rds
 
to help meet a national goal of "clean air" by 1975. The automakers have
 
long argued that the technological state-of-the-art was so inadequate that
 
a vastly inferior and expensive "band aid" approach would have to be used:
 
the catalytic converter. Despite a one year delay, the devices were man­
dated at an admitted c6st of reduced gas efficiency and, some argue, engine
 
2Allen V. Knuse and Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy
 
(Washington, D.C., 1975), Chapter 1. 
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reliability, and-at increased unit costs. It has recently been discovered
 
that, while the catalytic converter may reduce the level of carbon monoxide
 
and carbon dioxide, it also emits a fine bath of sulfuric acid which may.
 
-ave more persistent and drastic long term effects than the original
 
problem of carbon monoxide.
 
This, then, becomes pLma facie proof for both sides of the argument:
 
that the Environmental Protection Agency did not know what it was doing; 
or
 
that the automobile industry had no intention of significantly addressing
 
the problem. The current slump of the automobile industry is further
 
proof, so the argument goes, that environmental protection legislation is
 
inherently bad for the country and contributes to recession and inflation.
 
Many events are likely to occur in the next few years which may
 
further threaten environmefital protection. A pervasive notion in the
 
country is that environmental protection is economically non-productive and
 
expenditures in this area are likely.to reduce further the economic
 
competitiveness of American industry vis-a-vis other nations. 
 Such arguments,
 
however, overlook the creation of a pollution abatement/control industry
 
which in turn creates its own multipliers in the economy in the form of
 
employment, salaries, demand for support industries and the like.. 
It also
 
overlooks the social overhead costs as well as costs to the firm of not
 
protecting the environment 
-- costs associated with reduced productivity,
 
increased medical costs, increased absenteeism, etc. However, the argument
 
is currently being used by advocates of relaxing the current restrictions
 
to permit exploitation, for instance, of domestic supplies of high sulfur
 
fuel. The Environmental Protection Agency has already relaxed the clean
 
air standards for the U.S. automakers, both as an incentive to the
 
industry and as a response to recent concerns over the sulfuric acid
 
production of catalytic converters. .
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There is no question that the goal of environmental protection will
 
be attacked as never before in the next few years as the nation attempts
 
to adapt to fundamental changes in global economics. During the same
 
time period research undoubtedly will identify other environmental
 
contaminants which are toxic, mutagenic or carcinogehic, generating additional
 
pressure for environmental protection. However, the end of the era of cheap
 
energy, together with global economic change and increasing shortages of basic
 
materials and minerals, will continue to threaten efforts to protect the
 
environment. As current international economic conditions remain impervious to
 
traditional economic prescriptions, pressures will mount to relax stringent
 
restrictions upon pollution control and abatement in the name of economic
 
recovery. It is likely that at least temporary relaxation of regulations
 
will occur -- witness the recent relaxation of automobile emission standards.
 
Environmental degradation is related to the level of industrialization
 
and the size and rate of population growth. Industrialization per se is not
 
the sole cause of pollution,as pre-industrial societies are usually
 
characterized by inadequate or absent sewage treatment and agricultural run­
off problems contributing to waterborne infectious diseases. However, the
 
most persistent and difficult pollution problems are associated with high
 
levels of industrialization. Industrialization and economic growth appear
 
to have a strong positive correlation with energy consumption, which in
 
turn is often highly polluting. In fact, a recent Environmental Protection
 
Agency sponsored study identified the exploitation of new energy sources
 
as the single most pressing environmental problem for this country.3
 
.James E. Finn and R. S. Reimers, Development of Predictions of Future
 
Pollution Problems (Environmental Protection Agency: Government Printing
 
Office, March 1974. j 7
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There is no question that industrialization is the major cause of
 
air pollution. Those things most highly associated with increasing
 
standards of living and economic growth (such as transportation systems,
 
industrial processes and energy generation) are the primary sources of
 
air pollutant emissions. Simultaneously, industrial processes and sewage
 
sludge contribute a substantial portion of water pollution.
 
It is also important to note the role of population and population
 
density in the generation of problems of environmental degradation. A region
 
could better sustain a given population if that population were evenly
 
distributed over the land rather than heavily concentrated in
 
a small portion of the region. This concentration of activity is one of
 
the fundamental causes of environmental degradation in this country.
 
The environment is able to accept a substantial amount of waste
 
materials and "cleanse" itself. However, this naturally occurring cleansing
 
process cannot and will not suffice if either the effluent is inherently
 
toxic (such as radioactive wastes) or a given region has exceeded its
 
"carrying capacity." Carrying capacity is a concept borrowed from the
 
study of ecology and essentially refers to the population that a given
 
region can sustain -- that region's."carrying capacity." A simple example
 
will illustrate the concept. A single acre of grassland can support only
 
so many cattle; the number is constrained by either the available food
 
and water supply,or the ability of the region to handle the animal wastes
 
without harm to the animals. The carrying capacity is by no means fixed;
 
it can be increased easily through the application of technology. Intro­
duction of improved grass, grain feedings to reduce demand for grass,
 
2K,
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sophisticated waste treatment facilities, additional water supplies,
 
automated barns, and the like would all increase the number of cattle
 
that could be sustained on the original acre. Likewise, failure of the
 
grass crop, drought, abnormally foul weather, etc., could reduce the
 
carrying capacity. But even with technology, the carrying capacity of
 
the region cannot be infinitely increased, the effects of technology being
 
subject to the law of diminishing returns.
 
The carrying capacity concept then helps to relate the level and kind
 
of population that a region sustain: the mix of transportation, commercial,
 
utility, and industrial activities that can coexist within the ecological
 
constraints imposed by the region, and the technological limits imposed
 
by the current and expected state-of-the-art. What environmental protection
 
and planning tries to do, then, is to identify the most stringent limits
 
to the carrying capacity and then negotiate, engineer, and plan ways of
 
operating within these most rigid constraints.
 
Do economic growth and improvement in the material standard of
 
living necessitate environmental degradation? Quite clearly, they do not.
 
But this does imply that extensive capital investment will be required to
 
remedy pollution mistakes of the past and prevent future degradation of
 
the environment. The Council on Environmental Quality has estimated that
 
the nation will spend almost $200 billion from 1973 through 1982 for
 
environmental improvement as a result of Federal legislation,or about 1% of
 
GNP annually.4 As the nation has always made some expenditures for
 
environmental quality even in the absence of Federal mandates (for instance,
 
garbage collection and municipal sewers), this estimate does not reflect
 
4 Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental
 
Quality - 1974, (Washington, D.C." Government Printing Office) p.173.
 
(hereafter called Environmental Quality, 1974). Z_
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the total expenditures for pollution abatement. The CEQ estimated "total"
 
expenditures include expenditures for air and water pollution, noise
 
prevention, radiation and nuclear power plant safeguards, solid waste
 
disposal and land reclamation programs. The CEQ's "total" estimate of
 
p6llution control expenditures from 1973 to 1982 is $325 billion
 
5 
(in 1973 dollars) as shown in Figure 1. This estimate is provided only
 
to give the reader insight into the magnitude of the domestic environmental
 
protection problem. To permit comparison, consider that the Federal
 
government has spent only $18.2 billion in the 1965-1974 time period for
 
6
 
this purpose.
 
Undoubtedly, the regulations and requirements will change as further
 
research gives additional insight into the long term consequences of
 
environmental degradation and human ingestion of industrial, agricultural
 
and household wastes. It is-likely that the expenditures required could
 
escalate considerably. As the state-of-the-art in pollution control and
 
abatement technology progresses, cost reductions and economies of scale
 
may occur.
 
Failure to address adequately the domestic environmental degradation
 
issues can contribute to increasing international conflict. While
 
the problem of the lack of international agreement over shared resources
 
is discussed elsewhere, it is important to note here the global problem
 
of environmental degradation. Many of the climatic changes of the last
 
several decades which are now aggravating the global food situation are
 
5 Ibid., p.2 21. 
6 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
1974, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printin Office) (hereafter 
Statistical Abstract 1974). 
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being related to acts of man in the industrialized world. The country
 
cannot be an environmental isolationist. 
Even if this were determined to be
 
an effective or desirable policy, the global ecosystem will not permit
 
"exporting" of pollution. 
As more is learned about the global biosphere
 
and climatic change the interrelatedness among actions, decisions and
 
consequences is likely to become much more clear.
 
This investigation of the environment has identified four primary
 
issues which we believe to be the fundamental environmental problems
 
facing this country:
 
. Deterioration and modification of the biosphere leading to
 
irreversible climatic change of the global ecosystem.
 
* 
Destruction of the recreational aesthetic agricultural,
 
conservation, preservation and residential uses of the land
 
leading to inadequate or misallocated supplies of land for
 
sustenance of human and animal life.
 
* Contamination, misuse and abuse of the global oceans
 
leading to ecosystem destruction and damage, health
 
consequences and international conflict.
 
" Pollution and contamination of the domestic environment
 
leading to detrimental, long run and possible irreversible
 
effects upon human and animal health and longevity.
 
FIGURE 1
 
ESTIMATED TOTAL POLLUTION CONTROL EXPENDITURES
 
(Inbillions of 1973 dollars) 
Cumulative -- 1973-821973 1982 

Total Capital Total
Pollutant/medium Total 

Capital - Annual Capital Annual Invest- Annual
 
Costs 3 ment O&Hi Costs 3
 OR Costs 2 Costs 3 O&M1 Costs 2 

Air pollution
 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.7 1.7 3.8 5.4
Public 

Private
 
1,2 0.2 1.4 8.4 4.9 13.3 31.3 49.9 74.4
Mobile 

1.1 2.2 4.7 3.1 7.9 21.4 35.3 62.6
Stationary 1.1 

13.6 8.2 21.9 54.4 89.0 142.4
Total 2.4 1.4 3.8 

WAter pollution
 
Public
 
NA NA 0.2 NA NA 1.8 NA NA
Federal 0.2 

4.2 8.3 12.5 50.6 27.4 88.5
State and Local 1.4 4.1 5.4 

Private
 
16.5 21.6 40.4
Industrial 0.9 1.1 2.0 2.8 2.2 5.0 
2.2 3.5
NA NA 0.01 0.4 0.3 0.7 4.4
Utilities 

5.2 7.4 7.6 10.8 18.2 73.3 51.2 132.4
Total 2.5 

NA 0.1 NA NA 1.0-1.4 NA 6.0-8.7 NA NANoise 

Radiation
 
NA NA NA 0.05 < 0.05 0.07 0.3 0.08 0.31
Nuclear power plants 
Solid waste 
1.9 0.5 2.4 4.2 15.5 19.3Public 1.1 0.3 1.4 
3.1 0.4 25.2 25.6Private 1.9 < 0.05 1.9 3.0 0.1 40.7 44.9Total 3.0 0.3 3.3 4.9 0.6 5.5 4.6 
Land reclamation 
0 0.6 0 5.0 5,0
Surface mining 0.3 0 0.3 0.6 
26.7 19.7 46.3 132.6 185.9 325.0GRAND TOTAL5 8.2 6.9 14.8 
'operating and maintenance costs. 4Includes only coal mining.
 
Interest and depreciation. Does not include noise control
 
30&M plus capital costs.
 
Council of Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental Quality - 1974, (Washington, D.C.:
Source: 

Government Printing Office), p.221.
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ISSUE: POLLUTION AND CONTAMINATION OF THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT LEADING TO
 
DETRIMENTAL, LONG RUN AND POSSIBLE IRREVERSIBLE EFFECTS UPON
 
HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH AND LONGEVITY
 
The Issue:
 
Thorough understanding of the diverse negative impacts of widespread
 
waste disposal into the domestic environment remains at an early stage even
 
though man has for some time shown concern about municipal garbage disposal,
 
sanitation treatment and contaminated drinking water. The advent of
 
industrialization certainly brought concern and documentation of the
 
occupational hazards of working in close contact with toxic and carcinogenic
 
materials. However, it is only recently that fear has been expressed that
 
widespread dispersion of these materials in the air and water environment may
 
be hazardous as the regional and individual impacts from pollutants. Man
 
now recognizes that his basic abundant resources of air, water and land
 
cannot absorb infinite amounts of polluting materials. This recognition that
 
environmental degradation, once thought only to be aesthetically offensive,
 
poses health concerns has lead to the establishment of the Environmental
 
Protection Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality and the National
 
Environmental Policy Act.
 
Immediate concern with rehabilitating the domestic environment largely
 
manifested itself in the Clean Air Act of 1970, which required establishment
 
of national standards of ambient air quality; primiary standards to protect
 
health and secondary standards to protect the public welfare, specifically
 
property, vegetation and aesthetics. These standards provide the basis for
 
state implementation plans. A second law governing rehabilitation of the
 
nation's waters, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Amendments of
 
1972, requires every "point source" discharge of pollutants to obtain a
 
permit ipecifying the amount and constituents of the effluents.
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Dimensions of the Domestic Problem of Air and Water Pollution:
 
In general, the problems of air, water and land pollution are largely
 
associated with the disposal of wastes from a variety of man-ased activities
 
such as industrial processes, fuel combustion in stationary sources (energy
 
generation), transportation, agricultural and solid waste disposal. There
 
are not many alternatives available for waste disposal: it can be dumped
 
into the nearest body of water, burned, buried or chemically transformed.
 
This section will briefly discuss the quality of the air and water
 
environment, the long term impact of this quality, the determinants of
 
air and water quality, and finally, the origins of air and water pollution.
 
Quality of the Air: As Figure 1 shows, there has been some improve­
ment in limiting air pollution; however, poor air quality is still common
 
place and the air quality of some regions is actually deteriorating. In
 
fact, despite legal mandates to the contrary, the Environmental Protection
 
Agency estimates that by mid-1975 (the original target date of the Clean
 
Air Act of 1970 for "clean air") at least 75% of the U.S. population will be
 
experiencing levels of sulfur dioxide and/or particulate pollution in
 
excess of the ceiling necessary to protect health,
1
 
In discussing air pollution trends, a distinction must be made
 
between "air quality" and "emission trends," There are two levels of
 
federal air quality standards; a primary ambient air standard, that
 
level necessary to protect human health; and a secondary air standard, that
 
level necessary to protect the public welfare (economic losses
 
IEnvironmental Protection Agency, The National Air Monitoring Program:
 
Air Quality and Emission Trends, Vol. 1, 1973, p.170.
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from recreation days lost, for instance), The emphasis is on the ambient
 
concept -- which refers to localized concentrations of given pollutants.
 
Specifically, ambient air quality standards exist for suspended particulate
 
matter (PM), sulfur dioxide (S02), carbon monoxide (CO), photochemical
 
oxidants (0,), hydrocarbons (0) and nitrogen (NO ), which are monitored by
 
the collection of data at different times of the day in specific center city
 
locations. Generalizations about national or even regional air quality
 
trends cannot be made from these data: only assessments of the individual
 
sites can be made.
 
To draw conclusions about air quality at a national level requires
 
investigation of the nationwide emissions data. These data, prepared on a
 
nationwide basis are not the result of direct measurement,'but rather are
 
inferential. They are largely based upon emission factors but include
 
estimating a majority of the emissions on a point-by-point basis, using
 
such parameters as fuel rates, process rates, control equipment efficiencies,
 
motor vehicle emissions, vehicle miles of travel, average vehicle speeds,
 
population, and distribution and age of the motor vehicle. It is the ambient
 
air standard (the concentration of a pollutant at a given site) that is
 
particularly health threatening; however, it is the emissions trends that
 
normally causes the ambient air standard to be exceeded. However, it is
 
possible for these indices to move in opposite directions.
 
Consider, for example, a comparison of the measured average central
 
city sulfur dioxide concentrations (which has been decreasing) with the level
 
of nationwide SO emissions (which has been increasing), (see-Figure 2).
 
2
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FIGURE 2 
Source: 	 EPA, The National Air Monitoring Program: Air Quality and
 
Emission Trends, p-. 1-12, 1-14.
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Let us examine this apparent contradiction, SO2 emission rates in central
 
cities have been decreasing largely due to the absence of coal combustion
 
and the reliance upon cleaner fuels, such as natural gas and distillate
 
fuel oil. While this does not contribute substantially to the nationwide
 
pattern of SO2 emissions, it does positively effect localized air quality.
 
Another contributing factor is that large point sources of SO2 -- such as
 
electric power plants -- cannot locate in or near the central city. Hence,
 
the problem on a national level could be deteriorating, while improvements
 
are seen at a local level.
 
Figure 3 presents the estimated total nationwide emission levels for
 
the period 1940-1970. 'hile inferential, EPA has stated that "these estimates
 
provide fairly reliable representations of nationwide emission totals."
2
 
This data shows that total CO emissions have increased at a compound annual
 
rate of 1.1% over the thirty year period, while CO from automotive sources
 
have increased at an annual rate of nearly 4%. Hydrocarbon emissions
 
increased about 1.7% over the thirty years; again automotive sources
 
contributed at a greater rate, about 3.3% increase annually. For the same
 
period growth rates of NO emissions were similar -- 4.8% annually
S 
for motor vehicles and 3.7% for stationary fuel combustion sources. But
 
over the last 10 years, NO emissions from steam electric power plants
S 
increased at an annual rate of 7.4%
3
 
In contrast, investigation of air quality measures at particular
 
center city sites is more encourging. Figure 4 indicates the time series
 
data for these on-site measurements of carbon monoxide. Again, these are
 
2Environmental Protection Agency, The National Air Monitoring Program:
 
Air Quality and Emission NTrsnds, Vol. 1, 1973, p.170.

3Ibid., p.1-9, 1-15. 
 /
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FIGURE 3
 
ESTIMATED TOTAL NATIONWIDE EMISSION LEVELS, 1940-1970
 
(106 tons/yr)
 
SO2 PM CO HC NOx
 
1940 Controllable 22.2 19.2 42.5 10.1 5.5
 
Misc. (uncontrollable)a 0.6 25.7 30.5 6.5 1.0
 
Total 22.8 44.9 72.5 16.6 6.5
 
1950 Controllable 24.3 20.8 62.3 15.6 8.2
 
Misc. (uncontrollable) 0.6 12.4 20.6 6.2 0.6
 
Total 24.9 33.2 82.9 21.8 8.8
 
1960 Controllable 22.6 21.0 79.3 18.8' 10.9
 
Misc.'(uncontrollable) 0.6 8.9 19.3 7.0 0.5
 
Total 23.2 29.9 98.6 25.8 11.4
 
1968 Controllable 30.5 22.5 93.4 22.1 19.1
 
Misc. (uncontrollable) 0.6 5.9 18.0 7.6 0.4
 
Total 31.1 28.4 111.4 29.7 19.5
 
1969 Controllable 31.9 22.8 97.6 21.9 20;6
 
Misc. (uncontrollable) 0.2 12.2 17.5 6.8 0.5
 
Total 32.1 35.0 115.1 28.7 21.1
 
1970 Controllable 33.3 22.3 96.0 22.5 22.0
 
Misc. (uncontrollable) '0.1 3.2 4.7 4.8 0.1
 
Total 33.4 25.5 100.7 27.3 22.1
 
auncontrollable sources include forest fires, structural
 
fires, coal refuse banks, some agricultural burning,
 
and some 	solvent evaporation.
 
Source: 	EPA, The National Air Monitoring Program: Air Quality and
 
Emission Trends, p. 1-12, 1-14
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assessed by the measurement of changes in specific pollutant concentrations on
 
a pollutant-by-pollutant basis. Urban areas show a long term trend of
 
decline in total suspended particulates and a marked decline in the last
 
decade of sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide, However, analysis of the
 
levels of nitric oxide, nitrogen dioxide and the oxides of nitrogen indicates
 
for most cities an increase in the annual average concentration with time.4
 
What does this mean? We have indicated that emissions of pollutants
 
are increasing but air quality may be improving. Examination of the data
 
suggests that while environmental improvements are being made, many of the
 
reporting stations are still reporting concentrations in excess of the
 
primary ambient air quality standard, see Figure 5. Should the average
 
concentration over the year not exceed the primary standard, the range
 
of the geometric mean is sufficiently wide to ensure that primary health
 
standards are still exceeded some portion of the time. The fact that
 
emissions trends show a consistently upward path indicates that the problem
 
is by no means under control.
 
Improvements in the TSP and SO2 concentrations were primarily found
 
in areas where pollution concentrations had been the highest. However,
 
environmental degradation and substantial pollution was found in those
 
areas where there had been no significant air pollution or the
 
environment previously had met the primary ambient air quality standard.
 
Clearly, the environmental problem of air quality is not solved.
 
4Ibid., Chapter 4.
 <S 
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FIGURE 5 
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The impact of such air pollution upon human health is not well
 
understood,and the number of citizens whose health is affected is not
 
clearly known. Gross estimates suggest that health damages from air
 
pollution affects at minimum 50 million U.S. citizens at an annual cost
 
5
 
of over $6 billion.
 
The biology and chemistry of the effects of air pollution on human
 
health are not well understood. What is known is that the complexity and
 
the interaction of the pollutant with other environmental factors maywell
 
render the pollutant more hazardous than the pollutant acting by itself.
 
One of the concerns of environmental scientists is the possible synergistic
 
effects among groups of pollutants. For instance, many gases interacting
 
with particulate pollution present much more serious health hazards than
 
either one acting alone. Secondly, the impact of weather factors may
 
effect the hazardousness of a pollut&fit. For instance, a given pollutant in
 
the presence of humidity, specific termperatures and catalysts may cause
 
significant health damages. As an exampleSO2 in concentration typical of
 
urban areas presents only slight hazards to the lung. However, under
 
certain temperature and humidity conditions when it combines with wet aerosal,
 
its hazards increase significantly. Because of So2 's ability to oxidize into
 
s03 and then to form H2s04' it is a particularly dangerous sulfur compound.6
 
5 T. S. Waddell, The Economic Damages of Air Pollution (Washington, D.C.:
 
Environmental Research Center: EPA, May, 1974).
 
6 R. Frank, et al., 
Sulfur Oxides and Particles: Effects on Pulmonary
 
Physiology in Man and Animals," Proceedings of the Conference on Health
 
Effects of Air Pollutants, (Washingtoni -D. C7: National Academy-of
 
Scietces, National Research Council, prepared for the Committee 'on
 
Public Works, United States Senate, November 1973).
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Historical examples of the health effects of acute periods of high
 
pollution provide the clearest and most substantial evidence of the
 
relationship between health and air pollution. The massive inversions
 
and "killer fogs" that have occurred in the Meuse Valley, Donora, New
 
York City, London and elsewhere resulted in an increase in mortality
 
from the very first day of the episode. The excess deaths-were attributed
 
to bronchitis, pneumonia, cardiac and respiratory diseases, influenza
 
and the like.
 
It is interesting to note that despite advances in chemotherapy, the
 
introduction of broad spectrum antibiotics and biochemistry innovations
 
the death rate from such diseases as heart disease, cancer, pneumonia,
 
bronchitis, emphysema and asthma have remained constant or actually
 
increased since 1950. 7 These diseases, of course, are the ones most
 
prominently associated with environmental pollutants. Research also has
 
determined that the main effect was exacerbation of existing disease
 
rather than initiation oftillness.8 Comparison of the death rates for
 
chronic respiratory disease between urban and rural areas (which typically
 
demonstrates the effects of a reduced level of atmospheric pollution) for
 
several countries reveals substantially higher mortality rates for the
 
urban area. Similarly, differences can even be found within the same
 
city and are shown to be correlated with point-sources of pollution.
9
 
7U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
 
1974, 95th Edition, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
 
1974), p.6 2 .
 
81.T.T. Higgins & B. Ferris, "Epidemiology of Sulfur Oxides and Particles,"
 
Proceedings of the Conference on Health Effects of Air Pollutants,
 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, National Research
 
Council, prepared for the Committee on Public Works, United States Senate,
 
November 1973).
 
9Higgins and Ferris, op.cit.," p
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There is increasing concern that polluted community air may be
 
carcinogenic. The evidence of some occupation/lung cancer connections is
 
substantial; .indicating that prolonged occupations such as radioactive
 
ore mining and smelting, coke oven operations, gas works, chromium and
 
nickel ore refining, and asbestos mining all cause significantly
 
increased rates of lung cancer. Experiments with animals suggest that
 
many common community air pollutants may cause lung cancer. Among these
 
are radionucleides, hydrocarbons, fluorocarbons, sulfur dioxide,
 
hydrocarbons, and polyurethane dust.10
 
Recent evidence has been accumulated to suggest that it is not just
 
workers who suffer from the health effects of these toxic materials, but
 
also workers' families and neighbors of the industrial sites. A medical
 
team from Mt. Sinai found that 35% of asbestos workers' families had
 
lung abnormalities comparable to men who had worked in the actual asbestos
 
factory. Other examples of the spread of occupational hazards are
 
cdmimon:
 
* 	autopsy findings indicate that 100% of the urban
 
population has asbestos fibers in their lungs;
 
* 	people who live near orchards where lead arsenate
 
is used as an insecticide have 20% more cases of
 
lung cancer than would be expected from the
 
general population;
 
* 	people living near a beryllium processing plant
 
are dying of berylliosis, a lung disease similar
 
to black lung disease.11
 
10Paul Kotin, 'blutagenic and Carcinogenic Problems Associated with Air
 
Pollutants," Proceedings of the Conference on Health Effects of Air
 
Pollutants, (Washihgton, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, National
 
Research Council, prepared for the Committee on Public Works, United
 
States Senate, November 1973).
 
1 1Stuart Auerbach, "Job-Caused Cancers are Found Spreading to Workers'
 
Families," Washington Post (March 25, 1975) p.l.
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The number of people so affected is-unknown. Because the effects
 
of pollution are likely to be exacerbations of existing conditions or
 
symptoms and ill defined conditions; it is, of course, difficult to
 
ascribe causality. However, a crude estimate has been made which suggests
 
that a minimum 50 million people -- one quarter of the American population 
-- may be affected by pollution (see Figure 6). 
Health effects of air pollution are just the primary problem.
 
Secondary problems include economic costs associated with air pollution
 
damages to man-made materials, vegetation, agriculture, and property
 
values. One study estimated that the total costs of air pollution damages
 
in the U.S. in 1970 ranged from $6.1 billion to $18.5 billion.12
 
Sources of Air Pollution: Any reader of the daily paper knows the
 
primary contributors to air pollution: the automobile, combustion of
 
fuel for steam electric plants, and industrial processes. Figures 7 and 8
 
show the sources of air pollutant emissions. Transportation and fuel
 
combustion are clearly'the leading contributors to the pollution problem.
 
Figure 9 shows their contribution over time.
 
The recent energy shortages have emphasized once again the close
 
relationship between energy consumption and environmental protection. Fuel
 
combustion at stationary sources (inclhding power plants, factories,
 
residential and commercial heating) accounts for almost 80% of SO2 emissions
 
and over 25%--f-p-iticulate emissions. Automobiles and other forms of
 
13
 
transportation contribute over 75% of CO and over 50% of nitrogen oxides.
 
12Waddell, oj. Cit. 
13Council on Environmental quality, Energy and the Environment (1973), p. 9-10.
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FIGURE 6
 
o ~ ROUGH ESTIMATES OF SONE HEALTH BENEFITS THAT CAN BE REALIZED BY THE 
CONTROL OF-SULFUR DIOXIDE, SUSPENDED SULFATES, AND SUSPENDED PARTICULATES 
Rough estimate of Rough estimate of
 
population affected,a annual health benefits,
 
Health effect million people Estimated possible change $ million
 
Irritation symptoms arising
 
from acute air pollution
 
episodes 50 Sympioms 75-100% eliminated Not known
 
Impairment of ventilatory
 
function 50 Subtle improvement Not known
 
Symptom aggravation in the
 
elderly 4 	 On tKe average 10-30% 150-800
 
fewer would report a d
 
worsening of symptoms
 
V.sthma attacks 4 	 On the average 10-50% 50-3009
 
fewer asthmaticsfmight
 
repm't an attack 
Acute lower respiratory 50 -Reduction in restricted 400-1500 ­
activity days by 10-40% ang
 
physician visits by 20-50%
 
Chronic bronchitis 6 	 Reduction.in prevalence 300-600 k
 
by 20-40%3
 
Source: EPA, The Economic Damages of Airyollution, 	Table 8, p,1-9.
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- 19 -

In an effort to meet the energy shortages some areas were permitted to
 
use high sulfur fuels. It appears that these variances may have had
 
almost immediate impact upon the ambient air quality. Philadelphia,
 
for instance, experienced a marked upward trend in ambient SO2 
soon
 
after a number of sulfur fuel variances were granted in the winter of
 
1973-1974 14 (See Figure 10). Energy policy cannot be formed in the absence
 
of environmental policy. In fact, a recent EPA study identifies the
 
impacts of new energy initiatives as the highest ranking health and
 
intermediate term pollution problem.15 
While energy policy has a host of environmentally related issues
 
(witness: the Alaska pipeline, deep water ports, nuclear power plant siting,
 
stripmining of coal, etc.), we are primarily concerned here with the
 
combustion of fuel for steam electric plants, largely a controversy over
 
sulfur dioxide emissions. Several strategies have been used in the recent
 
past to cut back on utilities' generation of sulfur dioxides -- prohibitions
 
on high sulfur fuel (coal), requirements for "scrubbers" to remove the SO2'
 
from the air, or fuel desulfurization. The present controversy is over
 
the use of scrubbers (EPA wants the utilities to spend $7.5 billion on
 
scrubbers by 1980 16), the questionable scientific basis (so argue the
 
utilities) for the alleged health dangers of sulfur dioxide, and the
 
soaring demands for energy in the face of declining or unavailable low
 
sulfur supplies.
 
14Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental
 
Quality - 1974, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 277.
 
15EPA, Development of Predictions of Future Pollution Problems (March 1974).
 
1 6Paul H. Weaver, "Behind the Great Scrube al," Forn(
 
p.105. & 0 
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FIGURE 10
 
PHILADELPHIA: FUEL SULFUR CONTENT VS AMBIENT SULFUR 
DIOXIDE (12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGES) 
0050,­
-- AMS data (residential sites)
 
0040 CAMP data (downtown sites)
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Variances 
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Source: 	 Based on data from Air Management Services,
 
City of Philadelphia, Pa.
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Until recently, the bulk of the country!s utility firms have relied
 
upon naturally low sulfur fuel: natural gas basically has none, oil has
 
little -- and both of these fuels have essentially run out, at least for
 
the short run. At the same time, the domestic supply of high sulfur
 
coal is essentially unlimited. In fact the U.S. reserves of coal, oil
 
shale and uranium vastly exceed the world's proved reserves of crude
 
oil. The coal reserves are estimated to be 1600 billion tons, compared
 
17
to the 1970 consumption of 322 million tons.
 
The environmentalists argue that coal smoke is half the nation's air
 
pollution problem (motor vehicle exhaust being the other half) and that any
 
use of coal requires extensive desulfurization. The utilities argue
 
that it is not a proven health hazard. Of all their arguments, this
 
appears to be the weakest. As mentioned previously, the synergistic
 
effect of SO acting in concert with a wet aerosals can produce deadly
 
H2SO 4. The sdcond argument from the utilities sector is based on the cost
 
of removing sulfur dioxide. The cost is substantial ($7.5 billion for
 
utilities by 1980), occurring at a risky financial period for the utilities
 
and at a time when they are required to expand capacity, as well as find
 
and develop new fuel sources.
 
The utilities final argument rests on technology. Fuel desulfurization
 
(removal of the sulfur in advance of burning) has been used routinely
 
for oil for some time, but the technology for coal is not commercially
 
available and some estimates suggest that it will not be available until
 
the id-1980's. The available alternatives now are scrubbers or tall
 
stacks. The utilities argue that the dilution method, reducing sulfur
 
17David Rose, "Energy Policy in the U.S.," Scientific American
 
(January 1974), p.25 .
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dioxide concentrations through the use of extremely tall stacks, effectively
 
controls the S02 problems at ground level. However, despite the utilities
 
advocacy of this system, in lieu of scrubbers, recent research seems to
 
indicate that dilution is not enough and does not adequately meet health
 
standards.
 
Hence, the scrubber technology remains. A scrubber essentially removes
 
the SO2 before the smoke from combustion is allowed to enter the atmosphere.
 
The sulfur dioxide is absorbed by a slurry and reacts with limestone to form
 
the precipitates calcium sulfate and'calcium sulfite. The utilities argue
 
that scrubbers are a new and untried technology, they create their own
 
environmental problems (i.e., sludge disposall and they decrease the
 
efficiency of generating systems.18
 
While there has not been a change in EPA policy, selective relaxations
 
have been allowed and have thereafter clearly demonstrated the impact of high
 
sulfur fuels upon the environment, as discussed previously. It is quite
 
likely that in the energy short months to come, the utilities will win at
 
least a 5hort run reprieve which may result at least in temporary degradation
 
of the environment. In the long rin, however, it is more likely that the
 
Environmental Protection Agency will be able to enforce its restrictions
 
and regulations, especially as scrubber technology improves.
 
The second major contributor to air pollution is the automobile.
 
Automobiles contribute the bulk of the carbon monoxide, hydrocarbon, and
 
nitrogen oxide pollution. As the number of registered automobiles is
 
expected to almost triple by the year 2000, (see Figure 11), the
 
18Ibid. 46 
FIGURE i1 
ITEMIZATION OF TIE AUTOMOBILE TOTALS INCLUDING QUANTITIES REPLACED 
AND NET ADDITIONS FROM 1950 EXTRAPOLATED TO 2000(2,3,4,5) 
Total Registered Net Replaced Total Purchases Net Additions 
Autos -Demand Total Total 
Year (Thousands) (Thousands) Percent of Total (Thousands) Percent of Total (Thousands) Percent of Total 
1950 40,334 2,700 7 6,500 16 3,800 9 
1955 52,092 4,000 8 7,700 15 3,700 7 
1960 62,258 5,000 8 7,000 11 2,000 3 
1966 80,106 5,556 7 9,028 1i 3,472 4 
1967 82,367 6,076 7 8,337 10 2,261 3 
1968 85,793 6,230 7 9,565 1 3,426 4 
1969 89,156 6,219 7 9,582 11 3,363 4 
1970 90,978 6,575 7 8,397 9 1,822 2 
1971 92,799 8,426 9 10,247 11 1,821 2 
1980 120,000 9,600 8 14,000 12 4,400 4 
1990 170,000 13,600 8 19,700 12 6,100 4 
2000 244,000 19,500 8 28,800 12 9,300 4 
it
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problem will clearly not go away by attrition. Here, there is no
 
question whatsoever about the hazards of automobile exhaust. The
 
contribution of automobile exhaust to urban smog has been experimentally
 
the late 1950's in this country.19
 verified and was apparent as early as 

The Clean Air Act originally mandated that regulated emissions from
 
automobiles be reduced by 90% from 1970 levels by 1975. Since the original
 
mandate;,auto manufacturers have been granted two delays; early in March
 
they were granted the third. Now the goal is 1978. The efforts have
 
concentrated on emission control devices, new gasoline formulations,
 
improved gasoline efficiency (meaning smaller cars), and the long run
 
solution, a substitution for the internal combustion engine.
 
The controversy has centered over the implementation of the catalytic
 
converter. The function of the catalytic converter is to oxidize
 
hydrocarbons (HG) and carbon monoxide (CO) to the harmless materials
 
water (H20) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Originally, the technological
 
barrier was the development of a catalyst-which was 1) effective,
 
2) available and 3) inexpensive. The chosen catalysts, platinum coated
 
aluminate and precious-metal-coated aluminate, may not completely meet­
these criteria.
 
The arguments against implementation of the catalytic converter
 
were similar to those used against the scrubber: too expensive,
 
technologically unsound, unknown consequences, economic costs too high,
 
and so forth. The health effects of automobile exhaust are well known;
 
there has not been an argument on this point. Despite automobile manu­
facturers assertions to the contrary, EPA research as well as that of the
 
19fDevelopment of Predictions of Future Pollution Problems, op.cit., p.56.
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the National Academy-of-Sciences indicate that achievement of statutory
 
emissions is currently technically feasible.20
 
Regardless of the public relations, the anti-catalytic converter argu­
ments are founded largely on n6tions of the "public welfare." The auto
 
industry contributes 16% 
of the GNP, and a large number of materials producers
 
(i.e., lead, synthetic rubber, malleable iron, zinc) are dependent upon
 
the automobile industry. The current postponement of the standards is
 
largely a consequence of fears for the economy. 
 There is no question that
 
the automobile manufacturers are somewhat responsible for their own
 
inability to respond to the law more quickly and effectively. Similarly,
 
it is equally apparent that the catalytic converter will be improved: one
 
would be horribly surpised if improvements were not possible.
 
Researchers are in agreement 
there are no technological -- nor real
 
economic 
--
barriers to meeting the existing standards. The question
 
then becomes one of presumed priorities.
 
_Quality of the Water: 
 The problem of water pollution is no less
 
pressing. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
 
require that every "point source" discharger of pollutants obtain a permit
 
which specifies the allowable amount and constituents of the effluent.
 
The basis for the permit for a point source discharger is both a technology­
based effluent standard and a water quality standard. At a minimum the
 
water treatment must be the best practicable control technology. If that
 
is insufficient to meet the water quality standard necessary for good
 
health, then further pollution reduction will be required. By 1977,
 
municipal treatment plants must provide secondary treatment (and thus
 
20. / /

"Auto Emissions: EPA Decision Due on Another Clean Up Delay," Science
 
Vol. 187, (March 7, 1975), p.818.
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create further sewage sludge disposal problems), and all industrial point
 
dischargers must meet standards based on "best practicable control
 
technology currently available." For 1983 the standards are more
 
stringent: municipalities must provide the "best practicable waste
 
treatment technology" and industrial point sources must comply with
 
guidelines prescribing the 'best available control technology economically
 
"21available. 

The EPA is progressing with establishing effluent standards -- such
 
as the maximum monthly average discharge of BOD, suspended solids, fecal
 
coliforms and pH level. Simultaneously, the agency is developing and
 
promulgating standards for individual industry sectors.
 
The objective of the water law is "to restore and maintain the
 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters."
 
This has been interpreted as requiring standards which will protect
 
indigenous aquatic life and permit secondary contact recreation such as
 
fishing and boating. Water of this quality will be sufficient for use as
 
public water supply, agricultural and industrial use, and navigation.
 
Much of the discussion elsewhere relating to the misuse of the
 
oceans are relevant to this discussion and will not be repeated here.
 
This discussion will center largely on the fresh water problems of the
 
country. Specifically, the following discussion will explore the quality
 
of the nation's water and the prognosis for the future.
 
Demands for the nation's water resources are expected to increase
 
substantially through the remainder of this century. While agriculture
 
uses of water have traditionally been the dominant consumer of fresh
 
water resources, steam electric power uses of water will grow the fastest
 
1974, op.cit.
2lEnvironmental Quality ­
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and become the major consumer of water by early in the next century. Two
 
projections of water requirements are presented in Figure 12. Water
 
consumption, like demand for any other commodity, is related to population,
 
technology efficiencies, reuse possibilities and the level and extent of
 
economic and industrial activity. Steam electric power plants, expected
 
to provide over 90% of U.S. electrical generation by the year 2020, are the
 
fastest growing consumer of fresh water. They are projected to increase their
 
fresh water withdrawals from 63 billion gallons per day to 411 billion
 
gallons per day by 2020. This is in addition to saline demands of 504
 
billion gallons per day.
2 2
 
Despite demands such as these, it is the contention of many experts
 
that the problems are not those of Water quantity but of water quality.
2 3
 
The Resources for the Future study indicated that "the degradation of water
 
quality and the related environment is a serious threat to well being-but
 
also poses the possibility that a serious physical limitation (dissolved
 
oxygen concentrations) will prevent achieving a high quality water
 
ehvironment. ...high quality water is likely to be available only if the
 
output of raw waste per unit of GNP is reduced by either changing the
 
nation's product mix or by changing production processes." 24 The study
 
indicates, however, that this pessimistic prognosis could be rendered
 
incorrect by either a dramatic decline in the costs of desalination or in
 
water transportation and delivery costs. Likewise, technological
 
improvements that reduce the amount of wastes generated by production of a
 
given output level would significantly perturb this forecast.
 
22aA 
Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources (Washington, D.C.: 
1968), p.1-11 - 1-12. .1 
Nathaniel Wollman and G. W. Bonem, The Outlook for Water: Quality,
 
Quantity and National Growth published for Resources for the Fut ire,

32
 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) p. . 
2 4 Th.-. 
23 
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FIGURE 12 
ESTIMATED WATER USE AND PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS, BY PURPOSE,
 
UNITED STATES
 
(bilion gallons daily) 
Type of use Used 
1965 
Projected 
1980 
reuirements * 
2000 2020 
Use 
1965 
Projected requirements 
1980 2000 2020 
Withdrawals Consumptive use 
Rural domestic ............ 2,351 2,474 2,852 3,334 1,636 1,792 2,102 2.481 
Municipal, (public­
supplied) ................ 23,745 33,596 50,724 74,256 5,244 10,581 10,478 24.643 
Industrial (self-supplied) ,. 40,405 75,026 127,365 210,707 3,764 6,126 10,011 15,619 
Steam-electric power: 
Fresh .................... 162.738 133,963 259,208 410,553 659 1,635 4,552 8,002 
Saline ................... 21,800 59,340 211,240 503,540 157 498 . 2.022 5,183 
Agriculture: 
Irrigation ................ 110,852 135.852 149.824 160,978 64,696 81,559 89,964 96,919 
Livestock ................ .1,726 2.375 3,397 . 4,660 1.626 2,177 3,077, 4,238 
Total .................. 269.617 442.626 804.610 1.688,088 17,782 104.418 128,206 157,085 
Source: The Nation's Water Resources, Table 1-l, p.1-8. 
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FIGURE 10 
OVERALL SCHEMA OF WORLD FOOD PROBLEM 
Direct relevance and/or 
applicability
Underlying factors & problem elements of food technology 
YES NO 
1. Ecologieal-geographlicfactors 
1. Production/population imbalance 	 x x 
2. High dependence on climatic conditions x 
3. Soil depletion & water shortage 	 x 
4. Lack of diversification 	 I 
II. 	Economic factors 
5. High capitalloutput ratio which inhibits investment x 
6. Long time horizon needed to recover investment 	 'x 
7. Need for large initial investments 	 x 
8. Large ratio of sunk investment to total investment 	 x 
9. Low productivity of labor x 
10. Low yield per acre of land 	 x 
11. Poor credit facilities x
 
17 T ;;tpd dtinsfic purchasing power (demand) X
 
III. 	 Socio-economic tactors 
13. 	 Uneconomic use of capital due to small size holdings x 
14. 	High indebtedness by small owners x 
15. 	 Inadequate employment opportunities x 
16. 	 Inadequate transportation x 
IV. 	Socio-technologial factors 
17. 	 Low level technology 
18. 	 Inadequate tools and facilities x 
19. 	 Insufficient application of research findings x 
V. 	Psychosocial factors 
20. Lack of individual motivation 	 X 
21. 	 Increasing expectations of outside support x 
22. 	 Increasing dependency on outside support x 
IV. 	 Traditional social factors 
23. Ignorance of organizational.prnciples x
 
24 Institutional rigidity and inertt a 
 x 
25. 	 Lack of adequate inca information (empirical & quan- x
 
titative) to guid&policy
 
26. 	 Ignorance of input/output dependence between agricul- x
 
ture and other sectors
 
27. 	 Unhealthy dietary habits x 
.Source:
 
Hasan Ozbekhan, "The Role of Goals and Planning in the Solution of the World 
Food Problem," in K. Jungk and J. Galtung, Eds., Mankind 2000 (International
 
Peace Research Institute: Oslo) 1969 p.127.
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ORIGINAJ PAGE X 
OF POOR QUAL 
- 29 -
Essentially, all strategies reduce to two: either improve agri­
cultural productivity (measured as output per acre) or increase the land
 
under cultivation. As the previous discussion indicated, in many countries
 
all usable land is, in fact, under cultivation and to bring any more land
 
under cultivation would require substantial capital and time investment.
 
Hence, for the short term anyway, most strategies resort to attempts to
 
increase agricultural yields per acre. Because of the general problem of
 
hidden unemployment and agricultural underemployment, in lesser developed
 
countries, output per acre is a more meaningful measure of productivity
 
than output per manhour.
 
High Yield/Special Purpose Strains: Recently, the successes attributed
 
to high yielding species of wheat, rice, and corn generated a hope that much
 
of the world's food shortages would bealleviated through utilization of
 
improved strains. Indeed, acreage devoted to such crops increased by several
 
orders of magnitude in just a few years. In various developing countries,
 
yields due solely to the-application of improved varieties increased markedly.
 
As was mentioned previously, in areas where specific plants were developed for
 
specific regions the results were dramatic and yields per acre
 
comparable to the developed world have been achieved. From 1965 to 1977,
 
India, using the new varieties, increased its wheat production from 11
 
million tons to 27 million tons -- an increase unprecedented by any other
 
38
 
country in history.
 
However, these same varieties, because they are more genetically uniform
 
than the native strains they replace are extremely vulnerable to epidemics.
 
6 0/38In the Human Interest, op.cit., p.52. 
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What are the components of water quality? Biochemical oxygen demand
 
(BOD) is a significant pressure levied by municipal and industrial wastes
 
upon a fresh wYater system. Degradation of these wastes is accomplished
 
largely through biological degradation of the wastes; hence, the greater
 
the waste load, the greater the oxygen required for the oxidation process.
 
This oxygen demand is expressed in "population equivalents" -- 0.25 pounds
 
of oxygen per day required to oxidize the maste of an average urban person.
 
If the oxygen is depleted through waste degradation, then aquatic organisms
 
die, leaving the waterways to anaerobic bacteria which produce hydrogen
 
'sulfide and methane gas -- traditional smelly "swamp gas." The amount of
 
oxygen required to decompose materials varies from material to material,
 
but often extremely large amounts are required. For instance, the dissolved
 
oxygen in 320,000 gallons of air saturated sea water is required to oxidize
 
one gallon crude oil completely.25
 
Another particularly troublesome pollutant is high concentrations of
 
nutrients such as phosphates and nitrates. These materials cause bio­
simulation, that is, the accelerated fertilization of plant life. When the
 
excessive number of plants die, the oxygen necessary to support marine life
 
is depleted in their decomposition. This process indirectly changes the
 
entire bio-community of a waterway and may contribute to its "death,"
 
which is known as eutrophication. It is this process which has so choked
 
Lake Erie and reduced the fish population so dramatically. Thusly, the
 
BOD and nutrient problem can be seen to aggravate each other in causing
 
eutrophication. 
Despite the fact that the polluting problems of phosphates have
 
received a great deal of national attention lately, a recent study
 
25
'ouncil on Environmental Equality, Ocean Dumping: A National Policy
 
(Washington, D.C.: October 1970) p. 14
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by the Environmental Protection Agency shows a disturbing growth in
 
the level of nutrients in the nation's waterways. -Eighty-four percent
 
of the areas analyzed exceeded phosphorous and phosphate levels associated
 
with potential eutrophication,and up to 54% of the areas indicated increased
 
26
 
phosphorous levels over the earlier years.
 
In addition to the problem of eutrophication, nitrates in the nation's
 
waterways present the additional threat of toxic nitrites. While nitrates
 
themselves are not particularly dangerous, they can be converted into
 
highly toxic nitrates in the presence of certain bacteria in the digestive
 
27
tract. 

One of the major concerns :in water abatement is the level of hydro­
carbons in the water, some of which may be carcinogenic. While there has
 
not yet been an instance of identifiable cause and effect between consumption
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of tainted water or fish and resulting human cancer, the fact that cancer
 
in fish exposed to hydrocarbons has been found suggests the dimensions of
 
the hazards.
 
What is the present quality of the nation's water? To a large degree
 
water quality and quantity is a local problem and cannot be viewed from the
 
aggregate national levelwithout distorting the issues. The results of the
 
major investigation into the water quality of the nation's fresh water
 
supplies is presented in Figure 13. As is readily seen, the results are
 
mixed, Some pollutants show marked improvement, others show deterioiation.
 
26Entironmental Protection Agency, National Water Quality Inventory. Revort
 
to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p.
 
27Ehrlich, op.cit., p.158.
 
2%ouncil on Environmental Quality, Ocean Dumping. A National Policy, Op. Cit.
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FIGURE 13 
MAJOR WATERWAYS: 

Parameter 
Suspended solids 

Turbidity 

Temperature 

Color 

Ammonia 
Nitrate (as N) 
Nitrite plus nitrate 
Total phosphorus 
Total phosphate 
Dissolved phosphate 
Dissolved solids (105C) 
Dissolved solds(180C)
Chlorides 
Sulfates 
pH 
Dissolved oxygen 
Total coliforms (MFD) 1 
Total coliforms (MFI)' 
Total coliforms (MPN)2 
Fecal coliforms (MPN) 2 
Fecal coliforms (MPN) 2 
tiiefoua 
Refecence levs' and sourcei 
80 mg/I-aquatic life 
50 JTU-aquatic life 
90°FRaquatic life 
75 platinum-cobalt units-
water supply 
0.89 mg/laquatic life 
0.9 mg/I-nutrient 
0.9 mg/1-nutrient
0.1 mg/1-nutrient 
0.3 mg/I-nutrient 
0.3 mig/i-nutrient 
500 mg/1-water supply
500 mg/I-water supply
250 mg/1-water supply 
250 mg/i-water supply 
6.0-9.0-aquatic life 
4to mg/lcaquatic Ilie 
10,000/100 ml-recreation 
10,000/100 mI-recreation 
10,000/100 mi-recreation 
2,000/100 mt-recreation 
2.000/I00.ml-recreation 
"' !! -t-q"ni 
REFERENCE LEVEL VIOLATIONS, 1963-72
 
Percent of reaches 
exceeding reference 
levels 
1963-72 1968-72 Change 
26 14 -12 
28 28 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
16 6 -10 
12 24 +12 
18 261 +8 
34 57 +23 
30 41 +11 
11 22 +11 
25 18 -7 
28 12 -16 
12 9 -3 
12 12 0 
0 0 0 
0 0- 0 
24 13 -11 
50 30 -20 
23 20 -3 
45 21 -24 
17 43 +26 
86 71 -15 
I With the exceptions that follow. reference level designations are from Guide­
lines for Developing or Revising Warer QuahltyStandards, EPA Water Planning Division,April 2973; for ammonia, chlorides, sulfates, and phenols, Criteria for V/aterQuality, EPA, 1973 (Section 304(a)(1) guidelines); and for nitrate (as N). Biological
Associated Problems in Freshwater Environments, FWPCA, 1966, pp. 132-33. 
2 Membrane filter delayed, membrane filter immediate, most probable number. 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency, National Water Quality Inventory:. Re­
port to Congress (1974). Table 11-3. 
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Regionally, improvements can be seen, For instance, improvements in
 
decreasing the phosphate loading of the Detroit River have been made (see
 
Figure 14); and as this river feeds into Lake Erie, its improvement may
 
have substantial impact,
 
There are fundamentally two kinds of water pollution problems, those
 
associated with running stream water and those associated with underground
 
water tables. The former is considerably easier to deal with as there are
 
many naturally occurring cleansing mechanisms that can maintain the quality
 
of the water if the level of effluents is in accordance with the size of
 
the water body. Once pollutants enter the underground water tables, the
 
situation changes drastically. There are no such naturally occurring
 
processes, and the underground water tables are clearly not as amenable to
 
technological intervention.
 
Protection of the watershed regions is related in large part to
 
protection of the total land resources,. Much of the pollution of watersheds
 
occurs through rainwater, waste water and agricultural runoff picking up,
 
collecting and concentrating dangerous levels of effluents in the water.
 
These pollutant-laden waters then seep into the land contaminating under­
ground water sources or are dumped into surface water. Hence, efforts to
 
improve water quality cannot realistically be undertaken without effective
 
land use planning.
 
One of the problems with municipal water supplies is their contamination
 
by external pollutants. One major pollutant source is the use of salt
 
spread on U.S. roadways in the winter to melt snow and ice. Over one tenth
 
of all the salt produced in the world is spread on the nation's streets,
 
an amount equal to 12-15 million tons annually.29 Cbncomitantly, chloride
 
2. C. T. Nisbet, "Salt on the Earth,!' Technology Review, May 1974, p.61 .
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FIGURE 14
 
DETROIT RIVER (RIVER MILE 3.9), AVERAGE TOTAL AND SOLUBLE 
PHOSPHORUS, 1966-73
 
[In milligrams per liter] 
Year Total Soluble 
phosphorus phosphorus 
1966 
 NA 0.309 
1967 
 NA 0.175 
1968 0.186 0.0721969 
 0.144 0.083 
1970 
 0.133 0,062 
1971 
 0.067 0.036 
1972 0.079 0.029 
1973 0.058 0.015 
NA-Not available. 
Source: Michigan Water Resources Cornhiission, Annual Report to International 
JointCommission (average concentrations computed from, 10 sampling stations 
crossing the river). 
OFPOOR UL7 
JW 
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in drinking water have been increasing at a similar rate and -many urban
 
water systems are approaching the upper levels of the Public Health Depart­
ment. At least one town had reportedly had to close their well and begin
 
purchasing water from other sources because of chloride contamination of
 
their municipal water supplies.
 
It is commonly thought that since the bulk of the nation's population
 
is served by treatable municipal water that some contamination of well water
 
can be tolerated. This assertion is incorrect in both parts. While the
 
percentage of the U.S. population served by municipal supply systems has
 
indeed increased from 75% in 1960 to 82% in 1970, there is still a
 
substantial portion of the population that relies on direct well water for
 
their water use.30 More importantly, even if no one relied on well water,
 
contamination of ground water would still be of serious concern. Ground
 
water aquifers supply about 27% of the withdrawn water, and obviously,
 
provide the base flow of streams. The Water Resources Council has noted
 
that ground water aquifers may be expected to grow in importance as under­
ground reservoirs and as regulators of water supply through techniques of
 
31
 
artificial recharge, artificial storage and- induced infiltration. Their
 
size and, hence, potdntial value is enormous as well. It has been estimated
 
that their total storage capacity greatly exceeds the volume of all five
 
Great Lakes and that the usable portion is 150 times the amount of water
 
used in this country in 1965.32
 
30
 
Development of Prediction of Future Pdllution Problems, op.cit., p.109.
 
31The Nation's Water Resources, op.cit., p.327.
 
32Ibid.
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Despite the assurances of an aggregate level of water supplies,
 
there will be regional difficulties, most significantly in the South and
 
Far West. For instance, the lower Colorado iegion has been experiencing
 
a water supply deficiency and projections of economic and population growth
 
for that region indicate that this deficiency will increase in the future.33
 
This same region will be experiencing extremely high water demands because
 
of recent energy demands. Additionally, the National Academy of Sciences
 
has concluded that "not enough water exists for large-scale conversions of
 
coal to other energy forms. '#34 Mining of shale oil (presently contemplated
 
for the water deficient areas of Colorado and Utah) would require an
 
estimated three barrels of water for each barrel of oil,
 
Sources of Water Pollution: What are the origins of water pollution?
 
The origins, of course, are related to the uses of the nation's water
 
supplies. The following is a projection of uses through the year 2000:
 
Use Category* 1965 1980 2000 
Agriculture 41.8% 31.2 19.0 
Steam Electric 31.4 43.7 58.5 
Industrial 17.2 16.9 15.8 
Municipal 8.8 7.6 6.3 
Rural Domestic .8 .6 .4 
TOTAL USED/BGD 260.6 442.6 804.6 
From The Nation's Water Resources op.cit., p.1-8.
 
33The Nation's Water Resources op.cit., p.1-27.
 
3 4Les Gapay, "Far West's Shortage of Water May Break Many Energy Schemes,"
 
Wall Street Journal,(December 16, 1974) p.l.
 
35Ibid. 
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While there is some slight discrepancy between these figures and those
 
36
 
later produced by Resources for the Future, the Water Resources Council
 
figures are proportionately the same and the aggregate numbers fall midway
 
between RFF's "medium" and "high" scenario. In any event, it is likely
 
that these figures accurately reflect the general trends in water use.
 
Agriculture has traditionally been the major consumer of water in
 
this country and one of the major pollutant sources. The dominance of
 
agricultural land in this country is shown in Figure 15 illustrating the
 
dramatic increase in the amount of irrigated land. While only 10% of the
 
U.S. farms practice irrigation, these farms produce 20% of the value of
 
3 7 
U.S. farm crops. Most of the technological advancements in agriculture
 
such as pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, hybrid seed, etc. are predicted­
on the availability of even and controlled humidity and precipitation.
 
Hence, the greatest productivity increases can be achieved only in those
 
regions with the most favorable weather conditions or with irrigation. The
 
water scarce Western region is the greatest consumer of irrigation water,
 
38
 
accounting for about 95% of irrigation water uses.
 
The problems of irrigation stem from its role in increasing the
 
salinity of the freshwater. As the freshwater is extracted by the plants
 
and then evaporated into the-airmit results in increasingly high salt
 
concentrations. These saline waters are then returned either to the stream
 
or underground water aquifer, further increasing their salinity. In order
 
36 The Outlook for Water, op.cit.
 
37 The Nation's Water Resources, op.cit., p.4-41.
 
38Ibid, p.4-42.
 
FIGURE 15 
IRRIGATED LAND IN THE UNITED STATES
 
45 
&-&Houk 1951, Ref. (1)	 I 
G)-. 	 Economic research survey / 
Projectedo based on Ref.(3) 
-
35 
-30U 
C 
0 
25/ 
0 
20 
H 
'5 , 
-r4 
0. 
1900 	 1910- 1920 1930 1940 1950 i960 1970 1980 
Source: 	 EPA, Development of Predictions ot Future Pollution
 
Problems, Figure 4, p.1 1 7 .
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to meet demand, particularly in water deficient areas (such as the Western
 
regions), either the application of desalination technology or use of
 
irrigation water of lower quality may be required. However, reliance upon
 
irrigation water of uncertain quality may have unforeseen health
 
consequences, resulting from the ingestion of contaminated food.
 
Other'agricultural concerns revolve around the problems of the
 
persistence of pesticides, especially of DDT, has had a long and extensive
 
history; and its use continues to increase, even since 1966. Introduced
 
during World War II, it no doubt was responsible for the tremendous increase
 
in agricultural efficiency and the elimination and/or reduction of many
 
insect borne diseases. However, it is also an extremely stable compound
 
which breaks down very slowly in the environment. It is found in the fatty
 
tissues of man the world over and has been found even in the tissues of
 
39
 
Antarctic penguins. While it is unclear what the long run impact on man
 
is, it is known that it attacks some animal species by wiping out the
 
entire species through interference with reproduction. While the highest
 
concentrations have been found in carnivorous birds (up to 1600 parts per
 
million), concentrations in man have been found across the world ranging
 
from 2 to 20 parts per million,
40
 
While the cause and effect relationship of DDT and other chlorinated
 
hydrocarbon pesticides is not completely understood, examination of autopsy
 
data has suggested a correlation between concentrations of DDT in fatty
 
tissues and certain causes of death. The concentrations of DDT in fat
 
tissues of patients who died of softening of the brain, cerebral hemorrage,
 
hypertension, portal cirrhosis of the liver, and various cancers are higher
 
39George M. Woodwell, "Toxic Substances and Ecological Types," Scientific
 
American (Vol. 216, No. 3), March 196 , p,30.c 
40 Ibid. 
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than in groups of patients who died of infectious diseases. Further study
 
of the patients showed that high concentrations of DDT were strongly
 
correlated with heavy home use of pesticides.
4 1
 
The problems of nitrates have been mentioned previously, as have their
 
role in eutrophication and toxic nitrate formation. Extensive use of
 
nitrate fertilizers has already rendered drinking water of some rural areas
 
nonpotable. Toxic nitrate illnesses are most likely to be found in infants;
 
through reaction with the red blood hemoglobin, the illness may cause
 
suffocation. Hence, in the case of extreme nitrate pollution of lakes,
 
streams and wells as in central California, bottled water is relied upon,
 
especially for-infants. The problem is also severe in other areas such
 
as Missouri, Illinois and Wisconsin. The city of Elgin, Minnesota was
 
forced by nitrate pollution to abandon its water supply and find a new
 
42
 
source.
 
The quantity of water needed for energy in the future is another
 
serious problem ahead. Use of water by steam electric plants presently
 
consumes about 35% of total water used, but by the year 2000 this is expected
 
to reach almost 60% (as projected by both the Water Resources Council and
 
Resources for the Future). This, then will be the greatest'single use of
 
water and will use both fresh and saline sources of water. The greatest
 
growth in water demand will come from nuclear fission plants, which currently
 
requires about 50% more condensed water for a given temperature rise than
 
fossil fueled steam plants of equal size, due to unequal plant efficiencies.
43
 
41Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit., p.162-163.
 
42Ibid, p.158.
 
4 The Nation's Water Resources, op.cit.
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By 1990 it has been estimated that at least 492 new power stations will
 
be required, some of which will require cooling ponds of 2000 acres or
 
44
 
more.
 
The amount of water required is indeed substantial. One to two
 
cubic feet per second are required for every megawatt of installed
 
capacity, and the water is warmed by from 120 to 250F in the cooling
 
process. Hence, one of today's large steam electric plants could
 
feasibility require the entire flow of a moderate sized stream.
45
 
The primary concern, however, is over the impact of thermal pollution.
 
Thermal pollution has two seemingly contradictory problems associated with
 
it. First, there is the substantial and rapid temperature change, which
 
often results in fish and marine life kills, merely as a result of shock.
 
The second problem is associated with the more gradual warming of the
 
waters which contributes to biostinulation, which in turn results in the
 
depletion of dissolved oxygen in the water and contributes to eutrophication
 
in much the same way as influxes of the nutrient nitrates and phosphates do.
 
The consequences of such artificial warming are a reduction in species
 
diversity (either dying immediately or becoming more susceptible to
 
contaminants and disease) and a reduction in the ability of the water to
 
absorb organic wastes, since oxygen is a necessary prerequisite for the
 
oxidation of organic wastes.
 
While much of the publicity has revolved around fish kills, this
 
could be muted through more gradual cooling. The biostimulation effect,
 
which potentially is extremely hazardous to the viability of the water­
shed environment, will occur even within the limits of "gradual warming."
 
44U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environment Facts, June 10, 1973,
 
p.1-2. ap
45Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.t, p.235
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Industrial uses of water are around 16-17% of total water use and
 
will not be reduced below 14-15% by 2000. With the introduction of the
 
point source permit system, combined with the requirements of the Federal
 
Water Pollution Control Act, improvements have been made in the sources
 
and control of industrially caused water pollution. Despite the improve­
ments, industrial wastes are 
the source of some of the most hazardous of
 
the water pollutants including inorganic compounds (witness the controversy
 
over asbestos -- a possible carcinogen -- loading of a local Minnesota
 
water supply from the taconite tailings discharged into Lake Superior)
 
such as mercury, nitrates, organic compounds including known carcinogens
 
such as PCB's. EPA has identified 12 chemicals used in manufacturing as
 
toxic water pollutants, including the pesticides, aldrin, dieldrin, endrin,
 
DDT, DDE, and DDD, toxaphene and cadimium, mercury cyanide, benzidine and
 
PCB (polychlorinated biphenyls). Effluent standards are being studied for
 
possible inclusion on the list. These include among others, arsenic,
 
selenium, chronmium, lead, asbestos, zinc, beryllium, nickeland camphor.46
 
Industrial water pollution consists of the B0D stress placed on the
 
water as well as the sediment and suspended solid effluents, the toxicity
 
of which varies. Five industry groupings are responsible for the majority
 
(88%) of water withdrawals andhencepose the greatest environmental
 
threats. These include food and kindred products, pulp and .paper,
 
chemicals, petroleum and coal products and primary metals.
 
While industrial uses of the water supply are only)17% and are
 
expected to decline, water pollution from industrial sources is the
 
principal source of toxic pollutants. Figure16 shows the kind of
 
4 6Environmental Quality - 1974, op.cit., p.15 4 5
- .
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FIGURE 16 
ESTIMATED VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL WASTES BEFORE TREATMENT, 1963 
Standard Settleable and 
Biochemical Suspended 
Industry Wastewater Oxygen Demand Solids 
Bil. gal. Mil.lbs. Mil.lbs. 
Food and kindred
 
products ................ 690 4,300 6,600
 
Textile mill products 140 890 Not Available
 
Paper and allied products 1,900 5,900 3,000
 
Chemical and allied
 
products ................ 3,700 9,700 1,900
 
Petroleum and coal ........ 1,300 500 460
 
Rubber and plastics ....... 160 40 50
 
Primary metals ............ 4,300 480 4,700
 
Machinery ................. 150 60 50
 
Electrical machinery ...... 91 70 20
 
Transportation equipment.. 240 120 Not Available
 
All other manufacturing... 450 390 930
 
All manufacturing ......... 13,100 22,000 18,000
 
For comparison:
 
Sewered population of 1 2 	 3
 
U.S....................5,300 7,300 	 8,800
 
1120,000,000 persons x 120 gallons x 365 days.
 
2120,000,000 persons x 1/6 pounds x 365 days.
 
3120,000,000 persons x 0.2 pounds x 365 days.
 
Source: 	 Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on
 
Environmental Quality - 1974, p.320 .
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pollutants from different industries in 1968. The Water Resources
 
Council has estimated that when considering criteria for strength and
 
volume; wastes from industrial sources are about three times as great
 
as the wastes associated with sewage. They also expect that the volume
 
of industrial pollution will increase about three times as rapidly as
 
population. 47 The effluents from sewage and industrial wastes are not
 
at all in common. The major problem associated with sewage sludge is the
 
BOD stress it places on a waterway and the potential contribution that
 
this has to the eutrophication process. However, this is an essentially
 
biological process that can be reversed;and it does not involve toxic
 
materials per se, witness the progress being made in the restoration of
 
Lake Erie. However, the problem with industrial wastes is the level of
 
toxic,carcinogenic,and mutagenic materials that are in the the wastes.
 
Often these materials do not degrade but persist in the wateraccumulating
 
into higher and higher concentration levels. Because the chemistry and
 
physiology of these materials in the human health process is largely
 
unknown, the persistent dumping of suchwastes may be contributing to an
 
unknown public health time bomb. It is likely that all industrial waste
 
compounds in sufficient concentrations and for exposure periods of
 
sufficient time are toxic. The public health question is to determine
 
what these thresholds are. 
The point source permit program is only semi-successful. Its 
success depends upon the availability of economically feasible technology. 
The Nationis Water Resources op.git., p. 
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This distinction enables industry to postpone some pollution abatement
 
improvements. Secondly, if point source emissions are explicitly prohibited,
 
then the industry often has the option of discharging his wastes directly
 
into the municipal water system which merely transfers the problem to
 
another entity.
 
The final major category of water use and misuse is municipal
 
drinking water and sewage systems. The basic environmental problem here
 
is the potential intermingling of these two systems. The expenditures for
 
municipal sewage systems are substantial and about 85% of the population
 
48
 
is served by a municipal water supply system. Every year another 1000
 
communities outgrow their sewage treatment facilities.49 Gross municipal
 
wasteloads as measured by person equivalents of BOD are expected to
 
increase substantially as shown in Figure 17. This projection,while a
 
gross estimate,does assume that all urban populations were served by a
 
sewer system by the year 1973. The problems of sewage sludge are
 
substantial in terms of the level of nutrients they possess, their role
 
in eutrophication, and the increasing level of toxic contaminants found
 
in sewage sludge,as urban industries increasingly rely on municipal
 
sewage systems for disposal of their wastes.
 
The difference in different levels of sewage treatment is the amount
 
of BOD that is removed in the treatment process. As Figure 18 shows, the
 
increasingly stringent regulations have reduced the BOD of the sewage wastes.
 
Hence, after more than fifteen years of effort the sewage sludge is now
 
the same quality as it was in 1957.
 
48Development of Predictions of Future Pollution Problems, op.cit., p.109.
 
49 The Nation's Water Resources, op.cit. p.5-3-i.
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FIGURE 17 
GROSS MUNICIPAL WASTE LOADS1 IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES 
(Millions of population equivalents)2 
Region 

North Atlantic 

South Atlantic-Gulf 

Great Lakes 

Ohio 

Tennessee 

Upper Mississippi 

Lower Mississippi 

Souris-Red-Rainy 

Missouri 

Arkansas-White-Red 

Texas-Gulf 

Rio Grande 

Upper Colorado 

Lower Colorado 

Great Basin 

Columbia-North Pacific 

California 

Continental United
 
States 

1962 

45.8 

11.4 

15.6 

14:4 

1.3 

15.7 

3.6 

0.9 

6.3 

5.5 

6.9 

1.4 

0.2 

1.2 

.0,9 

3.7 

14.7 

149.5 

1980 

71.2 

35.9 

41.5 

29.8 

5.1 

18.0 

7.1 

0.9 

12.0 

11.0 

15.4 

3.2 

0.5 

'3.7 

2.2 

9.3 

35.0 

301.8 

2000 2020
 
94.6 128.0
 
54.1 77.4
 
54.5 72;8
 
38.5 51.0
 
7.1 9.8
 
24.4 33.0
 
9.7 13.2
 
1.2 1.6
 
17.2 24.6
 
14.9 20.2
 
22.8 32.6
 
5.2 7.6
 
0.9 1.3
 
6.0 9.0
 
3.6 5.4
 
12.9 18.0
 
54.3 80.6
 
421.9 587.0
 
Bioche~ical oxygen demand (BOD).
 
2A population equivalent is the quantity of water in terms of biochemical
 
oxygen demand (BOD) produced by one person, approximately 16/ pound per
 
day.
 
Source: 	 Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources,
 
(Washington, D.C.: 1968), p.5-5-3."
 
FIGURE 18
 
EFFECT OF SANITARY SEWAGE TREATMENT
 
tIn millions of pounds of BOD per day] 
Collected Reduced 
Year by by Discharged
sanitary treat. after 
sewers' ment2 treatment 
1957 16.4 7.7 8.7 
1962 19.8 10.8 9.0 
1968 28.3 15.0 8.3 
1973 27.1 18.5 8.6 
Based on 0.167 pounds of BOD per sewered person per day. 
I Based on the distribution of treatment facilities and on estimates of removal 
Suffcienncy.
 
•Source; Environmental Protection Ag~ency. 
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obviously, the sewage problem is intimately associated with the
 
population, population density, level of and kind of industrial activity
 
and the geographic limitations of a region. Water pollution from sewage
 
is an unusual example of diseconomies of scale occurring with increasing
 
population sizes. As the population increases, the waste degrading
 
ability of the water stream decreases, increasing the degree of elaborate
 
and expensive sewage and/or water treatment facilities required. In
 
summary, the greater the population in a given watershed, the higher the 
per capita costs of water pollution control and abatement will be.
50 
It is a problem that is never solved as population growth necessitates
 
ever increasing system capacity. Disposal of sewage sludge becomes a
 
severe constraint both because of population pressures and increasingly
 
stringent pollution requirements. When discharged into water, sludge increases
 
the eutrophication process (e.g., Lake Erie), may spread waterborne
 
diseases or encourage increase in disease vectors (i.e., mosquitos), or
 
may add toxic impurities to the water. The bulk of the sewage sludge in
 
the country is either incinerated (therefore, transferring a water
 
pollution problem to the air) or used for land fill. An excellent
 
potential use for sewage sludge lies in its use in land reclamation for
 
stripmined lands, and its potential as a nutrient rich fertilizer.
 
Some Potential Actions:
 
Perhaps to a greater degree than even the air quality problem, water
 
quality is not well understood. The mechanisms of persistence, the
 
cleansing ability of the water, the flow of pollutants through the under­
ground water table, and the toxic effects and impacts of persistent public
 
50_ So
Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit,
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exposure to pollutants is not understood. Hence, an essential step which
 
is currently being undertaken is extensive research into the biological
 
and chemical aspects of water pollution. A concomitant part of the effort
 
is the development of more adequate data bases for accurate monitoring
 
and sensing of the flows of pollutants and the effect of these pollutants.
 
A second problem in the development of any agenda for action
 
is the interrelationships between water pollution strategies and air
 
pollution strategies and a host of other environmental and economic
 
variables. There are essentially three low cost options available for
 
waste disposal: it can be burned, it can be dumped into the nearest body
 
of water, or it can be buried -- all three of which have untold environmental
 
impact. This interrelationship becomes confused; in the interests of
 
contributing to water quality improvements, air quality is degraded. An
 
example is the impact of the point source effluent permit program.
 
Prohibited from discharging industrial wastes directly into a body of water,
 
some firms are instead discharging the wastes into the municipal waste
 
treatment plants which currently handle only biological wastes -- it is
 
then either burned, dumped into the nearest body of water, or buried. Hence,
 
this strategy merely rearranges the pollutants rather than controlling or
 
reducing them.
 
Waste disposal into a nearby waterbody is by all measure the most
 
economical method of waste disposal for the firm. Assuming that techno­
logical capability is available, and most experts suggest that the problem
 
of water pollution is NOT technology, then government incentives, regu­
lations, and legislation can be applied to alter the economies of water
 
pollution abatement. If pollution control is uneconomical, the easiest
 
way to alter the cost picture is to make water pollution more uneconomical
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through a system of elaborate fines and penalties. Such a sliding scale
 
would most penalize those who generated the highest level of effluents of
 
the greatest toxicity for the greatest period of time. Concomitantly,
 
such a scale should take into account the volume of business that is being
 
conducted at a given site, For instance, a small producer should not be
 
allowed to generate a higher level of pollution per level of output than
 
a larger firm merely because the aggregate level of pollution generated
 
would be less. Such a scale if nationally and rigidly applied could
 
provide the necessary incentive to develop and install the latest technology
 
by making it bad business sense not to implement pollution control equip­
ment. Such a sliding scale could be combined with a host of tax and
 
investment credits, small business loans, capital gains and tax depreciation
 
benefits to further encourage the installation.
 
Several U.S. regional test cases and European areas where industries
 
have been charged for every unit of BOD not-removed indicate that the
 
"effluent charge" method is preferable and more realistic for future
 
control of pollutants than the present regulatory laws.51 Charges for
 
emitted effluents may be set at increasingly higher rates over the years
 
to attAin the level of desired pollution relative to the technological
 
possible alternatives. Furthermore, the effluent charge may be adopted
 
to automobiles as well, in the form of a "smog ratings," resulting in
 
52
 
a "smog tax" levied with the purchase of gasoline.
 
Simultaneously, the implementation of such charges to industry should
 
be not so rigid and heavy handed as to practically guarantee the bankruptcy
 
of small and/or obsolescent firms, A recent study by McGraw-Hill suggests
 
Allen V. Knuse and Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices, and Public 
Policy (Washington, D.C., 1975), Chapter 7 
52 Knuse and Schultze, Chapter 7. 
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that a substantial portion of the plant and equipment of these industries
 
is outmoded, unproductive and obsolete with respect to the state-of-the-art.53
 
Their overall estimate for manufacturing plants and equipment is 14%. While
 
this seems high, another section of this document will argue that in fact
 
this number is low, by as much as a factor of two; and in some industries
 
it may be low by a factor of four, For instance, twenty percent of the
 
iron and steel industry's plant and equipment is rated obsolete by that
 
industry (estimates of the capital required to modernize the industry
 
approach $15B). This level of obsolescence, no doubt, contributes to
 
the inability to effectively control pollution. The steel industry,
 
because of its high level of obsolescence and increasingly non-competitive
 
stature with'foreign steelmaking entities is especially hard hit. Even
 
the compromise of installing the "best practicable technology" available
 
as suggested by EPA would cost the nation's four largest steelmakers
 
54
 $80-100 million.

If increasingly uncompetitive plants and mills are to remain
 
competitive at all in the world markets, massive capital investments will
 
be required to replace obsolescent plant and equipment. Requiring current
 
or advanced SOTA pollution abatement equipment to be implemented in
 
technologically and economically obsolescent plants is not a good economic
 
or environmental protection decision.
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"The Rising Toll of Obsolence," Business Week November 30, 1974, p.2 7
 .
 
54
"Steel: Clean Up or Close Up?" Business Week, April 6, 1974, p.72 .
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ISSUE: CONTAMINATION, MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE GLOBAL OCEANS LEADING TO
 
ECOSYSTEM DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION, HEALTH CONSEQUENCES AND INTER-

NATIONAL CONFLICT
 
The Issue:
 
Concern and conflict over use of the oceans is not new; in fact, it
 
may be as old as fishing and sailing. What is relatively new is the
 
recognition that man's use of the oceans may indeed have severe negative
 
consequences and that unregulated uses of the oceahs may threaten the global
 
ecological balance, alter plant and animal life and significantly impact the
 
global climatic systems. Recent plans to locate large scale structures on
 
the oceans and to exploit the mineral riches of the seas pose even greater
 
risk to the ecological system. Finally, increasing use of the oceans for
 
large scale transport greatly enhances the probability of collision,
 
polluting spills and international conflict.
 
The issue basically revolves around potential degradation and abuse
 
through unregulated use of the oceans. The uses that present threats
 
include:
 
* 	Resource exploitation -- fishing, maricultute, ocean mining
 
" 	Recreation -- swimming, beaches, offshore boating, and
 
recreational sites
 
* 	Waste dumping -- industrial wastes, waste treatment, effluent
 
and sewage disposal, dredging spoils
 
" 	Transportation -- world merchant shipping including super­
tankers, deep water ports and offshore ports
 
" 	Energy development -- offshore exploration and exploitation
 
of gas and oil, nuclear/electrical power plant siting and
 
cooling
 
The increasing use of the oceans raises questions concerning the
 
biological, chemical, ecological, physical, social and aesthetic impacts
 
of these activities. 
 5 
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Dimensions of the Problem:
 
The significance of the oceans is not limited to the dominant role they
 
play in the world's environment -- the oceans cover over 70% of the earth's
 
surface. Over 60% of the nation's population resides in coastal areas. In
 
addition, over 99% of the U.S. trade (by weight) is dependent upon marine
 
transportation. The oceans play a substantial role in the global food chain.
 
While on the global scale fish provide only a small percentage of world
 
caloric intake Cor about 40 pounds annual per capita consumption), the
 
consumption of fish varies significantly from country to country; hence, so
 
does its importance. Fish provide 20% of the global animal protein. In
 
Japan, fish are consumed at almost twice the rate of the world average and
 
provide one and a half times the protein provided by agriculture. The
 
importance of fish is not limited to human consumption; in fact, one third
 
'
2
 
of the world fish catch is used as animal feed.
1

Furthermore, the oceans play a substantial role in the climate formulation 
of the planet. It is the interactioh of the oceanid eE6system with the 
atmospheric and stratospheric dynamics that essentially determines climate 
3
 
and weather patterns.
 
Viability of the oceans, then, is clearly essential to the commercial
 
vitality of the-world as well as to the global food chain. Each of the
 
uses of the ocean will be explored below.
 
IPaul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment,
 
133
(W. H. Freeman and Co.: San Frahcisco) 1972, p. .
 
2Lester R. Brown, By Bread Alone (Praeger: New York) 1974, p.147-149.
 
3National Academy of Sciences, The Ocean's Role in Climate Prediction
 
(National Academy of Sciences: Washington, D. C.) 1974.
 
Transportation: The increasing reliance upon-the oceans for bulk
 
transportation is putting severe pressures on the world merchant marine
 
system: the world merchant vessel fleet has been increasing at 2500
 
vessels a year, each one at ever increasing tonnage and the total fleet
 
size is expected to continue to increase 15% annually4(see Figure 1).
 
The volume of trade carried by ship is enormous as well; imports and
 
exports of the U.S., carried by ship,amounted to 58i million short tons in
 
1972, representing an increase of 27% since 1965 and equaling over 99% (by
 
weighty of total U.S. trade,
 
Not only have the number of vessels and the volume of waterborne
 
freight increased but the individual ocean vessels have been increasing in
 
size with a concomitant increased risk associated with their use. As a
 
consequence'of economies of scale, the supertanker (greater than i00,600
 
dead weight tons) is the most efficient way to carry oil. The oil
 
shortages have provided an impetus for construction of ever larger super­
tankers; currently enough construction is underway to double the world's
 
tanker fleet capacity within the next few years. The recent growth in
 
supertankers is shown in Figure 2. The bulk of the supertanker construction
 
is in the 200-400,000 dead weight ton class, but even one million dead
 
weight ton ships have been proposed. By 1983, over 5% of the world fleet
 
is expected to be of "supertanker size," that is, in excess of 100,000
 
6
 
dead weight tons.
 
4Frost and Sullivan, Commercial Navigation and Air Traffic Control Market,
 
New York: February 1974.
 
5
"The Oil Push Sets Off a Supertanker Boom," Business Week'(July 27, 1974),
 
6p.62-66.Frost and Sullivan, op. . 
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FIGURE 2 
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Much of the enormous effort in supertanker construction is a result of
 
the recognized inequitable distribution of world petroleum supplies and the
 
need to redistribute these supplies. However, because of the economies of
 
scale that accrue from these huge ships, it is likely that the pressure to
 
build increasingly large supertankers will continue. Economies of scale in
 
oil transport are such that even allowing for terminal and transshipment
 
costs, an increase in tanker size from 65,000 tons to 325,000 could reduce
 
the overall transportation cost of Persian Gulf oil by 25%.
7
 
However, there is recent evidence to suggest that shipbuilders
 
vastly overestimated the capacity that would be required. Worldwide tanker
 
operations are so seriously'depressed by the reduction in the worldwide
 
flow of oil that foreign shipyards are receiving massive cancellations of
 
orders. Until the global energy/food situation stabilizes, it is thought
 
that theshipbuilding will be in a state of flux.
8
 
The growth in world merchant shipping has indeed been enormous, but
 
the U.S. has lagged behind international growth. The U.S. merchant fleet
 
carries only 5% of our waterborne trade, down from 40% in 1950. While the
 
U.S. presence in merchant shipping has decreased (total tonnage of U.S.
 
merchant ships has declined to 14,818,000 tons, a decrease of 40% since
 
1960); world merchant vessel tonnage has been increasing at 7-10%
 
annually to a total world tonnage of 289,532,000. In 1950 the U.S. had
 
33% of world tonnage but by 1960 this share had declined to 19%, and by
 
1973 it was barely 5%.
9
 
7Henry S. Marcus, "The U. S. Superport Controversy," Technology Review
 
(March/April) 1973, p.49.
 
8
"Shipbuilders Signal for Federal Help," Business Week (Match 24, 1975),
 
p.36-37. 

9U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974.
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The large number of vessels represent ever increasing safety problems.
 
On a worldwide basis over three ships are lost or broken up daiZy; and if
 
this rate of loss continues at the rate of increase of the last decade, it
 
could reach 6 ships-daily (2,350 annually by the year 2000).i0 Slightly
 
over 75% of the collisions occur in harbors, and the largest cause of oil
 
spillages (by volume spilled) is from collision and grounding of tankers.l
1
 
While the environmental consequences of oil spills are discussed later,
 
suffice it to say that aesthetically, ecologically, and commercially the
 
damage is severe.
 
It is likely that oil spills resulting from collisions will increase
 
-- as both numbers of vessels and the individual size of vessels increase.
 
Major tanker accidents currently cause an average daily spill of 384 barrels
 
of oil. World crude oil production is expected to double from the 1970
 
level of about 14 to 28 billion barrelsand transportation of crude oil will
 
increase from 9 billion to 19 billion barrels by 1980. Should collisions
 
and spills continue to occur at their present rate, oil pollution of the
 
12
 
could reach 70 million barrels annually.
oceans 

Accommodating a fleet of supertankers will require specifically equipped
 
harbors -- superports. Without domestic superports petroleum will be shipped
 
to neighobring superport facilities in the Maritime Provinces of Canada or
 
the Caribbean and from there shipped by regular tanker to the coastal U.S.
 
As a result, the U.S. would lose the advantage of economies of scale of
 
supertankers and would be paying 25% more for Persian Gulf petroleum than
 
countries with superport facilities. This could have a far-reaching economic
 
impact for those industries dependent upon foreign sources of raw materials
 
10United Aircraft Research Laboratories, U.S. Ocean Shipping Technology
 
Forecast and Assessment: Final Report, Vol.IV: State of Society and
 
Industry (prepared under Contract 3-36204 to U.S. Department of Commerce,
 
Maritime Administration) July 1974, Figure IV, p.87.
 
11 U. S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Polluting Incidents In and Around U.S./
 
Waters, 1970-19 71. -

Pes
12Don E. Kash, etal, Energy Under the Oceans, (University of Oklahoma Press:
 
Norman) 1973. 

and could render them internationally non-competitive. It might even force
 
the relocation of individual industries (such as oil refineries) to those
 
areas where superports are availaBle.
 
Despite the economies oX scale to be achieved through the construction
 
of superports, there are four-major obstacles to the development of super­
tanker capacity in the U.S,
 
" 	One is the risk of collisions or groundings in congested
 
harbors: 80% of the durrent tanker collisions occur as
 
the'ships are entering or leaving the harbor. This fact
 
presents a fundamental barrier to supertankers and gives
 
substantial cause for- local opposition.
 
* 	A second problem is the environmental concern for damage
 
resulting from oil spills. As the earlier discussions
 
indicated, this is clearly a legitimate concern. The
 
Coast Guard has calculated that the currents costs of
 
annual oil spills from tanker collisions are about $40
 
million.1 4
 
* 	A third obstacle is the inadequacy of existing storage
 
and transfer facilities for handling large bulk cargo
 
carriers,
 
* 	A final obstacle is the shortage and increasing cost of
 
waterfront land necessary for expanding terminal-capacity.
 
In addition there is the environmental damage that would result from
 
the actual construction of the superports. First, it is not at'all clear
 
that it is technically or economically feasible to dredge many of the
 
existing harbors 30 or 40 feet below their'present bottom because of under­
lying rock, harbor and river tunnels, and silt and sedimentation problems.15
 
Assuming the channels could be dredged, what would be done with the dredging
 
spoils? Ecologists are concerned that dumping such spoils may be creating
 
13As noted by Henry Marcus, op'cit.
 
14	 bid

.
 
ibid.
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"dead" areas of the seas. Such damage to tidal areas, marsh lands, etc.,
 
could have irreversible impact on the breeding and feeding grounds of fish
 
and wildlife. Dredging in estuaries could change the salinity of the waters
 
by affecting the flows of water in and out of the region. This could change
 
the entire ecology of the region and seriously damage the commercial shellfish
 
industry.
 
Because of these problems, the current planning for superports
 
is to build offshore deep water terminals that would be constructed
 
outside the 3-mile limit. Goods would then be transported to shore via
 
pipeline (for petroleum products) or by smaller ship (for bulk cargo).
 
Authorized by the Deep Water Port Act of 1974, later this spring (1975)
 
the Department of Transportation will begin processing applications for
 
licenses to build offshore crude oil superports. The most likely first
 
superport efforts will be off Freeport, Texas and in the Gulf of Mexico
 
off Lafourd Parrish, Louisiana. Because of environmental opposition
 
and funding difficulties,plans to build offshore terminals on the East
 
1 6
 
Coast are considerably less well developed.

Waste Disposai: The oceans have traditionally been viewed as
 
suitable areas for waste disposal , and presently domestic waste material is trans­
ported from U.S. coastal ports aboard barges or ships-for disposal at
 
sea. The oceans are able to accept substantial amounts of wastes and still
 
cleanse and regenerate themselves. However, the ability of the oceans to
 
accept these wastes without environmental harm is not infinite; and its
 
capacity is currently being exceeded at the same time that the ocean
 
16,U. S. Superport Plans Advancing," Chemical and Engineering News,
 
January 27, 1975, p.10-11 .
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-disposal of wastes is expected to increase substantially. These wastes
 
are largely composed of dredge spoil, solid waste, incinerator reqidue,
 
garbage, sewage sludge, chemical wastes, discarded military equipment
 
and munitions, excavation debris and industrial, municipal and agri­
eul-tura-l-wastes. The chart below summarizes the waste disposal problem.
 
SUMMARY OF TYPE AND AMOUNT OF WASTES DISPOSED OF
 
IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS FOR THE YEAR 197317
 
Pacific 

Coast 

Waste Annual 

Type Tonnage 

Dredging 8,320,000 

spoils
 
Industrial
 
wastes
 
Bulk 981,000 

Cont. 300 

Refuse 26,000 

garbage
 
Solid waste 

Sewage 

sludge 

Miscellaneous 200 

Construction 

debris 

Explosives 

Total 9;327;500 

Atlantic 

Coast 

Annual 

Tonnage 

30,880,000 

3,011,000 

2,200 

4,447,000 

574,000 

15,200 

38,959,400 

Gulf 

Coast 

Annual 

Tonnage 

13,000,000 

690,000 

6,000 

13,696,000 

Percent
 
Total of Total
 
Annual Annual
 
Tonnage Tonnage
 
52,200,000 84
 
4,682,000 8
 
8,500
 
26,000
 
240
 
5,429,400
 
4,447,000 7
 
200
 
1,161,000
 
574,000 1
 
15,200
 
61,982,900 100
 
1 7U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, Report to the Congress on Ocean Dumping and Other Man­
3nduced Changes to Ecosystems, October 1972 through December 1973.
 
(Submitted in compliance with Title II of the Marine Protection
 
Research and Sanctuaries, Act of 1972), March 1974.
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Most ocean disposal of wastes that has occurred was because
 
of significant cost differentials. In most cases, ocean dumping of solid
 
waste, sewage sludge and dredge spoils was significantly cheaper than
 
alternative land based systems. Since collection of the 1973 figure for
 
waste disposals in oceans, much of the industrial ocean dumping has been suspended
 
through both regulation and issuance of time limited ocean dumping permits.
 
Dredge spoils consist of the materials dredged to improve and maintain
 
navigation channels and represents the largest category of ocean-dumped
 
material. The Council of Environmental Quality has estimated that existing
 
pollution abatement programs will be sufficient to curtail some sources of
 
ocean-dumped materials, but the expansion of marine transportation and the
 
requirements of ever larger shipping channels suggest that dredge spoils
 
(largely sand, silt, and waste sludges) will become an increasingly
 
severe problem.18 The CEQ also estimated that up to one third of these
 
dredge spoils were highly polluted from industrial and municipal wastes
 
deposited on the bottom and that such spoils may be a serious source of ocean 
19
 
pollution.
 
Industrial wastes, the second largest category of wastes, include acid
 
wastes, refinery wastes, pesticides, paper mill wastes and other industrial
 
wastes. The Environmental Protection Agency monitoring data suggests that
 
this source of ocean dumping is decreasing, largely due to implementation of
 
technological improvements) increasingly stringent pollution regulations
 
and the ocean dumping permit program. However, permits are presently issued for
 
18Council on Environmental Quality, Ocean Dumping A National Policy,
 
(U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.), October 1970,
 
p.1b.
 
19Ibid. 
 4 
­
- 12 ­
waste dumping even though the dumping will exceed the criteria for public
 
health simply because there is-no feasible alternative for disposal.2 0 In
 
1968, New York City alone accounted for over 57% of the industrial waste
 
21 
disposed into the oceans, However, since then regulatory restrictions 
- 22 
have forced 40 dumpers to cease dumping. Pollution from industrial wastes 
is largely controllable Calthough not preventable) through regulatory 
restrictions and technology improvement. 
Sewage sludge, the third largest category of waste dumping, appears to 
be largely the product of the New York Metropolitan area, as most other parts 
of the country dispose of the sewage sludge on land. This source of pollution 
is expected to increase as greater levels of sewage sludge will be produced by 
the higher levels of waste water treatment required under new stringent 
pollution laws. 
Other wastes which are disposed of at sea (solid waste, military wastes, 
construction and demolition debris and radioactive wastes) represent minor 
components of the problem -- about 1% by weight of the total discharge. The 
problem for the future revolves around dredge spoils, sewage sludge and 
industrial wastes. 
Marine pollution from ocean dumping has seriously endangered the 
environment and sporadically posed severe threats to the environment. 
Shellfish have been found with high concentrations of hepatitis and polio 
virus. Pollution of the marine environment through toxicity, oxygen 
depletion, biostimulation and habitat changes can seriously affect marine 
life. For instance, copper residues have caused fish kills similar to those 
caused by pesticides, as depicted in Figure 3, 
2 0Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental
 
Quality - 1974, p. 149-150. '(hereafter: Environmental Quality - 1974).
 
2U. S. Department of Commerce, NOAA,op.eit."
 
2Environmental Protection Agency, Annual Report of the Administration of
 
the Ocean Pumping Permit Program, August 1973.
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FIGURE 3 
FISH KILLS RESULTING FROM PESTICIDES 
Average Kill of 
Number of Total Kill Incidents Reporting 
Year Reports Reported Kill Totals 
1963 60 401,415 10,849
 
V3 191,167 2,583 
1965 74 770,557 12,039 
1966 51 217,406 4,941 
1967 43 329,130 7,654 
1968 51 325,194 7,74Z 
Source: Wall Street Journal, (May 7, 1973) p.22 .
 
To date, human impacts upon the ocean have largely been economic and
 
aesthetic with fortunately few public health crises. Occasional viral hepatiti,
 
outbreaks have been traced to consumption of contaminated raw shellfish, and
 
significant economic losses have been incurred from ocean dumping. It has
 
been estimated that the potential U.S. shellfish catch in 1969 was $320
 
million of which only $257 million was realized due to pollution losses.23
 
Despite the lack of direct human~impact, the reports of fish kills that
 
are at least indirectly attributable to pollution are substantial as shown
 
in Figure 4.
 
23This discussion is drawn largely from Council on Environmental Quality,
 
Ocean Dumping: A National Policy, op.cit.
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FIGURE 4 
POLLUTION CAUSED FISH KILL
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Resource Exploitation (Excluding Energy): This use of the oceans
 
revolves largely around fishing and mining of ocean mineral deposits.
 
While fish provide only a small percentage of world caloric intake, their
 
contribution is very high in some countries and extremely important in
 
providing the feed stock for agricultural animals. The issues associated
 
with ocean fishing are largely the potential impact of over fishing and
 
the international conflict that is generated by lack of agreement over
 
these global resources. Here we will confine ourselves to the environmental
 
questions.
 
After two decades of growth in the world fish catch to a 70 million
 
24
 
ton annual yield, the yield has declined since 1970, as shown in Figure 5
 
FIGURE 5
 
WORLD FISH CATCH, 1950-73
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24Lester Brown, op.cit., p.149-150.
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There is serious controversy concerning the possibility of substantially
 
increasing the ocean fish yield. The dramatic growth of the 1950-1970
 
period was largely due to capital investment and technological advance­
ments. The hugh productivity improvements so gained are unlikely to be
 
repeated. Moreover, there is some controversy over this increase in fish production
 
over the two decades. Ehrlich suggests that it may be due in part to 
more accurate and complete reporting of existing fish catch rather than 
from actual increases in yield.25 
Estimates of the additional fish yields that the oceans could provide
 
vary significantly. Recent investigations of the fish producing capabilities
 
of the oceans reveal that the open seas (90% of the oceans) are essentially
 
a "biological desert," producing a negligible fraction of the world fish
 
catch at present with little or no potential for yielding more in the
 
future.26 Estimates of the productivity of the upswells and coastal
 
regions vary, however. The Woods Hole Oceanographic Laboratory has
 
estimated that the amount of fish available for sustained harvesting (that
 
is, leaving an adequate reproductive population sufficient to sustain the
 
species and continued harvesting) is approximately 100 million metric tons; 27
 
the F.A.0. suggests that.upper limit may be 110 million tons; 28 and still
 
another estimate suggests that the upper limit is 200 million tons.29 To
 
25
 
Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit

26John H. Ryther, "Photosynthesis and Fish Production in the Sea," Science
 
(Vol. 166, pp.72-76) 1969.
 
27Ibid.
 
28J. A. Gulland, The Fish Resources of the Oceans (United Nations Food and
 
Agricultural Organization: 1971).
 
29George A. Doumani, Science, Technology and American Diplomacy; Exploiting
 
the Resources of the Seabed, Prepared for the Subcommittee on National
 
Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign
 
Affairs U. S. House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research
 
Service (July 1971).
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increase the yield by several tens of tons appears to be possible through
 
exploitation of current species, productivity improvements and improved
 
fish resource management. However, to substantially increase the production
 
beyond this level does not seem possible. Ehrlich points out that "to surpass
 
the potential annual fish production of 100-150 million metric tons would
 
require moving down the food chain from the big fish ordinarily found in
 
fish markets to the harvesting of plankton. All signs at the moment
 
indicate that this will not be feasible or profitable in the foreseeable
 
future, if ever. More calories of fuel and human energy would be spent on
 
harvesting the plankton than could be gained, the expenditure of money
 
would be colossal in relation to yield, and the product would require
 
considerable processing to be made palatable as human food.'
30
 
It is generally agreed that overfishing of particular regions and/or
 
of particular species has become a global problem. Many of the top "table
 
fish" are below the sustainable harvest limit; that is, their reproductive
 
capacity cannot maintain even the present level of catch over time.
31
 
Unfortunately, at the present time overfishing is not generally identified
 
until the catch declines for a sustained period of time. The issue of
 
overfishing may be exceedingly complex -- witness the problems associated
 
with the failure of the Peruvian anchovy crop. The Peruvian anchovies
 
were largely used as high protein feed for livestock production, supplying
 
poultry feed for the industrialized world. In the late sixties (1967 ­
1971) the anchovy beds were fished in excess of the estimated maximum
 
30Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op.cit., p.125-127.
 
3
'Brown, op.cit., p.150.
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sustainable yield, resulting in a collapse of the harvest in 1972 - 1973.32
 
Intervention of the Peruvian government in the form of nationalization and
 
imposed management of fishing levels has tirned the harvest around, although
 
it is not yet up to its previous yields. 33 This collapse greatly exacerbated
 
both the international .and domestic food situation. At the same time the
 
agricultural industry was experiencing fish meal shortages, to substitute
 
animal feed; grain meals were also in short supply because of harvest
 
failures. This contributed substantially to the inflationary forces upon
 
U.S.. consumer food prices.
 
Any sustained domestic or international program of improved fish
 
management cannot take place without adequate pollution abatement and
 
regulation. Contamination of the world fisheries through ocean
 
dumping, transportation and offshore development are an integral part of
 
the fishery management problems and can only be effectively implemented
 
through some sort of international agreement.
 
Exploitation of the ocean's mineral deposits is at an early,
 
exploratory stage. Commercial mining of ocean floor manganese modules
 
is not expected before 1979 or 1980.34 Estimates of the market value which
 
the oceans' riches possess range up to $3 billion. Deposits in the Pacific
 
Ocean are expected to yield 1.3 times the world's land reserves of copper,
 
13 times the land reserves of nickel and 10 times the land reserves of
 
32 Some climatologists believe that this failure was actually due to 
changes in water/air temperatures that occurred as part of the global 
climatic adjustments of the past several decades. 
33Lester Brown, op.cit.. 
34
"Ocean Mining Faces Environmental Hurdle," Chemical and Engineering News, 
(September 30, 1974), p.5. FM 
/ a­
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manganese. One study has estimated that the continental shelves of the
 
world's oceans contain a world supply of phosphorite sufficient to last
 
36
 
1000 years at the 1965 rate of 
consumption.
 
Technically feasible and economically realistic, ocean mining
 
Further, the environmental impact
technologies are not yet operational. 

of these systems is not well understood. Adequate investigation of the
 
long term environmental impacts is just beginning.
 
While the environmental impacts of ocean mining are not fully known
 
some of the potential problems can be identified. Involved in most schemes
 
of ocean mining is the scooping up of large amounts of material and water
 
from the bottom of the oceans and bringing it up to the surface vessel for
 
The dumping of this obvious waste material back into the
preliminary sorting. 

ocean can have profound environmental effects. Many parts of the
 
ocean depths have lain essentially undisturbed for centuries if not
 
millenia. Intermingling the soil and plankton from the lower depths, at their
 
extremely cold temperatures with the volatile sub-surface marine environment
 
could have untold environmental consequences. Any processing of the
 
material at sea could again have substantial environmental consequences.
 
Finally, ocean mining is likely to cause severe land based environmental
 
problems as well. Problems of transporting large amounts of ocean bottom
 
"gunk," disposal of the wastes(including large amounts of mineral tailings),
 
air and water pollution from the processing itself, and site degradation
 
The lack of insight into
from the processing center are but a few. 

35
"Tapping the Lode on the Ocean Floor," Business Week (October 10, 1974).
 
3 6 
°Donmani, op.cit.t 
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potential environmental impacts could retard commercial exploitation of
 
the seas if regulations are superimposed upon commercial mining equipment
 
manufacturers requiring retrofit.
 
Energy Development: Exploitation of the oceans for outer continental
 
shelf supplies of oil and gas and offshore siting of nuclear and electrical
 
power plants is likely to play a fundamental role in the worlds energy
 
policies. It has been estimated that assuming maximum development of oil
 
and gas, approximately 20% of oil per day and 30% of gas per year will come
 
from offshore sources by 1985.
3 7
 
The same study concludes that the only feasible alternative to
 
increasing reliance upon the outer continental shelf is to increase oil
 
and gas imports. Other studies indicate that total worldwide oil production
 
could increase to 8,395 million barrels annually or 2.5 times the 1971
 
38
 
production level.

The global needs for petroleum are likely to come in conflict with
 
environmental concerns. The mass media concern with oil spills and the
 
-publicity of the Union Oil Company blowout off Santa Barbara have created
 
intense opposition for offshore development. There is no question that
 
further exploitation of offshore oil and gas sources will increase oil
 
contamination of the oceans. In 1969-1970 offshore gas and oil operations
 
accounted for about 4% (1.4 million barrels) of total direct oil
 
pollution, a somewhat misleading figure because of the absence of abnormal
 
discharges and accidents. 39 Major blowouts can drastically perturb this
 
37Don E. Kash, op.cit., p.7-10.
 
38L. C. Weeks, "World Offshore Petroleum Resources," American Association
 
of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin (49: 1680-1693), 1965.
 
59Kash op.cit, p.275-277. 
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figure. The Union Oil blowout generated 18,5000 to 780,000 barrels, a
 
blowout in the Persian Gulf in 1971, 200,000 barrels. 40 It is possible
 
that should worldwide offshore production lie as high as 12.8 billion
 
barrels by 1980 (as some expect) and offshore pollution continues at the
 
same rate as 1969-1970, then offshore production could generate four
 
41
 
million barrels of oil pollution annually.

The problem is that little is known about the impact of oil
 
discharges into the oceans. It is thought that the greatest areas of
 
concern are the estuaries and coastal embayments where dispersion is
 
restricted and where many species undergo early development and may be
 
especially vulnerable.4 2 Environmental impacts, of course, will occur
 
besides those associated with petroleum spills. Construction itself
 
will have impacts, as well as pipelines, transportation, storage and
 
refinery operations.
 
In fact, one study concluded that far greater concern to marine
 
life and ecosystem stability was occasioned by the indirect effects of
 
the petroleum industry effects than by oil spills themselves.4 3 The
 
same study questioned the food chain argument; that is, that petroleum
 
hydrocarbons become magnified in concentration as they progressively move
 
up the food chain. The evidence is strongest that direct uptake from
 
the water of sediments is more important than the food chainS4 This is
 
not to minimize the effect petroleum has. Polycyclic aromatic hydro­
carbons are carcinogenic and are known to be present in oils (albeit,
 
Ibid.
 
4
'Kash, op.cit., p.297
 
4 2Report to the Congress on Ocean Dumping and Other Man-Induced Changes
 
to Ocean Ecosystems, op.cit., p.57-58.
 
4 3National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environment,
 
(Workshop 6n the Inputs, Fates and the Effects of Petroleum in the
 
Marine Environment held under the auspices of the Ocean Affairs Board,
 
Commission on Natural Resources, National Research Council),
 
4 4Washington, D.C.: 1975, p.89.
 
Ibid., p.67.
 
4 0
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they are also present in the smoke of cigarettes, burning refiase and motor
 
vehicle operations). However, the National Academy of Sciences points out
 
that knowledge of the properties of all the constituents of petroleum is
 
not complete; therefore, there may be other dangerous materials present in
 
45
 
petroleum that have not been identified.

They conclude: "Conclusions regarding the effects of oil in the
 
marine environment on human health are based on limited information. From
 
our interpretations of this information, modest concern rather than alarm
 
4 6
 
appears to be justified."

In addition to accidental spills from collisions, groundings and
 
blowouts, it is important to note that there is naturally occurring
 
seepage of petroleum into the marine environment. While only a very few
 
naturally occurring oil seeps are known and located, it is very likely
 
that more will be found. In order to determine the relative role of
 
manis activities in the hydrocarbon load of the oceans, it is necessary
 
to quantify this seepage.
 
One estimate of such seepage suggests it is about 0.6 x 106 metric
 
tons per year (or at most 60% of the total annual tonnage of spills
 
caused by tanker collisions as estimated by the U.S. Coast Guard). Of
 
this total, at least 40% is generated by the Pacific Ocean.
4 7
 
Offshore location of power plants is currently contemplated as a
 
means of providing adequate supplies of condenser water and avoids much
 
of the local opposition to power plant installation.
 
Nuclear power plants can also be located in estuarial areas to take
 
advantage of the easy availability of cooling water. Of the presently
 
4 51bid., p.97.
 
46Ibid., p.99.
 
47R. D. Wilson, etal, "Natural Marine Oil Seepage." Science (V. 184,
 
N. 4139), May 24, 1974 (p.857+).
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installed nuclear power plants over 30% rely on saline or brackish water
 
for cooling.
 
Present offshore designs would include a plant with a massive 30-60
 
foot protective breakwater 3 miles offshore with transmission lines buried
 
in the seafloor. Obviously, the environmental impacts of such schemes are
 
formidable. Discharge of heat into the oceans may be severe enough to
 
kill fish. Accidental discharge of radioactive compounds could have untold
 
impact. Construction of the site itself could be damaging. Many of
 
these schemes must await further analysis.
 
Some Potential Actions:
 
As with the other environmental issues, the positive actions
 
largely fall into three areas:
 
" 	Regulatory - regulations, restrictions, legislated
 
incentives governing the uses of the oceans with
 
mandatory sanctions if isolated.
 
" 	TechnoZojical - implementation of or incentives to 
encourage development and implementation of advanced 
pollution abatement/control and waste disposal and 
treatment equipment.
 
* 	Cooperation -- integrated management and coordinated 
uses of the oceans on both a national and international 
scale. 
Protection of the oceans adjacent to the United States received 
substantial support by passage of the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 which prohibits disp6sal of radiological, chemical 
.and biological warfare agents and high level radioactive wastes into the 
oceans and regulates all other dumping through issuance of permits by EPA 
or U.S. Army Corp of Engineers. As stated pxevtonsly oceai 
disposal of waste has continued to increase. What other actions can be
zY77 
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taken? One, permits can be refused or cancelled for ocean dumping and
 
environmental degradation. To a large degree, where feasible alternatives
 
exist, this is already done. Industriaf entities are being prohibited
 
from dumping wastes in New York to the degree possible. Yet in many
 
locales there is no feasible economic or technological solution. In such
 
a case, the EPA required the City of Philadelphia to move its sludge
 
dump site 36 miles farther out into the Atlantic while an alternative
 
measure was being developed.48  In those cases where the EPA has tried to
 
mandate compliance with regulations, court resistance or local fears of
 
unemployment, industry moving and the like have effectively mooted the
 
program. This suggests the need for public education programs concerning
 
the environmental fragility of the ecosystem.
 
A most important positive action is the development of economically
 
feasible technological alternatives. Current restrictions on ocean
 
dumping are providing some incentive to do this, but more strinigent
 
legislation coupled with subsidized researdh, tax incentives and so on
 
could encouage implementation. There is an implicit tradeoff between
 
delaying stringent regulations on the grounds that there is no
 
technologically/economically feasible alternative. Prohibition of present
 
activities, or -more reasonably, continuation of present activities at
 
higher cost (e.g., fines and fees) suddenly provide incentives and renders
 
alternatives more economically competitive. Let us examine some of the
 
technological solutions being offered.
 
Sewage sludge is one of the greatest contributors to ocean pollution,
 
and 1970 cost estimates of land based sewage sludge disposal were
 
48Environmental Quality - 1974, op.cit., p.149. 
_ 752 
- 25 -­
considerably higher than ocean-based.4 9 However, most promising for the
 
use of digested sewage sludge is for land and strip mine reclamation
 
(current estimates of completely unclaimed stripped land reach 2 million
 
acres or 3300 square miles) or as a supplemental crop fertilizer.
 
Recognizing that sewage sludge is likely to increase both as a function
 
of population pressures as well as more stringent waste treatment require­
ments, this would be not only a "feasible" and environmentally protective
 
measure but would also contribute significantly to other issues discussed in
 
this document. Solid wastes could also contribute to land reclamation.
 
While little research has been done on the use of sewage sludge for
 
fertilizers, preliminary research By the Metropolitan Sanitation District
 
of Chicago suggests that it is odorless, safe and high in reauired nutrients.
 
Refinements and advancements in incineration techniques would assist
 
in disposal of many otherwise polluting wastes. Currently, incineration
 
techniques are more costly than disposal at 20 miles to sea; however
 
incineration is likely to be a long term alternative.
 
Of foremost importance is research on the seas itself. The inter­
action of man's actions with the physical system of the sea is not at
 
all well undpfrstood. The Council on Environmental Quality has stated that
 
"A critical need is an effective monitoring system to gather data on the
 
effects of dumping in the oceans, so that trends can be detected and actions
 
50
 
taken to prevent degradation.",

49 Ibid, p.150.
 
50T id.
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Finally, little can be done without an institutional forum for
 
international cooperation. While this is discussed in detail elsewhere,
 
suffice it to say that the United States is not alone in its abuse of the
 
oceans. The United States is only the precursor to other nations; all
 
industrialized nations will eventually experience similar waste disposal
 
pressures. The current Law of the Seas Conference could play a substantial
 
role in the future protection of the oceans.
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ISSUE: 	 DESTRUCTION OF THE RECREATIONAL,ASTETIC,AGRICULTURAL,WILDLIFE 
CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATIONAND RESIDENTIAL USES OF THE LAND 
AS A RESULT OF THE ABUSES OF THE MANUFACTURING,COMKERCIAL, 
EXTRACTIVECONSTRUCTIONAND TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 
The Issue:
 
Explicit concern over land use and abuse is a fairly rbcent one and
 
stems from the recognition of the negative impacts of unrestrained .and
 
unregulated economic, industrial, and population growth upon finite land
 
resources. This comes at a time when the demand for land for agri­
cultural, mineral extraction, residential groirth, and industrial and
 
power plant purposes is rising substantially. Only one quarter of the total
 
surface area of the earth is land, and of that a large portion is unin­
habitable. The present stresses upon the land include urbani-zation,urban 
sprawl and urban congestion; electrical, nuclear industrial park
 
siting requirements; -landdegradation through stripping surface minerals;
 
land degradation through disposal of radioactive wastes, sewage sludge,
 
solid waste and other industrial wastes; rising demands for agricultural
 
land; and the erosion and destruction of land through elimination of
 
protective coverings such as forests, grasslands, and wetlands. Despite
 
the large land mass of this country and the low national population density
 
over 70% of all Americans live in metropolitan areas, over half in the
 
suburbs alone.I (See Figure 1)
 
FIGURE 1
 
U.S. POPULATION, 1960 AND 1970
 
(inmillions) 1960 1970 Percent 
Change 
Total Metropolitan Area Population 120 139 17 
Central City Population 61 64 5 
Suburban Population 59 76 28 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Populationcand Housing: Z970, 
General Demographic Trends for MetropolitanAreas, Z960 to 1970, Final 
Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). p. 1-33 and p. 
15.
 
1Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental 
Quality - 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974) p. 3 
(hereafter: Environmental Quality - 1974) 
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Figure 2 shows the uses of land in 1959-1969. One can see that
 
the uses of land associated with urban areas and the.support of urban
 
areas have been increasing substantially. Simultaneously, the amount
 
of land allocated to agricultural purposes has decreased. At the same
 
time the Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that 7 million
 
acres of agricultural land may be converted to recreation and wildlife
 
areas, 5 million converted to public facilities, second home development
 
and waste control projects, and 3.5 million acres for highways, airports
 
and other transportation requirements by the year 2000.2
 
FIGURE 2
 
SELECTED USES OF U.S. LAND, 1959 AND 1969
 
(in millions of acres)
 
Special Uses
 
1959 1969 Change 
Urban areas 27.2 34.6 7.3 
Transportation areas 2 24.7 ­ 26.0 1.3 
Recreation and wildlife areas 3 61.5 81.4 19.9 
Public instal ations and 
facilities 27.5 27.4 -.1 
Farmsteads and farm roads 10.1 8.4 -1.7 
Total 151.0 177.8 26.8
 
lncludes urbanized areas as defined by the Bureau of the Census, and other
 
incorporated and unincorporated places of 1,000 or more population.
 
2Rural land in highway, road, and railroad rights-of-way, and airports.
 
3Federal and state parks and related recreation areas and Federal and state
 
wildlife refuges.
 
4Federal land used for national defense and atomic energy purposes and state
 
land in institutional sites and miscellaneous other uses.
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Major
Uses of Land in the United States: Smnary for L969, Agricultural Economics 
Report Number 247 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.)
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Facts (June 10, 1973) p.1 2
-
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In the broadest sense, the effective and efficient allocation of land
 
resources affects all other pollution and envirbnmental related issues.
 
Much of the pollution problems that have occurred regionally have done so
 
because of misallocation of the land resources. Many of the environmental
 
problems occur simply because the aarrying capacity of a given area of land
 
is exceeded; that is, the level of population(whether that be an industrial,
 
residential or commercial population)that a given area can sustain is
 
exceeded. Once this carrying capacity is exceeded the ability of the
 
environment to cleanse itself of pollutants is severely impeded. Therefore,
 
land use policies offer one of the most beneficial strategies fbf-ensuring
 
the long run viability of the global biosphere. The location of human 
activities and the density and concentration of these human activities on
 
the finite land resource may determine the environmental quality of the
 
planet.
 
While land abuse is clearly an international problem, this issue
 
largely deals with the land use and abuse in the United States. However,
 
the inability of the underdeveloped and less developed countries to ade­
quately protect their own land resources has placed greater demands on 
the United States land resources -- witness international demands for U.S. 
agricultural products. Like other resources, the allocation of valuable 
and nutrient rich land is highly inequitable. Just as some countries are 
energy rich and energy poor, others are land poor and land rich. The Udiited 
States has a larger proportion of arable land than many other countries; 
and hence, we can expect cohtinued international pressures upon-the-United 
States to contribute substantially to the world food supply. 
Dimensions of the Problem: 
Urbanization: Urbanization, population congestion, and population 
density.Are-major cdntributors to land abuse in the United States. Considet,
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for example, the unequal population density of the country. Over 73% of 
the population lives on about 1.5% of the land! On the island of 
Manhattan in New York City, population density exceeds 67,000 per square 
mile; Chicago has a population density one quarter of that. Figure 3 
shows the inequitable allocation of population in this country. 
The statistics are somewhat misleadin& however. 
While 13% of the nation's
 
land is designated as being within the confines of standard metro­
politan statistical areas (SMSA), and 10% of the SMSA's land is classified
 
as-"urban" (therefore only 1.3% of the national land would be called urban);
 
this clearly understates the problem associated with urbanization.3 One
 
of the major problems associated with urbanization is not population 
density in a given location and a given area of land per se but urban sprawl -­
"the hop, skit and jump" location of urban functions. The Environmental 
Protection Agency has estimated that 19.7 million acres may'be consumed
 
by urban sprawl by the year 2000, a land area that is approximately equi­
valent in size to the states of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts and
 
Rhode Island combined.4
 
3U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1974,
 
(Washington, D.C., 1974) (hereafter: Statistical Abstract, 1974). 
4Environmental Facts, op.cit., p.1-2. 
FIGURE 3 
POPULATION DENSITY - 1970
 
(Population per square mile in thousands)
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SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1974
 
(WASHINGTON, D.C.., 1974).
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The urbanization process shows no signs of abatement and the pressures
 
on urban land are increasing. From 1960 to 1970, the population in the
 
total metropolitan areas of the United States increased 17%, at the
 
same time,the population in suburbs increased 28%,while the population in the
 
central city only increased 5%.
5
 
As a result of this increase, 35 million acres of land are now in
 
urbanized areas; and from 1960-1970 over 2000 acres a day shifted from 
rural to urban use. Much of this development has taken place in an unco­
ordinated and scattered fashion aggravating the "hop, skip and jump" or 
6
urban sprawl problem in the country. While the problem of increased
 
urbanization is discussed in detail elsewhere, let us review some of the
 
land abuse problems associated with it.
 
A recent'study supported by the Council on Environmental Quality entitled
 
The Cost of Urban Sprawl investigated the comparative cost of low, medium,
 
and high density communities. They concluded that low density urban sprawl
 
communities traditionally made up of single family homes on quarter acre 
lots that "leap frog" the suburban area consumed more than twice as much 
land as the high density land communities. Low density communities also 
contribute to land abuse by increasing the proportion of land allocated to
 
vacant-improved and semi-improved uses -- at best, an inefficient use of land, 
at worst, a waste of land. Because this land is scattered between housing 
units, housing development and community developments, it is essentially
 
!U.S. Bureau of Census, Census and Population: 1970 - General Demographic 
Trends'for'Metropolitan'Areas, 1960-1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office) 19.71 
6U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Major Uses of Land in 
in the United States, Summary for 1969, AER 247 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO) 1973
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unusable. The inefficiency of this land use pattern is shown in Figure 4.7
 
FIGURE 4 
Community Land Use 
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The concern with urbanization, however is.. not merely the amount of 
land that is allocated to urban purposes that could be used for other
 
purposes; but the unique stress that high concentrations of population 
can place upon the -environment. The pattern of residential development 
known as urban sprawl actually increases air pollution because of the 
increasing requirements for automobiles and residential heating. The 
Costs of Urban Sprawl determined that high density planned communities 
generated about 45% Zess air pollution than the low density sprawl 
community (assuming the same population), as shown in Figure 5. The simple 
shift of housing density alone could result in reduction of air pollution
 
8
 
from automobiles from 20 to 30 percent.

7 Real Estate Research Corporation, The Costs of Sprawl: Executive Summary 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974)
 
8 TIid., p. 8 
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FIGURE 5 
Community Cost Analysis 
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The kind of urban architecture and urban form can also affect the way
 
pollutants are dispersed as well as the environmental chemistry of a region. As
 
is discussed elsewhere,the mean temperature of an urban area is 2-30 C
 
higher than its surrounding areas due to the high concentration of asphalt
 
and concrete which absorb heat more efficiently than vegetation. This
 
increased temperature in turn affects the local wind patterns which affect
 
the ability of an urban area to disperse high concentrations of air pollution.
 
Hence, the level of open spaces, trees, parks and recreational areas within
 
an urban area has a functional role other than mere aesthetics in its
 
contribution to the region's ability to cleanse itself of air pollutAnts.
 
Water pollution problems also vary with the kind of urban development
 
-that is permitted. The Costs of Urban Sprawl analyzed the types of water
 
pollution problems that are generated by alternative housing and density
 
communities. Figure 6 indicates that low density areas actually contribute
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higher levels of water pollution than high density areas (again, assufing 
the same population levels). This somewhat counterintuitive result is
 
largely the result of increased sediment pollution which occurs when large
 
amounts of land are disturbed.
 
FIGURE 6
 
Community Cost Analysis
 
Annual Water Pollution Generation
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Population densities per se can contribute untold environmental
 
pressures upon an area. Consider, for example, the impact of winter road
 
deicing programs in the United States. One-tenth of the world's salt
 
production is spread on U.S. roads each year, an amount equal to 12-15
 
million tons annually and an amount that has been doubling every five
 
years. While the impact of this high concentration of salt is not -learly
 
known, it is.known that in those areas with shallow soils and a dense
 
network of highways, the chlorine level in drinking water is increasing
 
rapidly and increasing at the same rate as the increase in salt usage.
 
Chlorine levels rose tenfold in some towns during the 1960's and are
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approaching the Public Health Service maximum acceptable level, 250
 
milligrams per liter. At least one town has had to close its wells,and
 
9
 
buy water from another source. The danger of this increased use of salt
 
is pollution of ground waters and public drinking water supplies.
 
Another study indicates that storm run-off in urban areas may be a
 
substantial source of pollution of urban watersheds through the concentra­
tion of heavy metals and heavy pollutants.. Comparing storm water run-off
 
with waste process by means of municipal sewage treatment plants, run-off
 
becomes the major source of pollution in most cities as soon as secondary
 
treatment (defined as 85% removal of BOD) of municipal wastes is achieved.
 
It will also be the major source of settleable solids, pathogens and bacteria,

'a
 
and a major contributor of such toxic pollutants as lead and mercury. The
 
study also found that raw storm water contained five times the level of
 
1i
 
pollution as treated sewage.
 
Siting Requirements: The second category of land use whick.may lead
 
to land abuse is the siting of electrical, nuclear and industrial parks.
 
It has been estimated in another section of this report that energy demands
 
are expected to increase'at about the rate of 3.6% per year from 1970-1980.12
 
It has further been estimated that electricity generation will account for
 
approximately 50% of the basic national energy utilization for the year 2000.13
 
The implications of this kind of energy growth on land use is quite
 
substantial. It has been estimated by the Environmental Protection Agency
 
that additional sites for 492 new power stations will be needed by 1990, some
 
9 Ian C.TL Nisbet, "Salt on the Earth," Technology Review, (May 1974) p. 6
 
1 0Environmental Quality 
- 1974, op. cit., p. 13
 
1 1
"Pollution from the Streets," Technology Review, (October/November 1974) p. 74
 
1 2See "Energy and Materials,"
 
1 3Fusion Power and Assessment of Ultimate Potential, Report AEC-WAHC 1239
 
(Washington, D.C. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission) February 1973
 
of which will require cooling ponds of 2,000 acres or more. At the same
 
time transmission line rights of way will require another two million acres
 
during the same period.14 In 1970 ,the Federal Power Commission estimated that
 
395 new power plant sites would be required by 1990, as shown in Figure 7
 
below.
 
FIGURE 7 
NEW POWER SITES 
Number 
Type 1971-80 1981-90 Total 
Conventional hydro
 40
(100 MW and above) 15 25 

Pumped storage hydro
 55
(300 MW and above) 20 35 

Fossil Steam
 140
(50 MW and above) 80 60 

Nuclear
 160
(500 MW and above) 70 90 
395
185 210
Total 

Source: Federal Power Commission,, 1970 National Power Survey 
The siting of power plants is complicated b a host of land use controversies. 
The siting must consider access, slope, drainage, weather protection, 
possibilities of floods and earthquakes. While economic considerations 
require "close in" locations to minimize transportation, transmission and 
water supply costs, environmental considerations force them further away. 
As future plants will be several times larger than present ones,
 
they will require more,land. The Office of Science and Technology estimated
 
the land required for a 3,000 MW power station of the future will range
 
between 100 and 1,200 acres, according to type. Coal-fueled plants require
 
land for ash disposal and coal storage. Sizable open areas around nuclear
 
14Environment Facts, op.cit.
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plants are advised for public safety. 	Gas and oil fired plants require
 
15
 
-- 100 to 350 acres.
the smallest sites 

Because of continuing environmental fears concerning the location of
 
nuclear power plants,it is quite likely that nuclear power plants will
 
have to be located much further away from population centers and will require
 
additional acreage as a buffer zone. This will create further land
 
demand both in terms of the acreage required for the individual nuclear power
 
plant and because of the additional acreage that will be required for
 
transmission and rights of way.
 
Another siting requirement which is likely to cause substantial
 
controversy is the siting of petroleum refineries and their pipelines.
 
The recent efforts of the Onassis empire to locate a refinery in the
 
heating oil scarce New England region is an example of the vehemence of
 
public opposition.
 
Strip Mining: A third and substantial stress on the land is degrada­
tion of the land through strip surface mining for different minerals.
 
As a result of mining for clay, coal, stone, sand and gravel, coal,
 
phosphate rock, iron ore and other minerals, it has been estimated that
 
16
 
over 3.1 million acres of land have been disturbed as shown in Figure 8.
 
The major source of this disturbed land is coal mining. In 1965, an
 
estimated 1.3 million acres of land in the U.S. had been disturbed by
 
strip mining. A sharp jump in new acreage disturbed by strip mining
 
occurred between 1969 and 1970. This increase (amounting to 25,000
 
acres) equalled the increase in the previous four years. Assuming the
 
accessibility of the mineral, economics have always dictated strip mining.
 
15 fMaterial Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow, Final Report of
 
the National Commission on Materials Policy, June 1973, p. 7-20.
 
16.

Environmental Quality, Appendix 8... >,
 
AL.
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FIGURE 8
 
LAND DISTRIBUTED BY STRIP AND SURFACE MINING IN THE UNITED 
STATES AS OF JAN. 1, 1965, BY COEIMODITY AND STATE (ACRES) 
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L. ,,.. 900 .0) 29,700 .. ..................... 50 30.750
 
403 ... 0) 28.200 12 .......... !00 1.700 34.8,2 
... tl1, ' 1.200 12.200 12.2J( 118.800 20 25,.!0t.............. '800 

36.400 ................... 1.100 900 40,300
W -ntw'ctts' 700 ........ 1,_01 

G.d.............. 7,13 25,200 ...................... 2,200 1.200 36,00 
1,600 115,403
.mnnestc1 I' 600 ..... ... 3,0) 41.600 3 67.700 

M ,.m,,' ;.,2 2.703 .0) 26.500 .- ............... ..... 30. . .... 29.630
 
S6.600 131.890 8.0) 3,300 ........................ 200 8.300 59,100
 
Mont ,na' ...... 1,500 10 1 !-.500 5,500 100 10 6,200 26,920 
N90skJ 900 ... ..... 4,300 !3700 ................................. . 28.900
 
Nvada 1 100 ............. 1,600 5.500 5.600. ......... 
 600 19.500 32,900 
tNiv Har.,hire ......... ............ 100 000 ................ 200 S 300
 
Ne J , 2rs, 1.400 ........... 2.000 !7600 ............... 1.000 12.00 32 803
 
40 .......... 100 4,600 6.453
 
New York ' 1,700 ........ 12,500 !2200 5 700 coo 97,705
 
New Mexwco 2 13 1.200 00 400 
1 10 6.000 1S 400 2.200 300 100 4.000 36,810Nort. Car, ia 5,800 
Noth'CkCta '200 27.700 2300 I WsI00 ...... . . ................. 12. 36,960
 
Ohio '10,200 2212.800 3 21,000 :.100.. ............ .4,000 ' C'0 276.700
 
.,5C. 23,500 ,. .. ......... . 1,400 27400
 
Oregon = 100 ............... .00 6.:00.10 1ioo0.30 ),10 
Pen.gI.ml .a 10.400 2302,400 124.400 i ±3800S.2 ' ......... . s800 1400 370.202 
Rhode isl.'.d I 
Oklahoma 
. 20 2 600. ..................................... 3,G20
 
so i cA,.,,n, 10,900 ...... .... 1,400 tC.400 200 8.!f 100 1,6o 32,7V
 
South Dahlia -2,000 1900 ........... 1 '000 ............................ 2 3.303 34.200
 
4,400 I5 400 .... 27,000 5,300 13.800 100,900
Tennc$.,re 2,700 29.300 
Ieas 1 6.800 2.900 21,900 112.300 .................... 9,600 2,S00 163.300
 
Utah1 600 200 2,200 10 500 P.000 r.510 
Ver.mont . ..................... .. t 30U 4 000. . ..............................- 00 6.700
 
V1,91Ha 131,100 129,800 '4,300 I .3,100 '600 '100 127,700 1-4.150 G0.800 -
Vrashingimn 500 100 1,300 5,700 400 ........ 20 80.) 8,820
 
Wpst Vrg~eia 2 303 192.000 2,800 300 ................... 100 . .. .. 195.500
 
Wic3r1sin 2 100. 9,000 !6 400 5 . 49 .. 5..
- 554 
niriJ '213,500 '1,000 1300 :,200 ... ".. "800 12300 ' 4,300 10,100W3 
Tots! 108.513 1,301,430 2f1,430 8 !3230 203,167 183.110 164,255 162.620 3,107,825 
I Ma obtained from Soi Conservat:on Service. U.S. DerartmCnt of Agr., utturo
 
2 Oea conpiled from repo: ts suvi.utted by the States on U.S. Oepartmiett Of ie Inter,cr form G-I 38SX.
 
•Ebtinato~ 
Source: "Surface Mining and Our Environl~nlt; A Silctal Report toth, raton". U.S. Departninit of the Interior. 
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As a rule, deep mining required three times as many workers to produce the
 
same tonnage as strip mines doand underground mining productivity has actually
 
17
fallen in recent years.
 One of the reasons for the economic advantages
 
of strip mining is that a larger proportion of the coal deposit can be
 
removed from the land by .that method. In underground mining about 50%
 
of the coal that is in situ can be extracted, while in surface mining this
 
is generally increased to 80-85%.1 8
 
Although the strip mined -acreages represent a small proportion of
 
the national acreage, the effects that they have upon the immediate and
 
adjacent areas of the mine itself are often quite dramatic and substantial.
 
The dominance of surface mining as an extractive technique is strong,and
 
is gaining in importance in the United States. About 50% of the coal and
 
more than 90% of all other minerals produced in the United States,with the
 
exception of petroleum and natural gas are extracted by surface mining
 
19
 
methods.
 
If, in fact, coal becomes the energy source of the'future as many
 
sugges, 
the impact upon land degradation could be substantial. It has
 
been estimated up to 92,000 additional acres of land could be destroyed
 
by coal strip mining by the year 2000. 20 This same study identified a sub­
stantial source of strippable coal reserves in the western states. 
In fact,
 
the estimated strippable reserves in the western states amount to over
 
17Edmund Faltermayer, "Its Back to the Pits for Coal's New Future," 
Fortune
 
(June 1974) p. 137
 
18National Academy of Sciences, Mineral Resources and the Environment (National
 
Academy of Sciences: Washington, D.C.) 1975, p. 193
 
1 9Material Needs in the Environment Today and Tomorrow, Op. Cit., p. 76
 
20National Academy of Sciences 
and National Academy of Engineering, Rehabili­
tation Potential of Western Coal Lands: A-Report to the Energy Policy

Project of the Ford Foundation, Ballinger, 1974
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26 billion short tons.2 1 The cost of a reclamation of this land is astro­
nomical: 925-2750 dollars per acre plus potential road rehabilitation costs
 
of $500-2000 per mile.
2 2
 
Of the four million acres surface mined in this country,about 45%
 
require no further treatment to prevent substantial environmental damage;
 
however, the remaining 55% require shaping, planting or drainage control.
 
Surface mining can result in serious erosion because of the lack of vege­
tation material to hold the soil during rain and wind. Strip mining coal
 
is a common source of sulfuric acid, and the pollution can adversely affect
 
23
 
stream life miles away,
 
The controversy and arguments of strip mining are not close to resolu­
tion - witness the current federal legislative battle. Like other environ­
mental protection controls the efforts to protect the land against the
 
ravages of strip mining are likely to run into increasing obstacles because
 
of the energy and material shortages that the country is experiencing.
 
Co'sts of rehabilitation and reclamation will be a further impediment to
 
effective action.
 
While coal mining bears the brunt of the attack against strip mining,
 
it must be remembered that coal mining accounts for but 40% of the total
 
land that is disturbed by strip mining. Hence, there are many other minerals
 
extraction processes which equally disturb the land.
 
Waste Disposal: Another major source of degradation of the land is
 
the disposal of waste materials including sewage sludge, radioactive wastes and
 
21Thbid., p. 27.
 
22Ibid
 9
. 

23 1bid 
.
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industrial and consumer solid wastes. 
As has been mentioned
 
previously, there are essentially only three methods of waste disposal
 
available: discharging it directly into the nearest body of water,
 
burning the waste, or burying it ih the nearest body-of land. It is
 
the disposal of such wastes on land that is our concern here. 
In the case
 
of solid waste, there is another technically feasible option: res~urce
 
recovery.
 
Disposal of solid wastes is a significant environmental management
 
problem. Each year in the United States-it is necessary to dispose of
 
55 billion cans, 26 billion bottles, 65 billion metal and plastic bottle
 
caps and more than 1/2 billion dollars worth of packaging materials.
 
The amount of urban solid wastes collected annually is approximately
 
two hundred million tons, and the per capita level of solid wastes in the
 
United States is nearly one ton annually.24 In addition, in 1971 industrial
 
activities generated over 140 million tons of solid waste: 
 scrap metal,
 
25
slag, ash, plastics, paper and rags. Figure 9 on the following page
 
shows the solid waste levels generated by selected industry.
 
Currently, the disposal of solid wastes is largely dictated by q'.
 
economics. Costs of incineration of solid wastes range from $10 to
 
per ton. Costs of sanitary land fill range between $3 and $13 per ton
 
but can be much higher in particular locations, especially where land
 
values are high or lack of suitable land fill sites necessitates substantial
 
transportation costs. Because these costs are continually rising, the economics
 
of resource recovery are becoming more attractive. Because of increasingly
 
severe material shortages, the value of recoverable waste materials is
 
24Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, People Resources, Environment (San Francisco,
 
California: W.H. Freeman and Co.) p. 159
 
25 Needs, Op. Cit., p. 4E-4 47
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FIGURE 9 
SOLID WASTE GENERATED 
Industry 

Food 

Meat 
Textile mill products 

Apparel and related products 

Wooden containers 

Sawmills 

Millwork 
Wooden furniture 

Paper 

Printing and publishing 

Chemicals 

Paints 

Asphalt roofing 
Rubber 
Tanning 
Glass 
Metal cans 
Fabricated metal products and 
machinery except electrical 
Electrical machinery 
Auto and aircraft 

Cotton ginning 

Demolition 

Stockyards (including auction) 

Supermarkets 

Total 

BY INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY 
Tons (Millions)2
 
19651 1975
 
5.3 7.0
 
.8 1.2 
.9 1.1
 
.3 .5
 
1.2 1.1 
32.8 11.5 
.3 .4
 
1.5 2.6
 
5.0 7.3
 
1.2 1.6 
1.3 2.4 
.2 .2 
.6 .8 
1.5 1-9 
.3 .3 
1.3 	 2.0 
.i .1 
3.0 4.4 
1.4 2.5
 
1.5 1.8
 
.8 .8,
 
19.1 22.1
 
.4 .4
 
10.2 13.2' 
91.0 87.2
 
Source: National Bureau of Standards.Repart 10595, April 1971
 
lEstmated 2Projected 
rising significantly. As a result, a number of resource recovery teth­
niques, especially those combining recycling of the heavy components
 
of the wastes with combustion of the light components to recover energy,
 
become economically competitive with traditional land fill and incineration
 
techniques. 6 
26Environmental Quality

- 1974, p. 131-132
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The major emphasis of current resource recovery techniques is to recover
 
the energy value of the material. Figure 10 shows the planned implementa­
-tion of energy recovery schemes.
 
Disposal of sewage sludge presents another land use problem. Most
 
sewage sludge is disposed of through land fill projects. This disposal
 
problem is likely to increase in the future for several reasons. One,
 
as higher levels of waste treatment are required under increasing stringent
 
pollution and control laws, the pollution of sewage sludge will increase as
 
well.
 
Secondly, obviously as population grows, so will sewage sludge.
 
Thirdly, irrespective of aggregate populationdensity in a region may
 
aggravate the sewage sludge problem. The ability of a waterway or water
 
body to effectively cleanse itself of the biological oxygen demand (the
 
pollution problem generated by sewage sludge) declines with population
 
growth; that is, the carrying capacity of a given water body is soon
 
reached. This requires that sewage be subjected to higher and higher
 
levels of treatment before the waste is discharged. One of the unusual
 
aspects of sewage control is the diseconomies of scale that result from
 
population growth. As the population increases the waste degrading
 
ability of the watershed decreaseS-and an increase in the degree of the
 
sewage and water treatment is required. In summary, the greater the
 
population in a given watershed, the higher theper capita cost of water
 
pollution and control and abatement are likely to be.27
 
With the exception of New York City, the bulk of the sewiage-dlige
 
in the country is either incinerated or used for land fill. While
 
27 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, Population, Resources,_Environment
 
(W. H. Freeman and Co.) 19M2.
 
FIGURE 10 
PROJECTED. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ENERGY RECOVERY SYSTEMS BY 1980 
TonsLocationyper 
y 
Description Location Tons per
da0y 
Description 
C) 
0 
)__ 
0 
0California 
San Diego County 
Connecticut 
Bridgeport 
DistrictofColumbla 
Illinois 
Chicago 
Chicago area ex-
cluding the City 
200 Pyrolysis; EPA is sponsoring project to demon-
strate the Garrett Research and Development 
system; oil produced wilL be accepted by San 
Diego Gasand Electric; project in engineering 
design phase, 
1,200 Solid waste as fuel; state-wide resource recoy-
ery authority is reviewing proposals, North-
east Utilities will accept the fuel. 
1,000 Solid wasteasfuel;D.C.. FairfaxCounty, Arling-
ton County. the City of Alexandria, and the 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Govern-
ments are studying the feasibility of asupple.
mental fuel system on a region-wide basis. 
Virginia ElectricPower Companyand Potomac 
Electric Power Company are cooperatng in 
the studies. 
2,000 Solid waste as fuel; construction started in 
early March, Commonwealth Edison will 
accept the 4uel. 
1 GC, - . - e-­ , oa -uburbs have an-
pcc..cc Co' mor%-aith Edison to deter-mine the feasibility of implementing sup-
MissouriSt. Louis 
New Jersey 
Essex County 
Hackensack-Mead-
owiands 
Union County-Mid-
diesex County 
New York 
Albany area 
8,000 
1,000 
2,000 
1,000 
500 
Solid waste as fuel; Union Electric Company
plans to implement, by mid-1977, asystem to 
handle the residential, commercial and 
selected Industrial waste from the entire 
metropolitan area; Union Electriowill process 
raw waste, recover magnetic metal, alumi­
num, and glass aswell as fuel. 
Solid waste as fuel; request for proposals be­
ing prepared; supplemental fuel to be ac­
cepted by Public Service Gas and Electric or 
other Industrial steam boilers. 
Solid waste as fuel; detailed proposals are cur. 
rently being reviewed; it is anticipated that
the fuel wil be accepted by Public Service 
Gas and Electric or industrial steam boilers. 
Solid waste as fuel: feasibiity of producing a 
supplemental fuel for Public Service Gas and 
Electric is being assessed. 
Solid waste as fuel; feasibility of producing 
supplemental fuel for Industrial steam 
boilers, state owned heating plant and munic­pal electric utility is being assessed. 
I 
IH 
Iowa 
Ames 
Maryland 
Baltimore 
MontgomeryCounty 
Massachusetts 
Braintree 
East Bridgew~ater 
Saugus (near Bos. 
ton) 
Lawrence 
plemental fuel systems 
200 Solid waste as fuel; construction to begin by 
June 1974; municipal electric utility will 
accept the fuel, 
1,000 Pyrolysis: EPA is sponsoring project to demon-
strate the Monsanto system: pyrolysis gas
will be combusted on-site to generate steam for sale to Baltimore Gas and Electric; plant 
will be operational Inearly 1975. 
1,200 Solid waste as fuel; County Is planning project 
with Potomac Electric Power Company co-
operation: feasibility study has been corn-
plated; County Couneil and County Executive 
have approved the plan. 
240 Water wall Incineration; panthas been operat-
ing since 1072; contract signed early 1974 
for sSleof steam toWeymouth ArtLeatherCo. 
1,200 Solid waste as fuel; pnvately financed process-
ng facility; Weyerhauser is accepting the fuel 
for its industrial steam boilers. 
1,200 Water walL incineration; plant under construc-
tion; steam product will be sold to GeneralElectric Co. for process steam. 
1,000 Solid waste as fuel; Lawrence will be the first 
Hempstead 
Monroe County 
New York City 
Westchester County 
Ohio 
Akron 
Cleveland 
1,000 
500 
2.000 
1.500 
1,000 
500 
Detailed proposals have been received for de­
sign andconstructon of cierbyd materials 
recovery syiteii.Solid waste as fuel; feasibility study to produce 
a supplemental fuel for Rochester Gas and 
Electric completed, request for proposalsbeing prepared.
Solid waste as fuel: City has completed feasi­
bility study of using waste as supplemental
fuel In Consolidated Edison's boilers; City 
writing request for proposals to design and 
construct supplemental fuel facility; City and 
Consolidated Edison plan contract to deter. 
mine feasibility of designing new steam­
electric boiler to burn 50 percent solid waste 
Feasibility study completed: County most 
interested in energy recovery for County­
owned Industrial park 
Water wall incineration; detailed engineering 
study is underway; steam product will be 
used for downtown heat and air conditioning 
and for BF. Goodrich process steam. City has received bids for a steam generation 
system; the super-hested steam will be usedfor electric generation by the municipal 
utility. 
implementation under the statewide solid 
wasto master plan approved in early 1974: 
master plpn calls for supplemental fuel pro­
duction for steam and steam electric boilers, 
and materials recovery. 
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improvements in incineration technologies hold promise for an effective
 
long run solution to,.the problem, in the short run incineration-of 
sewage sludge contributes substantially to air pollution. The use of
 
sewage sludge for land fill on the other hand offers an opportunity.for
 
reclamation of strip minied lands as well as a potential for nutrient rich
 
fertilizer. The metropolitan area of Chicago has investigated the costs
 
and benefits of using nutrient rich sewage sludge for fertilizer. Their
 
research has concluded that it is indeed cost effective to use it as
 
a nitrate/phosphate concentrate. The potential hazard of using sewage
 
sludge lies in the possible persistence of heavy metals, carcinogenic,
 
mutagenic or toxic materials which mhy be in the sewage sludge. As
 
industrial polluters are precluded throughthe Water Pollution,Control Act
 
from discharging toxic materials into water bodies, they often discharge
 
them instead into municipal sewage and water systems. Therefore,,instead of
 
dealing with the problem of persistent and toxic materials in a fresh
 
running water system, the toxic materials instead turn up in sewage sludge'
 
Agricultural Requirements: A fifth major issue with respect to land
 
use is the requirements for agricultural purposes. Apparently, less than
 
one-quarter of the total land in the United States is used for crop land.
 
4pproximately a third of the land is used for pasture, and range land.
 
These numbers are only expected to increase a small amount between now 
and the year 2020, 8 as .shown in Figure 11- on the next page. 
Contrary to the publicity, there is not much latitude in.the allocation
 
of the United States land for agricultural purposes. Figure 12 on the
 
next page shows the current crop land potential of the nation's atable land.
 
Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources, (Washington, D.C.:
 
1968). 

( 
28 
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FIGURE 11
 
PROJECTED USES OF U.S. LAND
 
.Z NON-AGRICULTURAL LAND 
- FOREST AND WOODLAND 
---- =- - LE PASTURE AND RANGE 
[ CROPLAND - IDLE AND FALLOW 
- USED FOR CROPSIlCROPLANDII 
1960 - 1980 2000 2020 
FIGURE 12
 
CROPLAND POTENTIAL
 
MARGINAL CROPLAND jSeD FOR cp
 
169 
& 
GOOD CROPLAND 
639 
-MAJOR WATER PROBLEM 
75 
LAND AREA, 2,274 MILLION ACRES 
Source: Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources,
 
(Washington, D.C.: 1968).
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Over 61% of the U.S. land (or 1391 million acres of land) is unsuitable
 
for cultivation. In addition, another 75 million acres have a major
 
water problem, either insufficient water or excess water. This land could
 
-he cultivated for agricultural purposes.with major reclamation efforts.
 
While less than 50% of the lands which are suited for crop lands are
 
currently so used, the remaining suitable crop land is used for pasture,
 
range, forests-or woodlands.29 Much--of this land goes for suppdtt of
 
animal crops,as well as for supplying an increasingly high demand for
 
wood products and urban purposes. It is the conclusion of the Water
 
Resources Council that these activities will severely limit the amount
 
of potential crop land which can actually be made available for culti­
vation.
 
The ability of the nation to turn non-crop land to crop land purposes
 
as the demand arises is likely to meet with severe obstacles. It is not
 
at all clear that the United States will have sufficient land to serve as
 
"the world's bread basket." The world food shortages -- not likely to
 
be a short lived phenomenon -- will undoubtedly generate further pressures 
for the United States to serve in this capacity because of its high level
 
of agricultural productivity. These kinds of pressures will of course
 
necessitate that more land be allocated to crop land. However, recent
 
research indicates that increases in U.S. agricultural productivity
 
through further uses of fertilizers, pesticides and herbidides may not,
 
in fact, be possible.
3 0
 
In fact because of the problems associated with pesticide persistence
 
and water pollution from agricultural run-off, it may even be necessary
 
Thid., 
p. 1-7
 
30National Academy of Sciences, Productive Agriculture and a Quality Eiviron­
ment, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences) 1974
 
29
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to reduce the present reliance upon fertilizer and pesticides given the
 
current state-of-the-art. This would, of course, increase further the
 
amount of land required for the same level of production. Even without
 
these additional pressures, Resources For The Future has estimated that
 
as many as 416 million acres will be required for crop land by the year
 
2000 versus 384 million acres presently so employed.
31
 
3 1Resources for theFuture, Resources in America's Future, Johns Hopkins
 
Press, p. 979-980.
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ISSUE: 	 ACCUMULATION OF POTENTIALLY HARIFU SUBSTANCES IN THE FOOD CHAIN
 
LEADING TO DISEASE AND GENETIC DEFECTS IN THE POPULATION
 
The 	Issue:
 
There is growing evidence that the American public is consuming, both
 
directly and indirectly, substances which may, over a period of time and in
 
differing concentrations, be toxic, carcinogenic or mutagenic. 1
 
These substances can enter the food chain in several ways: 
2
 
1. 	They can be present in food as a consequence of a
 
natural event, such as mold or chemicals naturally
 
occurring in plant tissues.
 
2. 	They can result from materials used in agricultural
 
production that have not been removed and remain
 
in the final product.
 
3. 	They can result from excessive use of additives
 
during food processing, perhaps accumulating
 
through different stages of the food preparation
 
process.
 
4. 	They can result from containers and packages, and
 
from accidents or negligence in various processes
 
directly or indirectly related to food production,
 
processing, and handling.
 
Toxics refer to any harmful material that may enter the food'chain.
 
The 	most obvious, and hence, prevalent, points of entry, are in the agricultural
 
process 	(i.e. pesticides, herbicides, biological agents, growth agents,
 
antibiotics and vaccines) and the industrial process (heavy metals such as
 
lead, mercury, cadmium, arsenic and nickel). Increasingly, there is
 
'The focus of this issue is on substances ingested with normal intake of
 
food. The subject of general environmentalfpollution and its effect
 
upon society is discussed in another section._
 
2Emil T. Chanlet, Environmental Protection (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973,
 
3 7 0
 p. .
 
!While the term "toxic" actually refers only to "poisons," the term will
 
be used here to refer to a general class of harmful substances whether
 
poisonous to the host who originally ingests the substance or not. For
 
instance, some substances may not be poisonous to the consumer, but may,
 
in fact, be mutagenic and poisonous to later generations (such is the
 
postulated effect of DDT) 	 _06
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evidence that substances added to foods to enhance flavor, retard spoilage,
 
improve color, consistency and other aesthetic qualities of the food,
 
may actually be harmful. Especially suspect are artificial sweeteners,
 
nitrate preservatives, fluorides, monosodium glutamate, and artificial
 
dyes. Even known beneficial substances, such as essential minerals and
 
vitamins, may be hazardous when ingested in high concentrations. Likewise
 
some drugs such as the hormone stilbestrol ("the morning after pill") and
 
other therapeutic hormones are known to cause cancer in humans.
 
Consumption of these materials has increased substantially in recent
 
years because of the industrialization of American agriculture, the increasing
 
industrialization of the preparation of foodstuffs, the reliance upon mass produced
 
convenience foods, and the tremendous number of new chemicals that have
 
been introduced since World War II. For example, a list of organic pesti­
cides commonly found in thediet of Americans is shown in Figure 1. Clearly,
 
each item may not prove to be harmful, especially since effects from the
 
dosage, the period of exposure, and even the diet, race, age, and other
 
characteristics vary with the individual involved. 4
 
However, the growing reliance on these materials suggests that close
 
monitoring and further research is required. According to Robert L. Rudd
 
of the University of California, in 1945 DDT, benezene, hexachloride, and
 
lead arsenic were the only insecticides used in any significant amount.
 
DDT production increased enormously after the World War II (in the United
 
States and around the world). Growing concern about its use ultimately
 
resulted in its curtailment, Yet overall use of pesticides in the Unites Sta"_s
 
more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, reaching a level of about one billion
 
pounds in 1970. 5 In fact, there currently are more than 32,000 pesticide
 
4Paul R. Erhlich and Anne H. Erhlich, Population, Resources, Environment
 
(San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1972), p. 163.
 
51bid, p.213. 
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Incidence Daily intake 
% range (mng) 
DDT 	 37.3-55.6 0.015-0.041 
DDE 31.1-50.6 0.010-0.028 
TDE 19.4-32.8 0.004-0.018 
Dieldrin 15.3-31.3 0.004-0.007 
Lindane 10.6-15.8 0.001-0.005 
Heptachlor epoxide 8.9-13.4 0.001-0.003 
BHC -6.0-13.1 0.001-0.003 
Malathion 1.9-11.1 0.003-0.013 
Carbaryl N.D.-74 N.D.-0.15 
Aldrin 0.8- 5.6 T-0.002 
2.4-D 0.3- 4.2 T.0.005 
Diazinon 0.3- 5.8 T-0.001 
Dicofol 0.5- 5.6 0.003-0.010 
PCP N.D.- 3.3 N.D.-0.006 
Endrin 1.1- 3.3 T-0.001 
Methoxychlor N.D.- 1.9 N.D.-0.001 
Ileptachlor N.D.- 1.9 N.D.-T 
Camphechlor N.D.- 3.6 .N.D.-0.002 
Tcrthanes' N.D.- 1.3 N.D..0.004 
Parathion 0.6- 5.0 T-0.001 
Endosulfan 0.3- 5.3 T-0.001 
Ethion 0.3- 4.4 T-0.004 
N.D. = not detected. T = <0.0005 
SOURCE: R. E. and M. B. Duggan, "Pesticide Residues
 
in Food," in C. A. Edwards (ed.), Environmental
 
Pollution by Pesticides (New York: Plenum
 
Publishing Corp., 1973), p. 341.-

Figure I 	Organic residues commonly found in total
 
diet in the United States, 1965-1970.
 
products containing almost 1000 chemicals which are registered for use in
 
6
the United States. New plant'hybrids require greater and higher concentra­
tions of pesticides and fertilizers per acre to achieve their advertised
 
7
 
high yields.
 
One of the most widely used flavor enhancers, MSG (monosodium glutamate), 
has been shown to cause central nervous damage to fetal and infant primates.
 
Therefore, it has been banned from commerical baby foods yet is still readily
 
available on the spice shelves of the grocery store.
 
Mercury is one of the most hazardous materials.- For examjle; a chemical
 
plant in Minamata City, Japan, substantially increased production and the
 
release of mercury in 1953. Soon thereafter, more than 100 people died or
 
experienced serious nervous system damage from eating seafood obtained from
 
Minamata Bay. Also, a New York woman, in the mid-1960's, suffered dizziness,
 
memory loss, hand tremors, tongue quivers, hypersensitivity to light,
 
difficulty in vision focusing, and loss of physical coordination-due to
 
mercury poisoning as the result of the daily consumption of 10 ounces of
 
swordfish. 
This was the first known case of mercury illness attributed to
 
eating mass-marketed food in the United States and resulted in the banning
 
8
 
of swordfish.
 
However, a frequent example of toxic ingestion is the cQnsumption of
 
shellfish that have been tainted by other industrial and sewage waste; It
 
has been estimated that over 20% of the nation's shellfish beds-are closed
 
-due to contamination and that the economic loss from shellfish pollution is
 
9
$63 million.. Even where contaminant levels do not prevent safe consumption,
 
6Environmental Quality, The Council on Environmental Quality (Washington, D.C.:
 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Spetember 1973), p.183.
 
7Population Resources, Environment, op.cit., p.213. Z /1
 
8Population, Resources, Environment, on.cit., p.169.
 
-Ocean Dumping: A National Policy, A Report to the President Prepared by
 
the Council on Environmental Quality (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

1 7
 Office) October 1970, p. .
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the food may be discolored or tainted. Even in small amounts oil can taint
 
the flesh of fish. In addition, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (present
 
in oil) are known carcinogens. While there has not been an identified case
 
of hydrocarbon-caused human cancer, such cancers have been found in fish.
 
These and many other instances attest the need for concern about the
 
effects of toxic materials in the food chain. Of particular worry is the
 
increasing concentration of some substances through the food chain as
 
food is ingested by higher organisms. For instance, filter feeders such as
 
oysters, will have higher concentrations of toxic substances in their tissues
 
than will be found in the surrounding environment. As a result of their
 
shallow coastal water habitat where pollution may be heavy and the constant
 
filtering of the pollutant laden water, oysters can contain much higher
 
concentrations of radioactive substances and lethal chemicals than is found
 
in the surrounding water. Concentration levels of up to 70,000 times the
 
normal concentration of chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides found in the
 
environment have been found in oyster tissues. 10
 
But the effects of many toxic substances are not immediately apparent.
 
Blindness, deafness, loss of coordination, madness, or even death, while
 
readily apparent may not be easily related to years of ingesting a particular
 
-- and possibly unknown -- chemical. Further, many effects may not be
 
readily apparent and may not show up even in the same generation. Often
 
the effect may be so insidious and gradual (such as mental retardation from
 
lead poisoning and central nervous system effects) as to not even be readily
 
apparent for years and then to be seemingly without direct cause.
 
10population, Resources, Enviornment, op.cit., p.198 .
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Many of the commonly used chemicals such as chloro-methyl methyl ether
 
(CMME), bisechloromethyl ether (BCME), and polyvinyl chloride were not identi­
fied as carcinogenic until 20 to 30 years after widespread use. -Unlike most
 
illnesses, it typically takes 15 to 30 years for cancer to develop in the body.
 
One tesbaicher'in the area; Dr. Irving J. Kelikoff of'the-tK. 
Sinai Sch6oljof
 
Medicine, noted that "to prevent cancer in the year 2000, we have to identify
 
the problem chemicals in 1975. ilI

Increasingly, as the foundation of heredity is better understood, the
 
chemical basis for many congenital defects and illnesses is being discovered.
 
Occupational exposure to chemicals (i.e. vinyl chloride, arsenic, asbestos)
 
is increasingly being recognized as a pathway for toxic substances that is
 
at least as hazardous as direct consumption, as evidenced by the recent
 
conference on Occupational Carcinogenesis sponsored by the National
 
Academy of Sciences. Researchers found not only increased incidence (i.e.even
 
orders of magnitude higher than the normal expected incidence) of cancer and
 
cancer-caused deaths in workers that came in contact with potentially carcino­
genic materials, but also higher rates in their families and in people who
 
lived near the factories.
12
 
In sum, the effects of these substances are highly dependent
 
on:
 
l. The mode of exposure (inhalation, ingestion, or contact).
 
2. The amount taken.
 
llStuart Auerbach, "Cancer: 
A Work Hazard Industry is Forced to Face,"
 
The Washington Post (March 30, 1975) p.A-3.
 
12 Studrt Auerbach, "Job Caused Cancers 
are Found Spreading to Workers'
 
Families," The Washington Post (March 25, 1975) p.1.
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3. 	The time span of intake, including intervals between intakes
 
(which largely affect excretion and therefore recovery by the
 
body).
 
4. 	Physiological and psychological status of the individual,
 
including the sum of his assets and deficits which detdrmines
 
his ability to cope with the toxicant.
 
5. 	Synergistic or amplifying effects of other substances taken
 
in at the same time. 13
 
Unfortunately, the lack of an immediate and well understood crisis may
 
retard effective policy on this issue, especially since long-term effects
 
are likely to be irreversible but are not likely to be perceived or under­
stood until the damage has been done.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
Agricultural Chemicals: Prior to World War II, only a small number of
 
lethal inorganic compounds and relatively non-toxic products were used in
 
agriculture-. The location of residues from these materials in the food
 
supply was predictable and examination of foods for such residues was
 
relatively simple. But there are now many sources of pesticide residues in
 
food and the list of such residues is long (see Figure 2). Pesticide
 
residues have even been found in foods whose production did not entail the
 
use of pesticides. For instance, pesticide residues have been found in milk
 
because pesticides were used during the growth of cattle feed. Pesticides
 
14
 
can enter the food chain in other ways as well. Materials used to pro­
tect forests and fiber crops, to control weeds on roads and other right­
of-ways, and to control insects in homes and gardens are transported by air,
 
soil, and water movements. Even disposal of used pesticide containers provides
 
another source of residues in food.
 
4 	 Protection, op.cit., p.374.
'REnvironmental 

4Population, Resources, Environment, op.cit., p.160.
 
Domnctic 	 imporicd 
Number 
sampk
c..anucd 
Number 
samples(>2.0 
ppm) 
Peslicide 
chemical 
Number 
samples 
Range of 
level. 
(ppm) 
Number 
samplcs 
examined 
Number 
samples 
(>2.0 
ppm) 
Pesticide 
chemical 
Number 
=mples 
Rnge of 
leve s 
(ppm) 
Le frds" July 1, 1967-June 30, 1968 
1,551 10 Ethion 
Carbaryl
Dicloran 
. 1I 
3 
2 
5.6 
3.0-8.0 
4.3-8.0 
162 0 
Zmcb I 3.6 
Trithion 
SOPP* 
1 
1 
3.5 
13.5 
DDT 2 2.8-33 
Smalfruits 
419 5 Dicloran 1 8.0 58 0 
Dicofol 
Elhion 
DDT 
2 
1 
1 
2.1-2.5 
3.8 
3.2 
Leof and stem Vegetables 
2,461 97 Camphechlor
DDT 
59 
28 
2.1-14.0 
2.2.24.0 
122 0 
TDE 4 3.6-21.1 
Zincb 12 2.4-6.2 
Parathion 3 2.3-3.0 
BHC 
Malathion 
•cthane0. 
I 
I 
96 
46 
14 
Maneb 1 2.1 
Carbaryl
Nicotine 
1 
I 
4.0 
5.3 
Sodium arsenite 1 5.4 
Lead arsenate 1 4.2 
1.954 6 Parathion 2 2.1-3.3 67 0 
DDT 2 3.5-3.9' 
Dicloran I 3.0 
Lindane 1 2i 
Vine and carvegetables 21.091 3 DDT 1 2.3 300 0 
Toxaphene 2 2.3-4.0 
Grains(human)
934 25 Malathion 20 2.1-15.1 8 0Melhoxychlor 2 3.0-4.0
 
Camphechlor 1 2.3
 
Methyl bromide 1 31.4
 
Mercury 1 4.2
 
Grainstaninwl 
371 I Malathion - 1 28.0 10 0 
Dairy product4 
1.141 	 5 DDE 4 2.0-21 177 3 Ileptachlorepoxde 1 .3 
DDT 1 2.8 Lindane 2 3.5-7.6 
Fluidmilk 
1,552 I0 	 DDE 10 2.0-3.9 0 ­
4 Sodium-o-phcnylphente; Orthophenylplieno 
SOURCE: R. E. and M. B. Duggan, "Pesticide Residues in Food," in C. A. Edwards
 
(ed.), Environmental Pollution by Pesticides (New York: Plenum Publishing
 
Corp., 1973), 	pp. 344-347.
 
Figure: 2 U.S. Food Samples Containing Pesticide Residues Exceeding 2 ppm.
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Figure 2 (cont'd)
 
Domestic Imported 
Number 
samples 
examined 
Number 
sanples 
(>2.0 
ppm) 
Pesticide 
chenical 
Number 
samples 
Range of 
levels 
(ppm) 
Number 
afples 
examincd 
Number 
samples 
C>2.0 
ppm) 
Pesticide 
chemical 
Number 
samples 
Range of 
levels 
(ppm) 
Lrge (rit:s July 1, 1968-June 30,1969 
863 7 DDT I 2A 94 0 
Mcthcxychlor 1 2.7 
PCNIB 1 4.1 
Diphenyl
SOPP* 
1 
3 
2.7 
2.2-6.2 
Small fmits 
410 9 Methoxychlor 
Ethion -
1 
4 
2.3 
2.3-3.2 
144 2 Dicofol 2 2-1-3.L 
Dicofol 2 2.2-3.9 
Captan 2 5.1-5.9 
Beans 
85 1 DDT 1 5.0 24 
Leafand stem vegetables1,920 139 CampbechlorDDT 8530 2.1.40.02.1-23.0 19 4 CamphcchlorDDT 22 2.9-183.02.7-68.0. 
TDE 1 2.5 Tliodfn 1 4.7 
DDE 1 6.1 
Zincb 6 2.1-20.1 
Endosulfan 2 2.1-2.3 
Malathion 1 2.9 
Trdion 1 2.9 
Bile 1 2.8 
Ethion 
"Pcrthane 0 
4 
4 
2.6-8.4 
2.8-4.0 
Cazbazyl I 8.4 
Chlordane 3 2.8-7.1 
Dazinon 7 2.4-6.4 
Farathion 6 2,2-13.2 
glethyl parathion 1 2.1 
Root regetcbles 
1.213 4 DDT 2 2.2-3.0 90 0 
Chlordane 1 3.8 
Camphechlor 1 2.3 
Vine and ear vegetables 
856 2 . DDT 2 2.0-7.5 280 0 
Grains(human) 
590 14 Mtlathion 11 2.7-28.0 40 
Methyl parathion 1 5.5 
Camplcchlor 1 2.9 
Groins laninurt]119 7. Malthion 3 11-3.8 
Patalhion 3 2.8-8.8 
C lcium arsenite 1 3.7 
lkwy P uclj 
61 2 Ileptachlof 
cpoxidc 
1I1C 
1 
1 
4.1 
6.0 
620 11 BIC 
I.indan: 
DDT 
7 
2 
1 
23.-6 I 
3.7-7 2 
24 1 
DDI- 2 2w-2 . 
Tetiadifon 1.1 
640 1 hlondane 14.8 0 
I7-VmdA 
A5 4 DDIE 2 .2:3-2.6 0 
TDI: I 4.1 
Mr4lo~ychtur I 4.1 
Adaptcd f(onm: W. R. I'v.ix.Chnzt. 1971. l-d. Vtlizcjde Control Act of 197 1. Ilelring. U.S. (hvy' Panting Oltite. '2.A. 
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The lack of understanding of the movement of these substances
 
through the food chain and, more importantly, the inadequate understanding
 
of the short and long term health effects of these materials aggrevate the
 
problem. Not surprisingly, there is no consensus among international
 
experts regarding the maximum-tolerances for these substances (see Figure 3).
 
In fact, a single measure of toxicity, it is argued, may not be sufficient
 
to measure the risk of various pesticide residues in food.1 5
 
Even though the biological importance of pesticide residues in food is
 
currently of considerable interest, reliable evidence does not exist that
 
even suggests that current levels of pesticide exposure are harmful. However,
 
this may be more a judgment about the quality of the evidence than the
 
safety of pesticides. The National Academy of Sciences concluded: "On the
 
one hand, data presently available do not indicate that man is being harmed
 
by small quantities of pesticides in his tissues; on the other hand there
 
are even fewer data to justify complacency." 16 It is argued that data on
 
large population groups with either high or low exposure are required for
 
epidemiological studies to determine whether pesticides have any influence
 
on the incidence of disease, apart from the known consequences of obviously
 
17
 
excessive exposure.
 
Another important source of hazardous compounds is the increasing use of
 
growth hormones in livestock. In January of 1973, diethylstilbestrol (DES)
 
was determined to be carcinogenic and was banned from further use. 18
 
15Environmental Protection, op.cit., pp.376 and 378.
 
1 6Productive Agriculture and A Quality Environment (National Academy of
 
2 7
 Sciences: Washington, D. C.), 1974, p. .
 
"Insecticide Residues in the Human Diet," Archives of Environmental Health,
 
Vol. 10, No. 831 (1965).
 
1 8Chemical Marketing Reportr, Vol. 206, No. 13 (September 23, 1974),
 
pp.3 and 13.
 
17
-11-

Figure 3
 
REPRESENTATIVE TOLERANCES FOR INSECTICIDE RESIDUES
 
Maximum tolerance, mg/kg 
Insectdcide chenical
 (common name) Switzerland The Netherlands U.S. U.S.S.R.
 
Aldrin 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.0 
Aenic-containing 1.0 0.7 2.3 0.0 
DDT 4.0 5.0 7 1.0 
Diazinon 0.75 1 0.73 
Mehiyl parathion 0.75 0.5 1 
Parathion 0.75 0.5 1 .0' 
*The purified compound only; the "impure" compound is restricted to 0.0 prm. 
SOURCE: Emil T. Chanlett, Environmental Protection,
 
McGraw-Hill Series in Water Resources and
 
Environmental Engineering (New York: McGraw-

Hill Book Co., 1973), p. 378.
 
According to Dr. W. Clarke Wescoe, a top drug company executive, the decision
 
to ban DES "was a triumph of superior, sophisticated analytical techniques
 
that permitted the measurement of 120 parts per trillion of DES." He indi­
cated that with the development of better, more sophisticated techniques,
 
more and more substances can be identified in more minute quantities. This
 
conflict between promulgation of standards and technological capabilities of
 
monitoring, is-similar to many of the difficulties in the establishment of
 
the air and water quality standards.
 
Despite the evidence, the ban on DES was overturned by a federal court
 
due to a procedural error -- the FDA did not conduct public hearings previous
 
to the ban, thereby depriving producers of their chance to comment. At this
 
writing, DES is still being used as a growth stimulant for cattle.
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While both the FDA and EPA monitor toxic and potentially toxic substances,
 
the rate of introduction of new products has been high. The management of agri­
cultural chemicals ultimately rests with the farmer and the agricultural 
chemical supplier. Unfortunately, many chemicals have proliferated widely 
without understanding of their long run impact,and the consequences of 
their widespread presence only becomes apparent at a much later time.
 
It appears that most human effects associated with pesti6ide residues
 
in food are related more to accidents than ingestion through the food pro­
duction process. But this is no reason to become complacent, as there
 
have been many epidemics of poisoning by pesticides (see Figure 4). In
 
the cases shown here, spillage from transportation or storage caused 11
 
incidents, eating formulated chemicals caused five others, and irresponsible
 
applidations w7ere the cause of four. Fatalities occurred in 12 of these
 
epidemics. 
Industrial Processes: In one way or another, all of the toxic metal 
materials are used in industrial processes in the United States, including
 
lead, mercury, cadmium, arsenic, and nickel.
 
Contrasted to the uncertainty about the effects of agricultural
 
chemicals, the harmful effects of consuming heavy metals is well-known and 
documented. The dangers of lead poisoning have been recognized for centuries.-
A popular theory ascribes the decline of both Greek and Roman civili­
zations to an over-exposure to lead, as it was used by them to line bronze
 
cooking, eating, and storage utensils. 19 As lead is a cumulative 
poison,it is difficult to diagnose early, especially when its effects are
 
still at a low level. The largest single use of lead in the United States
 
19Population, Resources, Environment, op.cit., p.166.
 
Kind of accident 	 Pesticide M.aterial Number Number Location 
contaminated of cases of deaths 
Spillage during transportation or storage 	 Endrin Flour 159 0 Wales 
.ndrin Flour 3 0 IEgypt 
Endrin Flour 691 24 Qatar 
Endrin Flour 183 2 S. Arabia 
Dieldrin Food 21 0 Shipboard 
Diazinon Doughnut mix 20 0 U.S.A. 
Parathion Wheat 360 102 India 
Paration Barley 38 9 MalayaPalathion Flour 200 8 Fgypt 
Parathion Flour '600 88 Colombia 
Parathion Sugar 300 ' 17 Mexico 
Consumption of treated soil 	 Ilexachlorobenzenc Seed grain >3,000 3-11% TurkeyOrganic mercury Seed grain 34 4 W. Pakistan 
Organic mercury Seed grain 321 35 Iraq 
Organic mercury Seed grain 45 20 Guatemala 
Improper application Toxaphene Collards 4 0 U.S.A. 
Toxaphene Chard 3 0 U.S.A. 
Miscellaneous Parathion Crops >400 0 U.S.A. 
E.M. Mrak (Chairman),Report of the Secretary's Commissin on Pesticides and their Relationship to Environmental 
Health, Part 1i, 311, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Ae lfare (1969). 
SOURCE: 	 R. E. and M. B. Duggan, "Pesticide Residues in Food," in C. A. Edwards (ed.),
 
Environmental Pollution by Pesticides_(New York: Plenum Publishing Corp., 1973),
 
p. 356.
 
4iterature between 1952-1969.
 Figue 4 Epidemics of poisoning by pesticides reported in 
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today is in leaded gasoline for automobiles. Exhaust dust, settling on
 
crops and water supplies, has been a major source of consumed lead-.
 
Recognition of this problem is long standing and attempts are being made 
to remove it (witness automobile engines designed to meet new pollution 
requirements cannot use leaded gasoline). 
Mercury, another well-known poison, enters the environment from many 
sources: industrial processes, processing of pulp and paper, 
agricultural fungicides, and even through the combustion of fossil
 
fuels. It has been estimated that in 1971 over 23 million pounds of
 
mercury were released into the environment?0
 
Mercury appears not to be a problem in marine waters currently, but the addition
 
of mercury to fresh waters is substantidl due *to the disposal of industrial
 
wastes. Metallic or elemental mercury is essentially non-toxic to humans, 
but certain micro-organisms convert it to more toxic organic forms, including 
methyl mercury and other alkyl-mercury compounds which become increasingly 
concentrated in the food chain, especially in fish (concentrations in fish 
tissue are thousands of times higher than the surrounding water).- Mercury has 
been found in significant quantities in tuna, swordfish, and other animals 
that exist near the top of the marine food chain. Recently, the FDA dis­
covered that most of the samples of swordfish it tested exceeded maximum 
allowable concentrations and that 8% of the samples exceeded such levels by a
 
factor of 3. Sensitivity to mercury varies with individuals and involves 
blindness, deafness, coordination loss, madness, and even death in high 
concentrations. Populations consuming large amounts of seafood are likely
 
to have high exposures to mercury, as discussed earlier. 
2%opulation, Resources, Environment, op.cit., p.168.
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Cadmium is now being detected in lobsters and other food, but the 
implication of these concentrations is uncertain. Fatal cases of cadmium
 
poisoning have been reported in Japan,- and cadmium has now been found in concen­
trationq above U.S. Public Health Service limits,in the water supplies 
(prior to treatment) of 20 cities. High levels of- cadmium and chromium 
have been found in Long Island, where the contamination was traced to
 
waste deposited during World War II.
 
A study by HIT on critical environmental problems listed lead, mercury,
 
cadmium, chromium, arsenic, and nickel as the most toxic, persistent and 
abundant elements in the environment. it is agreed, however, that con­
siderably more information on short-and-long-term human exposure is needed 
before proper courses of action can be formulated.21 '
 
In addition to the metallic poisons, it is becoming clear that asbestos
 
is profoundly carcinogenic. Autopsy findings indicate that it is found in the
 
lung tissue of 100% of the urban population who died of cancer and lived or
 
22
 
worked near construction sites. In'Duluth, Minnesota, asbestos
 
tailings in Lake Superior have become a test of the strength of the environ­
mentalists.
 
Another material which is. causing increased concern is polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs). These chemicals are used in the preparation of paint, 
as a plasticizer for vinyl plastics and as an ingredient in certain waxes. 
They have already been found in hazardous levels in fresh poultry. Another 
group of chemicals, the chlorylethers, are being considered as possible 
water pollutants and drinking water contaminants. It has been reported 
that bis-chlorylethel ether and bis-chloroisoprophyl ether have been found 
21population, Resources, Environment, pp. 169-170.
 
22 Stuart Auetbach, "Job Caused Cancers," op.cit. 
-16­
in some water supplies, including treated drinking water. Both of these
 
compounds are closely related chemically to bis-chlorol ethylmether which
 
is known to produce cancer in mice.23
 
There are other chemicals which are used for health purposes and have
 
become part of the food chain, and may, under some circumstances, present
 
health hazards. Fluoridated water is the classic example and a source of
 
continuous debate. Fluorides are also discharged into the air from steel,
 
aluminum, phosphate, glass, pottery, and brickworks; These effluents can
 
add to the fluoride intake of individuals who drink fluoridated water. It
 
has been noted that the difference between safe and unsafe levels of
 
fluorides is small and that people in fluoridated communities and else­
where are now ingesting more,than the official safe level.24
 
There are two fundamental difficulties in establishing standards 
and protecting the population from further exposure to hazardous substances. 
One is the huge number of new chemical and biological substances that are 
introduced annually. A second problem is the state of understanding of the
 
biological and chemical impact of these substances. Quite often a product 
will pass the tests established by the FDA and will, in full conscience, 
be introduced by their manufacturers: It is only after prolonged exposure, 
perhaps under conditions that cannot be duplicated in the laboratory and
 
perhaps in synergistic combination with other materials, that the negative
 
implication becomes clear.- As previously mentioned, the latency period for
 
development of human cancers may be 20 years or so. 
Often, the mutagenic
 
2 3Envirnmental Quality, op.cit., p.189
 
2opulation, Resources, Environment, op.cit., pp.170-171. 4'Z2 1
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consequences cannot be observed for several generations. A contributing 
problem has been the inability to monitor and and trace known hazardous 
compounds in the food chain. 
But the fundamental difficulty has been and will continue to be the
 
inadequate understanding of cellular mechanisms. Biochemical study of 
the cellular processes is in its infancy and it is through this research 
that the best hopes for understanding the carcinogenic and mutagenic
 
effects lie. While to date much of the biological evidence has been
 
inferential, further understanding of these cellular mechanisms will make
 
it possible to better identify cause and effect relationships. 
Potential Actions:
 
Several distinct and different courses of action are possible as
 
means of minimizing or preventing hazards associated with ingestion of
 
toxic substances from the food chain.
 
However, additional capabilities are required to develop effective
 
policies. These involve:
 
1. 	 Determining acceptable limits of various materials. 
2. 	 Developing and implementing monitoring systems which can 
measure the level of various trace constituents.
 
3. 	Improving understanding of the movement of substances through
 
the food chain, and developing and implementing means of
 
removing toxic elements.
 
4. 	Seeking ways to te-gate, countetA-ct, -ameliorate the effects 
of toxics. 
5. 	Increasing research into basic cellular biochemistry.
 
These are goals of an extensive and expensive research program that
 
would contribute substantially to improving all areas of public health
 
management.
 
The use of materials can be regulated or prohibited by law,and many 
statutes exist which already govern the use of various materials. The ban 
-18­
on DDT would presumably open the markets for other pesticides, but pro­
ducers are having difficulty meeting Environmental Protection Agency 
standards. According to the National Agricultural Chemicals Association 
in 1970 it took $5.5 million, 6.6 years and the testing of 7630 chemical 
compounds to get a pesticide on the market -- as opposed to the former 
$3.4 million, 5 years and 5481 tests in 1967.25 
While there is recognipion of the problem and cognizance of the need
 
for policy response,.an inadequate understanding of the biology and
 
chemistry of the problem is hampering efforts to respond effectively. The
 
most efficacious action would be the continuation of the fundamental
 
research, environmental monitoring and data gathering necessary for informed
 
policy formation and decision making.
 
25 
"New Pesticides," Wall Street Journal, August 23, 1973, p.l.
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ISSUE: DETERIORATION AND MODIFICATION OF THE BIOSPHERE LEADING TO
 
IRREVERSIBLE CLIMATIC CHANGE OF THE GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM
 
The Issue:
 
Previous sections of this report have explored the level, intensity,
 
nature and impact of a variety of man's activities upon the environment.
 
These discussions were largely concerned with the relatively short run
 
problem of human health impacts. This, of course, must be the primary
 
concern of environmental regulators. However, of equal importance in terms
 
of the long run stability -- even viability -- of the planet is the question
 
of whether current activities, decisions, and actions of man are having
 
irreversible impacts upon the weather and climate that could fundamentally
 
change the level and kind of life that could be supported. This issue,
 
then, explores the possibility of such changes, their likely impact,
 
and tries to identify actions that man could take to reverse these
 
trends. of the question of mddification of the biosphere includes not
-Part 

only climatic modifications but also modifications of the delicate balances
 
of the ecosystem that may result in extinction of some species, overpopulation
 
of others, and the like.
 
It is important to clearly differentiate between short run perturbations
 
and long run change. For instance, research and experimentation in weather
 
modification has identified certain ways of increasing the naturally occurring
 
precipitation. This precipitation, then, can be modified by the inadvertant
 
application of the same materials -- say, through industrial pollution.
 
However, this kind of change is clearly different from change in the
 
temperature of the planet itself which undoubtedly will have substantially
 
more profound effects and will be substantially more difficult to perturb
 
on a global scale.
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The problem of biosphere change and climate modification is extremely
 
difficult even to assess because of the difficulty in observing and monitoring
 
trends. Climatic change involves consideration of time series data that are
 
centuries long, most of which, obviously, must be inferred. Unlike ambient
 
air quality standards,we cannot run out and monitor the state of the climate
 
at any given point of time -- it is only through long run relative measure­
ments that climatologists can discern the dynamics that are occurring. The
 
issue is further complicated by the fact that the negative effect of a given
 
set of actions may not be observed until the action has been carried on for
 
some time or even until the action has ceased. Even then, the problem of
 
ascribing cause ,and effect is never adequately surmounted.
 
A,final cautionary note must be mentioned with respect to climate
 
change. The climate is changing, it always has been changing, and it is
 
the evolutionary nature of the planet that it always will be changing.
 
Hence, what we are concerned with here is those climate modifications which
 
are the direct result of particular actions of mankind and which alter or
 
perturb the "natural" evolution of the planet. While this may be exceed­
ingly difficult, it is important to at least conceptually differentiate
 
between change which would have occqrred without man.and change which
 
could not have occurred without man.
 
The discussion below, then, will center onsome major issues with
 
respect to the present and future condition of the biosphere: tempera­
ture changes of the planet, precipitation changes of the planet, urban/
 
rural weather imbalances, and disruptions of the ecological system of
 
balances.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
That the earth's climate has been changing should not be surprising to
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any reader. Careful reading of the Farmer's Almanac combined with possibly
 
apocryphal stories of past blizzards attest to the observed changes
 
in local weather patterns. These observers are not incorrect; within the
 
last several decades there have been substantial changes in the weather. Moreover,
 
Toldwtde changes in weather and climate have accelerated in the last
 
century; and there is some evidence that this acceleration is directly
 
attributable to activities of man, in particular, the Industrial Revolution.
 
However great the anecdotal evidence, the situation calls for more
 
rigorous analysis. Yet a fundamental problem remains, the infancy of the
 
science of climates. Assuming that the problems of monitoring and teasuring
 
changes of the global climate could be overcome, there is no model of clima­
tic change. It is not merely a problem of modelling, there is not an adequate
 
theoretical base that describes the interrelationships of the many variables
 
that are known to affect climate. A very generalized model of what is known
 
about climatic change is pictured in Figure 1. The important thing about
 
this model is the feedback, i.e. dynamic nature of the relationships. The 
ceteris paibua assumptions of economists have absolutely no role in this 
model. The range of interactions among these variables is immense and the 
likelihood that only a variable could be acting singularly is highly
 
unlikely. Experts, however, do not think that the complexity of the issue
 
will preclude them from developing an adequate theoretical understanding of
 
theory a simulation can be developEyl.
1
 
climatic change, and from this 

The present state-of-the-art in theoretical climate dynamics has
 
identified five external variants which can substantially alter the climate.
 
1W.W. Kellogg and S.1. Schneider, "Climate Stabilization: For Better or
 
For Worse?" Science (December 27, 1974) p. 1163
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These include:
 
1. Fluctuations in solar emissions
 
2. Variations in the earth's orbit and axis of rotation
 
3. Changes in the atmospheric carbon dioxide content
 
4. Changes in atmospheric dust content, and
 
5. Changes in the character of the land surfaces.2
 
As the first two are unlikely to be altered by man's actions -- at least
 
in the short run -- we will concern ourself largely with the kinds of
 
activities that have affected the C62 levels, dust content and land surface
 
changes.
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Let us briefly examine the state of the global climate over the past
 
century or 
so and then explore the likely role that man's activities may have
 
had in these changes. The first part of this century, through 1940, saw
 
abnormally warm weather climate in all parts of the globe as shown in
 
Figure 2. During this warming trend, the global human population
 
2Kellogg and Schneider, O 
 ., p.1165.
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more than doubled. The warming conditions of this period were also extremely
 
conducive to satisfactory agriculture as it lengthened the growing times and
 
encouraged increasingly high crop yields. Beginning around 1940, a cooling
 
trend suddenly began. After the temperature had risen about l.i0C between
 
1885 and 	1940, it has already dropped 0.60C.3 This may seem relatively
 
insignificant until one realizes that a mere global change of 2 or 3 degrees
 
would be 	sufficient to trigger another major ice age. Measured another
 
way, the 	dimunition of the sunlight by as little as 1% could be sufficient
 
to trigger a major glaciation.
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It now appears that the period beginning in the early 15th century and
 
lasting through the mid-18th century was among some of the worst weather in
 
over 2000 years and has become known as the "Little Ice Age. ,4 It is likely
 
that the warming trend between 1885 and 1940 was the anomalous condition, not
 
the colder period that has been occurring since then. Furthermore, the
 
3ohn H. Douglas, "Climate Change: Chilling Possibilities," Science News,
 
Vol. 107 (March 1, 1975) p. 138
 
4Tom Alexander, "Ominous Changes in the World's Weather," Fortune, (Feb., 1974)
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precipitous drop in global temperatures since 1945, relative to the historical
 
mean, represents the longest period of sustained temperature decrease that has
 
been noted in several countries.5 Recent conclusions derived from drilling
 
of the ocean floor suggest that for at least the past 700,000 years, global
 
mean temperatures have not been as high as they were in 1885-1940 period
 
except for about 5% of the time,
 
What has caused the temperature changes in the planet? Generally the
 
cooling of the earth's surface is accomplished by the planet's albedo, the
 
planet's capacity to reflect solar radiation, About 35%01f the incident
 
radiation is reflected Back into space, 
This reflection is largely accomplished
 
by the clouds, dust particles in the atmosphere, or from reflection from the
 
surface of the earth, Any change in the albedo, obviously, could have signi­
ficant temperature impact.
 
It appears that change in the earth's albedo powers is exactly what has
 
happened, causing both the previous warming trend as well as the current
 
cooling treAd, Historically, these kinds of changes have been associated with
 
the level of volcanic activity on the earth. Volcanism introduces substantial
 
levels of dust and particulates in the air which in turn reflect solar
 
radiation back into space. During the warming period of the early century
 
there was a cessation of volcanic activity; and since 1955 (during the cooling
 
period), 
there has been a periad of extremely active volcanoes. A recent
 
study of long term trends concluded that greatly increased volcanism during
 
the last 2 million years coincides with major and rapidly oscillating climatic
 
conditions related to glacial-interglacial cycles in the Southern Hemisphere.7
 
5Alexander, oP,Si., p.90.
 
6fDouglas, opcit.
 
7james P. Kennett and R, C.' Thunell, "Global Increase in Quaternary-Explosive
 
Volcanism," Science, Vol.187, No. 4176 (February 14, 1975) p.5 0 .
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However, climatologist Dr. Reid Bryson of the University of Wisconsin has
 
concluded that the level of volcanic activity or inactivity has not been
 
sufficient to explain the temperature changes of the past century and that
 
8 
the primary responsibility rests with man. The two man-induced forces at
 
work include the increase in atmospheri C02, contributing to the greenhouse
 
effect (awarming trend), and the vast increase in particulate pollution,
 
increasing the albedo of the earth (a cooling trend).
 
The "greenhouse effect" refers to the role that CO2 plays in
 
trapping heat on the earth. It is so named because the C02 behaves in a
 
fashion analogous to the glass of a greenhouse. Carbon dioxide is quite
 
transparent to light of short wave lengths, the bulk of the solar radiation
 
received from the sun. After penetrating the earth's atmosphere, the light
 
is converted to heat and reradiated at the longer, infrared wave length.
 
As CO2 is not transparent to this wave length, the heat is "trapped" on the
 
earth by the atmospheric CO2.
 
There is no question that the level of CO2 has increased substantially
 
over the past 100 years, largely due to the Industrial Revolution and the
 
burning of fossil fuels. Atmospheric C02 has been increasing steadily as
 
measured for three decades at Mauna Loa, Hawaii. The increased levels of
 
C02 are largely related to the increasing reliance upon coal as an energy
 
source. According to the National Academy of Sciences, atmospheric CO2 has
 
9
 
been rising by 4% a year since 1910 because of industrialization.

in the interests of objectivity, it is important
8Alexander, op.cit. [Note: 

to point out that Dr. Bryson is the leading spokesman of the "doomsday"
 
school of thought regarding climatic change.]
 
9Kellogg and Schneider, op.cit.
 
Because C02 is quite stable it persists in the atmosphere for sometime.
 
In fact, it has been estimated that the atmospheric level of CO2 has
 
increased from the pre-Industrial Revolution level of under 290 parts per
 
million by volume to 320 parts per million. By the year 2000 the CO2 level
 
could reach 380-400 parts per million, which would increase the global
 
temperature by 0.5 by the year 2000,10 assuming a continuing reliance upon
 
coal rather than oil or natural gas.
 
During this warming trend, the impact was quite visible. For instance,.)
 
the growing season in England increased by two-three weeks. Some argue
 
that the advances in agricultural technology (especially in yields per acre)
 
were not due to technology or plant strains, but to favorable weather, all
 
of which has ended.
12
 
If rising C2 concentrations mean warming of the planet and phenomenal
 
agricultural successes, then why are crops failing worldwide and the planet
 
cooling? Since 1940-45 the mean annual temperature of the Northern Hemisphere
 
has been declining. In this period of time the average temperature has
 
declined about 0.6 C -- the average temperature showing a consistent decline.
 
Meteorologists have isolated atmospheric dust as the cause of this cooling.
 
The atmospheric dust content, by increasing the reflective capacity of the
 
atmosphere, decreases the intensity of the sunlight that reaches the earth's
 
t
surface. Without the impact of the "greenhouse effect, ' this cooling would
 
have begun earlier and many of the agricultural and natural disaster problems
 
facing the world this decade would have occurred a decade earlier. As
 
10Douglas, op.cit.
 
1 "NAS Warning on Climate Changes," Science News (January 25, 1975) p.52-53.
 
1?James McQuigg, a government climatologust at the University of Missouri,
 
in Alexander, op.cit.
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Figure 3 shows, the intensity of sunlight reaching the earth's surface
 
first began to decline in 1930, but CO2 levels were sufficient to prevent
 
substantial cooling until the early 40's. Here is a paradoxical situation
 
where one pollutant (C02) softened the impact of the second (atmospheric dust).
 
Figure 3
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SOURCE: Alexander, Tom, "'Ominous Changes in the World's Weather," Fortune,
 
(February, 1974) pp. 94.
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Atmospheric dust has shown tremendous increases in the past several
 
decades. Dust is generated by natural phenomena (volcanism, wind erosion,
 
forest fires, salt particles from evaporated sea water, etc.) and man-induced
 
activities. While the present day particulate loding i estimated to exceed
 
the average stratospheric loading by volcanic dust during the past 120 years,
 
it is thought to equal only by perhaps one-fifth the stratospheric loading
 
that followed the 1883 eruption of the volcano Krakatoa.13 Despite this, the
 
human contribution is the only one over which we have any control and the
 
only one that we can project with some certainty,
 
Man-induced atmospheric dust -- called particulate emissions or "Total
 
Suspended Particulates"? by the environmentalists 
-- is generated largely
 
through industrial processes, fuel combustion, wind erosion of abused land,
 
and "slash and burn" techniques of primitive agriculture. In this country,
 
the primary contributors are industrial processes and steam electric fuel
 
combustion. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that nationwide
 
emissions of particulates have increased approximately 15% over the past
 
three decades, although they indicate that somae of this increase could be
 
attributable to refinements in monitoring capabilities.1 4 Particulate
 
pollution is more severe with combustion•of coal thanwith oil or gas 

witness the plague of coal miners: black lung or "Coal Worker's
 
Pneumoconiosis." 
 We can expect that in the short run -- the next several
 
decades -- it is likely that petroleum shortages will encourage a further
 
reliance upon coal, at least in this country, further contributing to
 
particulate loading of the atmosphere.
 
13National Academy of Sciences, Understanding Climatic Changes: A Program

for Action (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1975) p.4 4 . 
14Environmental qualit 1974 op.cit. 4 / . 
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Misuse and abuse of the land contributes to substantial atmospheric
 
dust. Any activity which removes the vegetation cover and exposes the
 
surface soils contributes to the atmospheric dust problem. Strip mining
 
is an immediate example; currently 3.1 million acres of land in this country
 
have been stripped, of which 1.3 million can be attributed to coal mining.
 
By the year 2000 another 209,000 acres in the coal rich Western states
 
15
 Abuses of the land have increased the proportion of
could be abused. 

land termed."wasteland or desert." In 1882 land so designated amounted to
 
9.4% of the total land on earth; by 1952 it had risen to 23.3% (recogniz­
ing that these numbers could reflect better monitoring as well as changing
 
definitions). 16 The Sahara Desert, moving southward at the rate of several
 
miles per year, is partially man created: the results of mismanaged
 
deforestation as well as inadequate naturally occurring climatic changes.
 
Finally, erosion of the topsoil contributes to atmospheric dust. In India,
 
fully one-third of the farmland is faced with topsoil loss due to 
erosion.17
 
Likewise, erosion is the most widespread land management problem in this
 
country, threatening 51% of the non-Federal rural land.18 Worldwide, the
 
greatest contributor to atmospheric dust may well be agriculture. Windblown
 
dust from mechanized agriculture, overgrazed arid land and smoke from
 
"slash and burn" primitive agricultural techniques generate substantial
 
amounts of atmospheric contaminants.
 
15National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering,
 
Rehabilitation Potential of Western Coal Lands: A Report to the Energy
 
Project of the Ford Foundation (Ballinger: 1974).
 
16Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population/Resources/Environment
 
(W.H. Freeman and Co.: 1972) p.2 02 .
 
17Ibid.
 
18United States Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources
 
Washington, D.C.: 1968) p.5-5-1,2.
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In sum, it appears likely that worldwide atmospheric dust will continue
 
to increase, perhaps at increasing rates. The global spread of industrial­
ization, the worldwide search for resources, the need to expand agricultur­
al productivity and the reliance upon fossil fuels is likely to ensure a
 
continuance of the atmospheric dust problem. Assuming continuation of these
 
trends, the planet is also likely to continue its cooling process, at
 
least through the end of the century.
 
What has been the effect of these weather changes and what is the
 
prognosis? First, much of the disruption of world agriculture can be
 
attributed to these weather changes. 
 Temperature changes fundamentally
 
affect location, frequency and intensity of precipitation. The general
 
consensus of the experts is that a cooling trend increases the variability
 
of the weather causing alternating periods of high and low temperatures,
 
--- 19
 
droughts contrasted with floods.
 
This increased variability can be readily seen in the global weather
 
disturbances of the last several years. The progression of the Sahara
 
desert has been discussed previously. In addition, the Sahel section of
 
Africa south of the Sahara has experienced a consistent drought for five
 
years, resulting from the shift of its normal rains to over the Atlantic.20
 
This drought is one of the fundamental causes of the current sub-Saharan
 
food problem.
 
19Douglas, & .pi4
 
20Stuart Auerbach, "The Future: 
New Ice Age or More of the Same,"
 
Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.: February 16, 1975).
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The wind currents that bring warm and cool weather, heavy precipitation
 
or none at all are largely determined by temperature changes on the planet.
 
It is possible that these wind current changes and the concomitant changes
 
in water temperatures resulted in the failure of the Peruvian anchovy harvest
 
in 1972-73. Similarly, the farmland of the United States was plagued by
 
heavier than usual rains in the planting season and hot dry weather during
 
the prime growing season, reducing the feed grain harvest 
by 17% in 1974.21
 
It is conceivable that future schemes to increase energy self-sufficiency
 
and decrease reliance upon fossil fuels may even have an impact of greater
 
magnitude upon the climate than that which-has come before. Perhaps one
 
century from now, the per capita energy consumption of a world population
 
of 20 billion will be quadrupled the present U.S. consumption rates; and
 
the major sources would be thermonuclear, nuclear, solar and coal. This
 
population would require 8 x 105 gigawatts, about 1% of the total solar
 
power absorbed at the surface. This power, of course, would be concentrated
 
on the continents, about one-fourth of the earth's area. Existing climate
 
models indicate that a 1% increase in thermal power would raise the
 
average global temperature by 10C,and some regional temperature changes
 
could raise this temperature by a factor of 1.3 to 3.0 (the effects differing
 
as a result of latitude). Hence, the future physical impact of mankind
 
could be extensive; and those technological interventions which have been
 
heralded as the panaceas for the future may in fact greatly exacerbate
 
2 2
 
global problems.
 
2 4
 2 1
"Weather Creates a Peck of Troubles," Business Week (August 17, 1974) p. .
 
2 2Kellogg and Schneider, op.cit.
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The list of current climate related calamities is already endless; for
 
example, the cooling trend of the past three decades-has reduced the growing
 
2.3
season of England by up to three weeks and the Russian wheat failure
 
of 1972 was caused by a winter freeze followed by a summer heat wave and
 
2 4
 
drought.
 
What about the future? The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra­
tion has concluded-that variability will be the keynote of the future. They
 
also estimated that in any given three year period the probability of a
 
drought seriously disrupting the American Midwest Wheat crop is 29%. 25 Any
 
increased variability will have a negative impact on food yield. As the
 
United States food surplus is used to equilibrate the world food supply,
 
any disruption in the U.S. food supply could have grave implications for
 
global food security.
 
Despite the accumulating body of evidence --Lor perhaps because of
 
this growing body of data -- the role of man in the climatic changes and
 
even the direction of that climatic change is hotly debated by the experts.
 
The prognoses for the future fall into one of three categories:
 
* 	a new ice age is coming, in part due to man's interference with
 
the atmosphere;
 
* 	the world's natural climate cycle is shifting and a period of
 
adverse weather is beginning;
 
23"NAS Warning onClimate Changes," Science News, Vol. 107 (January 23, 1975),
 
5 2
 p. .
 
24Auerbach, op.cit.
 
25flouglas; op. cit. 
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* the observed climatic change is a normal shift in the weather 
pattern leading to an Ice Age at least 15,000 years from now
 
and the atmosphere is sufficient to compensate for man's
 
activities.
 
Regardless of the direction of these three schools of thought, they do
 
agree on one aspect: weather patterns are changing and a continued period
 
of adverse weather is likely.
 
The role that man plays in this global change is also highly debated.
 
'While there is no question that atmospheric dust causes cooling, normal
 
precipitation goes far to cleanse the earth of this atmospheric dust.
 
Whether the increased concentrations of atmospheric dust is the result of
 
increased volcanic activity, industrialization, changes in patterns of
 
precipitation or a combination of these, it is not known. It has been
 
estimated that man's activities have only produced one-fifth of the atmos­
pheric dust that the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa did. The relationship of
 
climatic change to the food situation cannot be overestimated. Recently,
 
archaeologists have been relating the fall of some past power civilizations
 
to climatic changes. Repeated droughts and agricultural failure are thought
 
to have contributed to the demise of the Indus, Hittite, Mycenaean and Mali
 
S 26
 
empires. The great civilizations of Rome, Egypt and China were developed
 
during relatively warm, agriculturally supportive periods, while drought
 
and famine drove the Greeks to the Hellenic Peninsula 
97
 
Another massive debate is raging concerning activities of mankind
 
that are al-1dgedly destroying the ozone layer, that layer of "superoxygen"
 
which protects the planet from ultraviolet ,radiation. The two sources of
 
ozone destruction that are at the center of the controversy are: SST's
 
and chlorinated hydrocarbons used in the propellants of aerosol dispensed
 
26Auerbach, Op. Cit.
 
27Alexander, Op. Cit.
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materials.
 
The basic concern is that nitrogen oxides emitted into the stratosphere
 
by a fleet of SSTs -- as well as from nuclear explosions -- and chlorinated
 
hydrocarbon will combine with ozone and convert it to normal but unprotective
 
oxygen. The question then becomes (1) how important is ozone in solar
 
radiation protection; and (2) just how much would be destroyed from these
 
various activities. The lack of consensus over answers to both of these
 
questions is at the heart of the controversy.
 
Sunburn from uv exposure is well documented, and the relationship
 
between sunburn and potential skin cancer is fairly well known; hence, it
 
becomes possible to give an estimate of the skin cancer relationship to
 
ozone depletion. 2 8 Other studies at the University of Kentucky demonstrated
 
that solar ultraviolet light killed large aquatic micro-organisms in a
 
matter of minutes.2 9 Another study team isolated some instances of
 
changed rates of mutation in some plant species exposed to excessive ultra­
violet light. 3 0 The-evidence seems to suggest that while the ozone layer is
 
important and necessary as a protective shield, the amount of ozone that can
 
be safely destroyed without harmful consequences is not known.
 
The experts assessment of the potential impact of the use of the SST
 
seems to indicate that the ozone threat was somewhat overstated. After review
 
of more than 1000 investigations from 16 separate agencies, the Department
 
of Transportation's Climatic Impact Assessment Program recently concluded
 
that SST operations involving between 1 and 30 planes flying a maximum of
 
one hour per day would reduce the amount of ozone in the stratosphere by
 
28Pythagoras Cutchis, "Stratospheric Ozone Depletion and Solar Ultraviolet
 
Radiation on Earth," Science, Vol. 184, No. 4132 (April 8, 1974) p. 13
 
29
"Clime Study: SST O.K. with'Controls," Technology Review (July,August 1974)
 
p. 56
 
30 Ibid.
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no more than 0.01% annually and that over ten years the ozone depletion would
 
amount to about 0.5%. Subsonic fleets, it was estimated, now deplete the
 
stratospheric ozone at an annual rate of about 0.1%3 1  Supersonic fleets
 
have been perceived as being more dangerous because they fly at greater
 
heights with higher concentrations of ozone depletion. Other studies have come up
 
with higher levels of ozone depletion but have based their calculations on
 
the fuel inefficient American model and have estimated huge fleets, 500­
'
3 3 
100 flying 8 hours per day.32 These assumptions are not consistent 
I with current political realities. 
Based on the data available at this point in time, it is likely that
 
supersonics, as well as subsonics, do result in some appreciable depletion
 
of the stratospheric ozone layer. However, evidence to indicate that this
 
rate of depletion is hazardous does not exist. Despite this, caution
 
dictates'that supersonic transport be undertaken with adequate controls.
 
Researchers working on the SST controversy may be reaching a consensus,
 
but the furor over flurocarbon aerosol propellants is just getting underway.
 
A recent mass media magazine said aerosol cans " . . have a disastrous 
delayed effect capable of destroying all life on this planet by the year
 
2000. ,3 4 While this doomsday approach seems to be a bit of an overstatement
 
of the problem, it does indicate the level of emotion and public uproar that
 
is accompanying the issue. The issue is recognized as sufficiently threat­
ening to warrant an investigation by the National Academy of Sciences.
35
 
31"SST and Ozone: Less Danger Than Thought?" Industrial Research (March'1975)
 
p. 34
 
32
H.S. Johnston, Report LBL-2217 (Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkeley
 
Laboratory) 1973
 
3 3Perf6rmed by the MIT Depattment of Meteorology and reported in "SST: Doubts
 
Confirmed," Technology Review (October/November 1974) p. 74
 
34Michael Drosnia, "Not With a Bang But with a Psssst!" New Times (March 7, 1975)
 
p. 27
 
35 
"NAS Launches Study on Flurocarbons," Science News (NoV4mber 30,1974)p.314
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The concern about chlorinated hydrocarbons (chlorine-containing
 
fluorocarbons) is that they are disassociated by uv energy and release
 
reactive chlorine atoms which in turn react with ozone (03) to create
 
oxygen (02). It is,'this chemical reaction that has been the basis for the
 
modeling and simulation efforts to date. The most pessimistic conclusions
 
have come from F.S. Rowland at Irvine and M.B. McElroy at Harvard..
 
Rowland's observations lead him to conclude that the amount of fluorocarbons
 
in the lower atmosphere is about equal to that manufactured, meaning that
 
these chemicals'do not dissipate through normal degradation processes or
 
36
 
through rainfall.

The Harvard computer analysis is hardly more reassuring. Their results
 
are shown in Figure 4 and show that if growth continues at the 1960-72
 
rate of 22% and production is not halted for 10 years, then 10% of the
 
earth's ozone layer could be destroyed. This could translate into several
 
thousand cases of skin cancer per year. Similarly, decreases of 16% ozone could
 
result in 500,000 to 1.5 million additional cases of skin cancer and 20,000
 
to 60,000 deaths annually.
37
 
Despite the hysteria surrounding the issue, it appears that the causal
 
agent may not be properly identified. It is not freons per se that are
 
dangerous but rather the atomic chlorine produced when they are irradiated
 
by uv light. The emphasis upon freons (the chlorinated hydrocarbon propellant
 
of aerosol cans) seems misplaced as they are a relatively unimportant source
 
of atmospheric chlorine. In addition, there.is an effective mechanism for
 
removing chlorine from the atmosphere. A much larger proportion of chlorinated
 
hydrocarbons are produced in ordinary solvents, paint thinners, dry cleaning
 
36
"From Upper Arms to Upper Atmosphere," Technology Review (December 1974) p. 61
 
"Environmentalists Seek Fluorocarbon Ban," Chemistry and Engineering News
 
(December 2, 1974) p. 14
 
37 
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fluids (carbon tetrachloride, for instance) and the like. Combustion of
 
The fact that the ozone layer
fossil fuels similarly produces nitrogen oxides. 

has not been seriously depleted by all of these other potentially "threatening"
 
materials gives some insight into just how-resilient the ozone is.
 
FIGURE 4 
PROJECTED DEPLETION OF OZONE LAYER
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It is possible, of course, that 	we are approaching a limit in the
 
capacity of chlorine removing mechanisms and that only a small incrementa­
loading of freons could cause disaster. However, until more is known
 
about the chemistry of the atmosphere,it is impossible to estimate the
 
reality of this possibility. Regardless of the particular school of
 
thought that one adheres to on this issue,it is clear that the major
 
stumbling block to resolution is scientific understanding of the atmospheric
 
dynamics. 
s 
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While we have discussed at some length the potential long term effects
 
of man's activities, there is an immediate example of the impact of man's
 
activities. The weather in a downtown area is usually different from the
 
surrounding areas. Temperatures in cities are commonly 20-3 C and -even as
 
0 
much as 10 C higher than those in neighboring rural areas. This urban
 
"heat island" is due to the large areas of concrete and asphalt which absorb
 
and store heat better than vegetation and soil. Simultaneously, large amounts
 
of heat are injected into the air of cities from combustion processes and
 
air conditioners.38
 
At the same time, because of these surface temperature differences
 
and the "roughness" of the topography, there is a difference in the winds
 
of a city. The downtown urban area usually has 40% less wind overall,
 
and up to 10% less "light wind;AI These decreases in the level of wind
 
activity may have substantial impact upon the concentration of pollutants
 
in a 	region and the ability of the region to "cleanse" itself -- witness
 
the difficulties of the Los Angeles basin.
 
Some 	Potential Actions:
 
The recognition of these problems is only of recent vintage. The
 
question of what could be done about them is even less well understood.
 
The strategies reduce themselves to three categories of actions:
 
(1) 	Research into understanding global climatic interactions
 
(2) 	Actions (government incentive/regulation, technological) to
 
prevent negative consequences identified as contributing to
 
climatic change of their occurrence
 
(3) 	Actions to ameliorate negative climatic modification, and
 
(4) 	Actions to modify or influence the weather and climate.
 
38P.V. Hobbs, H. Harrison, E. Robinson, "Atmospheric Effects of Pollutants,"
 
Science, Vol. -183, N6. 4128 (March 8, 1974) p. 909+
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(1) Research Needs: Clearly the need for research is fundamental
 
and further insights must be forthcoming before any programs of climate
 
modification should be undertaken. Research should be geared to understanding
 
the long run climatic cycles and the consequences of man's perturbations of
 
these cycles. Hopefully this research would produce some simulations
 
of the global climate so that it would be possible to gain insight not
 
only into the consequences of current activities but also any consequences
 
of explicit actions to modify the climate.
 
The National Academy of Sciences has noted the inadequacy of current
 
knowledge about climates. What we cannot identify at the present time is
 
how the climatic system operates, which are its most critical, sensitive
 
parts, which processes are responsible for its changes, and what are the
 
most likely future climates. In short, while we know something about
 
climate itself, we know very little about climatic change.
39
 
(2) Preventative Actions: -Evenwithout an adequate understanding
 
.of the consequences of man's intervention in the globe, the information
 
that does exist concerning the itapact of various environmental contaminants
 
is sufficient to warrant control over their ejection into the atmosphere.
 
It is unlikely that much public support will be gained for pollution control
 
and abatement on the grounds that particulate emissions may contribute to
 
global cooling of 0.5 C over the next three decades. However, a great
 
deal of support can be mustered on the grounds that particulate emissions
 
are a substantial health hazard , cause respiratory disease and may even 
be carcinogens.
 
The current efforts underway to rehabilitate and protect the environ­
ment on the basis of public health concerns and public welfare costs will
 
39Understanding Climatic Change, Op. Cit., p. 65
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also, of course, help to protect the global ecosystem balance. Hence, if
 
the air, water, solid waste, radioactive, noise, etc., regulations are
 
met, they will protect the globe from further degradation.
 
However, this discussion refers to the United States only. Obviously,
 
the U.S. is only part of the problem and as mentioned previously the global
 
spread of industrialization and the global search for resources will
 
contribute substantially to worldwide biosphere degradation. As the
 
dynamics of climate are better understood,'it is likely that international
 
conflict could stem from disputes over environmental degradation and weather
 
pattern interruption. Hence, any preventative action, to be effective,
 
must be global in nature. Gradually, the need for global cooperation is
 
becoming apparent, witness the Stockholm Conference and the Law of the Seas
 
Conference, yet greater international cooperation is essential.
 
(3) Corrective Mechanisms: Another set of actions have to do with
 
correcting or ameliorating the effects of man's industrialization in advance
 
of substantive climatic change. Such actions would include ways of dissi­
pating the concentration of atmospheric dust, protecting the ozone layer, and
 
even increasing the 'level of CO2 in the atmosphere to encourage the green­
house effect thus counteracting the cooling trend. This does not seem to be a
 
productive area of inquiry at this point in time because of the level of
 
the state-of-the-art and the outlook for it.
 
(4) 'Climate Modification: The most radical kinds of actions are those
 
associated with actually modifying the climate and weather. A number of
 
schemes have been attempted already, such as-hail suppression technologies,
 
seeding of clouds and Snowpak enhancement. Experiences from cloud seeding.
 
experiments to date have yielded both positive and negative results. A
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study by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that a review of the
 
work done to date showed that artificial modification of precipitation
 
exercises can sometimes lead to more precipitation, can sometimes lead
 
to less, and can sometimes have no effect whatsoever. Dissipation of cold
 
fogs over limited areas appears operationally practiciable, while there
 
is no reliable procedure for dissipating warm fogs over airports. Little
 
is known about the ability to modify severe storms as data and opinions
 
4 0
 
are contradictory.
 
Research into such weather modification efforts is proceeding,
 
recognizing the infancy of the art. Simultaneously, research is underway
 
into another class of activities: massive climatic change (rather than
 
regional weather modification.) Figure 5 shows many of the schemes currently
 
contemplated. An often repeated suggestion is to eliminate the Arctic
 
Ocean ice pack. The introduction of open ocean in this region would
 
result in a much more moderate weather around the Arctic Basin with tem­
peratures 10-150C warmer. However, the possibility of more snowy winters
 
might be sufficient to start another glaciation of northern Canada and
 
Europe.41  It would be relatively simple to do; spreading black particles
 
such as soot would produce sufficient decreases in reflectivity in the
 
area to cause a large area of the ice to disappear in a period of about three
 
years.
 
Needless to say, the dangers both in a scientific sense as well as
 
in terms of international conflict of widescale weather and climate modifi­
cation are substantial. Even a seemingly humane activity as diverting a
 
40National Academy of Sciences, Weather and Climate Modification: Problems 
and Progress (National Academy of Sciences: 1973) p. 4-12 
41Kellogg and Schneider, Op. Ci. 3,54z7 
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hurricane from its path may have negative consequences because of the
 
possibility of diverting needed rainfall from a potential drought ridden
 
area.
 
Figure 5
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Kellogg and Schneider have concluded ". that it would be dangerous 
to pursue any large-scale operational climate control schemes until we can
 
predict their long term effects on the weather patterns and the climate with
 
some acceptable assurance. We cannot do so now, and it will be some time ­
if ever- before we can. To tamper with the system that determines the
 
livelihood and life styles of people the world over, would be the height
 
of irresponsibility if we could not adequately foresee the outcome. ,42
 
42Kellogg and Schneider, Op. Cit., p. 1170
 
WORLD CONCERN: ECONOMICS 
No barrier strains the world's-ability to meet the emerging crises
 
and problems more than the potential collapse of the world and domestic
 
economic system as we know it. Underlying any strategy for environmental
 
protection, energy self sufficiency, resource assurance, world food
 
adequacy is the requirement of a stable economic system generating
 
income, employment and severely needed capital. There is no assurance
 
whatsoever that these requriements will be met.
 
Inflation is a world-wide phenomena, many countries experiencing
 
inflation rates of over 20%. Unfortunately, inflation will be a continuing
 
factor in world economics, if for no reason other than the classical laws
 
of supply and demand in the marketplace. This inflation will lead to
 
the erosion of purchasing power of government as well as the individual,
 
to reduced demand, and probably most important, to the constraint of capital
 
investment.
 
The need for capital investment in many segments of the economy over
 
the next decades is enormous, if the nations.are to build the plant and
 
facilities necessary to sustain even modest economic growth or, in the
 
cases of the underdeveloped nations, to meet the rising expectations of their
 
citizens for something like economic parity with the developed nations.
 
The capital needed to-meet the U.S. expanding energy needs over the next:
 
10 years is estimated as almost $600 billion more than will be available.
 
In the aggregate, world-wide capital needs for the next decades could 
be staggering. The question is not can we sustain the economic growth levels 
of the past twenty-five years,-but can economic growth continue at any 
level during the next twenty-five? 0 
There are other economic issues with long term, future implications
 
for the American society. The continuing income gap between whites and
 
blacks based on discrimination in earnings, promotes social unrest and
 
conflict, simply adding to the tensions withinthe society.
 
ECONOMICS: THE ISSUES
 
Continuing Inflation Leading to Erosion of Purchasing Power,
 
Unemployment and Constraint of Capital Availability
 
National and International Capital Shortages Slowing, Perhaps
 
Preventing, American Economic Growth and Leading to a Decline
 
in the Domestic Standard of Living
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ISSUE: 	 CONTINUING INFLATION LEADING TO EROSION OF PURCHASING POWER,
 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND CONSTRAINT OF CAPITAL AVAILABILITY
 
The Issue:
 
For the first time in American history consumer prices as well as whole­
sale prices have experienced sustained periods of rapid increase during peace
 
time. In 1974, consumer prices increased 12.2%, the biggest annual increase
 
since 1946 when prices increased 18.2% following the abolition of World War II
 
price controls. There have been five major inflationary periods in the
 
history 	of the United States: the Revolutionary War inflation, the War of
 
1812 inflation, the Civil War inflation, the World War II inflation, and
 
the continuing Vietnam War inflation (See Figure 1). The first four of these
 
inflationary periods were generally caused by the same short-lived original
 
phenomenon; that is, government deficit spending to finance the war effort.
 
Often the wars were financed merely by printing of currency. Contrary to
 
•the current experience, the previous four inflationary periods were brought
 
to a close by an immediate return to a balanced budget, a substantial
 
decrease in total government spending and explicit anti-inflationary
 
actions. The post Vietnam inflation, contrary to the others, has persisted.
 
Quite clearly, something new is happening.
 
An examination of historical trends again shows how atypical the
 
current situation is. Figure 1 presents the wholesale and consumer price
 
index for the past 100 years or so. It is only recently, beginning around
 
the end of the 40's, that both the Wholesale Price Index and the Consumer
 
Price Index have maintained a rather consistent upward trend.
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Why is this period so different? Inflationis remaining impervious
 
to -the traditional remedies (although one school of thought argues that
 
the current dilemma exists because the traditional remedies have, in
 
fact, not been implemented). High inflation,has continued unabated for 
so
 
long that significant unemployment is occurring because of the impact of the
 
drastic reduction in disposable and discretionary income on demand.
 
The impact of this inflation has -been devastating and has caused an
 
erosion of personal income, unemployment, reduction in gross national 
.
 
product, cessation of economic growth, balance of payments deficits, and a
 
host of other related problems. This section will speculate about the
 
causes of this inflation, its implication, and possible policy responses to
 
the problem.
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
The persistence of the current periQd of inflation and its apparent
 
resistence to traditional fiscal and monetary policy have lead to profound
 
economic controversy in the academic and political circles of the country.
 
Current (i.e.. Keynesian/Friedman) economic thought argues that inflation is
 
caused by too much money 5has4ing too few goods -- this encourages escalating
 
prices until such time as hig'h prices result ina reduction in demand, and
 
prices fall, or there is less money in the system doing the chasing. The
 
corrective tools are somewhat different, depending on whether one relies upon
 
fiscal policy (Keynesian) or monetary policy (Freidman). The appropriate
 
fiscal policy would be to reduce aggregate demand by reducing government
 
spending and increasing personal and corporate income taxes. Appropriate
 
monetary policy would be to reduce the money supply by .changing the discount
 
rate and reserve requirements reducing the supply of money and 

increasing its cost. Friedman has advocated a fixed rate of money
 
7 
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supply growth (4%), his estimate of the real growth that the economy can
 
sustain (monetarists argue that if the money supply grows faster than the
 
economy, that is, GNP, then inflation results). Keynesian policies were
 
largely designed to respond to insufficient or excess demand. The supply
 
side was largely ignored. This, of course, is a natural outgrowth of the
 
Depression origins of the Keynesian economic doctrine. Hence, the bulk of
 
the available theoretical and policy tools exist to correct excess or
 
insufficient demand. It is becoming clear that these tools alone are
 
inadequate, and perhaps, even inappropriate, for the current situation.
 
It is also becoming .clear that the traditional view of inflation -- that
 
is, demand-pUZ inflation, is, in fact, only a partial explanation of
 
inflation. The second causal mechanism, cost-push inflation, is substantially
 
different in origin and requires different policy remedies. The notion of
 
cost-push inflation explains how prices can continue to rise after the economy
 
begins to slow to reduce aggregate demand. Cost-push inflation usually
 
occurs in response to previous periods of demand-pull inflation; beginning
 
often with the demands by labor unions for substantial cost'of-living
 
adjustments to compensate for the demand-pull inflation which has already
 
occurred. Hence, the economy can begin to wind down (that is, a decline in
 
demand), but because of cost-push accelerators, prices actually continue to
 
rise.
 
Looking at the inflationary period from 1966-1974, one can determine that
 
these different kinds of inflationary pressures were all operating during
 
5
 
this time. A recent investigation by Business Week indicates the dimensions
 
of the problem,(see Figure 3). From 1966-1969, the country experienced
 
traditional demand-pull inflation caused by huge government deficit spending
 
to finance the Southeast Asian war. At the beginning of this period-the
 
economy was already experiencing an industrial boom and was at full capacity;
 
hence, there was no short term way to increase supply to respond to the
 
demands that wartime deficit spending generated in the economy. Demand-pull
 
inflation resulted. This was followed by% a two year (1969-1971) period of
 
cost-push inflation during which labor unions began demanding and receiving
 
substantial cost-of-living allowances to protect their members against further
 
erosion of their real income. 
The period 1971-1972 again saw demand-pull
 
inflation, again caused by deficit spending. 
As 1972 wage controls were
 
imposed, cost-push inflation began to come under control. However, in 1973,
 
as controls were lifted, an immediate burst of cost-push inflation began
 
again. This was then followed by a substantial increase in food prices,
 
fueled by demand-pull inflation. In 1974 the skyrocketing cost of energy
 
prices-resulting from the OPEC actions began an inflationary spiral
 
(again cost-push inflation) which may finally be exhibiting some signs of
 
abating today.1
 
This view of inflation is considerably more complex than the traditional
 
demand-pull concept. It is a more pessimistic view in that it implies a
 
circular behavior that becomes increasingly impervious to ameliorative action.
 
The following section describes the events that have triggered this spiralling
 
process of inflation. These events which have never.'a't&afln tiidem before in
 
history, include:
 
1 "Why Inflation is So Hard to Cure." Business Week, June 1974..
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FIGURE 2 
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1. A concurrent industrial boom among the industrialized countries.
 
2. Price and production policy of the oil exporting countries.
 
3. Devaluation and subsequent float of the dollar.
 
4. World-wide reductions in the supply of agricultural products.
 
5. International shortages of natural resources and raw materials.
 
6. Continued and increasing Federal government spending.
 
7. The administered price concept.
 
8. Rise of multinational firms and merchant banking.
 
9. Difficulties in improving productivity.
 
1. International Industrial Boom: Within the past five or six years
 
there has been a simultaneous industrial boom among the major industrial
 
powers of the world which has lead to significant international and domestic
 
material shortages because of the international demand for materials, labor,
 
technology and skilled manpower. This international industrial boom
 
occurred at a time of insufficient international production capacity. The
 
year 1973 saw a simultaneous economic upturn in the major industrial powers,
 
including Japan, Italy, West Germany, France, U. S., 
and Great Britain, as
 
shown in Figure 3. This was the first time.since the early 1950's that
 
practically all the advanced economies of the world have shown vigorous
 
expansion at the same time. Total international trade increased about 13% in
 
real terms stimulated by strong demand for food, manufactured goods, and basic
 
materials.2
 
The occurrence of such an international industrial boom can in part be
 
explained by the incrisea t-int&rnational affluence, contributing to
 
substantial increases in the worldwide demand for consumer durables, luxury goods,
 
food products and the plant and equipment necessary to produce them.
 
Lawrence A. Mayer, "The World Economy: High Prosperity is Here, but
 
What's Around the Corner?" Fortune,.Spetember 1973, page 165
 
2 
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rIGURE 3
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One of the consequences of affluence.which profoundly affects U;S. prices
 
is the substitution of animal for vegetable protein. This substitution
 
process is seen currently in Europe and Japan. This worldwide increase
 
in demand for meat has contributed to increases in U.S. food prices.
 
The international industrial boom and rising affluence have generated 
inflation worldwide -- the U.S. is not alone in suffering from inflation. 
In fact, as Figure 4 shows, the U.S. rates of inflation are considerably 
lower than experienced in other industrialized countries. A
 
major contribution to worldwide inflation is the evolution of a one-world
 
economy, a situationin which the economic and business decisions made in
 
one country can profoundly affect the economic and business conditions
 
in another. The recognition of the interrelationship and interaction of
 
international decisions has profound implications for regulators and
 
policymakers. 
Decisions cannot be made without consideration of external
 
events. Neither can one nation have effective control over its economic
 
destiny. 
It was said in the 30's that when the United States sneezes, the
 
whole world catches a cold. It is quite clear that this view of the uni­
directional flow of economic .viruses is no longer accurate% 
The Sixties
 
view of "fine tuning" the domestic economy has proven to be unduly
 
optimistic in light of today's events.
 
There is no reason to expectthe international forces of economic 
affluence -- and interrelatedness 
-- to diminish. In fact, all the evidence 
suggests that the United States is losing its leadership and preeminence in the
 
international economic system. The current OPEC domination of the petroleum
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FIGURE 4 
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situation is transferring and redistributing the petroleum-dependent
 
nation's wealth, ensuring the rise of affluence. The United States no
 
longer leads the world in per capita income. In fact, Switzerland and
 
Sweden are ahead of the United States. Incomes are rising more quickly
 
in European countries than they are in the.United States, even-discounting
 
for inflation. In the period 1965-1973, the United States experienced an
 
average real annual increase in hourly earnings of 1.3%. During this same
 
period of time, almost every developed country of the world exceeded this
 
rate of increase. Japan's average annual increase in hourly earnings
 
was almos 10% for the same time period.3 While it may be argued that
 
foreign industrialized countries have had substantially lower salaries and
 
these increases .merelyreflect "catching up", there can be no doubt that
 
the industrialized nations are quickly gaining on the economic
 
standard of living that the United States has enjoyed.
 
Similarly, during this same period of time the United States economic
 
growth was far below that of the.rest of the world (See Figure 5). During
 
the period 1968 to 1973, the average annual percentage change in GNP in the
 
United States was 3.5% (See Figure 6). During that same period of time the
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) experienced a
 
4.9% average annual change and Japan experienced almost 10% annual growth.4
 
Clearly, the United States is no longer the economic leader of the world.
 
These forces of international industrial boom and increasing affluence
 
are likely to continue., In fact, every indicator suggests that this 
movement toward a global economy is accelerating rather than decelerating.
 
3 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States-1974, 
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, paga'828'. 
4 Ibid, page 824
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FIGURE 5 
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FIGURE 6
 
COMPARATIVE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH 
 IN GNP AND GNP/CAPITA 
1968 - 1973 
10.0 
99.6
 
9.a10 f 8.4
 
S 8.0 - .L.- ....
 
7.0 
w 
., 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.3 
4.1 4.2 
......
 
3 .0 N.3. ...... 4. 4
2.6 2 .8 
ii!!!"
"fl * :'I, :.:!L.ELL.=ptr........
 
U.S. (eOD) GERMANY U.K. CANADA JAPAN 
GNP
 
EGNP 
PER CAPITA
 
SOURCE: U.S..AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 
ORIGINAL PAGE 1Soi -POOR QUAL]TI'i 
- 14 -

Hence, we can expect that the demand for scarce trained manpower, scarce
 
technology, and scarce resources will continue to increase. This rapid
 
acceleration of industrialization in some parts of the world means that
 
more and more money will be chasing a finite (perhaps) number of goods,
 
services, and materials.
 
2. Price and Production Policies of the Oil Exporting Countries:
 
The price and production policies of the oil exporting countries out­
side the United States (OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 
Countries) wreaked havoc on the international economy. This began in late
 
1973, when the OPEC nations took direct action and formed a cartel to control
 
and dominate the supply and price of world petroleum products. This after­
math of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was quite unexpected by the developed
 
petroleum consuming nations. In retrospect, it seems somewhat naive of the
 
industrialized nationd to be surprised by these activities. It is quite
 
clear now that the OPEC countries bad' been selling their oil at unreasonably
 
low prices, which further contributed to the vulnerability of the petroleum
 
consumers.
 
While there is some evidence to suggest that the OPEC cartel is now
 
close to disintegration, the impact of such economic warfare activities
 
upon the petroleum consumers cannot be overestimated. Consider, for example,
 
the impact that these oil prices had on the U.S. Balance of Payments.
 
Immediately after the announcement of the OPEC decision in late 1973, the
 
United States trade surplus took a downward turn. At the end of 1973,
 
the U.S. Balance of Trade showed a surplus in excess of 1.5 billion dollars,
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but currently that balance is now a $7 billion deficit. 
Consider for example
 
that the U.S. spent about $20 billion on foreign oil in 1974 versus $7.5.
 
billion merely a year before. Between the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the end
 
of 1974, the OPEC nations had received more than $102 billion from the
 
5petroleum consumers. The direct impact of OPEC actions can be immediately
 
seen in the retail gasoline prices around the world as shown in Figure 7
 
comparing retail gasoline prices internationally. This clearly demonstrates­
the direct impact of the OPEC actions. Those nations which have substantial
 
domestic oil deposits, such as the United States and Canada, experienced
 
the smallest price increase while Japan, which is totally dependent on
 
foreign sources for petroleum, experienced a doubling of its retail gasoline
 
prices.
 
The implications of high energy costs are only recently becoming known
 
and quantified as the 'energy depefidency of the economy is becoming better
 
understood. One of the reasons for the substantial increases in U.S. labor
 
productivity and rates of real economic growth has been the substitution of
 
energy intensive activities for labor intensive activities. This has resulted
 
in the current energy dependency and vulnerability. The process of energy
 
substitution is especially visible in the industrialization of U.S. agriculture
 
which has become extremely energy intensive 
-- and, extremely productive.
 
The reliance upon irrigation techniques, automated large scale machinery,
 
fertilizers and pesticides, and hybrid plants has been increasing substantially
 
i4 the last several decades resulting in substantial increases in agricultural
 
productivity. As a result, it now requires more energy to produce a
 
unit of food than it did thirty years ago; however, food output per acre
 
5 Saturday Review, January 25, 1975, page 13.
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FIGURE 7 
INTERNATIONAL RETAIL GASOLINE PRICES 
(In U.S. cents for gallon of regular gas) 
COUNTRY July 31, 1974 July 31, 1974 
United States (N.Y.C.) 59.9 41.9 
Japan 136.1 83.2 
Canada (Ottawa) 57.2 56.7 
Britain '125.0 78.0 
France 131.8 106.2 
Germany 1.26.5 118.0 
Brazil 60.6 29.2 
Saudi Arabia 12.2 22.4 
Source: N. Y. TIMES, January 26, 1975. 
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has increased substantially. While the energy intensity has increased -­
(the kilocalorie returA for a kilocalorie of input has declined from 3.7 in
 
1945 to 2.82 in 1972) the labor input has declined by a factor of 3.6
 
'Similarkinds of substitutions of petro-chemical energy for human
 
energy have occurred in other industries in the United StAtes. Of'course,
 
it is not just the substitution of petroleum'energy for human energy that renders
 
the U.S. economy so vulnerable to the OPEC actions. It is also the reliance
 
upon petroleum derivatives-such as plastics, synthetic materials, and a host
 
of other hydro-carbon derivatives. The substitution of synthetic materials (by
 
and large petroleum derivatives) for natural materials is shown in Figure 8.
 
It has been argued that the abnormally low oil, electricity, and natural
 
gas prices of the past two decades distorted the efficient allocation of
 
these resources by encouraging waste and over-dependency. This dependency
 
is probably far greater than that which would have occurred had energy prices
 
been established solely by market forces.
 
While the OPEC nations clearly proved their ability to wreak inter­
national economic havoc, fears were expressed that members would ­
collect petrochemical dollars indefinitely with the total approaching 
perhaps even a trillion dollars. It is likely-that the imminent demise of
 
OPEC was an inevitable result of its short run success. These increases,
 
acting in concert with other international economic factors, triggered an
 
international recession in the industrialized world. The recession,
 
combined with oil conservation measures, has so reduced the
 
international demand for oil that some experts predict a glut on.
 
the market. Oil turned out to be more price elastic than the U.S. had
 
6 	David Pimentel, et al., "Food Production and the Energy Crisis," Science,
 
November 2, 1973, pp. 443+. r7 .1
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dared hope and far more than the OPEC nations had estimated. In addition
 
two mild winters in a row substantially reduced the demand for petroleum
 
as 	did energy conservation measures. Currently the OPEC nations, in fact,
 
are reducing production in the face of excess capacity. The OPEC output
 
is 	estimated to be 26 million barrels a day, 11 million barrels below
 
capacity.7
 
Regardless of the possible decline in the price of oil, many of the
 
inflationary pressures of the OPEC oil increases will remain within the
 
economy for some time as cost-push inflation. While many of the petroleum
 
derivative materials which were scarce are once again available, the
 
experience has dramatically indicated the vulnerability of resource
 
scarce countries to resource blackmail.
 
3. Worldwide Reduction in the Supply of Agricultural Products:
 
Rapid population growth and international weather catastrophies created
 
substantial worldwide food shortages in the 1972-1974 period. The role of
 
climate and weather change is discussed in detail elsewhere, but a quick
 
review will be made here. Among the events contributing to the international
 
food shortages were:
 
e The failure of the Peruvian anchovy crop, a basic feed
 
for poultry.
 
* 	The failure of the Russian wheat crop due to weather.
 
* 	The seventh year of sub-Saharan drought.
 
* 	The catastrophic floods and/or drought in the major agricultural
 
areas of the world.
 
e 	The inadequate American harvest due to excessive or
 
insufficient rains.
 
7Robert Z. Alrber, "Impending Breakdown of OPEC Cartel", The Wall Street
 
Journal, March 20, 1975.
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o 	Rising international affluence changing and increasing the
 
demand for food stuffs, especially for protein inefficient
 
foods (i.e., meat).
 
Rapid population gorwth in those nations experiencing the
* 

most severe agricultural problems.
 
Dramatic shortages and increasing prices of petrochemical
" 

derivative herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers.
 
* 	Dramatic spot shortages and substantial price increases in
 
energy in U. S. energy-intensive agriculture.
 
Finally, the energy intensity of U.S. agriculture provided another inflationary
 
In fagt, food prices have been the fastest
 pressure on U. S. food prices. 

growing component of the Consumer Price Index, growing faster than gasoline.
 
The price of all commodities has increased over 57% since 1967, while the
 
price of food has increased over 70% and gasoline over 60% for the same time
 
period.
 
4. International Natural Resource and Material Shortages:
 
Until very recently, the United-States and other industrialized nations
 
viewed materials as infinitely available. It was always assumed that
 
more capital investment Vould always be rewarded with discoveries of substantial
 
new deposits. Should a resource become too expensive, new extractive
 
technologies or technological substitutes could always be found (such as the
 
substitution of synthetic rubber for natural rubber.)
 
Current economic difficulties suggest that this substitution process
 
mEy not be as simple, as flexible or as optimistic as originally thought. While
 
there is no doubt, for instance, that acceptable substitutes for fossil fuels will
 
be developpd in the long run, short run difficulties for the next several
 
decades will currently be substantial with profound economic impact as there
 
do not appear to be acceptable substitutes available. Scarce materials such as
 
,72
 
- 21 ­
copper and platinum have no technological substitutes at this time. Clearly
 
the infiniteness of resources can no longer be assumed, and it is also
 
likely that infinite substitutions cannot be assumed, especially in the
 
short run.
 
Among contributing causes to the current material shortages are the
 
recent international political changes which have brought about profound
 
changes in the ownership and management of key industrial resources. The
 
end of the era of colonialism has created independent governments in some
 
lesser developed countries which are well aware of not only the hugh reserves
 
of scarce minerals that they control, but also the value of these materials
 
to the industrialized world. Hence, this mixture of economics and politics
 
result in continued cartelization of key materials and economic blackmail
 
in the future. Other lesser developed countries will become quite consaious
 
of the hundred billion dollars that the OPEC nations have received from
 
the industrialized world and will review their own resource supplies to look
 
for similar situations and are likely to apply the same approach.
 
In several key materials the United States is in an extremely vulnerable
 
position, as a discussion elsewhere on U.S. material supplies indicates.
 
By the year 2000 it is estimated by the U.S. Department of Interior and the
 
National Commission on Materials Policy that the U.S. will be substantially
 
(that is, more than 75%) dependent on foreign sources for such minerals as
 
chromium, tin, titanium, platinum, beryllium, nickel, aluminum, asbestos,
 
fluorine, and magnesium. The bulk of these resources are located in South
 
Africa or Latin America, the transitional countries that are especially
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politically and economically vulnerable. A recent study has notedthat
 
many of these scarce minerals (chromium, platinum, tungstun, maganese,
 
aluminum, titanium, and cobalt) are especially vulnerable to cartelization
 
8 
or embargo by their principal exploiters. It may well be that the dependency
 
of the United States upbn foreign sources of materials will be a source of
 
inflationary pressures, as well as political and military pressures over
 
the next several decades. This undoubtedly will prompt conservation
 
measures, development of technological substitutes, exploration of possible
 
domestic sources, and further efforts to guarantee long term foreign sources.
 
5. Devaluation of the Dollar:
 
The two devaluations of the dollar and its subsequent float resulted
 
in the under-devaluation of the U.S. dollar which encouraged exports of
 
materials which were already in short domestic supply. Figure 9 relates the
 
value of thA U.S. dollar to other major currencies of the world. The result
 
of the devaluation of the dollar has been to reduce the value of the
 
dollar relative to all major currencies except the British pound. Such
 
under-valuation of the dollar makes the American goods and products (including
 
scarce material resources) undervalued on the world market and, hence, more
 
attractive export products. At the same time, it makes imports considerably
 
more expensive and serves as an incentive to export, and a disincentive to
 
import. This is normally a procedure used by policymakers to encourage
 
exports and growth of international trend is to rectify Balance of Payments
 
difficulties and promote economic growth. However, .during periods of supply
 
problems and capacity constraints such as those of the last several years, such
 
undervaluation merely furthers the inflationary pressures upon American goods
 
by increasing total demand for them.
 
8Alvin H. King and John R. Cameron, "Materials and the New Dimensions of
 
Conflict," New Dynamics of National Security, New York, Crowell Publishers,
 
9 5
 1975, p. . 57
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6. Big Government and the Supply of Money:
 
One argument suggests that the Federal Government is the cause of all
 
inflation and that this-inflation is attributable to massive government
 
spending ("Big Government") and the concomitant increase in the supply of
 
money that has occurred over the last decade. Monetary theory states that
 
if money supply expands at a rate greater than the economy's capacity for
 
real growth then inflation inevitably will result. As Figure 10 shows; the
 
money supply has been growing at about an annual rate of 7% over the past
 
three years. The spokesman for th& monetary school, Milton Friedman,
 
advocited that monetary growth be held to a constant rate of 4% annually
 
577
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to reduce uncertainty in the market. The percentage increase is based on
 
his perception of what level of real growth that the conomy can sustain.
 
In a recent Federal Reserve Publication, an economist stated the view of the
 
monitarists quite simply: "The current inflation has not been largely
 
determined by the supply behavior of non-industrial countries. The basic
 
cause of the current inflation is the same as the cause of all previous
 
inflations -- too much money chasing too few goods." 9
 
In a desperate effort to check the growth in money supply the Federal
 
Reserve system dramatically reduced the supply of money and caused the cost
 
of money (interest rates) to rise substantially. It can be argued that
 
interest rates are themselves viewed as components of cost and monetary
 
policy may contribute to rising industrial costs. Therefore, as a result,
 
the Federal Reserve efforts to reduce the supply~of money are, in fact,
 
substantial causes to cost-push inflation. Clearly,- this can be seen in
 
the impact of such policies upon the construction industry.
 
FIGURE 10
 
GROWTH OF THE MONEY SUPPLY 
7A
 
44%-- Trend of growth% 
-SOLACE: SANFORD ROSE. "ME AGOW OF THE FPDERAL RESERVE,"' FORTM'E (JILT, 1974), P. 93. 
9Albert E. Bergur, "The Current Inflation: The United States Experience,"
 
Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, September 1974.
 
p.13.
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7. The Administered Price Concept:
 
Increasingly, prices of goods are not being established by the
 
traditional equilibrating devices of supply and demand.
 
Inflation, interest rates and even profit are being viewed as legitimate
 
costs of doing business which, like material and labor costs, must be
 
recouped through the selling price. This is a primary source of cost-push
 
inflation. Industry increasingly passes the costs of successive rounds of
 
inflation to the consumer, regardless of the demand for the product. Hence,
 
demand for the product could actually be decreasing, yet the price of the good
 
may be increasing due to these successive rounds of inflation.
 
This vicious circle of inflation -- in the face of conditions that
 
traditional economies indi6ate should result in price reduction -- becomes
 
increasingly difficult to perturb. While restrictions of demand are likely
 
to reduce the price pressures in the long run, the short run implications
 
could be far more devastating than the price pressures. Consider, for
 
example, the current situation of the automobile. Despite unprecedented
 
declines in demand, inflationary pressures have continued to force the
 
price of automobiles up. However, further attempts to reduce demand would
 
have substantial negative impact upon the economy.
 
S79 
- 26 -

Clearly, the-notion of freely fluctuating prices in the face of
 
constantly changing demand would be managerially impossible, requiring
 
a stock exchange mechanism for every wholesale and retail transaction.
 
Hence, producers establish their prices ("administer" them) and maintain
 
Unless cost'functions
them until market circumstances force a change. 

drop precipitously (witness the technologically induced cost reductions in
 
or a firm seeks to increase
 
computer componentry, calculating equipment, etc.) 

his share of the'market through price reductions (price wars), 
there are
 
few incentives to reduce price, but many forces to raise it.
 
Administered prices largely are not sensitive to changes in demand
 
because of the moderate to high concentration of most industries where the
 
concern is market share, and where any given product is likely to represent
 
but a small percentage of the firm's sales and.proftts. Hence, faced with a
 
declining share of the market and declining profits, a firm is likely to
 
diversify and eliminate that product rather than continue to sustained long
 
term losses that could be aggravated by price reductions.
 
Clearly, the existence of administered prices, the concentration of
 
American industry and the notion of cost-push inflation make price
 
increasingly impervious to changes in demand.
 
8. The Emergenae of the Multinational Firm:
 
The last decade has seen the evolution of the multinational firm, a
 
firm which truly views the world as its supplier as well as its market.
 
of evolution from an international
Several writers have noted that the mark 
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firm (which predominantly views foreign soil as a new market only) to a
 
truly integrated multinational firm is the abolition of the international
 
division, which served usually as the foreign sales office. In multi­
national firms, organization is primarily product oriented and secondarily
 
function oriented; hence, the view of the world.as a market place is
 
integrated into every activity of the firm.
 
The fundamental contribution that multinational firms make to domestic
 
inflationary pressures is that they largely escape any government attempt
 
to institute effective economic policy. Multinational manufacturing and
 
service firms together with international banking can, for instance, create
 
and participate in capital markets that are totally independent of central
 
banking activities of any country. Hence capital becomes the mobil and transferable
 
among organizations irrespective of political boundaries.
 
A recent took by Global Reach 10 contends that the multinational firm
 
dominates any political or national entity and the nation state has little
 
if any ability to regulate the multinational firm without causing domestic
 
economic havoc.
 
Again, this is another instance of an institutional change which
 
renders available economic policy obsolete because the policy tools were
 
designed for an institutional structure than no longer exists.
 
9. Difficulties of Improving Productivity:
 
A final contribution to inflation is the difficulties in achieving
 
productivity improvements in the domestic economy. One of the traditional
 
forces, and a very strong one at that, against increasing costs is to
 
improve the productivity of labor; that is, increase the output of goods or services
 
per unit of resource input (whether that resource input be labor capital,
 
t~chnology, etc.). Massive technological innovation and the aforementioned
 
Global Reach, Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E, Muller, Simon & Schuster,

1974.sl
 
10 
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substitution of mechanical petroleum based energy for human energy has resulted
 
in tremendous achievements in productivity in the manufacturing and agricultural
 
sector. However, proportionally these are declining sectors of the national
 
economy as measured by employment. Government and services accounted for
 
34% of total employment in 1960, and are projected to reach 45% by the
 
year 1985. The concept of the productivity of labor is extremely difficult
 
to apply to these economic sectors and it becomes difficult to determine
 
whether productivity is even improving or declining. How, for example, can
 
the productivity of teaching be measured? Of civil servants? Of marriage
 
counselors? And yet the costs of these services are rising, contributing to
 
the general inflation and little is known about productivity in the dominant
 
service sectors of the economy.
 
Implications of These Events:
 
These nine events never have occurred in tandem before; in fact, some
 
of them have never occurred, even in isolation. The simultaneous occurrence of
 
these events is the fundamental cause of the current economic predicament.
 
Quite predictably, the lack of experience with these interacting forces renders
 
the existing political and economic tools inadequate. The central fiscal and
 
monetary policies available have evolved from 200 years of economic thought,
 
most of which assumed the independent, even isolated, nation state. Most of
 
the current economic policies are based on the work of John Maynard Keynes whose
 
goal was to develop counter-depressionary policy tools for the 1930's. It is
 
quite clear that the economic situation that we are faced with now is quite
 
different from that which was occurring in the thirties in terms of both
 
unemployment and inflation.
 
lkonald E. Kutscher; "The United Economy in 1985: Projection of GNP, Income,
 
Output, and Unemployment," Monthly Labor Review (December 1973) p. 39.
 
- 29 -
It can be argued that the fundamental economic difficulty of this
 
country is the application of economic and policy interventions which are
 
totally inappropriate for the current institutional, structural and cultural
 
basis of the country. The entire institutional and value structure of the
 
society is so significantly different from the depressionary .period in
 
American history when the current policy tools were originally invented, that
 
the tools may, in fact, be totally inapplicable to the current situation. There
 
is no doubt that the Keynesian formulas of the '30's substantively affected American
 
life to the point of profoundly changing national goals, creating fundamental
 
legislative change, increasing the role of the Federal government-in the
 
maintenance of the economy, and fundamentally influencing-the way business and
 
government was conducted in this country. The significance and impact -of these
 
changes was so basic that it cannot be understated. For instance, the notion
 
of "full employment" as a goal and the concept of explicit action to achieve
 
this goal was completely alien to American expectations and government policy
 
in the pre-Keynesian period. Undoubtedly, one of the aspects-of the inability
 
to "fine tune" the economy is the reliance upon policy tools designed for an
 
institutional structure that no longer exists.
 
Multinationalism and the trem(ndqus concentration of productive capacity
 
in a relatively small number of firms was not even foreseen in the thirties.
 
Many of the social programs implemented in response to changing attitudes and
 
values are inflationary, and reflect structural and institutional change.
 
Daniel Bell has written recently of the "revolution of rising 'entitlements,"'
 
that is, claims upon the government to provide an array of social programs and
 
rights beyond anything heretofore demanded or expected. He notes that
 
generations ago, the French observer Tocqueville identified the demand of equality
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of opportunity as the most dominant characteristic of American culture. Bell
 
observes an aggressive shift: "Clearly, the demand of equality now goes far
 
beyond equal opportunity, or protection against unfair hazards. Too many
 
Americans who got that protection still came out losers. What is now being
 
-- ,an equal outcome to all. 
1 2
 
demanded is equality of result 

Quite clearly, the institutions that have emerged from this set of
 
values and demands are substantively different from those that developed a generation
 
ago, the period of history that was the origin of the economic tools currently
 
available. An equally preposterous and disastrous anology would be to require
 
an electronic technician trained in the thirties to repair the IBM 370 computer.
 
In both examples, the technological principles and the working mechanisms have
 
changed fundamentally, but the tools have remained the same.
 
It is quite important to note that the economy has not failed: the
 
population of the United States has never been so affluent. By 1973, the
 
average citizen's disposable income was 2.4 times as large, in constant
 
dollars, as it was in 1939. Increases in income have continually been in excess
 
of price increases. The consumption of "luxuries" is clearly increasing as well
 
as becoming more equitably distributed. A declining proportion of income is required
 
to purchase "essentials" (food, housing and clothing), a smaller portion than
 
in any foreign country. At the same time, many "quality of life" indicators
 
have shown substantial improvement: life expectancy has increased, infant mortality
 
has decreased, death rates from many diseases have declined, a larger percentage
 
of the population is going to school for a longer period of time, leisure
 
1 3
 
time is increasing.
 
12 	Daniel Bell, "The Revolution in Rising Entitlements," Fortune (April 1975),
 
p. 	99.
 
13 	Edmund Faltermayer, "Ever Increasing Affluences is Less of a Sure Thing," 
Fortune (April 1975), p. 92-97. 
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Hence, while we may not have the tools to regulate and fine tune the
 
economy as optimistic economists had led us to believe, it is quite clear
 
that the economy has generated a level of affluence for the United States
 
not heretofore experienced in the world, and perhaps not likely to be duplicated.
 
Institutional Bias Towards Inflation:
 
One of the consequences of the Keynesian economic policies of the
 
1930's is that there is now an institutional bias in the legislative,
 
regulatory and value structure of government, industry, and the public
 
towards inflation -- full employment at (almost) any cost. Previous sections
 
explored some of the external events which have contributed to the
 
inflationary pressures upon the domestic economy. This section will discuss
 
the factors which have become built-in, institutionalized and reflect the
 
inflationary bias of the economic system.
 
First, full employment has become a national goal. The
 
Employment Act of 1946, the foundation for current economic policy, declared
 
that the goal of Federal Economic Policy should be "maximum production,
 
unemployment and purchasing power." This has come to be interpreted as the
 
basis for a full employment economy. As the economist Phillips originally
 
pointed out, there is an implicit trade-off between the level of inflation
 
and the level of employment in an equilibrium economy. That is,
 
as unemployment has increased, inflation has decreased.- Therefore,
 
any policy which encourages full employment is, by definition, inflationary.
 
While the discussion of the Phillips analysis will be postponed for now,
 
there is no question that jthe goal of full employment created
 
built-in infldtionary pressures. x__2
 
Most prevalent, and somewhat redundant, is the obvious change in social
 
attitudes which encourages a tolerance for a moderate level of inflation in
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exchange for some assurance of full employment. Full employment policies
 
are inflationary and include tax cuts for individual and corporate incomes,
 
reductions in excise and sales tax, unemployment insurance (begun as a
 
counter-recessionary incentive rather than as a "good deed"), federal
 
deficit spending to increase demand, "easy" money policies, tax incentives
 
(such as the current $2000 tax credit to encourage purchases of new homes
 
to revitalize the housing industry), and increases in the level of and
 
recipients of transfer payments (i.e. a guaranteed income or negative
 
income tax). Even the more indirect efforts such as revaluation of the
 
dollar or import controls often used to stimulate exports and the domestic
 
economy are inflationary.
 
A second value change is the rising level of expectations. For
 
instance the annual salary raise is viewed as automatic and earned. Hence,
 
increasingly, the level of wages becomes separate from any judgment of or
 
increases in productivity and output. The rising level of expectations also
 
results in automatic cost-of-living escalators in union labor contracts as
 
well as in material and service contracts. The rising level of expectations
 
also generates ever increasing demand for "more," and this is viewed as a right
 
that accompanies citizenship. Hence, a vicious circle is reinforced: the more
 
prices increase, the more prices increase.
 
To some degree, rising levels of expectations contribute to another
 
institutionalized pressure towards inflation: the unprecedented levels of
 
consumer debt. The extremely easy consumer credit practices that exist
 
undoubtedly contribute to substantial increases in demand. While firms
 
are prohibited from charging usurious interest rates in most states,
 
there is no regulation governing the number of credit relationships that a
 
consumer may enter into nor any limit (other than common sense) to the
 a=X 
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magnitude of his deficit spending. Therefore, the consumer can enter into
 
virtually unlimited debt. The level of consumer debt at the current time
 
has never been higher (see Figure -11).
 
Consumer installment debt is currently $154.5 billion (August 1974),
 
an increased of more than 50% since 1970 and an increase of 3,500% since
 
1946. This debt increase is not due merely to population growth. During
 
this period of time the number of households in the United States increased
 
by 8%, while the level of consumer debt increased 50%. This adds up to
 
an increasingly large debt burden per individual household. Consumer debt
 
now amounts to more than about 16%.of disposable income. The Federal
 
Reserve notes that deliquency rates on installment loans are at their
 
highest level in more than 25 years. The biggest credit users are house­14 

holds headed by those 25-34 years old with family incomes of $10-15,000,
 
who account for 60-70% of all consumer debt. This age group is also
 
particularly hard hit by the current recession, as they are often just
 
beginning their careers and are in highly insecure positions vulnerable
 
to lay-offs. Such lay-offs could encourage even more debt financing, and
 
further fuel inflation.
 
Another inflationary bias is the personal income tax structure which
 
is not nearly as progressive as Keynesian economics dictates that it should
 
be to moderate consumer demand effectively. The underlying notion of a
 
progressive income tax is to increase spending during-periods of recession
 
and decrease spending in periods of inflation. However, taxation at upper
 
income levels is not sufficient to do this. Neither is there sufficient
 
flexibility at the lower income levels to quickly (that is, automatically)
 
14"Will Consumers Stop Buying?" Business Week, October 12, 1974, p.94. Z-
 .
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increase the level of disposable income during recessionary periods. The
 
unemployment insurance program is a similar approach to increase demand as
 
unemployment increases, and decrease it as full employment is reached.
 
However, political considerations ("unemployment benefits cause unemployment")
 
often interfere with the optimum economic considerations.
 
Another institutional deficiency is the built-in time lag between
 
recognition of a problem and the policy intervention. The reliance upon
 
legislative solutions to structural economic problems results in today's
 
policies for today's perception of yesterday's problems. This confusion
 
over the state of the economy and the appropriate, that is, politically
 
acceptable, solution can be readily seen in the current reversal of
 
.administration policy from advocating an increase in taxes to the recent
 
decrease in taxes.
 
It is beginning to be recognized that present monetary policy may, in
 
fact, be counter-productive and contribute to inflation. 
The Federal Reserve
 
has taken a number of actions to reduce the supply of money (the appropriate
 
policy of response of a monetarist to sustained periods of inflation), which
 
have resulted in "tight" money; that is, exorbitantly high interest rates.
 
The idea is that the increased cost of money will reduce the demand for it
 
(through reducing debt financing), and hence, aggregate demand will fall and
 
prices will soon drop.
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To a degree this happens. But increasingly, interest (the price of
 
Industry continues to borrow at
money) is being viewed as an input cost. 

high rates and then passes these costs forward to the consumer. Hence,
 
an argument can be made that high interest rates may, in some cases,
 
contribute to inflation.
 
There
The impact of tight money on the housing market is well known. 

is little question that the high interest rates significantly raise the
 
There is a tremendous shortage of
cost of the existing.house stock. 

country, as indicated by the homeowner vacancy rates of abouthousing in this 
1% and in urban areas the rental vacancy rate is about 2%. Hence, _
 
tight money reduces the ability to add to the housing stock (witness the
 
collapse of the housing industry as measured by housing starts). This exerts
 
extreme pressure on the existing housing supply and forces the prices of
 
these housing units up dramatically. The lower the vacancy rate in the area
 
(this is, of course, a regional phenomenon), the greater the impact of high
 
interest rates upon housing prices. This is expressly the cause of the
 
phenomenal appreciation in the cost of housing in the Washington, D.C.
 
metropolitan area, the tightest housing market in the nation.
 
In sum, the institutional mechanisms encourage inflation through
 
sustaining the cost-push forces. Current pricing policies are largely
 
unresponsive to changes in demand because of the rising cost of input
 
products.
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Industry increasingly views both inflation and profit as legitimate
 
costs of doing business. This coupled with the increased cost of input
 
factors leads to higher prices. They, in turn, pass on the costs of
 
these rounds of inflation to the consumer -- regardless of the demand.
 
Hence, the demand for their product may be decreasing, and the law of
 
supply and demand will tell us the price will fall. Yet because of these
 
previous bouts of price increases for their inputs, the costs in fact,
 
must go higher.
 
Tradeoff Between Unemployment and Inflation:
 
This section will discuss the relationship between unemployment and
 
inflation. The confusion of this tradeoff is one of the issues which is
 
at the center of current economic controversy and yields often contradictory
 
economic policy recommendations. Most fundamentally the heart of the
 
domestic economic difficulties may be the fact that the empirical relation­
ship between unemployment and inflation is changing.
 
Historical evidence indicates that there is a quantifiable relationship
 
between unemployment and inflation. Professor A. W. Phillips was the first
 
to note the empirical relationship between the rate of wage-price changes
 
and the rate of unemployment.15 The original Phillips curve (shown in
 
Figure 12) relates the set of inflation-unemployment tradeoffs or policy
 
choices that are available to economic stabilization authorities.
 
Essentially, the curve indicates that one can achieve a 2% unemployment
 
rate at a cost of 3 to 4% inflation. The implication being that the only
 
way to substantially reduce inflation further is at a cost of higher unemploy­
ment. This leads to some very hard decisions about the impact of policies
 
15A. W. Phillips, "The Relation Between Unemployment, and the Rate of.
 
Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom," Economica (November 1958).
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that the government can pursue. One of the arguments is being conducted in
 
economic circles is the degree to which the Phillips curve is shifting. The
 
original Phillips curve essentially defined full employment at about 3 or 4%.
 
That is, one could not go below that level of unemployment without
 
substantial increases in inflation. There is agreement among economists that
 
the Phillips curve has shifted substantially to the right, meaning that
 
price stability is possible only at higher levels and only can be achieved
 
at concomitant higher levels of unemployment.16 This may contribute to the
 
explanation of the present dilemma of concomitant "high" inflation and "high"
 
unemployment ("high" being merely relative to the level of expectation and
 
past experience) -- stagflation.
 
Why are higher levels of inflation and unemployment occurring? It 
is likely that the composition and causes of inflation in this country are 
changing. There are essentially three kinds of unemployment that we must 
consider. One is functional unemployment; that is, those people who are 
temporarily unemployed because they are shifting jobs, on vacation, leave 
of absence,etc. A second component is structural unemployment; that is, 
the "built-in" unemployment of the economy due to a long term mismatch of 
available skills and available employment opportunities. A large portion 
of this population is totally unskilled or possess technologically 
obsolescent skills (i.e., chimney sweeps). Note that this category of 
unemployment can co-exist with a boom economy; in fact, it is probably 
largely unaffected y industrial expansion. The third kind of unemployment
 
is the kind which we traditionally define as demand unemployment; that is
 
aggregate demand for goals and services is insufficient and workers are
 
16Note that "high" rates of inflation and "high" rates of unemployment are
 
politically defined. Professor Samuelson has noted that the modern
 
electorate has become increasingly intolerant of levels of unemployment
 
that would only have been labeled "moderate" in the 1950's.
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laid off and denied employment opportunities. This kind of unemployment is
 
amenable to such stimuli as tax cuts, federal deficit spending, "easy"
 
money-and the like, and is the kind with which the public is most familiar.
 
However, increased demand rarely has a substantial impact upon
 
structural employment. In November 1974, it was estimated that only about
 
17
 
24% of the total unemployment was due to recession. While clearly
 
recession-induced employment has increased since this time, it has been
 
suggested that the rise in structural unemployment is a fundamental weakness
 
of the presdnt day economy. Advocates of this argument indicate that the
 
fastest growing segments of the labor force are those members with the
 
greatest difficulty gaining employment because of lack of skills and
 
experience (see Figure 13). This sector includes blacks, women and
 
teenagers whose unemployment rates are highest in the nation.
 
The participation rate of women in the labor force has been increasing
 
substantially over the past decade and has now reached 45% from a level of 37%
 
in 1960. The unemployment rates of women are considerably higher than
 
that for men as shown in Figure 13. One of the current difficulties is the
 
job opportunities for women, teaching, sales and secretarial employment,
 
are becoming saturated. The decline in the birth rate combined with the
 
tremendous increase of college students majoring in education in the '60's
 
has produced a glut of teachers in the market. Simultaneously, such signi­
ficant productivity improvements are being made in sales and clerical jobs
 
through the advent of computerized information systems that the demand for
 
labor is slackening in these areas. While point-of-entry jobs (that is,
 
first jobs in the job market) have always been difficult to obtain for low
 
skilled women, blacks and teenagers, increasing difficulty is being 
experienced. L 
17"Unemployment Becomes An Explosive Issue," Business Week (November 9, 1974).
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Teenagers experienced the highest unemployment rate in the United
 
States, approaching 18%. One concern expressed by some is that the cause
 
of this is the minimum wage laws which discriminate against teenagers by
 
pricing them out of the market. Given the choice between a teenager with
 
no skills and no experience versus an older person with some skills and
 
some experience, the teenager obviously loses. There is a growing movement
 
to amend the minimum wage laws to exclude teenagers from its coverage to
 
encourage their employment. Finally, black unemployment is significantly
 
above average as well as shown in Figure 13.
 
It is argued that this population has skills and experience totally
 
unsuited to the employment opportunities that do exist. Many of the
 
current crises facing the nation have created demands for new job specialties
 
such as energy technicians and scientists. As well, legislation in
 
environmental, safety and health issues has created a tremendous demand
 
for specialists in these fields. The U.S. Department of Labor has estimated
 
that there are approximately 800,000 jobs that remain unfilled because they
 
cannot find the workers with the right skills. While this is only slightly
 
more than 10% of the total employment, it may well be vastly underestimated.
 
It has been suggested that the most short-handed industry in the United
 
States are oil drilling companies.1 8 The energy companies in general are
 
experiencing significant shortages of trained personnel. Representatives
 
from the Department of Labor indicate that this is an underlying problem
 
that is related neither toward recession nor prosperity but reflects the
 
basic malfunctioning of the job market.
 
18"A Million Jobs Go Vacant," Business Week, March 17, 1975. 
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One of the institutional difficulties contributing to unemployment
 
is that unlike commodity markets, there is an insufficient monitoring of the
 
labor supply and demand relationships resulting in both a lack of
 
information, as well as a inadequate information transfer mechanism
 
regarding the regional availability of both labor and jobs.
 
-Consequences of Long Run Inflation:
 
This section explores some of the impacts of long run inflation upon
 
the economy. Quite clearly, inflation serves as a tax upon the consumption
 
of goods and services and without simuiltaneous increases in money wages, the
 
immediate impact is to decrease the standard of living for that segment of
 
the population that does not-have access savings or deficit spending. In an
 
effort to determine the real costs of alternative standards of living, the
 
Bureau of Labor has established budgets for households estimating the amount
 
of money required to sustain three different standards of living -- low,
 
moderate and high. The budgets specify the amount of money that would&have
 
to be allocated to food, housing, transportation, medical care, social
 
security, and income taxes to maintain these alternative standards of living.
 
This is a device that the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses to determine
 
regional differences and national changes in the cost of living and is an
 
effective way of monitoring changes in the standard of living.
 
As Figure 14 indicates, the amount of income that will be required
 
to sustain a family of four at the same standard of living in 1974 as in 1973
 
increased 14.6% in that one year. In 1973, a family of four could attain
 
moderate standard of living on an income of $12,626. By 1974, the same
 
standard of living would require $14,466. 'The recent inflation hit the poor
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FIGURE 14
 
THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION
 
ON VARIOUS INCOME LEVELS
 
The figures below Are estimates of what It would cost to maintin sanJdards
 
of living judged typical for a family of four at three income levels.
 
PERCENT OF 
FAMILY BUDGET FAMILY 
DOLLARS BUDGEt* 
FOOD FALL 1973 FALL 1974 FALL 1974 
Lower $2,440 '$2,730 29.3 
Intermediate $3,183 $3,562 24.6 
Higher $4,020. $4,498 21.5 
HOUSING 
Lower $1,627 41,847 19.8
 
Intermediate $2,908 $3,301 22.8
 
Higher $4,386 $4,978 23.8 
TRANSPORTATION 
Lower $563 $644 6.9 
Intermediate $1,014 $1,159 8.0 
Higher $1,315 $1,503 7.2 
CLOTHING & 
PERSONAL CARE
 
Lower $091 $988 10.6
 
Intermediate $1,270 $1,393 9.6
 
Higher $1,846 $2,024 9.7 
MEDICAL CARE 
Lower $660 $734 7.9
 
Intermediate $664 $738 5.1
 
Higter $692 $770 3.7
 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
Lower $492 $560 6.0
 
Intermediate $647 $787 5.4
 
Higher $647 $787 3.8
 
PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXES 
Lower $724 $950 10.2
 
Intermediate $1,607 $2,033 14.1
 
Hlher $3,080 $3,842 18.4.
 
TOTAL
 
Lower $7,407 $8,453
 
Intermediate $11,293 $12,973
 
Higher $15,986 $18,402 
*Budget items not accounted for are miscellaneous expenses. 
Souree; 	 Bureau of Labor Statistis, Department of Labor, and Joint Ecootic 
Cosittee. 
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the hardest, because the prices of foods consumed in greatest quantities by
 
low income groups rose the fastest of all food commodities.
 
There are many readily apparent and immediate effects of inflation 
upon the consumption behavior of the moderate income families. For instance, 
consumption of luxury goods, consumer durables, recreation, and education 
decreases during periods of inflation -- witness the current state of the 
automobile, appliance, housing and tourist industries. 
Because inflation changes both the pattern of demand as well as the 
ZevelZ of demand for many luxury and durable goods (such as the appliances,
 
automobiles, television and consumer electronics); unemployment inevitably
 
will result in the long run. In the past, this reduction in demand has been
 
sufficient to moderate inflationary pressures and this action combined with
 
anti-inflationary actions restored price stability. As we have previously
 
discussed, the new era of administed price, cost-push inflation, and
 
structural unemployment interfere and a period of simultaneous unemployment
 
and inflation result.
 
Some Potential Actions:
 
The available solutions and policy choices are at least as numerous
 
as the advisors and economists that exist. One is reminded of Winston
 
Churchill's comment that every time five economists walked into his office,
 
he was offered six different ideas because Keynes was always arguing for two
 
different positions. The diversity of opinion has tiot change significantly
 
in the forty years since then. One of the current debates is the unemploy­
ment/inflation tradeoff suggested by Phillips and the apparent contradictory
 
notion that they could occur simultaneously. The implication of this trade­
off is that inflation can be controlled only at the cost of increasing
 
unemployment. As discussed earlier, this traditional analysis considers
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only the impact of demand-pull inflation and ignores the domestic institu­
tional changes, the "one world economy," the impact of multinational firms,
 
and the notion of administered price cost-push inflation and structural
 
unemployment. It can be argued that the panoply of actions available are
 
developed for an economic system that no longer exists. It has been said
 
that an economic model describes how the world would work if only it worked
 
that way. It is likely that it is not the policy interventions that are
 
at fault, but rather the inappropriate and irrelevant economic model to which they
 
are applied. The difficulty is not the failure of the theory, but the
 
irrelevance of existing economic models to the current economic situation.
 
There are generally six categories of actions that are advocated
 
today to improve the economic performance of the country. They include­
(1) 	monetary policy;
 
(2) 	fiscal policy;
 
(3) 	actions to affect supply and capacity;
 
(4) 	institutional mechanisms to realign the inflationary
 
biases of the economy;
 
(5) actions and policies aimed at reducing structural
 
unemployment;
 
(6) 	international mechanisms to account for the Eurodollar
 
market, multinationalism and petrodollars.
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1. Monetary Policy: Advocates of monetary policy assume that equili­
brium can be achieved merely by regulation of the supply of money. This
 
policy intervention assumes that inflation is caused by rapid growth in
 
the supply of money ("easy" money),and recession is caused by slow
 
growth in the supply of money ("tight" money). While Keynesian economists,
 
clearly agree that the stock of money should be controlled, they do not
 
agree that monetary policy instruments by themselves are sufficient for
 
stabilization. One of the current arguments, then, is whether the monetary
 
actions (in an effort to control inflation) may, in fact, be counter­
productive because of their recessionary bias. For instance, the tight,
 
money policy no doubt contributed to the -collapse of the housing market.
 
It can also be arg&ed that tight money contributes to inflation because
 
interest if viewed as a cost and the high costs of money are passed' 
on to
 
the consumers with other increasing costs.
 
Figure 11 earlier shows the trend of consistent growth of the money
 
supply in the U.S. over the past 14 years. Advocates of monetary policy argue
 
that to prevent inflation the money supply can only grow at the same rate
 
that the economy is capable of growing, Any growth beyond that contributes
 
to inflation and any growth below that contributes to recession.
 
Most monetary policy advocates also recommend a reduction in the size
 
of government because they also identify deficit spending and big government
 
as one of the major causes of distortion of the equilibrating market
 
mechanism that prevents monetary policy from achieving its goals. Through
 
adequate manipulation of the monetary supply, the rest of the economy will
 
equilibrate by itself. / 
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Monetary policymakers recognize that the increasing interrelatedness 
of
 
world economies tend to weaken the usefulness of monetary policy for
 
stabilizing prices and unemployment. Any kind of activity that 
relates one
 
country's economic activity with another country's, even international trade,
 
Hence, the increasing connection of
 renders monetary policy ineffective. 

national economic systems is a strong force against the effectiveness 
of
 
For instance, speculation in the $150 billion Euro-Dollar
 monetary policy. 19
 
One can
 
market further decreases domestic monetary policy effectiveness. 

imagine that a continual outflow of dollars to the 
petroleum producing
 
countries could have similar impact.
 
Fiscal policy is the foundation of Keynesian
2. Fiscal Policy: 

economics which suggests that an equilibrium can be maintained 
through
 
control of aggregate demand by government spending and tax policy 
manipulation.
 
It was merely a question of timing and "fine tuning" of the economy, 
and
 
Currently, the government has chosen this
 equilibrium will be achieved. 

Increased deficit
route of activities (tax cuts> to stimulate demand, 

spending by the government is also underway to further stimulate the
 
economy, recognizing the threats to price stability that are likely to
 
accompany it.
 
19Jane Sneddon Little, "The Impact of the Euro-Dollar Market on the Effective­
ness of Monetary Policy in the United States and Abroad," New England
 
Economic Review (March/April 1975).
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There is no doubt that fiscal policy is an extremely powerful economic
 
tool. 
However, the major difficulties,as previously mentioned, are the timing
 
difficulties and the progressiveness of the income tax structures. 
For
 
fiscal policy to be effective requires extremely quick recognition and
 
implementation timing, both impossible because of the political
 
process involved. 
 Secondly, the tax structure is not as steeply progressive
 
as it should be to provide the desired balancing mechanisms. Regardless,
 
fiscal policy still remains a powerful tool.
 
3. Supply and Capacity Problems: 
 Unlike other periods of inflation
 
this period is aggravated by insufficient supply and productive capacity that
 
is not readily corrected. Inadequate production capacity has plagued the
 
economy in the past; this time, however, it is not merely production line
 
capacity that is a barrier but also shortages of key resources and material
 
inputs. 
A survey of the nation's largest 500 industrial firms by the Senate
 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations indicated that the most severe
 
20
problems were steel, petrochemicals, aluminum, copper and paper.. 
Many
 
ideas have been offered to try to correct these imbalances including from
 
a national stockpiling of key materials, based on the model of the critical
 
materials stockpiling program for materials deemed necessary for national
 
defense. These new stockpiles could then be used to insure adequacy of
 
supply at reasonably stable prices. Another variation of this is to
 
20Material Shortages: 
Industry Perceptions of Shortages, Permanent
 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations,

United States Senate, August 1974.
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establish an equitable rationing system for key energy and resource
 
materials based on a system of economic priorities. A third idea which
 
has been advocated a great deal has been the establishment of anti-cartel
 
cartels. Essentially this is the effort that Dr. Kissinger has tried to
 
use in trying to gain international support for joint action against the
 
establishment of naterial based cartels. A fourth activity is aimed at the
 
regulation of transportation, energy, and material industrLes, to more
 
closely monitor their investment patterns, their capacity expansions, their
 
price increases, and in general oversee the delivery of services to both
 
consumer and industry. Many ideas revolve around incentives that would
 
encourage technological innovation and the diffusion of innovations to
 
encourage the development of new capacity, to develop technological
 
substitutes for scarce materials; and finally to find, explore and develop
 
new sources of materials and energy.
 
One of the current arguments is that government intervention in the
 
marketplace through regulation of such things as energy prices has, in
 
fact, stifled incentives to expand capacity by limiting the potential
 
return on investment. While this may be an argument for increased prices
 
now, there appears to be some merit to its historical effect on capacity.
 
4. Institutional Mechanisms, As has been mentioned previously, much
 
of the current economic dilemma is based on the institutional biases and
 
mechanisms which have been built into the economy over the last 20 or 30
 
years. Many of the economists, especially those who participated in the
 
Conference on Inflation in September, recommend fundamental changes in
 
economic institutional mechanisms to remove and alter some of the biases
 
21
 
toward continued inflation. There is consensus that institutional
 
change must occur; however, the dimensions of this change are indeed
 
2 1Troceedings on the Conference on Inflation, held at the request of
 
President Gerald L. Ford in the Congress of the United States,
 
September 27-28, 1974, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
 
- 51 ­
controversial. Senator John Tower of Texas recommended fundamental changes
 
that would basically restore things to the way they were in the 30's and
 
40's. He said: "It is clear to me that the roots of our current inflation
 
may be traced to profound historical tilt in the social tolerances and value
 
systems of our democratic system as reflected in our political decisions in
 
the 1940's. Our political body subsequently superimposed massive social
 
costs upon'the normal workings of our free enterprise system. Such costs
 
are only now coming home with the buyer and the consumer. Our greatest
 
fault has been in not correctly assessing the total cost of our political
 
actions and in educating the public as to what the true costs of programs
 
are, both in terms of tax dollars spent and inflationary pressures
 
22
 
unleashed."
 
There can be no denial that these kinds of changes have occurred
 
and that they may have rendered Keynesian economics inappropriate to the
 
current situation. The past application of Keynesian economic policies
 
have, as Senator Tower observed, changed the basic institutional mechanisms.
 
However, it is not at all clear that a return to the institutions of the
 
thirties and forties is even possible, regardless of the alleged desirability.
 
Economists, however, have suggested institutional change of another
 
sort. There are many legislative and regulatory barriers within the panoply
 
of industrial regulations that were originally created and suited for
 
particular sets of circumstances which no longer exist. For instance, one
 
of the regulations originally implemented to assist the failing U.S.
 
maritime industry was the Jones Act which said that all goods travelling
 
between American harbors must be transferred in U.S. ships. This law has
 
22Ibid, p.23.
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caused a substantial increase in the price of goods because of the
 
inability to use more efficient and cost-competitive foreign ships. It
 
could also be argued that by protecting existing non-competitive U.S.
 
shipping practices it has served as a disincentive for development of
 
comparable ships by the U.S. industry. Another law which perhaps has
 
created inflationary pressures in the cost of goods and services has
 
been the Davis Bacon Act which requires government contractors to pay union
 
wages. Some economists argued that this is unnecessary to gain the labor
 
pool required, contributes unnecessary inflationary pressures, and puts
 
the U.S. government in a non-competitive position with private industry
 
in the ability to deliver goods and services. Recommendations also have
 
been made with respect to the procurement policies of the U.S. Government,
 
the anti-trust policies, bale-outs of existing industry, fundamental tax
 
reform and revision of minimum wage laws. The economist, Dr. Hendrik
 
Houthakker, of Harvard University recently recommended to the administration of
 
Gerald Ford, that over 45 existing laws be abolished on the grounds that
 
they contribute to inflation and encourage structure unemployment.
 
4. Structural Unemployment: There is a great deal of concern, as
 
was discussed earlier, regarding the level of structural unemployment in
 
this country and the likelihood that it will require massive job creation,
 
job training, and job re-training programs in order to fundamentally lower
 
the structural employment level. One argument is that minimum wage laws
 
discriminate against the structurally unemployed that are without training
 
or experience. It has been advocated that teenagers, for instance, be
 
exempt from the law to encourage their employment. Other actions include
 
matching jobs to people, not to matching people to jobs. This implies
 
that factory design and layout would take' into account the kinds of jobs,
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skills, and the labor pool that was available rather than the optimal
 
efficiency that the engineers can provide; a design often developed in
 
the absence of any understanding of the local labor market characteristics.
 
Charles Holt of the Urban Institute argues that the nation requires
 
a permanent public job program aimed at these groups that suffer the most.
 
At the same time he argues that a second tier system which is counter­
cyclical and would come into effect if the unemployment rate rise above a
 
certain level is essential. This is a tacit admission that there is a
 
group of people that would not be employed unless explicit action is
 
taken by the Federal Government to employ them -- the notion of the Federal
 
government as the employer of last resort.23 Many economists believe that
 
this race must be greatly increased through authorization provided by the
 
Emergency Employment Act. Simultaneously, the comprehensive Employment
 
and Training Act would allocate money to state and local governments for
 
public service jobs as well as money for manpower training. However,
 
traditional manpower training programs have failed consistently as was
 
effectively demonstrated by the efforts of the 60's. Part of the problem
 
is the lack-of insight into job requirements of the future and the
 
increasing obsolescence or unappropriateness of current job skills.
 
5. Direct Government Intervention: There are two basic components
 
which are often recommended here. One is "let's live with it approach,"
 
such as indexation that is successfully used in Brazil. Indexing pegs
 
all prices and wages to the current rate of inflation so that if the
 
price of food increases 27%, then salaries increase 27%, and the cost of
 
other goods increase 27% to prevent degradation in the standard of living.
 
23
"Unemployment Becomes an Explosive Issue," 
Business Week, November 9, 1974,
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A second approach is the reliance upon wage and price controls. While
 
such wage and price controls may provide short-term relief, but upon
 
removal or relaxation of the constraints prices immediately increase rapidly.
 
This occurred in the recent 1972-73 experience, as'well as is the post-

World War II time period. History suggests that it is extremely difficult
 
if not impossible to effectively administer price and control policies.
 
To overcome the difficulties associated with temporary controls,
 
John Kenneth Galbraith, recognizing that inflation is a built-in phenomenon
 
of the economy, recommends permanent wage and price controls to control
 
price increases.
 
6. International Mechanisms: Because of this recognition that we
 
are now in a one-world economy, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
 
United States cannot act by itself to establish mechanisms to deal with
 
both unemployment and inflation. As so many of the current economic
 
difficulties are caused by activities which have occurred outside the
 
United States, it becomes quite clear that there must be an international
 
effort to establish and regulate such economic behavior.
 
Among the international actions that have been suggested is an
 
international cooperation to conserve materials and ensure supplies of
 
scarce materials, international action to reduce oil prices, and actions
 
to prevent further economic warfare.
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PREVENTING, AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND LEADING TO A DECLINE 
IN THE DOMESTIC STANDARD OF LIVING 
The Issue:
 
It may well be that the capital shortages that the United States will
 
soon experience will be the most serious problem facing this country in the
 
next several decades. All the problems besetting the nation have generated
 
a host of technological research priorities, actions and strategies that
 
should be implemented by the United States, yet all require massive capital
 
investment.
 
The discussion has identified major problem areas in American society
 
that will demand a tremendous influx of capital over the next several decades
 
if there is any hope of maintaining the high standard of living to which
 
Americans are accustomed. These critical problem areas include:
 
* obsolete plant -and equipment in American industry
 
* 	demands for pollution abatement, prevention and
 
control equipment
 
a 	fundamental retraining of the U.S. labor force to
 
combat structural unemployment and changing labor
 
demands of the future
 
* 	restoration, rebuilding, expansion and replacement
 
of American cities
 
o 	substantial additions to and replacement of the
 
nation's housing stock
 
* 	rebuilding or replacement of the nation's railroads
 
" 	tremendous maintenance requirements of the capital
 
improvements of the last two decades including the
 
demands of a federal highway system, proliferation of
 
the public school and college system, and the
 
maintenance requirements of a massive public water,
 
sewer and sanitation system
 
* the massive capital investments required for research,
 
development, construction, implementation and
 
maintenance of an exponentially growing energy system.
 
2
 
It is evident that the total price tag of these demands is in the
 
trillions of dollars; and it is also clear that the likelihood of
 
meeting these requirements is quite sli indeed. Treasury Secretary Simon
 
has suggested that U. S. capital requirements could approach $4.5 trillion
 
1
 
by the year 1985, approximately three times the level of the recent past. 
Estimates of the capital shortfall -- that is, the difference between savings 
and demand for investment capital -- range up to $1.5 trillion for the same 
time period. 
A brief review of the current economic dilemma indicates the magnitude
 
of the problem. For instance, the discussion of energy shortages elsewhere
 
identified potential technological innovations that could, if implemented adequately
 
supply domestic energy demands, but all require billions, perhaps"trillions
 
of dollars of investment. Simultaneously, any efforts to develop alternative
 
sources of scarce raw materials or to develop technological substitutions
 
for the materials also require billions, perhaps trillions, of dollars.
 
The most conservative estimates suggest that it will require $325 billion 
between now and 1982 merely to meet existing and currently anticipated pollu­
tion control requirements.2 At best, one can assume that this number is a 
gross underestimate of the real cost to achieve the same goal'(and, if there 
is one thing that the nation has learned, it is that the goal will change
 
as the state-of-the-art changes).
 
A third pressure for scarce capital is obsolete plant and equipment
 
of American industry. One estimate suggests that 14% of manufacturing plant
 
*Peter ilius, "The Capital Shortage Issue,! Washington Post (July 14, 1975), 
p.l. 
'ouncil on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental Quality, 
1974 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office) p. 221.
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and equipment was obsolete at year end, 1974.3 Because this represents the 
results of a survey in which business was asked to judge the degree of its 
own obsolescence, it is likely that the numbers (see Figure 1) are grossly 
underestimated. The same survey estimates that it would take $197 billion 
to replace technologically outmoded facilities with the best available, 
a small number indeed when compared to industry's previous estimates of 
expenditures required to meet pollution abatement regulations, and further 
reason to suspect that these numbers are grossly underestimated. It is 
quite clear that the obsolescence of plant and equipment is dramatically under­
estimated nationwide. Stories of the United States railroad system, literally 
falling apart at the seams , appear on the front page of most every newspaper. 
The United States steel industry, for example, is considerably inferior to 
its European competitors because of its reliance upon obsolete technology.
 
It can be argued, and there is supporting evidence, that many of the
 
basic industries that the United States has relied upon in the past for
 
economic growth and development are now so obsolete, so old, and so techno­
logically inferior to that of our foreign competitors that the U. S. is losing
 
its international competitive position. The decline of the American steel
 
industry is the best example of this trend: the European and Japanese steel
 
industry is far superior to that of the U.S. and is slowly gaining market
 
share.
 
A fourth problem area for the United States is the quality of its housing
 
stock. The majority of the nation's housing was built before World War II,
 
"The Rising Toll of Obsolescence," Business Week (November 30, 1974) p. 27.
61+ 
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FIGURE 1
 
HOW BUSINESS RATES THE CONDITION OF ITS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT
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and the lifespan of a housing unit is thirty years (clearly, housing units
 
can be made to last longer than this, but not without substantial improvements).
 
Almost 8% of the occupied housing is already substandard (i.e., dilapidated and/
 
or lacking some or all plumbing), and almost 10% of the population lives in
 
crowded housing (i.e., more than one person per room). The number of house­
4 
holds are growing at the rate of about 1.5% a year.
 
This means that a large proportion, perhaps as much as all, of the
 
nation's housing stock must be replaced or completely renovated before the
 
end of the century to replace the decaying housing stock, provide standard
 
housing for those that do not have it, and accommodate population growth.
 
Finally, capital requirements are increasing because of the complexity
 
of large-scale technological systems. Large-scale, complex, technological
 
systems are here and they will remain in order to benefit from the economies
 
of scale as well as the technical requirements of the processes upon
 
which they are based. Such complexity increases cost by increasing the
 
minimum size and increasing the start-up costs of the enterprise. Because
 
of the large-scale of the plant, the initial investment required is, of
 
course, substantially higher than the average start-up costs 50 years ago.
 
The size of chemical processing plants and oil refineries that are being
 
built today are, for instance, much, much larger than those of even ten years
 
ago. Substantial economic benefits result from such economies of scale that
 
accrue from centralization and vertical integration of functions; however,
 
4Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget, Social
 
Indicators 1973 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office) 1973,
 
p. 206-210.
 
initial costs are substantially greater, whatever the potential average and
 
marginal costs may be.- Because of the tremendous scale involved, the risk
 
is higher, and hence, the cost of capital will be higher.
 
Capital costs will be initially higher because the vulnerability is
 
greater. Such large-scale technological systems are exceedingly vulnerable
 
to breakdown, terrorism and accident as can be seen by the vulnerability of
 
the Northeast to the 1965 power blackout and New York City to the February
 
telephone disruptions. The difficulties that currently are being experienced
 
with nuclear fission plants again indicates the vulnerability of these large­
scale systems to even small and misleadingly insignificant malfunctions.
 
The economics of the future dictate that -massiveefforts be devoted
 
to improving the efficient and effective use of such scarce resources as
 
materials, skilled manpower, energy, capital and entrepreneurial capability.
 
This demand for increased efficiencies implies that the reliance upon large­
scale systems will increase; therefore, the cost will increase, the risk
 
will increase, and the vulnerability will increase.
 
Dimensions of the Problem
 
The historic rate of economic growth that the United States has achieved
 
has been accomplished by massive capital investment and the gradual substi­
tution of capital for labor. 
The United States has one of the highest capital
 
labor ratios in the world. The achievement of this rate of growth has
 
Largely been accomplished by increasing the productivity of capital through
 
technological advancement. 
 Hence, when we speak of a capital shortage we
 
are referring to the problem of both absolute capital availability as well
 
as the productivity of that capital. 
As is well known, the rate of increase
 
in the productivity of labor in the United States has been declining in most
 
6/7
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industries. To a large extent, this reflects the productivity of capital
 
because the major way of increasing the productivity of labor has been to
 
increase the capital and technological intensity. A separate problem
 
relating to capital shortages is the reliance upon the service industry.
 
The greatest productivity gains have been made in agriculture, followed by
 
more than 50% of the labor force is employed in the
manufacturing. Now, 

service industry, an industry that has been largely impervious to productivity
 
improvements, technological change and has remained a labor intensive industry.
 
There is considerable historical evidence that the current economic diffi­
culty in the United States may stem in part from inadequate capital investment
 
in the past. The fact that the United States is experiencing increases in
 
productivity that are below those of other industrialized Western nations is
 
well known. From 1960 to 1973 output per worker grew 2.1% annually in the
 
United States whiletit grew 9.2% annually in Japan and 5.4% annually in
 
Germany. The underlying cause for this can be found by examining the
 
differential rates of capital investment. During this same period of time,
 
the Japanese diverted 29% of their total economic output annually tb capital
 
investment in new plants and equipment, the West Germans 20%, the French
 
18.2%, the British 15.2%, and the Italians 14.4%; but the United States
 
invested only 13.6%.
 
In addition to the productivity differences, the low rate of capital
 
investment is directly responsible for many of the shortage and capacity
 
problems in key materials industries. The shortage of petroleum refining 
- capacity, chemicals and steel capacity (which in turn contributed to massive 
bottlenecks in other industries and inflation), was due to the direct results
 
of insufficient capital investment. In fact, the steel industry has estimated
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that merely to meet expansion requirements they will have to spend $3 to $4
 
billion annually through 1980 to meet the capacity requirements of 175 million
 
tons in 1980, up from 150 million tons in 1973.5 Inadequate capacity of the
 
domestic steel industry has contributed to the phenomenal growth of the
 
Japanese and West German steel industry.
 
Many industries suffering from insufficient capacity have blamed it on
 
the federal environmental standards. Requirements for pollution abatement
 
equipment have siphoned off capital from much needed investment in capacity
 
expansion. They also argued that strict adherence to federal pollution
 
mandates has forced some industries to abandon some particularly old factory
 
sites because of the prohibitively high costs of meeting the requirements of
 
the law.
 
While there may be some truth to these arguments, they are rather short­
sighted explanations for the problem. The capacity dilemma is a function of
 
the industry's shortsighted economic planning, as well as the known relation­
ship between shortages and high prices. As editoralists have indicated, the
 
interests of the oil companies and the interests of the nation are not always
 
synonymous. Finally, industry (especially the steel and paper industry, 
where capacity problems are greatest) has avoided coming to grips with the 
pollution problem for years. Hence, their current dilemma cannot be blamed. 
upon "surprise" government regulations. 
The great problems that face the nation in the decades ahead will
 
require tremendous technological improvements. In most cases it does not
 
require the development of new technology, but rather large-scale imple­
mentation of existing technology that has not heretofore been implemented
 
5
"Finding Capital for U. S. Industry," Business Week,(September 14, 1974)
 
p.108.
 
-9­
because of cost. Pollution control is an example of a problem which if it
 
had been dealt with incrementally as it occurred, the capital costs would
 
have been substantially less, and the marginal cost would have been tolerable
 
to industry and consumer alike. The fact that such measures were postponed
 
until the situation quite literally became life-threatening has increased
 
costs of the actions which now must be taken. A similar situation is true
 
with respect to energy shortages. Had ongoing exploration and development
 
programs been continually underway, it is likely that the present dilemma
 
would not be as severe.
 
Just how great are the demands for capital? It has been conservatively
 
estimated that to support real economic growth of at least 4%, the U.S.
 
must invest from $2 trillion to $4.5 trillion between now and 1985. In a
 
similar time period between 1962 and 1973, the U. S. invested about $1.5
 
trillion Even these estimates are thought too low by some. Assuming a
 
4% rate of growth this level of investment is equivalent to about 15% of
 
GNP, about the same as the historical level of investment. Some industry
 
and government spojkesmen suggest that because of energy and environmental
 
problems the level of investment may have to reach 20% of GNP.
 
These kinds of capital demands are thought to lead inevitably to
 
shortages. The New York Stock Exchange, not known for its radical
 
positions, has estimated that there will be a capital shortfall of more
 
than $600 billion through the year 1985. 7 This represents a gap between
 
D. W. Sonner and J. S. MeClenahen, "Where Will Industry Get Its 'Survival'
 
Funds?" Industry Week (September 9, 1974) p.3 6-36.
 
7The New York Stock Exchange, The Capital Needs and Savings Potential of
 
the U. S. Economy, Projections through 1985, September 1974.
 
- 10 ­
savings, both corporate and personal, and the uses of the funds, as displayed
 
in Figure 2.
 
The conclusions regarding the severity of the impending capital
 
shortages are by no means unanimous. Other organizations question the
 
legitimacy of the problem. First National City Bank, confident that inflation
 
as well as higher interest rates will soon be over, believes that fears of
 
a capital shortage will dissipate with such inflation. They argue that fear
 
of a capital shortage is a psychological concommitant to continued inflation
 
and high interest rates and as those problems dissipate, so will the
 
8 
fears.
 
Brookings Institution feels that with a near full employment economy
 
there will,be sufficient demand as well as capital. They conclude "that with
 
normal growth and without unusual sacrifices the economy will be able to
 
meet the capital demands that can be reasonably p;ojected for the remainder
 
'9
of the decade. It is this underlying assumption of these two organizations
 
that we question. It is becoming increasingly difficult to expect or hope
 
that the economy will soon rebound and that full employment or anywhere near
 
"normal growth" will soon occur. 
 Without such economic growth, -even First
 
National City Bank and Brookings question the ability of the nation to meet
 
capital needs.
 
As the discussion below will indicate, it is likely that the New York
 
Stock Exchange's estimate of a capital shortfall is, in fact, an optimistic
 
statement. If the United States is to maintain the standard of living to
 
which its citizens are accustomed, then a tremendously enlarged pool of
 
capital must be made available to business and industry.
 
8"The Facts and Fallacies of a'Capital Shortage," First National City Bank
 
5 7
Letter, December 1974, p. - . B 
Barry Bosworth, James S. Duesenberry, Andrew L. Carron, Capital Needs in
 
the Seventies (Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.) 1975, p-3.
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FIGURE 2
 
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
 
Cumulative 1974-1985
 
(Billions of Dollars)
 
Sources of Funds 
-Business Saving $2,923 
Capital Consumption Allowances $2,359 
Corporate Retained Earnings 564 
Personal Saving 1,109 
Total Sources of Funds $4,032 
Uses of Funds
 
Gross Private Domestic Investment 	 $4,503
 
Plant and Equipment 	 $2,568
 
Residential Construction 	 1,085
 
Other 850
 
Financing Federal Deficits 42
 
Net State and Local Gouernment
 
Financing Requirements 30
 
Net Sponsored Credit Agency Borrowing 103
 
Total Uses of Funds 	 $4,678
 
Saving Gap 	 ($ 646)
 
Source: 	 The New York Stock Exchange, The'Capital Ne&ds And Savings
 
Potential of the U. S. Economy, Projections Through 1985,
 
September 1974, p.1 6 .
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How did this capital shortage come about? Part of the shortage is
 
a supply related problem, and part of the dilemma is a demand related
 
phenomenon. The sections below will detail the specifies of the major
 
demand categories, but it is important"to note here some general
 
characteristics about the market forces of supply and demand of capital.
 
The Supply of Capital: The supply-side of the question is characterized
 
by fundamental institutional probl ims. There are only three m&thods available
 
for industry to raise capital: drawin-upon its own savings (retained
 
earnings), selling equity in the corporation to inyestors, or finally, debt
 
financing either by selling bonds or-otherwise participating in the capital
 
market. All three of these traditional avenues to capital have been
 
adversely affected by changes in ihstitutional and consumer behavior in
 
recent years.
 
Despite the brief surge of high profits in industry in the past two
 
years, this appears to be a short-run phenomenon that was largely inflation
 
induced. Most experts agree that profits are likely to be severely con­
strained for U. S. industry over the next few years. The ability to finance
 
internally is decreasing. The difficulty in borrowing capital is well
 
known. In addition to unprecedented high interest rates, the capital pool
 
used for borrowing is simply not available. Bankers themselves are predicting
 
-that 
 they will be unable to provide sufficient loan capital if the economy
 
rebounds as is projected by the administration., They blame an inadequate
 
capital structure supporting the banking network as reflected in the recent
 
failure of several large banks because of overstretching their commitments.
 
E. H. Yeo III, the vice-chairman of Pittsburgh Nat'ional Bank has said
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"I personally don't believe (that the nation has) the financial base for a
 
(sustained) economic expansion." Because of inadequate capital, "the
 
banking'system's share of total financing will shrink in this recovery from
 
those of past recoveries.
 
The third avenue of capital formation is selling equity positions to
 
investors. This is the most traditional and historically successful way of
 
raising capital, and it is this mechanism that is most severely constrained
 
and hampered by the behavior of financial institutions. It is generally
 
agreed that institutional investment in "favored stocks" has been so great,
 
and the potential impact of selling and buying large blocks of stock by the
 
institutions so great, that the institutional investor, (pension funds, banks,
 
trust funds, etc.) has had a negative impact on the availability of capital
 
for several reasons. Business Week has said that:
 
"Institutional concentration in a tiny handful of high­
priced, high-visibility securities has driven most
 
stocks down to historically low ratios. Unable to raise
 
new equity, companies are contracting ever-increasing
 
interest costs that cut down their existing equity's
 
attractiveness. Except for the benefit of a few famous
 
institutional favorites, the equity markets have ceased
 
to fulfill their primary purpose. Stock issues have
 
effectively ceased. In just the first six months of
 
1973, more than 300 offerings were withdrawn as unsalable. 1 1
 
The stream of equity capital to U.S. industry has run dry.
 
The lack of equity capital then forces industry into relying upon
 
greater and greater debt financing, and the gradual shift in the debt/equity
 
ratio renders the equity offerings continually more unattractive. The debt­
equity ratios of industrial companies have shifted from 25% to 40%, in just
 
10Edward P. Foldessy, "Bankers Doubt Ability to Meet Loan Needs if Economy
 
Rebounds," The Wall Street Journal, (June 13, 1975) p.l.
 
1 1
"Can U. S. Industry Find the-Money it Needs?," Business Week3
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the past ten years. This, then, forces the firm into greater debt still
 
or forces them to abandon expansion plans further aggravating capacity
 
problems and contributing to the escalation of prices (as does the high
 
cost of debt financing). The U. S. economy (government, corporate and
 
individuals alike), is in greater debt than ever before in history.
 
Corporate debt amounts to more than 15-times after-tax profits, compared to
 
under 8 times in 1955.13.
 
The role of institutions in the capital markets is difficult to quantify,
 
yet all the evidence suggests that the increasing concentration of corporate
 
assets in the hands of .afew financial institutions is having a strongly
 
negative impact on the ability of the nation to raise capital. Banks have
 
always kept their trading positions confidential and their control of
 
industrial equity is not-well known. However, estimates suggest that
 
banking institutions .own about 40-45% of the -equityof U. S. corporations,
 
but that eheir role is increasing while the role of the individual investors
 
is declining at a fast rate; perhaps the shift from individual to institutions
 
may amount to as much as $40 billion a year.
 
In addition to the assets controlled by the banks and the banking trust
 
funds, are those assets controlled by pension funds, educational endowment
 
funds, privately controlled trust funds, tax exempt-foundations and other
 
institutions. This increasing concentration of the capital assets in the
 
hands of a few conservative organizations intetisifies the inability of the
 
12"Th Crushing Burden of Corporate Debt," Business Week (October 12, 1974), 
5 4 p. .
 
13
"The Debt Economy," Business Week (October 12, 1974), p.4 5
 .
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"non-glamour" stocks to attract buyers, and decreases the willingness of
 
the capital markets to take risk. Such organizations traditionally devote
 
large portions of their portfolios to the Blue Chip stocks, to the detriment
 
of the others. Since these organizations operate in secrecy and there is
 
no regulation governing the percentage share of a firm that the institutions
 
can control, the industrial organization may become increasingly vulnerable
 
to the actions of a few large institutional investors. If one of these
 
investors decided to unload their ownership in a particular stock, it could
 
be sufficient to depress the value of that stock for some time to come.
 
In hearings before Senator Bentsents subcommittee on financial markets,
 
C. V. Wood raised the quite legitimate fear: "Will America follow the
 
pattern of Europe -- where the economy is controlled by a few great banking
 
houses?" By concentrating their ownership in a few stocks they have contri­
buted to the downward spiral of the value of stocks, as well as continued to
 
force the individual 'investorout of the market.
 
The decline df the individual investor can be explained by several
 
distinct phenomena. Surveys by the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities
 
Industry Association, and Arthur D. Little have all come to the same
 
conclusion concerning the exodus of the individual investor: over 70%
 
believe that the market is manipulated. No doubt, many of the recent stock
 
market frauds, the increase in stolen securities, and the alleged prevalence
 
of insider information has done little to increase consumer confidence.
 
Secondly, the increasing prevalence of social security and pension plans have
 
muted the need, to some degree, for insuring financial security for the future
 
through direct investment in the stock market. Thirdly, as an investment
 
-aiternative, more and more individuals are choosing land and real estate as
 
16
 
the only possible hedge against inflation. The increasing speculation in
 
land and the rising ownership of second and vacation homes is a competing
 
use for savings, and often a more successful venture. Finally, investing in
 
the stock market is associated with overall confidence in both the national
 
economy as well as the individual's personal economic fortune. Confidence
 
in both aspects is probably at a thirty year low.
 
Venture capitalist entrepreneurs are a final source of equity capital.
 
But since they contribute only an estimated $100 million a year, their
 
influence upon the capital'supply picture is almost negligible. In addition,
 
the same kinds of conservative no-risk influences which are affecting
 
other areas of the capital market are affecting the venture capitalists.
 
The'Demand for Capital: Much of the current demand for capital results
 
from the postponed investment and research of the past. In many areas this
 
occurred because of artificially low prices which generated no incentive for
 
further investment (i.e., the domestic energy industry). In other areas this
 
occurred because the benefits that were to accrue from the investment would
 
be for the common societal good, rather than for the corporate good; and in the
 
absence of federal mandate, there again was no incentive (i.e., pollution
 
abatement ana consumer product improvement).
 
Another category of capital demand comes from the lack of maintenance
 
and deterioration of etisting plant and equipment. The nation's railroads,
 
the city core, much of the national,infrastructure and publically owned
 
buildings and plants have drastically become dilapidated from insufficient
 
upkeep.
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A final pressure comes from changing assumptions and operating considera 
tions of the current environment. The era of plentiful resources is over,
 
-the era of American economic, military and technological hegemony is over,
 
and the era of unrestricted business and industrial activity is over. Instead,
 
the one world economy has appeared, combined with a fundamental shift in the
 
relative position of the factors of production in the United States.
 
The industrial machine established drives during the Industrial Revolution
 
were based on expensive and scarce skilled labor, and cheap, easily available
 
resources, capital and land. Iehce, existing industrial processes are wasteful
 
of material and resource inputs, allow for little if any recycling, and make
 
most efficient use of their historically scarce commodity, labor. Now
 
the tables are turned. Resources and material are extremely scarce, while
 
the current labor problem is an abundance of overeducated, underemployed or
 
unemployed productive workers. Shifts in the fundamental way that business
 
and industry does business is capital intensive. However, many observers
 
are optimistic about the nation's ability to accomodate to these changing
 
14
 
circumstances.
 
The following sections detail the areas of especially high capital
 
demands through the end of the century.
 
14 Glenn Hueckel,. "A Historical Approach to Future Economic Growth,"
 
Science Vol. 187 (March 14, 1975), p. 925-937.
 
Energy: One of the greatest sources of demand for capital in this
 
country will come from the strain of increasing the national energy capacity
 
to meet rising demands in the face of curtailed supply. The needs for
 
massive investment in the domestic industry stem from several problem areas.
 
One, of course, is the heightened reliance upon imported petroleum supplies
 
and the instability of this energy supply. Extrapolation of consumption and
 
demand trends indicate that for demand to grow as it has in the past.would
 
require that as much as 65% of the domestic energy supply would have to be
 
provided by imports by 1985 if no new domestic sources of energy supplies
 
could be found. This astounding reliance upon imports is up from only 17%
 
in 1973.15 Clearly, this increasing reliance upon imported energy in a
 
period of such international uncertainty is a dangerous economic and security
 
risk for the United States.
 
A second demand for energy capital comes from inadequate petroleum
 
refining capacity in this country. Because of the lack of incentive to
 
increase refining capacity during periods of low cost energy, the national
 
refining capacity is well below national requirements.
 
A third pressure is that easily available domestic energy resources
 
in the technological and economic sense, are depleted. The only
 
large supply of an easily available domestic energy source is 1.5 million
 
acres of-coal deposits in the Western United States that can be surface-mined
 
(i.e., stripped). 6 However, it is estimated that the costs of rehabilitation
 
2 Iatiofial Academy of Engineering, U. S.fEnergy Prospects: An Engineering

20
 Viewpoint (Washington, D. C.: 1974) p. .
 
l ational Academy of Sciences, Rehabilitation Potential of Western Coal
 
Lands, A Report to the Enerv Policy Project of the Ford Foundation
 
(Ballinger: Cambridge) 1974. & A
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of the stripped land could exceed $2,700 per acre, exclusive of an estimated
 
$500 - $2,000 per mile cost of road rehabilitation.17 Hence, these costs
 
somewhat belie the "ease" of access.
 
A final pressure for capital investment in the domestic energy industry
 
is the general insufficient capacity of the United States energy industry. Again;
 
because of low energy prices there was little incentive for the energy
 
industry to devote resources to exploration, and research and development of
 
alternative sources of energy. At the same time, the financial position
 
of electric utilities and the aggressive opposition to nuclear power plants
 
dramatically slowed down and increased the cost of electric power plant
 
construction. Hence, the capacity problem threatens all aspects of the
 
energy supply and transmission system.
 
The petroleum situation is especially capital intensive and a major
 
area of potential capital shortages. .Even if the consumption of oil fails
 
to grow at all beyond the present, a highly unlikely assertion, consumption
 
of oil in the 1970 to 1985 period will still result in the use of twice as
 
much petroleum as in the preceding 15 years. Chase Manhatten believes that
 
a more likely projection is that the annual rate of growth in the use of
 
oil will decline by about half, from 7.5% annually for the 1955-1970 period
 
to about 4% annually from now through 1985. Chase indicates further that
 
for the international petroleum industry to meet this minimum forecast for
 
petroleum demands requires that it find and develop a total of 600
 
billion barrels of new oil between 1970 and 1985. They further calculate
 
that even with the assumption of halving the growth rate in petroleum usage,
 
the international petroleum industry will have to invest $1.2 trillion between
 
1970 and 1985 to meet the capital requirements for capital and exploratory
 
17 bid, p.88.
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purposes, refineries and processing facilities, tankers, pipelines,
 
environmental equipment, distribution networks, and debt servicing, working
 
capital and maintenance. This level of investment for the next fifteen
 
years is 
treble the $375 billion dollars actually spent by the petroleum
 
industry in the preceding fifteen years.
 
Chase expresses concern over the potential sources of this capital and
 
suggests that because of the high risk involved in oil activities, the
 
Western countries' capital market will be unlikely to provide more than $240
 
billion so 
that the bulk of the funds (40% or $460 billion) must come from
 
industry profits. To meet these requirements, the international petroleum
 
industry must have an astounding rate of profit amounting to a total level
 
of $845 billion by 1985. This investment will be required merely
 
to provide the world's petroleum supply, regardless of alternative energy
 
sources.
 
The amount of capital required merely to meet the United States energy
 
dilemma Is equally huge. Chase suggests that the domestic oil industry will
 
require $200 billion by*1985, 18 While the estimates for total domestic
 
energy requirements vary depending upon the assumptions of oil prices and
 
the level of petroleum imports, it is generally assumed that to meet domestic
 
requirements will requite a cumulative investment of from $350 to $500 billion
 
19 
by the year 1985.' Figure 3 presents the range of estimates from different
 
sources. 
All sources assume some degree of energy conservation and substantial
 
programs designed to increase the energy self-sufficiency of the country.
 
18"11can U. S. Industry Find the Money it Needs?. Business Week.
 
1 9 Estimates of the National Petroleum Council, National Academy of
 
Engineering, Arthur D. Little, Inc., 
and the Federal Energy Administration.
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FIGURE 3
 
COMPARISON OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATES 
Cumulative 1975 - 1985
 
(Billions of 1973 Dollars)
 
YEA Accelerated PEA 
Supply Without Accelerated
Activity 	 NPC MAE ADL Workin Prores supply 
0il £ Gas 	 133 149 122 60.3 98.4 
(including refining)
 
Coal 	 8 1a 6 10.6 11.9 
Synthetic Fuels 10 19 6 .6 	 .6 
Nuclear 	 7 93 84 105.3 138.5 
fossil fuel 137 53 43 "50.5 60.3 
electric power 
plants 
Electric Trana- 42 125 90 92.1 	 116.2 
mission
 
Transportation 43 - 43 25.5() 	 25.5(,) 
Other (f) -	 8 2.2 2.2 
TOTAL 	 380 457 396 367 
 454
 
(a) U.S. Energy Outlook, a sunwary report of the National Petroleum Council, Wsanington, D.C.,
ecember 1912 	(average of four supply cases). 
(b) U.S Energy Pospeot 'An En ineoring Viehpoint, National Academy of Engineering,?ashLngton, D.c.. 1974. 
Cc) Arthur D. Little estimates based upon an energy conservation scenario. 
(d) Assumes 	 that imported oll price is $11/B. This column is considered roughly comparableto the NPC, NAE, and ADL estinates with the exception of oil and gas capital and theinclusion of 	replacesent capital costs for each activity. The pEA estimates for oile
 gas and refining do not include lease rentals and bonus payments, hence these items 
must be added to obtain co.parable costs. In order to make the PEA oil and gas figures
comparable to the other estimates, $107.4 billion should be added to the FLA oil and gas estimates. Work in progross consists of investment spending made prior to 1985
.for new plant and equipment which will not coma on line until attor 1985. 
(a) Does not include investments -required for tanker fleets, but does incluode $5.5 billion 
targeted for Tra:.-Alaska ipolinc. 
(f) Solar, Geothermal, 1lunicipal dIste Treatment Plants' and Shale Oil. 
Source: 	 Federal Energy Administration and the Federal Reserve Board,
 
Project Independence: Task Force Report - Finance (Government

21
Printing Office: Washington, D. C. November 1974, p. . 
Omrmuq 1	 AAQ-­
'OOR0 A4 
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It is not clear whether either the national lending institutions
 
or the utilities and energy companies themselves can meet these levels of
 
investment. Historically, energy capital investment has accounted for about
 
23% of the total fixed business investment, which in turn has comprised about
 
10.4% of total GNP (less than other Western industrialized countries). To
 
meet the energy investment demands, total business fixed investment must
 
command a: larger portion of GNP (perhaps up to 12% of GNP) and energy invest­
ment in turn must command a larger portion of fixed business investment,
 
from 25 to 30% of business investment. Even then, it is not at all clear
 
if the capital investment needs can be met.
 
The ability to meet these demands for capital are a function of the
 
investment capital pool that is available, and this in turn is a function of
 
the savings ratio and the GNP grdwth. While the savings ratio has been
 
consistently high in recent years; high unemployment, declining GNP growth,
 
and declining rates of growth in personal income are all having a negative
 
impact on the capital pool available for borrowing. The ability to internally
 
finance large scale projects is hurt drastically by the declining rates of
 
profit and the high costs that must be paid for equity participation.
 
While the Federal Energy Administration is confident of the ability
 
of the nation to meet the capital requirements of the energy industry, their
 
analysis is made on the assumption of an annual real GNP growth of 4%, a figure
 
unlikely to be met for some time. A second constraint, which the FEA admits
 
to, is that while the aggregate levels of capital may be attainable (a
 
conclusion which many analysts do not believe is warranted), there are likely
 
to be sectoral..roblzms within the industry. For instance,, electric
 
utilitie6 will require $365 billion by 1985 (compared to only $75 billion'in
 
--
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last ten years), only about 35% of which is expected 
to be funded internally.2O 
The particularly unfavorable investor position of the utilities is expected
 
to make capital financing of the remainder particularly difficult.
 
There is no question that the continuing energy crisis will put extreme
 
pressure on the nation's ability to provide sufficient capital investment.
 
Yet the continuing lack of a coordinated energy policy is likely to exacerbate
 
the capital shortage problem because of the continuing drain of dollars to
 
the OPEC nations -- another stress on the capital supply system.
 
Housing: Another major category of demand for capital that will strain
 
the nation's productive capacity is the demand for new and improved housing.
 
The housing crisis is not new and has been the object of concerted government
 
policy since the passage of the Housing Act of 1937, the first efforts to
 
provide housing for the poor. Government housing policy, whatever its
 
intention, has resulted in massive increases in home ownership by the middle
 
and upper income groups, with little impact upon the housing needs of the
 
poor. However, the subsidy of home ownership has contributed substantially to
 
The National
the now unrealizable goal of single family housing for all, 

Commission on Urban Problems concluded in 1968:
 
"The intent of Government policy [i.e., housing policy] 

and its effect -- has been to increase substantially the rate of
 
home ownership. The extent to which Government policy has
 
subsidized the private homeowner is not generally recognized or
 
acknowledged.. .This generous but generally unacknowledged Federal
 
subsidy to the affluent or middle-class homeowner needs to be
 
emphasized in view of the self-righteous opposition often
 
expressed toward subsidized housing for the poor.".2 1
 
The Commission noted the importance at that time of the necessity of
 
the rates of housebuilding to exceed the rate of household formation to
 
20Sommer and McClenahen, op.cit., p.38. & 34 
21 Building the Americah 'City, Report of the National Commission on Urban 
Problems to the Congress and to the President of the United States, 66
 
.
(Government.Printing Office: Washington, D. C.) 1968, p.
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compensate for crowded, substandard, and required vacant housing. During
 
the fifties and early sixties this ratio was 1.5-1.7 (that is, 1.5 housing
 
units-were built for every household formed). Assuming that the 1.5 ratio
 
could be maintained, the Commission thought it was possible to be well on
 
the way to solving the nation's housing problem by 1990. If the ratio could
 
be sustained through 1990, at that time the aggregate national housing need
 
would be only 5.7 million units, a little more than one-third of the 1960
 
figure. 22
 
However, -these figures have not been maintained and while the housing
 
situation has improved since the drastic shortages of the post World War II
 
era, there is every indication that the nation will essentially have to
 
build the equivalent of the existing housing stock to meet the needs of
 
the year 2000.
 
The demands for housing come from several sources. The first is the
 
obvious pressure from a growing population and the need to provide housing for
 
new household formation. Between 1970 and the year 2000 the number of house­
holds is expected to increase about 37% from 63.4 million to about 101 million.
 
Hence, immediately, all other things equal, an additional 37 million housing
 
units are required.
 
An added pressure is that the rate of household formation is growing
 
even assuming the lower birth rates. This is a cultural change, largely due
 
to increased mobility and affluence of the population. In the past, children,
 
especially women, lived at home with their parents until their marriage, and
 
22 1bid p.71. 14 
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even after that until the young couple became financially secure.
 
Concomitantly, the elderly and retired population often lived with their
 
children, especially if widowed or otherwise left alone. The gradual
 
collapse of the extended family as well as the change in attitudes made
 
possible by increasing affluence have since increased the tendency for
 
these population groups to form their own households. Despite the growing
 
communal movement, it is still likely that households will become smaller,
 
putting further demand on the housing supply.
 
A second pressure on the demand for housing is the quality and age of
 
the existing housing stock. While tremendous gains have been made in the
 
improving of the quality of the available housing stock, a substantial
 
amount of inadequate housing still remains. In 1940 more than 48% of the
 
households lived in substandard housing units (defined as dilapidated and/or
 
lacking in some or all plumbing); by 1970 this had declined to slightly
 
more than 7%. However, of rental occupied housing, that which the poor most
 
often occupies, over 11% is substandard 3 3 It is important to remember that
 
maintaining a standard housing supply is an on-going, up hill battle. Because
 
the average life span of a housing unit is about thirty years, constant
 
renovation and rehabilitation of the existing housing stock must be made;
 
Hence, while the percentage of substandard housing can be effectively reduced
 
to zero, housing rehabilitation must be maintained to sustain the quality of
 
housing.
 
While there was a surge of housing construction during the sixties, the
 
current housing supply is extremely tight. The national vacancy rates are
 
approximately 2%. In addition, the cost of housing is such that the majority
 
of the American public can no loAger afford a single family home. The
 
23Office of Nanagement and Budget, Social Indicators, 1973, (Govrnment
 
Printing Office: Washington, D.C.) 1973, p. 207.
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average price of new homes is $36 - 37,000, a purchase price which requires
 
a minimum of income of $18,000 to sustain. The age of the -housing stock is
 
increasing as well. Over one third of the nation's housing was built in
 
1939 or before. This represents a potential drain on capital resources
 
because the average housing unit life expectancy is only 30 years. After
 
that time, the housing unit requires capital investment equivalent to its
 
replacement costs to refurbish roofs, electrical, plumbing and heating
 
systems, etc.
 
It seems quite likely that it will be necessary to build at least the
 
equivalent of our existing housing stock by the year 2000 to meet population
 
growth between now and the year 2000; to meet the rising expectations about
 
standards of living and household formation; to accommodate vacancy allowances,
 
existing crowding and-substandard dwellings; and to allow for those dwellings
 
which will deteriorate. The capital costs for this level of construction will
 
be substantial. A minimum investment cost would be $1 trillion exclusive of
 
land, site, and development costs. This grossly underestimated number assumes
 
that there is no further deterioration of the housing stock (a futile assumption),
 
that new housing units will be high density, multi-family units (again, a
 
futile assumption given today's values), and finally, that housing costs do
 
not increase over their current level (in constant dollars).
 
It seems more likely that the total cumulative investment required for
 
new housing construction, land development and maintenance costs will exceed
 
$3 trillion between now and the year 2000, an investment equivalent to $100
 
billion annually for thirty years, beginning in 1970 (in constant dollars),
 
and an investment equivalent to four times the total housing investment in
 
1970.
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The dimension of the investment required is confirmed in a recent
 
study by General Electric. They conclude that housing will be the major
 
capital need of the country between now and 1985, and the capital require­
ments exceed those of electric utilities and the energy industry. GE
 
estimates that between 1974 and 1985 the housing industry will require
 
capital investment amounting to over $1.1 trillion. 24
 
It is evident that the United States cannot quadruple, or even double
 
its level of housing investment in the critical capital shortage years ahead.
 
It is clear that the housing standards of the average American -- a single
 
family detached dwelling on a privately-owned plot of ground -- is no longer
 
an achievable goal for the nation's future. In addition to the extraordinary
 
high construction cost of a conventional single family home (the average price
 
of a newly constructed single family home is currently $36,500), the
 
conventional mode of residential construction and sprawl is highly wasteful
 
of material and land resources, as well as inefficient in its use of utility
 
services such as heating, sewage, water and electricity. A recent study 2 5 of
 
the comparative costs-and impacts of alternative residential development
 
schemes concluded that the low density sprawl community (that is, the entire
 
community is made up of single family homes, the typical configuration of
 
,suburban development) requires 44% higher total investment costs than the
 
high density planned community (that is, 40% high-rise, 30% walk-up
 
apartments, 20% townhouses and 10% clustered single family homes), and 21%
 
24 Reginald Jones, Chairman of General Electric Co., in Sommer and MeClenahen,
 
op.cit., p.37.
 
25 Real Estate Research Corporation, The Costs of Sprawl:. Detailed Cost 
Analysis, Executive Sumary'Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.), 
April 1974. e 2 F 
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more costly than the combination mix community (that is, a community mix of
 
20% of each of the following, single family conventionally located, single
 
family clustered, townhouses, walk-up apartments and high-rise apartments).
 
The largest cost savings in the high density planned community accrue from
 
the construction costs of residential dwellings, although important savings
 
are attributable to reduced costs as-well in roads and utilities, which are
 
about 55% lower in the high density than in the low density community.
 
Probably of even greater interest is the fact that the higher costs of
 
conventional low density single family dwellings are not limited to the
 
initial investment costs but are manifested elsewhere as well. For instance,
 
while seemingly counter-intuitive, pollution is greater, and the costs of
 
abatement higher, in the low density development. Air pollution in residential
 
areas stems from automobiles and heating -- both of which are more efficiently
 
used in high density planned areas. The concluding remarks of the study
 
are strong in their advocacy of high density planned communities: "The
 
results of the study, show a surprising consistency: 'planning' to some
 
extent, but higher densities to a much greater extent, result in lower
 
economic costs, environmental costs, natural resource consumption, and some
 
personal costs for a given number of dwelling units."'26 It appears that the
 
United States cannot afford the single unit conventional residential plan in
 
the future.
 
There is another avenue of policy intervention which is likely to
 
facilitate more inexpensive housing. This has to do with the possibilities of
 
Ibid, p.6.
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industrialized housing and the relationship of low cost housing to housing
 
codes and standards and the position of the craft unions.
 
It seems clear that the only way to stem rising housing costs and
 
ensure a supply of adequate housing in the future 
is to reduce the unit costs
 
While high density living reduces unit housing costs, further
 of housing. 

economies of scale could result from industrialized housing; that 
is, the
 
and appliances, considerable
 
reliance upon prefabricated housing components 

Essentially,

economies of scale accrue from modules and service cores. 

One, considerable
 industrialized housing reduces housing costs in two ways. 

economies of scale are obtained from the assembly line manufacture of
 
particular housing components (e.g., kitchen cabinetry/appliance networks)
 
Secondly, by increasing the amount of fabrication
which reduce unit costs. 

and construction that can be done off-site rather than on-site, the ratio
 
of industrial labor to craft labor can be increased, thereby reducing the
 
costs of labor.
 
However, two factors impede the more widespread and rapid growth of
 
unions and housing standards. Union intransigence
industrialized housing: 

is often cited as one of the obstacles to lower cost housing and industrialized
 
housing. This is a legitimate complaint. However, the unions have a
 
legitimate complaint as well -- their work is dangerous, seasonal, subjective
 
to ever so slight economic disturbances and the whims of Federal Reserve
 
Board policy. Hence, their intransigence is the only method they perceive
 
available to ensure economic security. This barrier could be overcome
 
through enlightened labor-management bargaining.
 
A more difficult barrier is the variety and differences among local
 
building standards and codes. The variety of requirements has effectively
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precluded extensive use of industrialized housing components to date.
 
Housing specialists have long cited the need for national housing standards
 
that are uniform except where specific local anomalies, such as earthquakes,
 
necessitate more stringent requirements, Such uniform standards would
 
permit greater factory preparation of housing components, and hence,
 
reduced costs.
 
Another argument recently advanced against the current housing regu­
lations is that the codes demand a higher quality of housing than the popu­
lation can afford, and higher than that which is required for maintenance
 
of health and safety. This argument suggests that the poor, who can ill­
afford it, are forced to pay for level of housing in excess of what they desire
 
and in excess of what they can spend. Rather than improving their quality
 
of life, this housing standard actually detracts-from their lifestyle because
 
the large proportion of their income that must be allocated to housing
 
reduces the amount of money available for other necessities.
 
While the housing situation appears bleak, it is a situation which is
 
readily amenable to implementation of existing technology. However, as with
 
other fundamental social problems, the questions is not one of technological
 
amelioration, but rather institutional flexibility and adaptability.
 
Environmental Protection and Pollution Abatement: 
 There is little
 
argument that cleaning up the environment will be a costly venture, but at
 
that point the agreement breaks down. Estimates of the cost of meeting
 
environmental standards range from the low estimated of the government of
 
$325 billion to industry!s high estimate of close to $1 trillion by 1983 -­
the real figure is probably somewhere in between the two estimates.27
 
27Council of Environmental Quality, op.cit., p.221.5,2 7 
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There is considerable controversy among government, industry and the
 
public concerning the dangers of pollution versus the dangers of pollution
 
abatement programs. There is a growing consensus that "we ought to do
 
something," yet this consensus dissipates when the costs and potential
 
impacts are discussed. One reason that pollution abatement programs have
 
not been more successful is the lack of a strong national consensus and
 
commitment to the goal. The public is committed to the program until the
 
reality of additional auto purchase costs of $200, more costly no lead
 
gasoline, and poorer enginer performance hits them. It is not clear that
 
the consumer is willing to bear the costs of environmental protection and
 
pollution abatement, even though he demands such programs.
 
Industry, of course, is the most outspoken critic and opponent of
 
current environmental legislation and they argue that stringent environmental
 
regulation will have the following negative impacts:
 
" strain the nation's capital supply
 
" divert scarce capital from needed exploration, research and
 
development and capacity expansion aggravating material
 
supply problems and contributing to inflation
 
e render American industry increasingly non-competitive with
 
foreign firms because of the additional costs of pollution
 
abatement
 
* 	increase the flight of industry and employment centers from
 
this country to foreign manufacturing sites where pollution
 
legislation is less destructive to industry
 
a 	force plants and industry to shut down because the costs of
 
pollution abatement will bankrupt them, thereby causing
 
substantial unemployment and recession
 
* 	preclude the possibility of solving the nation's energy
 
crisis thereby contributing to further economic
 
regulation
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" 	reduce the productivity of the nation's farms'an6d raise
 
good prices domestically and reduce the ability of the
 
nation to contribute to solution of the world food
 
problem
 
* 	because environmental science is not well understood,
 
the impact of some pollution abatement technologies
 
could be equally hazardous as the pollution itself
 
* 	force unnecessary environmental control far in excess
 
of what maintenance of health and safety dictates and
 
merely cause economic dislocation
 
Of course, industry's opposition to pollution abatement regulation is
 
easily understood and explainable: for the industry itself, it is much
 
cheaper to pollute than to not pollute. As this paper argued earlier, one of
 
the sources of the current dilemma is the development of an industrial
 
machine that is based on the assumption of scarce labor and cheap and
 
abundant materials and resources. This encouraged wasteful and polluting
 
activities and discouraged efforts at recycling or reclaiming some of the
 
useful industrial wastes.
 
To some degree, the industry arguments are accurate. Some firms
 
undoubtedly will be forced to close; however, it seems reasonable that such
 
marginal plants and firms would soon be forced to closS anyway because of
 
other economic measures. The difficulties of the American textile industry
 
clearly cannot be blamed on environmental protection. Many of the plant
 
sites that are most severely hurt by pollution control legislation (small
 
paper and pulp mills, foundry mills, textile mills) are already in serious
 
economic difficulty due to old and obsolete plant and equipment, and the
 
serious competitive influx of more technological competent foreign firms.
 
It is not logical to conclude that environmental protection legislation is
 
forcing them out of business.
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Secondly, the economic disbenefits are grossly exaggerated. It is
 
clear that small, marginal and inefficient plants may close and that these
 
plant closings will cause some employment displacements regionally. However,
 
the pollution abatement and control equipment industry is one of the fastest
 
growing new businesses and will continue to grow in the future, employing
 
large numbers of the work force. Just as the computer industry and automation
 
contributed to the nation's GNP and employment base, so will the environmental
 
protection industry. Hence, the obsolete industries will be replaced by
 
sophisticated and technologically intensive industries such as pollution
 
abatement. In fact, despite the massive unemployment that the nation is
 
experiencing, environmental scientists and technologists are in extreme
 
shortage and in great demand.
 
There is some legitimacy to the observation that environmental science
 
is not well understood, and the tecent debacle of the catalytic converter
 
gives added credence to the assumption. However, it is equally foolhardy
 
to waituntil the exact interaction of man and pollutants is precisely
 
understood and quantified before beginning to act. The science is so
 
currently sufficiently sophisticated to indicate which pollutants are
 
harmful to man, animals and the biosphere. Postponing action merely adds
 
to the costs, both dollar and human.
 
The estimated costs of pollution control and abatement Vary considerably.
 
'The Council of Environmental Quality estimates that the costs of meeting
 
federally mandated standards will reach $325 through 1983 (see Figure 4).
 
This figure excludes non-point source pollution and storm and agricultural
 
runoff, estimated to reprtsent half the water pollution problems. Brookings
 
FIGURE 4 
ESTIMATED TOTAL POLLUTION CONTROL EXPENDITURES 
(In billions of 1973 dollars) 
54 1973 1982 Cumulative -- 1973-82 
Pollutant/medium Total Total Capital Total 
Capital Annual Capital Annual Invest- Annual 
O&M Costs 2 Costs3 O&M Costs 2 Costs 3 ment 0&4 Costs3 
Air pollution 
PublicPrivate 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.7 1.7 3.8 5.4 
Mobile 1.2 0.2 1.4 8.4 4.9 13.3 31.3 49.9 74.4 
Stationary 1.1 "1.1 2.2' 4.7 3.1 7.9 21.4 35.3 62.6 
Total 2.4 1.4 3.8 3.3.6 8.2 21.9 54.4 89.0 142.4 
Water pollution 
Public 
Federal 0.2 NA NA 0.2 NA NA. 1.8 NA NA 
State and Local 1.4 4.1 5.4 4.2 . 8.3 12.5 50.6 27.4 88.5 
Private 
Industrial 0.9 1.1 2.0 2.8 2.2 5.0 16.5 21.6 40.4 
Utilities NA NA 0.01 0.4 0.3 0.7 4.4 2.2 3.5 
Total, 2.5 5.2 7.4 7.6 10.8 18.2 73.3 51.2 132.4 
Noise NA 0.1 NA NA 1.0-1.4 NA 6.0-8.7 NA NA 
Radiation 
Nuclear power plants NA NA NA '0.05 < 0.05 0.07 0.3 0.08 0.3 
Solid waste 
Public 1.1 0.3 1.4 1.9 0.5 2.4 4.2 15.5 19.3 
Private 1.9 < 0.05 1.9 3.0 0.1 3.1 0.4 25.2 25.6 
Total 3.0 0.3 3.3 4.9 0.6 5.5 4.6 40.7 44.9 
Land reclamation 
Surface mining4 0.3 0 0.3 0.6 0 0.6 0 5.0 5.0 
GRAND TOTAL5 8.2 6.9 14.8 126.7 19.7 46.3 132.6 185.9 325.0 
1Operating and maintenance costs. 4Includes only coal mining. 
2Interest and depreciation. 5Does not include noise control 
30&H plus capital'costs. 
Source: Council of Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report on Environmental Quality - 1974, (Washington, D.C.:
 
Government Printing Office), p.221.
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Institution "conservatively" estimates that pollution abatement will
 
require at least $500 billion through 1982.28
 
Industry, of course, estimates the costs higher still. A coalition of
 
electric utilities (the Utilities Water Act Group) estimates that the costs
 
of meeting the water regulations for steam electric plants would require
 
over $48 billion by 1983,29 while the Council on Environmental Quality
 
Further, the utilities
estimates that it would require less than $4 billion. 

blame costs (as well as inflation) for raising the costs per unit of capacity
 
from $100 per kv to nearly $500 per kw.
3 0
 
Specific industries have estimated the costs of pollution abatement for 
them. Arthur D. Little, Inc., estimates that it will require $12 to $14 billion 
over the next nine years for the steel industry to meet the mandates of the 
Clean Air Act.31 The National Academy of Sciences estimates that it will 
require an investment of $23.5 billion per year for all automobiles on the 
highways to meet the Clean Air Standards.
32
 
Clearly, pollution abatement will be expensive, and it is also likely
 
that it will have some economic dislocations in individual sectors and regions;
 
just as some sectors will benefit greatly from the 'impact of the legislation.
 
28Bosworth, et al, op.cit.
 
29"House Units Probe EPA's Handling of Air, Water Laws," Industry Week
 
(July 29, 1974) p.16.
 
3 0
"Cash-Shy- Power Firms Trim $8 Billion From Spending Plans," Industry Week
 
(August 26, 1974), p.24 .
 
31
"Study Pinpoints Costs of Steel Plant Clean.-Up," Chemical and Engineering News,
 
(May 26, 1975), p.15 .
 
3 2Bosworth, o 
 .
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Yet the costs of pollution are great as well. One study estimates that
 
the direct economic costs of air pollution alone in 1970 was up to $18
 
33
 
billion.
 
Obsolete Plant and Equipment:
 
Another major category of demand is likely to be the costs of
 
maintaining, replacing and renovating deteriorating plant and equipment in
 
the nation. Since implementation of the gasoline tax and
 
establishment of highway fund over 40,000 miles of interstate highways have
 
been built, all requiring extensive maintenance. The nation's railroad
 
system is close to unusable, the nation's rapid transit system non-existent.
 
Despite the overabundance of schools in this country, communities are
 
building additional schools because the existing schools are deteriorating
 
from lack of maintnenace. Industry as well has equipment that is inferior
 
to its competitors, both domestic and foreign.
 
It is unclear what the costs of maintaining and replacing such
 
equipment are. In 1970 industry estimated the costs of replacing obsolete
 
equipment at over $144 billion, probably an unreasonably low number even
 
34 '
 theh. 

-Thomas E. Waddell, The Economic Damages of Air Pollution (Environmental
 
Protection Agency: Washingtion, D. C.) 1974.
 
34McGraw Hill, How Modern is American Industry , June 1970.
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ISSUE: 	 CONFLICT AND FEAR OVER THE IMPACTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 
MAY RETARD, OR MAY HASTEN, SOCIETAL PROGRESS
 
The Issue:
 
Anthropologists looking back at our time a hundred years or a thousand
 
years from now may well name it the age of transitors, computers or even
 
synthetics. They will describe our late twentieth century as a complex
 
civilization functioning through the grace of a well-oiled technology. Our
 
era will seem to them like a society which, in advanced countries at least,
 
ate what the machine manufactured, wore what the machine created, traveled
 
where technologies explored and lived where synthetically controlled
 
environments stimulated our senses and promoted our well-being. Despite
 
certain embarrassing pockets of poverty, they will find that we had greater
 
wealth, more widely distributed, than any society before us.
 
Having noticed only our technology and affluence, anthropologists will
 
have missed the point; for not only have we created this glittering era, we
 
have also come to question both our motives and the consequences of our affluence.
 
Such introspection is the essence of our time. Those future anthropologists,
 
granted sufficient insight about these self-doubts, might call our time either
 
the Age of Conscience or the Age of Cowardice; only from the perspective of
 
history will we be able to teli which name fits us best.
 
However, this concern with the fruits of our affluence and technological
 
success is not new. In fact, the beginning of such disillusionment with
 
science could be seen in the early 1920's. Bernal, writing in The Social
 
Functions of Science argued that:
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As long as the results of science appeared, at least to
 
the more respectable classes, as unmixed blessings, the social
 
function of science was so much taken for granted as not to need
 
examination. Now that science appears in a destructive as well
 
as construbtive role, its social function must be examined because
 
its very right to exist is being challenged. The scientists,
 
and with them a number of progressively minded people, may feel
 
that there is no case to answer, and that it is only through an
 
abuse of science that the world is in its present state. But this
 
defence can no longer be considered to be self-evident; science
 
must submit to self-examination before it can clear itself of
 
these accusations.1
 
More recently, another writer interested in the sociology of science identified
 
the post World War I era as the origin of the anti-science movement:
 
The social atmosphere surrounding science during the period
 
(1920's to 1930's) was one of disillusionment. The First World
 
War and subsequent dislocations of political and social life
 
shook the belief that science (and rational thought in general)
 
would lead to uninterrupted human progress, and the Depression
 
raised the problem of technological unemployment. Things went
 
so far that there were suggestions to declare a 'moratorium on
 
2
inventions'.

The fears of that period spurred serious analytic inquiry into the social
 
nature of science and resulted in the birth of a new field: the sociology
 
of science. What characterizes the current period as unique is the emotional
 
anti-science, anti-technology feelings expressed by the entire population
 
and the general recognition that technology has costs as well as benefits
 
associated with it. It is this motional concern with the risks of progress
 
that epitomizes this period of history.
 
1J'D" Bernal, The Social Function of Science, (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 
Cambridge, London) 1939, p. 1.
 
2J. Ben-David, "Introduction" to Special Sociology of Science issue:
 
International Social Science Journal XXII, No. I (1970), pp. 7-27.
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it is often argued that fear of progress is an attitude that only a very
 
rich society can afford. A society without food for its people must make progress
 
in agriculture; a society without goods for its people must make progress in
 
But when food and required material things are available to
manufacturing. 

most people and free time becomes a form of wealth, it is no longer a luxury
 
for society to question where change is taking it -- it becomes a necessity.
 
The issue is how to direct science and technology to better serve the interests
 
of humanity, whether these interests be economic or material problems, man's
 
intellectual needs, or the fundamental values that guide men and societies.
 
The developed countries of the world today are uniquely in that position.
 
We do question where change is taking us, and properly so. The issue is
 
how to direct science and technology to better serve the interests of humanity,
 
whether these interests be economic or material problems, man's intellectual
 
needs, or the fundamental values that guide men and societies.
 
The world, in the next three decades, is facing problems of unprecedented
 
complexity and importance: increasing agricultural production, distributing
 
food, providing and conserving energy, finding alternatives to depleting non­
renewable resources, protecting the world's environment, stabilizing the
 
problems implicit in maldistributions of wealth, and recognizing that all of
 
these problems have in the past been causes for conflict. All of these issues
 
face us now and promise to intensify in the immediate future. They elude
 
solution for many reasons: they are systemic -- acting on one may intensify
 
another; they require global perspective -- attempts to correct the issues 
may require abandonment of nationalism and unprecedented international
 
cooperation; they are oriented to the long term -- they require giving
 
priority to long-term considerations over short run payoffs.
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Additionally, there is one more important characteristic of these problems:
 
their interaction with science and technology. Future scientific and techno­
logical .developments could help solve or intensify most of these issues. 
The
 
nature of this interaction between sdience and the complexities of survival
 
is the focus of this paper and the discussion is developed in the following
 
sequence:
 
1. 	Recognizing that advancing science and technology has
 
sometimes had significant costs in terms of social and
 
human impacts, intellectual criticism of both science
 
and 	technology has been mounting. 
The view that tech­
nology can continue to solve problems is challenged;

critics believe that further technological development
 
may bring a net social loss.
 
2. 	Both in rdsponse to or in leading this criticism against science, public

attitudes toward science and technology have been changing
 
as well, Science and technology are recognized as having
 
societal costs; also society,wants what science does.
 
3. 	In fact, some scientific and technological developments of
 
the recent past have been threatening, and have had
 
obvious deleterious consequences.
 
4. 	Science occasionally produces intrinsically threatening
 
developments- bdcanse-it.sstuct-Eive-is -asocial,.that is
 
social need has not been a major determiuant of the direction

of research. In addition, science is perceived as having
 
failed because it addresses the wrong problems or has not
 
delivered according to expectations.
 
5. 	Technology is directed by sources'of funding. 
Funding is
 
largely controlled by mission-orientation of government
 
agencies and industrial interests. 
6. 	Despite the rise of an intellectualanti-technology move­
ment and a similar popular sentiment, the need for innovative
 
contributions from the basic and applied sciences and from the
 
physical and social technologies has never been greater.
 
7. 	However, the institutional difficulties which inhibit these con­
tributions are enormous. 
If they could be overcome to some
 
extent, science and technology could make more important
 
contribations to the solution of world problems 
 to.
 
improvements in the state of man, and to man's image of himself.
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The Criticism-of Science and Technology
 
Professor P. Siekevitz, Professor of Biochemistry, The Rockefeller Uni­
versity, summed up the arguments against further development of technology in
 
this way.
 
As an extreme, I would suggest further that technology has
 
badly outraced the political and social means of handling
 
the problems it generates, that research and development
 
are so intertwined that the former leads invariably to the
 
latter, and that, to give political methods a chancei to
 
work, or to devise new political methods, technology advance
 
and thus research, should stop....
 
I would thus suggest that the present environmental mess is
 
caused by rapid technological growth, driven on by haphazard
 
research, during the past thirty years; that this research
 
and development are inexorably linked; and that; in spite of
 
this research, we scientists have only little understanding
 
Given these beliefs, it
of the natural world around us. 

seems to me to be disastrous to think that further refined
 
technology, directed though it may be, will cure the past
 
So is it to be the ultimate responsi­technological mistakes. 

bility of scientists to society t at they discontinue their
 
existence as research scientists?
 
As Professor Siekevitz says, this is an extreme position, but it is
 
mirrored in arguments of other articulate critics of science and technology.
 
Here are some of their points:
 
- Science and technology may, through inordinate growth, beone
 
increasingly irrelevant to any human interest except that of
 
the technologist or corporate enterprise.
4
 
- Scientific projects, as practiced today, require that the
 
human being stand apart from nature as an isolated spectator
5
 
or pit man against nature.

3Science Policy Reviews, Vol. 4, No'. 2 (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle
 
Memorial Institute, 1971), p. 10.
 
4Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 234.
 
5Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
 
1972), p. 234. (Hereafter called Where the Wasteland Ends.) e
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- When scientists argue that it is their task to understand 
nature, not to determine how knowledge of nature will be 
used, critics answer; Why has science systematically taught 
-
our society to regard knowledge as a thing apart from wisdom­
- Science is being used to create new technologies which have
 
nothing to do with human need-only to create new human wants.7
 
Scientific and technological knowledge can be equated with
 
power; as knowledge,and specialization grow& power based on
 
knowledge becomes increasingly centralized.A.
 
Scientific and technological achievements which seem to have
 
benefici~l primary consequences often have pernicious side
 
effects.
 
Technology can be put to bad as well as good use--but as we
 
develop more powerful technologies, the deleterious applica­
tions can beee much more pronounced and more often outweigh
 
the benefits.mU
 
The image is of science serving technology and technology serving a
 
non-reasoning economic drive--aquisitive, depleting, polluting-moving in
 
directions which cause dehumanization, desensitization, and unexpected
 
side effects which are most often deleterious.
 
Public Attitudes toward Science and Technology
 
Are these attitudes reflected in public opinion or are they the iso­
lated feeling of a small articulate group? In 1972, the Opinion Research
 
Where the Wasteland Ends, p. 234.
 
7Rene Dubos, So Human An Animal (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
 
1968), p. 190.
 
8Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 301.
 
9Herman Kahn and B. Bruce Briggs, Things to Come (New York: MacMillan
 
'Company, 1972), p. 20. (Hereafter called Things to Corn?)
 
1 0Things to Come, p.' 208.
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Corporation conducted an opinion poll for the National Science Foundation
 
to determine public attitudes toward science and technology.1. They found
 
a generally optimistic picture:
 
- Seventy percent felt that science and technology had
 
changed life for the better.
 
- Forty-nine percent felt a sense of satisfaction or hope
 
in describing their reaction to science and technology.
 
- Fifty-nine percent valued the prestige of scientists as
 
"1excellent."
 
- Fifty-four percent felt that science and technology on
 
balance did more good than harm.
 
Figure 1 presents a summary of these portions of the poll.
 
These generally optimistic findings were challenged in a second opinion
 
poll conducted some two years later by LaPorte and Metlay.1 2 They attribute
 
the earlier optimistic response to the fact that the public made dis­
criminations between science and technology and that they were considerably
 
happier about science than they were about technology. In fact, the secbnd poll
 
found that:
 
- The public's reaction to the impact of technology upon
 
society is one of-wariness and some scepticism.
 
- The public applies a rather wide range of sometimes con­
tradictory values to its evaluation of technology.
 
- The public has a distrust of the institutions associatld
 
with decisionmaking in the technical policy areas.
 
- A clear element of political ideology is present in the
 
evaluations of technology made by an important segment
 
of the public.
 
Figures 2 and 3 summarize their major findings.
 
llNational Science Foundation, Science Indicators, 1972 (Washington,
 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). (Hereafter called Science
 
Indicators, 1972.)
 
12Todd R. LaPorte and Daniel Metlay, "Technology Observed: Attitudes of
 
a Wary Public," Science (April 1975), p. 121. (Hereafter called Larorte
 
and Metlay.) Z
 
Do you Feel That Science and Technology Have
 
Changed Life for the Better or for the Worse?
 
Percer! af tosr 
Response Percent having an opinion 
Better ................ 70 77 
Worse ................ 
Both ............... 
No effect ............. 
No opinion ............ 
8 
11 
2 
9 
9 
1 
2 
Which One of These Items Best Describe Your 
General Reaction to Science and Technology? 
Percent of those 
Response Percit Ihaving an opinion 
Satisfaction oir hope ... 49 58 
Excitement or wonder . 23 27 
Fear or alarm ......... 6 7 
Indifference or lack 
of interest .......... 6 7 
No opinion ............ 10 -
Overall, Would You Say That Science and Technology

Do More Good Than Harm, More Harm Than Good,
 
or About the Same Each?
 
Responye Peret,, 
Percent of those 
having an opinion 
More good ............ 
More harm ........... 
About the same ....... 
"54 
4 
31 
61 
4 
35 
No opinion ............ 11 
SOURCE: Science Indicators, 1972, pp. 96-97.
 
FIGURE 1
 
SUMARY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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Strongly Agree/ Strongly 
Statement agree disagree disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Unless scientists are allowed SCIENCE 
to study things that don't ap­
pear important or beneficial 54.2 32.1 3.8 5.9 4.0 
now, a lot of very beneficial 
things probably won't ever 
be invented 
2. Basically all scientific 
discoveries are good things; 
it is just how some people 45,9 29.0 5.4 13.5 6.6 
use them that causes all 
the trouble. 
TECHNOLOGY
 
3. 	Any attempt to control which 
inventionq are widely pro­
duced or made available will 14.7 22.5 11,0 29.8 21.9 
make our lives worse. 
4. 	No one should attempt to
 
regulate which inventions
 
are produced because it 18.1 26.8 8.3 27.1 19.6
 
interferes with the in­
dividual's right to decide
 
what he wants to buy.
 
5. 	No one should attempt to
 
regulate which inventions 21.4 25.1 10.8 27.4 15.3
 
are produced because they 
do not know how to do it. 
SOURCE: Science, Vol. 188, No. 4184 (April 11, 1975), p. 122.
 
Figure 2 	Should science and technology be controlled?
 
(percentage of those answering) 
Low High 
disen- Inter- disen­
chantment mediate chantment 
1 2 3 4 5 
I. 	It would be nice if we
 
would stop building so 32.3 24.6 8.7 22.1 12.2 
many machines and go 
back to nature
 
2. 	 Technology has made life 24.5 33.3 8.0 24.3 10.0 
too complicated
 
3. 	 People have become too 9.2 12.8 5.7 34.3 38.0 
dependent on machines 
4. 	 People shouldn't worry 
about harmful effects of
 
technology because new 5.5 10.3 5.2 30.9 48.3 
inventions will always 
come along to solve the
 
problems 
SOURCE: Science, Vol., 188, No. 4184 (April 11, 1975), p. 123. 
Figure 3 	 How disenchanted are people with technology 
(percentage of those answering) 
OF 	 (2S17T~Oit 
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If these findings are representative of public opinion, they'indicate that in
 
1974, at least, 'almost 80 percent of the people no longer believed that new
 
technologies would come along to solve their problems while 72 percent felt that
 
people had become too dependent on machines.
 
LaPorte and Metlay also inquired about the public's evaluation of
 
certain current technological developments, such as household appliances;
 
automobiles, automated-factories, the space program, and atomic weapons.
 
They found, in general that,
 
...positive public response to past and present tech­
nological development, overlaid with a set of concerns
 
about the more general consequences of that development.
 
This combination of attitudes appears to reflect a
 
tension in values, visible in the priorities held by

the public which determine whether a technological
 
development is "advantageous. u13
 
Science is Asocial -- TheStructure of Science is a Determinant of the Content 
of Science 
Science is not unconstrained for it moves in directions which are 
largely determined by the scientific reward system and the scientific 
method itself. These guiding factors however, are not related in any 
reliable way to social need; on the contrary, they may produce results which 
are socially catastrophic. 
That there are fashions in basic science is clear. In the decades
 
after the Second World War, interest centered around the development and appli­
cation of controlled nuclear reactions. Today, interests center around
 
understanding of genetic mechanisms and inventing techniques for trans­
mitting genetic information in biology; in particle physics, around the
 
13LaPorte and Metlay, op.it,, p,124.
 
further disaggregation of matter; in astronomy, around the remote exploration of
 
planets through unmanned probes and the exploration of the heavens using new
 
regimes of the electromagnetic spectrum. Such foci of interest largely result from
 
spectacular discoveries and new capabilities which have fired the imaginations of
 
scientists and opened new domains of knowledge to prospecting. In the case of
 
nuclear physics, the trigger for the new fashion was the atomic bomb and the
 
research which surrounded its development; the current interest in biology
 
can be traced back to the publication by Watson and Crick of the model for
 
the DNA molecule. It would be fascinating to catalogue these tides of in­
terest, using various scientific abstracting media as a data source, since
 
the ebb and flow of scientific fashion may give some warning about the raw
 
materials of tomorrow's technology.
 
Why do researchers rush into newly opened problem areas? The answer seems
 
to be that the reward system which society and science itself has devised for
 
scientists involves reputation, that reputation requires discovery and pub­
lication, and that discovery and publication require the performance of spectacular
 
and original work. Clearly, most opportunity for spectacular and original work
 
exists at the new frontiers of knowledge. The problem is that the new frontiers
 
too frequently do not coincide with the needs of society.1
4
 
Furthermore, the scientific method itself provides constraints on
 
science which limit the areas open to "acceptable" investigation. In his
 
book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn defines "normal
 
science" as distinct from "scientific crises".15 The majority of
 
scientists pursue normal science most of the time, which involves the probing
 
l4 Theodore J. Gordon, Ideas in Conflict (New York: St. Martins Press, 1966).
 
'15Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, ILL: The
 
University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
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of the discipline's paradigms, testing their application in new domains,
 
and increasing their precision and generality. "Normal" basic research is
 
this not directed toward the novel, but toward the refinement of previously
 
stated positions. Sometimes a paradigm fails in a new application; and in
 
consequence, a crisis develops in which old ideas no longer prove viable.
 
Today we may look back at many old ideas, which science once held inviolate
 
that have been replaced and buried. For example, phrenology, phlogiston,
 
and caloric, all dead ideas, have been replaced by more viable concepts of
 
nature. Unfortunately, only in crisis situations are proposals which
 
challenge the old paradigms usually admissable. An idea presented before
 
its time is in trouble; its author is likely to be treated with derision
 
and disrespect.
 
In other words, the processes of both "normal" basic research and the
 
efforts to handle the crises of paradigm revision lead to a survival of the
 
fittest among ideas. This progress, however, represents and evolution toward
 
an ultimate state of knowledge dictated not by social need but by the mechanigs
 
of scientific progress.
 
Funding is a Determinant of the Directions of Technology
 
When President Eisenhower departed from office, he made a well remem­
bered speech about the dangers of the military-industrial complex. In the 
same address, he said that "the prospect of domination of the Nation's 
scholars by Federal Government, project allocation, and the power of money, 
is ever present, and is gravely to be regarded." In other words, he who pays 
the piper still calls the tune. 6 _62 
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While it can be argues that basic research produces inventions that
 
are asocial because of the methods of science and demands of monied groups,
 
R & D as a whole does have links to social needs insofar as the missions of
 
the agencies which fund it are directed toward social interests and needs.
 
By far, the largest funding source for basic research (65%) is the Federal
 
Government. (See Figure 4) Figure 5 illustrates that the preponderance
 
of these expenditures were made by universities and colleges (57 percent).
 
Most of these funds for research and development flow from the Federal
 
Government through various mission-directed agencies. The Department of
 
Defense is the biggest single mission-agency, and most of its support is
 
related to weapons systems. Only in the case -of the National Science Foundation
 
is money available for research without specific mission orientation. But of
 
the billions spend for research, NSF's contribution is miniscule.
 
Figure 6 shows the Federal R & D expenditures for selected functions for
 
the period 1963-1972. Expenditures for national defense and space predominate,
 
although the rise and fall of expenditures for space is clearly apparent.
 
Defense R & D expenditures between 1963 and 1972 ranged from 48 to 64 percent
 
of all Federal R & D expenditures. R & D expenditures for space in 1972 were
 
19 percent of all Federal R & D funding. Expenditures in the "civilian" areas-­
that is non-defense and non-space - have grown significantly in recent years. 
In 1963, "ciizilian" areas accounted for 14 percent of the total'R & D expend­
itures; by 1972, they accounted for 27 percent. 
That portion of R & D which is not government funded is largely supported 
by industry, which justifies its expenditures in terms of the talent it attracts 
and the possibility of developidg new and important proprietary products. Corporate­
sponsored research is usually very much in the interest of the corporation. 
- -
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SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Science Indicators, 1972, p. 35.
 
FIGURE 4
 
BASIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURES 
-- BY SOURCE OF FUNDS 
(Constant 1958 Dollars) 
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FIGURE 5
 
BASIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURES 
-- BY PERFORMER 
(Constant 1958 Dollars) 
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The United States currently devotes about 2.5 percent of its GNP to the
 
performance of research and development (Figure 7).1 6 The federal contri­
bution to this R & D has been decreasing while the industrial contribution
 
has been rising. In view of the problems which face us two questions remain:
 
should a nation such as ours be content to spend only 2.5 percent of its
 
GNP on R & D, and are we spending that money in the places where it will do
 
the most good?
 
16Compared with 3 percent for the U.S.S.R. and 2.1 percent for the United
 
Kingdom.
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Figure 7 	National R&D expenditures, 1961-1972,
 
as a percentage of GNP
 
Science, Technology, and Social Values
 
In the previous section it was argued that science produces
 
results because of an internal reward system which favors certain directions
 
over others. In essence, science functions to expand the bound­
aries of knowledge while technology often responds to economic drives.
 
Technology produces information and mechanisms for accomplishing new ends
 
which may 	be based on science or folklore but, nevertheless, respond to a kind
 
of economic need. When these kinds of innovation are introduced into
 
society, value changes sometimes occur. This is the kind of dynamics that
 
Jacques Ellul refers to when he describes the technological juggernaut
 
17
 
The machine of science 'and technology
descending on society, ready or not. 

1Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).
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grinds out change and these changes descend on society, which must adapt in
 
its wake. Ellul argues that the mechanisms of science and technology are so
 
strong and immutable that whatever man is capable of doing he will do. We have built
 
the system that way. There is, of course, some data which support his
 
argument. If his argument were false, we would see around us many examples of
 
technology discarded in the interests of society. There are a few such exam­
pies including nuclear aircraft, supersonic aircraft, and chemical and
 
biological weapons. But who among us could argue that these technologies
 
have been put aside for all time? Furthermore, the Ellul argument depends
 
considerably on the nature of the impact of the technologies and whether
 
the impacts themselves can be distorted in a favorable direction. What is
 
seen as an imposed enslaving condition by one generation, through minor
 
changes to impacts, could be seen as desirable, useful and natural by the next.
 
There are other examples of social values changing in response to
 
science and technology. For example, some sociologists believe that the
 
advent of simple, effective contraceptives in the form of birth control
 
pills has resulted in changes of sexual mores.18 The automobile, through
 
the improved mobility which it brought, changed patterns of living, family
 
styles, and other aspects of our culture. In Ellulian fashipftn novelty
 
itself has become a value; new technology is an antedote to boredom. "Technol­
ogy gives us a never-ending parade of things to try in the unbounded search
 
for the meaning of self which after all, may be the base of all values. *'1 9
 
1 8Edtqard Pohlman, "Contraception 'In and Out of --MArriaga," Lester A. Kirkendall 
.and Robert N. Whitehurst, TheNew Sexual Revolution (New*"York: Donald W. 
Brown, Inc., 1971) pp. 183-196.
 
Theodore J. Gordon; "The Feedhack Between Technology and Value," Kurt
 
Baier and Nicholas Rescher (ads.), Values in the Future ( New York: The Free
 
press, 1969).p. 164.
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Thus, an important vector is from self-generated change within the dynam­
ics of science and technology to changes in social values. Science.and tech­
nology function through a dynamics essentially of their own, and the changes
 
which are produced create a framework for new values within society. Value
 
change is inevitably disturbing to the social order. Each generation some­
how feels that its values are best and that its values are the culmination of
 
an evolution of values to the present. Without this feeling, there would
 
have to be guilt for having lived according to the wrong set of beliefs.
 
Therefore, as new generations profess to believe in different values, older
 
generations sense the foundation on which they have based their lives as
 
being undermined. Thus, science and technology, giving society values
 
based on inventions and giving novelty a value in society, produce uncertainty
 
and unrest.
 
All of this neglects perhaps the most important question of all. Why
 
should the vector only move from science and technology to society; why not
 
from society to science and technology? Emmanuel Mesthene dealt with this
 
problem when he said:
 
A major consequence of the prevalence of power of our modern
 
technologies, however, is that we begin to realize that the end-­
the probable social consequences--must henceforth inform the
 
process of science and technology, since the cost of treating
 
science and technology as ends in themselves is becoming too
 
high. In different words, as our knowledge and technical capa­
bility grow, their inherent value takes a lower place in or
 
system of values relative to other values that they serve.
 
1 9 Emmanuel G. Mesthene, "Technology and Humanistic Values," Max Kaplan 
and Phillip Bosserman (eds.), Technology, Human Values and Leisure, (Nashville: 
5 7 Abingdon Press, 1971) p. . & 7 
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What is argued then is that we have the need for a mechanism which feeds
 
back into science and technology the social and humanistic values which would
 
guide those enterprises so that they may produce innovations valued by society.
 
The mechanisms for this feedback exist but they are primitive, unstructuted,
 
and relatively weak. For example, when a large scale problem is detected at
 
the federal level, our government often creates a mission-oriented agency
 
to tackle the problem. This mission-oriented agency, through its funding,
 
can create institutional support and thus ultimately produce technology
 
designed to cope with the problem. A number of institutions have been created
 
(e.g., the RANN program at NSF, the Office of Technology Assessment, etc.) to
 
improve this feedback mechanisms by which social values can be reflected back
 
into the evolutionary directions of science and technology. These feedback
 
mechanisms appear to be inadequate for several reasons, including:
 
The magnitude of the problems which loom in the immediate
 
future is enormous and the time available to mitigate these
 
problems is short. The response which requires the existence
 
of the problem Before action- will result in widespread human
 
suffering. In the decades immediately ahead response must be
 
made not to problems, but to their anticipation.
 
The institutions which have been created to call forth
 
specific kinds of innovation from science and technology
 
have viewed their functions in different perspectives;
 
they see themselves not-as shapers of science and technology,
 
but rather responding to political forces or, to a degree,
 
serving "a national need."
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- There is no science policy within the United States and
 
those institutions which could have brought it into being
 
have been reduced in power or eliminated.
 
- Even if science and technology could be produced to
 
mitigate some of the large scale world problems which
 
appear on the horizon, there will be institutional
 
inertia and other barriers of diffusion which will slow
 
their use.
 
The Role of' Science and Technology
 
A recent National Science Board report probably best summarizes the
 
role of science and technology - dealing with the challenges facing the
 
nation and the world.
 
Science and technology, by themselves, cannot solve any of
 
these complex problems, As part of a broader commitment and largqr
 
strategy, however, science and technology can play a pivotal role
 
in helping to alleviate many of them. But these contributions will
 
be neither immediate nor costless.
 
The principal role of science and technology is to provide
 
more and better options than are now available for meeting the
 
problems. Science can supply the basic knowledge required for
 
understanding the origins and dynamics of the problems; for measuring
 
their magnitudes and directions, and for devising and assessing
 
possible approaches for coping with them. And technology, drawing
 
upon scientific knowledge, can provide many of the practical tools
 
and techniques for attacking the problems.
 
Together, science and technology provide the means for:
 
* Understanding and measuring human needs for energy;
 
determining their trends and trade-offs; developing
 
policies and technologies for efficient energy use;
 
assessing the availability and implications of the
 
use of potential sources of energy; and developing
 
new energy sources.
 
* 	Comprehending the dynamics and trends of population
 
growth and developing alternative means of control.
 
a Understanding diseases for the purposes of preventing
 
them and developing improved methods of treatment and
 
more effective and efficient delivery of health
 
services.
 
- 22 ­
" Investigating natural and synthetic toods and materials, 
their development and their use, their disposal or re­
cycling, their efficient use or substitution, and their 
interaction with human lifestyles and their change. 
" Improving the understanding of interpersonal, institutional, 
and social problems, and developing and gauging the success 
of alternate approaches for alleviating them. 21 
Institutional Difficulties and Directions
 
.The problem with implementing structured planning leading to more
 
relevant and helpful science and technology is, of course, primarily institu­
tional. Here are some of the more important institutional considerations:
 
- The predilection of many scientists is to resist 
structured planning 
- Within the U.S. and most countries, funding agencies 
respond to problems which are popular, national in 
scope, and already in existence; unpopular, global 
forecasted problems have little attention. 
- Within the United States, science policy is 
essentially non-existent. 
- There are few organizations with global perspective 
which have any prospect of making large-scale contri­
bution to the solution of world issues through science 
and technology. 
As pointed out earlier, all of these institutional problems exist in a 
social context in which the adverse consequence of prior and forecasted 
scientific and technological devblopments are real and in which, as a result, 
anti-technology sentiments are apparent. 
The need for initiating a cohesive policy for Federal Scientific research 
22 
has long been recognized by Congress. For example, in 1967 the House Com­
21Science and the Challenges Ahead, National Science Board, National Science
 
Foundation, Washington, D.C.. 1974.
 
22T. J. Gordon, and M. J. Raffenperger, The Philosophy of Science Journal.
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mittee on Science and Astronautics undertook a critical review of the opera­
tions and functions of the National Science Foundation. 23. This investigation
 
indicated that Congress was concerned about the directions into which science
 
was carrying us and the mechanisms of its transport. The Committee made it
 
clear that in the future, Congress was likely to pursue questions related
 
to the establishment "of a broad strategy for science in public affairs,
 
...a framework for considering the effect of science and technology in regard
 
to the national economr, and priorities for chsiee amnndifferent possibilities
 
for Federal basic researck.q. (identification of issues) before they reach
 
They concluded that focusing on "areas of appropriate
the crisis stage.. .4 

research and education could be a major factor in maintaining the stability
 
of a civilization which is today seriously threatened by the surfeit and
 
2 5
 
concentration of people and their problems."

Today, Congress is again cfiticizing the National Science Foundation. The
 
issue this time is not stated with such clarity; the issue is posed in terms
 
of expenditures which are perceived as largely irrelevant. On April 9, 1975,
 
the House of Representatives voted to requrie that NSF submit research grants
 
to Congress for review. This state of affairs occurred after a long and
 
acrimonious debate which originally concerned an elementary school behavioral
 
science course call "Man: A Course of Study" (MACOS). Opponents of the
 
course, which was developed under NSF funding, argued that "it is absolutely
 
tinacceptable for NSF to continue using taxpayers' money for aggresssive
 
promotion and marketing activities for their own preferred social
 
22 The National Science Foundation; Its Present and Future, A report to the
 
Commnittee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 
(February 1, 1967). (Hereafter Lalled, NSF: Its Present and Future.)
 
2 4 Ibid., p.99. 
25TIbid., p.xiv. 
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studies courses, undercutting competition from regular textbook publishing
 
,26,
houses." The argument spread to include research projects dealing with
 
subjects that seemed irrelevant and far afield from the national interest.
 
In the end, the debate had a much larger effect than simply ruling on one
 
of NSF's programs: it resulted in a bill to have Congress review all NSF
 
grants.
 
In trying to come to grips with the issues behind the debate, the
 
question has been raised about whether Congress is loosing its nerve "where.,
 
27 
science and technology are concerned.", The scientific community was
 
urged:
 
...not merely to sit back and take a bad rap. If open season
 
is being declared on long accepted processes for determining
 
scientific merit and social value in the funding of research,
 
a very great deal is at stake. Summary judgments may spread
 
to scifence as a whole because of dissatisfaction with a few
 
28
fields.

It is too early to say whether this recent confrontation marks a deep split
 
between government and science and technology, or merely a temporary
 
rift. One hopes that the issue is not fundamental, because government
 
support of science and technology is necessary to meet the challenges ahead.
 
Although this action has raised significant and justified concerns in
 
the scientific community about undue constraint on "scientific freedom" and
 
the laying of a high inertia decision process on one which is already
 
ponderous, the underlying message may be the same as the one delivered
 
seven years earlier: science should be more relevant to problem solving.
 
The desirability of planning scientific research is challenged by those
 
who hold that science, intrinsically, is not amenable to foredasting or
 
Z6National Science Foundation, "Congress Taks Hard Look at Behavioral Science
 
Course," Science (May 16, 1975).

28"The Shaming of Science," Science (May 16, 1975).

28Ibid.
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planning. They argue that the uses made of the products of research are so
 
obscure at the time research is performed that planning cannot possibly be
 
effective. Using Kistiakowsky's example, who could have foreseen, at the time
 
of their research, "that the Curies would make a major-contribution to the cure
 
of cancer. Similarly, no man today is wise enough to know from what field will
 
come a critical discovery that, directly or indirectly, will solve the prob­
'29
lem of the control of insects. Sometimes the research which seems to be
 
the least promising proves to be the most fecund. The future, they observe
 
with justification, is particularly obscure in the region of new applica­
tions of scientific research.
 
Some philosophers of science,such as Thomas S. Kuhnhave argued that 
science has progressed at its impressive rate preciseZy because it responds 
to forces other than logical planning.30 Kuhn believes that the disparity
 
in.progress between the physical and social sciences results from the desir­
able isolation of the natural scientist and his ability to choose his re­
search using criteria other than those established by society. The social
 
scientist does not enjoy the isolation of the physical scientist. He must
 
choose his problems and defend his solutions not only among his peers but
 
in front of society as well. This concern with goals, the argument goes,
 
has cost him progress.
 
These then are the contrasting views on the organization of scientific
 
research: one holds that a goal structure is becoming more necessary in our
 
29G.B. Kistiakowsky, "On Federal Support of Basic Research," Basic Research
 
and National Goals, a report to the Committee on Science and Astronautics by
 
the National Academy of Sciences, March 1965.
 
3 0Kuhn, Thomas, op.cit. 
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modern society; the other, that a visible goal structure is inimical to sci­
entific progress. It is apparent that many scientists responsibly recognize
 
this dilemma.
 
When national issues become apparent, new mission agencies are created
 
and funding to these agencies increases greatly. From the energy shortages, the
 
creation of FEA, and ERDA, and the accelerating funding of those organizations
 
and others supporting energy research, serve as obvious examples. 
However, there are several crucial elements missing from discover-a­
problem, build-an-agency, and fund-with-intensity" approach to science and 
technology planning. To be most useful, any cohesive system should include: 
- A future perspective;-we should have been working on energy 
problems before the embargo; we should be working now with 
much greater urgency on problems associated with world agri­
culture, war prevention, and materials recycling. 
- A priority scheme so that resources can be allocated to the 
most important issues first - not to the problem which is 
momentarily most notorious. 
- A throughgoing analysis of higher order consequences of 
contemplated actions. 
- A global rather than a national orientation. 
In the United States we are very distant from this sort of planning; in
 
fact, there is no single science policy in the United States. Mission agen­
cies are created ad hoc in response to problems which have already been per­
ceived; and these agencies, in the course of executing their mission, create
 
limited R&D goals. The President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) con­
sists of non-governmental scientists and engineers which, in theory, contri­
bute to the formulation of political decisions based on scientific capability.
 
The Office of Science and Technology (OST) is designed to provide support to
 
executive'agencies in establishing and reviewing pxograms with science and
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Finally, the Office of the President's Special Assistant
 technology content. 

for Science and Technology has been moved out of the White House and has been
 
If there were a cohesive sci­attached to the National Science Foundation. 

ence policy, where would it originate : from any of these organizations,
 
from the National Science Foundation, or from the National Academy of Sciences?
 
The roles and missions of all of these organizations overlap and with the
 
changLng of administrations, their power and responsibilities shift.
 
Nevertheless, there are some important (but largely uncoordinated)
 
trends in the directions suggested for organization by this paper. For one,
 
the'National Science Foundation Research Applied to National Needs (RANN)
 
is designed to seek out problems of national importance to which science can
 
make a contributin .and to initiate research designed to mitigate the problem.
 
The group is specifically admonished to avoid areas where other government
 
agencies might have responsibility and are already supporting science. The
 
program has chosen to concentrate in the fields of energy, large-scale systems
 
analysis, materials, and experimental R & D incentives.
 
The General Accounting Office and the Congressional Reference Service
 
of the Library of Congress have introduced a future perspective to much 
of
 
their work. In the Rouse of Representatives, committees are now charged 
to
 
initiate a "foresight" function.
 
an arm of Congress,
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), created as 

has begun a series of studies directed toward reaching an understanding 
of
 
the policy consequences of physical and social technologies of interest 
to
 
The subjects for these studies are generated by Congress itself
 Congress. 

and, for the most part, OTA contracts with outside organizations to 
perform
 
this work.
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Within the executive department, there is a growing effort to study the
 
problems which they are charged to solve using holistic analysis tools which
 
are future-oriented and are designed to search for higher order consequences
 
of contemplated actions; examples are the SEAS model being developed by the
 
Environmental Protection Agency, the agricultural systems models being de­
veloped by the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agricul­
ture, and the National Aviation System models being studied by the Federal
 
Aviation Administration.
 
Technology assessment is not confined to Congress. 
It has become a
 
style and many organizations in government and industry have performed analy­
ses which generally conform to the intent of technology assessment. That is,
 
the studies focus on forecasting the future evolution of a particular
 
technology or problem, understanding the policies that might be used to mod­
ulate the development of the technology or problem, and determining, to the
 
extent possible, the primary, secondary, and higher order consequences which
 
flow from the evolution and policies. The point of such studies is to deter­
mine, before the fact, the potential consequences of action or inaction.
 
Many new "lookout" institutions have been created in order to call pub­
lic attention to future crises and the need for policymaking. Among these
 
institutions are:
 
- United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR),
 
an organization of the United Nations which, through its
 
Commission on the Future, intends to identify world prob­
lems which should be brought to the attention of the U.N.
 
General Assembly.
 
- The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
 
(IIASA) in Vienna, Austria, which is attempting to develop
 
energy, urban, and environmental (water resource) models.
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- Potomac Associates, the Washington firm that published 
The Limits to Growth (1973), the first in a series of 
books entitled State of the Nation. Each of these 
volumes will be concerned with developments and trends 
in a U.S. policy area such as arms control, the defense 
budget, social change, urban affairs, theenvironment, 
and foreign policy. 
- The Timetable Project. John McHale of the Center for
 
Integrative Studies, State University of New York, has
 
called for The Timetable Project, which has as its major
 
objectives:
 
* The appraisal of the global status of given problems
 
* The systematic analysis of their causal interrela­
tionships
 
* Projection of crisis points of key world problems
 
* Assessment of human and physical resources available
 
for problem solving
 
* Identification of value and goal priorities, options,
 
and alternatives.
 
- Mankind 2000 and the Union of International Associations (UIA). 
Another proposed activity is presently being jointly under­
taken by Mankind 2000, an informal association with headquart­
ers in Rome, and the UIA in Brussels. This effort calls for
 
establishment of a network of persons to identify, structure,
 
and seek out the policy implications of the world's "major
 
problems." The unusual aspect of the project is the plan to
 
arrange all of these problems in a hierarchy, an intellectual
 
framework that will make is possible to (1) establish pri­
orities for research and action, and (2) develop procedures
 
to follow every program (anywhere in the world) relevant to
 
individual problems.
 
- Club of Rome, the funder of the Meadows' "Limits to Growth" 
model and the Mesarovic-Pestel "Mankind at the Turning Point" 
model. Their work in the systematic exploration of world 
issues and policy approaches to their solution is continuing. 
- The International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, set 
up in Vienna in 1972, by the scientific academies of 12 coun­
tries, including the United States and the USSR. This organ­
ization is designed to perform detailed systems analyses of 
global problems and to make the information about these prob­
lems publicly available. 
Within the scientific community itself, concern over unintended con­
sequences has, in one notable instance at least, begun to shape the directions
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of research. At a symposium of biological researchers held at Davos, Swit­
zerland in October 1974, Carl Scherrer of the Swiss Institute for Cancer
 
Research said, "we are in the same place as nuclear physicists were in 1938." 31
 
He was referring to genetic experiments, in particular to research in which
 
genes of different species were crossed to obtain live hybrid cells. For
 
example, Nils Ringertz and his collegues of the Swedish Institute for Medi­
cal Cell Research and Genetics have combined human cells with chromosomes
 
of rats, mice and insects.3 2 In addition, artificial genes, with over 100
 
units and capable of directing the production of the pyrosine transfer of RNA with­
in a bacterial cell, have been produced.3 3  Experiments like these have led
 
to tremendous excitement and concern. One researcher at the Davos confer­
ence, Max Birnsteil of the Zurich Institute for Molecular Biology, said,
 
This new approach is likely to revolutionize not only our
 
knowledge of gene and chromosome organization but possibly
 
of genetic disease, perhaps cancer. The potential bene­
fits are so great that this sort of research is gaining
 
uncontrollable momentum.... The possibilities include the
 
suggestion that isolated genes for insulin might be intro­
duced into bacteria, which could then be grown to produce
 
insulin on a technical scale.34
 
Paul Berg of Stanford University, however, warned that these same tech­
niques might result in the creation of bacteria which could not be cured by
 
any known medical treatment. These artificial genes could be usedas a short
 
cut to genetic manipulation to achieve very desirable consequences (such as
 
the introduction of nitrogen fixation capability into various grains.) But
 
3 1
"Genetic Engineering: Clashing Views," Science News (November 2, 1974-.-­
321i
 
therink of a Functioin Arifcial Gene," Science News, (September 21, 1974) 
"4[GeneticEngineering:E\ Clashing Views," o .cit./3i 
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this capability could also lead to widespread suffering if a bacteria capable
 
of reproducing and causing an incurable disease were to escape into the en­
vironment or if this technology were to be used as a biological agent in
 
warfare.
 
In July 1974, Berg called for a moratorium on research involving the
 
formation of bacteria resistant to antibiotics and research which linked DNA
 
molecules with tumor causing viruses. In late February 1974, 140 scientists
 
involved in genetic experiments gathered at Asilomar, California to discuss
 
how the scientific community might manage this two-edged sword. 5 After in­
tense and dramatic discussions, the group agreed to initiate a policy in
 
which certain experiments on the transplantation of foreign genes into bac­
teria would be deliberately renounced. This decision came about despite
 
concern by the group that any specific document might be codified into too
 
rigid a law; that police powers did not exist within science; that cheat­
ing might go on; that any such restriction diluted academic freedom; and that the
 
issue was more than just scientific--it also hinged on moral and ethical
 
congide±ations. Yet the judgments were made on the basis of perceived
 
benefits versus perceived risks. How they will work in the future remains
 
to be seen.
 
35Janet H. Weinburg, "Decision at Asilomar," Science News (March 22, 1975);
 
and Science News (March 7, 1975).
 /~7C4 
THE 	BROADENING OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
The 	Issue. ..................
 1
 
The 	Dimensions of the Problem.. 
 . ........ 	 ........ 4
 
Increases in the Minimum Acceptable Standard of Livfng ..... 4
 
The Persistence of Domestic Inequality......... ....... 
 6
 
The poverty gap. . . . ................. 
...... 9
 
The income gap among the minorities........ ....... 9
 
The quality of life gap....... ................ 11
 
The concentration of wealth.................... 13
 
The 	Development of Equality and Inequality in.theUnited States. 
. . 15
 
Historical Political Heritage ................ 
..... 16
 
The Protestant Ethic and the Myth of Horatio Alger.. 
 .. ... 17
 
Education as an Equalizer ..... ...... 
Mass Communications as a Divisive Force . . 
The Rise of the Welfare State ... ........ 
The Emphasis on Growth .... ......... 
Some Positive Actions...... .............. 

TABLE OF FIGURES
 
1. 	Growth of Median Family Income 

......... 18
 
. . 24
........
 
......... 25
 
........ 31
 
..........	 33
 
5
 
2. 	Pretax Incomes of Families and Individuals in Each Quintile
 
as a Percentage of National Mean: 
 1929-1968 r 	 7
 
3. 	The Rising Income Gap 
 8
 
4. 	Median Income Differential 
-- Ratio of Nonwhite Earnings to
 
White Earnings .
 10
 
5. 	Median Income Differences 
-- Sex Ratio of Female Median 
Earnings to Male 12
 
6. 	Distribution of Wealth: 1962 
 14
 
7. 	Welfare Recipients as a Percentage of Total Population 27
 
8. 	National Human Resources Expenditures 28
 
ISSUE- THE BROADENING OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY
 
The Issue:
 
The problem of inequality is as persistent as civilization itself.
 
However, the United States was founded upon and dedicated to the principle of 
equality -- equality of opportunity. The essence of this concept meant that 
no man could be denied the chance for advancement because-of his background cw 
genetic heritage; however, it was always recognized that some individuals
 
were likely to be more successful than others. Alexis de Tocqueville found
 
this concept of equality so pervasive that it dominated his observations
 
and interpretations of early nineteenth century America. His first two
 
paragraphs of Democracy in America dealt with his perception of American
 
equality.
 
Amongest the novel objects that attracted my attention
 
during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more
 
forcibly than the general equality of condition among the
 
people. I readily discovered the prodigious influence which
 
this primary fact exercises on the whole course of society;
 
it gives a peculiar direction to public opinion, and a
 
peculiar tenor to the laws; it imparts new maxims to th&
 
governing authorities, and peculiar habits to the governed.
 
I soon perceived that the influence of this fact extends
 
far beyond the political character and the laws of the
 
country, and that it has no less empire over civil society
 
than over the government; it creates opinions, gives birth 
to new sentiments, founds novel customs, and modifies what­
ever it does not produce. The more I advanced in the study 
of American society, the more I perceived that this equality 
of condition is the fundamental fact from which all others 
seem to be derived, and the central point at which all my 
observations constantly terminated.1 
1Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ad. Richard D. Heffner
 
2 6
 (Mentor Books: New York) 1956, p. . 
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Despite the adherence to equality as an operating principle, inequality
 
of achievement has persisted. 
Blacks have not yet joined the mainstream of
 
American life; women are still denied equal treatment; poverty still exists;
 
and wealth continues to be concentrated in the hands of a few. 
The existence
 
of unprecedented levels of affluence side by side with abject poverty and the
 
continuing inability of large groups of the population to achieve the promise 
of the American dream has now led to this "era of rising entitlements" -- the 
notion that the population is entitled to a minimum standard of living solely 
by virtue of citizenship and regardless of the individual's productive
 
contribution to society. The welfare worker demonstrations, food stamp
 
program, and demands for a guaranteed income are all examples of this trend.
 
Speaking of the broadening of the concept of equality, Daniel Bell has
 
noted: "The equality that Tocqueville wrote about was generally considered to
 
be equality of opportunity 
. . . In recent years the demand for equality has 
broadened considerably, and the term now refers to a wide range of political, 
economic and social demands. The demands, furthermore, are now defined as 
rights. ,2 
The heart of the issue is the broadening of the concept of equality of
 
opportunity. This has been a gradual phenomenon and the analogy of a foot 
race may be helpful in understanding the transition. Originally, the concept
 
of equality of opportunity merely meant that all individuals could enter the
 
race. 
Recognizing that this by itself may only perpetuate inequality, the 
concept has been expanded to make ndt only all contestants-as evenly matched 
as possible, but also to make the course of the race as equal as possible 
for all contestants. And herein lies the problem: trying to equalize the 
contestants and their backgrounds. It is this process of equalization which 
2 Daniel Bell in "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements." Fortune (April 1975).634­
3
 
has been expanded and broadened. For instance, we no longer believe that
 
individuals can equally compete if some begin each day hungry and suffer the
 
long term effects of malnutrition.
 
To some degree, this expansion of the concept of equality of opportunity
 
is a natural consequence of the level of affluence that has been achieved in
 
this country -- level of affluence sufficient to ensure that no one need
 
starve, go without medical care or adequate housing. These kinds of amenities
 
are increasingly viewed as fundamental rights derived from the concept of
 
equality just as equality before the court of law is viewed as a right. Notice
 
that even the latter view of equality has been broadened. Equality before
 
the court of law now includes state-provided legal service, recognizing that
 
such equality requires legal representation for all.
 
The broadening of the concept of equality is not without conflict as
 
many groups view the granting of the rights and amenities of equality as
 
threatening to their own position. This leads to conflicts among groups,
 
demonstrations, complex litigation and class action suits, increasingly vocal,
 
media-based campaigns, occasional spurts of violence, and increasing federal
 
government intervention.
 
The challenge to the U.S. is to respond to these changing concepts of 
equality, the notion of "entitlements" and to satiate these rising demands 
to the degree possible and to do so with minimum conflict and tension. The 
fact that such widespread inequality has persisted -- and in some areas even
 
grown -- attests to the difficulty, even impossibility, of meeting these.
 
expectations. Increasingly, it becomes the role of the federal government to
 
provide these amenities and to serve as the "equalizer."
 
V1
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The Dimensions of the Problem:
 
The heart of the problem is the persistence of inequality. While the
 
United States is enjoying unprecedented wealth and affluence, there is still
 
a larxge sub-population that exists outside this mainstream, and for whom
 
the possibility of ever achieving even the average American level of
 
affluence is declining. Real median incomes of Americans have consistently
 
grown (see Figure 1); a larger and larger proportion of the population
 
enjoy the ownership of automobiles, single family homes, and rely on
 
extensive travel, long distance telephone, television -- all while spending
 
a declining portion of their income on essentials. At the same time these
 
average levels of income have increased, the public's perception-of the
 
level -f income necessary to sustain-anacceptable standard of living has
 
increased as well.
 
Increases in the Minimum Acceptable Standardof Living:
 
,As affluence increases, so does the public perception of the minimum
 
acceptable standard of living. A good example of this is the public response
 
to the quality of housing. It is not that the housing market has failed, but
 
rather that the quality of housing that is available at affordable prices
 
through the market allocation mechanism is below the minimum acceptable
 
standards for the population.
 
When a product is affordable by a few it is a "luxury." When its avail­
ability and consumption becomes widespread, then it is clearly an "essential" 
This transition from luxury to essential status is largely an irreversible
good. 

proces because an infrastructure develops to support the essential good which in
 
turn makes it indispensable. Consider, for example, the dependence upon the
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automobile. In many areas the dependence is so great (Los Angeles) that the
 
entire urban development has evolved around the availability of the automobile
 
and there is not an adequate rapid transit system available. Another example
 
is the refrigerator. It would be almost impossible to exist without a
 
refrigerator in this country -- it would require at least daily trips to the
 
grocery store.
 
The Persistence of Domestic Inequality:
 
The most compelling factor behind the transition in the concept of
 
equality of opportunity is the persistence of inequality -- especially income
 
inequality. There are many indicators of this income equality. Figure 2
 
displays the inequitable distribution of income since 1929. While there were
 
some improvements during the Depression and World War II, the degree of income
 
inequality did not change between 1946 and 1960, and then this inequality
 
trend of improvement was reversed in 1968. It is important to note two
 
aspects of the income inequality. First, everyone's real income has risen despite
 
the relative differences. Secondly, the absolute gap (measured in real dollars)
 
between the rich and the poor has increased. In 1950 the income gap was more
 
than $12,000; by 1970 it had almost doubled to more than $21,000 (see Figure 3).
 
FIGURE 2 
PRETAX INCOMES OF FAMflIES AND INDIVIDUALS IN EACH QUINTILE AS
 
A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL MEAN: 1929-1968
 
1935­
1929 1936 1941 1946 1960 1968 1970
 
Poorest Fifth 	 20 21 21 25 25 29 28
 
Fourth Fifth 45 46 48 56 55 57 55
 
Middle.Fifth 70 71 77 80 80 80 79
 
Second Fifth 95 105 112 •109 115 115 115
 
Top Fifth 270 259 244 231 225 218 223
 
Top 5 Percent* 600 530 480 426 400 334 344
 
Mean (Current Dollars) $2,340 $1,630 $2,210 $3,940 $6,820 $8,840 $10,100
 
(1968 Dollars) $5,210 $4,340 $5,380 $6,620 $7,860 $8,840 $ 9,040
 
Excludes 	capital gains.
 
Source: 	 Christopher Jenks, Inequality: A Reassessmient of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America
 
(Basic Books: New York) 1972.
 
22.5 
FIGURE 3 
THE RISING INCOME GAP 
Difference Between Mean Family Income of the Highest 
Income Quintile and the Lowest Income Quintile 
(In Constant 1971 Dollars) 
20.0 
0 
Co 
0 
17.5 
15.0 
0 
S12.5 
i0. ... . 
10" 0 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
SOURCE: Office' of Management & Budget, Societal Indicators, .1973 (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office), 1974. 
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The poverty gap: While the number of families living below the
 
low income level (that level of income necessary to sustain a minimum standard
 
of living) has dropped, there is still a considerable segment of the population
 
living in poverty. In 1959 22% of the population was below the 16w income
 
level; by 1969 this had dropped to just below 14%, still a substantial
 
3
 
portion of the population.

Among the lower income population, it requires more and more members
 
of the household to sustain the family. Hence, on a per capita earner
 
basis (rather than on a family/household basis) the widening income gap
 
Wuld be even greater. For instance, well over 40% of all wives below retire­
ment age work, compared to only 15% in 1940.4 This increase is occurring
 
for both white and black households. In 1959 only 34% of white families had
 
both husband and wife working to support the family; by 1972 this had
 
increased to 45%. In black families the trend has always been stronger: in
 
1959 44% of black families had both partners working to support the family,
 
5 
by 1972 this had grown to more than 56%. In addition, the rate of second job
 
holdings is gradually increasing. In other words, it requires the
 
efforts of more people, perhaps for longer hours, and at lower hourly pay to
 
earn the low income household's money -- and still they are falling further
 
and further behind.
 
The income gap among the minorities: Despite impressive gains
 
during the optimism of the sixties, black family median income is still only
 
slightly more than 70% of white median income. In some categories it has
 
actually been declining in recent years, as shown in Figure 4.
 
3U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1974
 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) p.391.
 
4Ibid, p.340.
 
51bid, p.341.
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FIGURE 4 
MEDIAN INCOE DIFFERENTIAL -
RATIO OFBNONWHITE EARNINGS TO WHITE EARNINGS 
Median female income is well below that of male income as well, as
 
shown in Figure 5. This is true even within the same occupational levels.
 
The recent economic downturn has been especially harsh to females
 
and racial and ethnic minorities because of the "last hired, first fired
 
policy." In addition, many more women are likely to work part time than
 
men and part timeworkers are among the first laid off in recessions.
 
Of all employed women in 1972 about 25% worked part time, while
 
6
 
less than 5% of the employed men worked part time. Hence, women are lik6ly
 
to work less hours, at lower hourly pay, and be more prone to lay offs.
 
The quality of life gap: Achievement indicators as well as
 
quality of life indicators for blacks are still considerably below that for
 
whites. Infant mortality is higher, educational achievement consistently
 
lower, crime indices higher, and indicators of family instability and social
 
disorganization are consistently higher. Even when shackled with similar
 
disadvantages black families are inequitably treated. For instance,
 
black families headed by a female head of household earn considerably less
 
than white families headed only by a female head of household.
 
There is still a considerable portion of the population that has
 
inadequate housing. While considerable progress has been made in providing
 
standard housing, over 7% of the households still live in substandard housing
 
(defined as dilapidated and/or lacking some or all plumbing) and
 
over 8% of families live in crowded conditions. 7 The difficulty-in
 
6Statistical Abstract of the United States, op.cit., p.339.
 
7Office of Management and Budget, Social Indicators 1973 (Washington, D.C.:
 
Government Printing Office) 1974, p.206 .
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MEDIAN INCOX DIFFERENCES -
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eradicating this last segment of substandard housing will be substantial.
 
In fact, it may be increasingly difficult for the housing sector to maintain
 
even its current level of quality. It is likely that the deterioration of
 
the nation's housing stock combined with the escalation in housing costs
 
will become a major social issue in the next decade. The problem stems
 
from several factors. One, the large portion of the nation's housing stock
 
is old and will require major renovation within the next decade, at a cost
 
Two, the rising costs of housing materials
equivalent to replacement costs. 

combined with the escalation of interest rates and the shortage of any kind
 
of mortgage funds make the prospect for meeting this housing demand dim
 
indeed. Inevitably, this will call for greater government intervention in
 
the housing market to provide construction subsidies, rent subsidies,
 
mortgage guarantees, and even mortgage funds,
 
The concentration of wealth: While the distribution of income is
 
inequitable, the distribution of assets and wealth is even more highly con­
centrated in the hands of a few and the concentration is increasing. The top 20%
 
of the population hold over 76% of the national wealth while the bottom
 
60% of the population hold- less than 9% of the wealth (see Figure 6). The
 
inequity is further demonstrated by noting that over 50% of the population
 
has a net worth of less than $3,000.8
 
Much of the national wealth is not owned by individuals at all but is
 
owned by corporations and foundations. Corporate assets are not only
 
growing but the concentration in a few firms is increasing. In 1960 firms
 
with assets over $1 billion controlled almost 28% of the total corporate
 
9
 
assets; by 1973 this size-class controlled almost 53% 
of the assets.
 
'fDistribution of Financial Assets" by James D. Smith, Steven D. Franklin,
 
Douglas A. Wion. Based on 1969 data.
 
9Statistical Abstract of the United States, op.cit., p.4-8.
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DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: 1962
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The inequitable allocation of income and wealth in this nation is not
 
atypical internationally; and in fact, income is more equitably allocated
 
here than in most other Western countries with the exception of the more
 
equitable allocation in Sweden. What makes the persistence of inequity so
 
critical is that the American myth and the American dream led to the conclu­
sion that not only was equity desirable, but was, in fact, achievable. It was
 
firmly believed, especially in the euphoria of the early sixties, that
 
poverty could be eliminated. In fact, much of the current dilerma and
 
the changing perceptions of equality stems from that belief that poverty
 
could be "cured." At that time the federal government accelerated the
 
level of social welfare programs with the expressed goal of eradicating
 
poverty and equalizing opportunity once and for all. Such programs fueled
 
the level of expectations higher yet, and when the rhetoric and promises
 
of the programs were not met, the level of frustration increased and the
 
violence of the sixties and disenchantment of the seventies resulted. The
 
result of the persistence of inequality is the evolution in the concept of
 
equality itself, and the current demands for broadening the conept of equality.
 
The Development of.Equality and Inequality in the United States:
 
The central assertion of this issue is that the concept of equality of
 
opportunity in this country is being broadened substantially to permit more
 
equal participation and competition in the mainstream of American life.
 
Equality of opportunity has been a fundamental tenet of liberal political
 
thought for the past three centu*ri6s and the notion of a broadened concept
 
of equality is clearly within the mainstream of American political thought.
 
What has contributed to the expansion of the concept of equality?
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(1) Historical Political Heritage: The nation was founded on the
 
liberal tenet of equality. We have spoken of Tocqueville's fascination with
 
equality in America. Thomas Jefferson was similarly enthralled with the
 
American concept of equality.
 
As Daniel Bell notes, the transformation of "equality" is not a
 
recent phenomenon. While the founding fathers spoke frequently of equality,
 
at that time there was no consensus on the meaning of the concept. Equality
 
as used by the Puritan forefathers was equality in a virtuous sense, Bell
 
called it the "equality of the elect."10 The writers of the Federalist
 
papers saw equality more in the sense of independence from an external force
 
as well as equality of opportunity. But this liberal notion of the equality
 
of opportunity implied an aristocracy of sorts: the notion of equality of
 
opportunity meant that men of equal talents and intellect would have equal
 
opportunity. As Bell again notesi it implied an aristocracy of intellect.
 
Since thofglit was prized; it was assumed that some-men thought better than
 
others, were more able, more intelligent 
-- and so formed the natural
 
11
 
aristocracy.
 
The foundations of the nineteenth century liberal view of equality were
 
based on the concept of the rights of the individual: the state and govern­
ment existed so that the individual could best maximize his potential. It is
 
clear that the American system has been extraordinarily successful at this, as
 
the previous discussion of the concentration of wealth indicates. Beginning
 
sometime in this century the notion of good for the greatest number, but for
 
all, a minimum, began to be expressed. This was to some extent the natural
 
10Daniel Bell, The Coming of Pot-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social 
Forecasting (Basic Books: New Yorkr, 1973) pn424. 
1 Ibid. 
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outgrowth of the level of affluence the nation was experiencing, as well
 
as the recognition that merely opening the doors did not guarantee equality.
 
The concept of the "group good" was expanded as well to include the protec­
tion of the environment and the individual from the onslaught of unrestrained
 
industrial and technological growth. This recognition of the need for the
 
federal government to intercede in the market system paved the way for the
 
role of the government in affecting the broadening of the concept of equality.
 
(2) The Protestant Ethic and the Myth of Horatio Alger: A natural
 
outgrowth to the individual oriented concept of equality of opportunity was
 
the Horatio Alger myth that sprang up during the economic growth of the
 
Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century. This reinforced belief
 
in the land of plenty: any one can become rich and famous in the United
 
States if they go to school, learn their lessons, and work long hours. (Hard
 
work always pays off with success, and there is room for success for all.
 
People who did not become successful clearly did not work hard enough.)
 
There were enough "poor boy makes good" and"immigrant man makes a
 
million" stories to keep the Horatio Alger myth alive for almost two centuries.
 
This in turn led to the further belief that poverty was the fault of the
 
poor: poor people are lazy and if they wanted to improve their lot they could
 
"pull themselves up by their bootstraps." But, the Horatio ALger myth has
 
turned out not to be true -- and especially irrelevant to the problems of
 
religious, ethnic, and racial discrimination and to those trying to break
 
from the "vicious cycle of poverty." Regardless of the level of effort, an
 
individual expends, there may be barriers so great that hard work alone will
 
be insufficient to overcome them,
 
There is increasing evidence that everyone cannot make it, that there are
 
not enough jobs to go around regardless of educational level, and hard work
 
simply may not always pay off. 
Recent public opinion polls indicate a declining
 
belief in the rewards of hard work. 
In one study 83% of the sample indicated
 
that they believed that people who work hard and live by the rules are not
 
getting a fair break.12 Another study indicated that among college age youth
 
only 56% agreed with the statement "hard work always pays off," a substantial
 
decline from 79% in 1969.13 
This represents a significant change in values
 
from earlier generations.
 
(3) Education as an Equalizer: Another major premise of the
 
founding of the republic was the role of education as an equalizer and the
 
route to success; hence, the commitment to universal free education. There
 
can be no question that universal education has served as an equalizer,
 
especially during the great influx of Immigrants. In fact, this argument
 
of education as an equalizer is still being used to justify free undergraduate
 
tuition at CUNY in the current debate over New York's impending bankruptcy.
 
The New York Times noted,"Despite the high cost, CUNY provides high-level
 
manpower of the type essential to the cit*'s survival, while integrating
 
poor American and foreign newcomers into the mainstream of urban society.14
 
Universal education is undoubtedly responsible for the pervasiveness of a
 
common single language, a common values and universal expectations about
 
the future.
 
1 2Study by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Jewish Committee,
 
Described in Boardroom Reports (December 30, 1974) p.6
 .
 
1 3New Morality, Daniel Yankelovich, 1974.
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At the same time universal education was creating common value systems
 
and common expectations, it was also the purported route to achievement of these
 
expectations and goals. In the past, education clearly provided one of the
 
routes to economic success as well as upward motility. But as the median
 
level of education increased, higher and higher (and more and more expensive)
 
levels of education became necessary for economic success. This, in turn,
 
served to further discriminate against economic, ethnic, and racial minorities
 
who were unable to meet the prerequisites. Hence, while decades of universal
 
education had succeeded in generating a pervasive set of common values and
 
expectations-about the future, higher education was now becoming closed
 
to a large portion of the population. This, in turn increased further the
 
levels of frustiation, and undoubtedly contributed to the violence of the
 
sixties.
 
During the social advances of the sixties one of the major thrusts of
 
federal government programs was to improve quality of education and the access
 
to education, based on the assumption that broadening the access to education
 
would broaden equality of opportunity. In addition to desegregation efforts,
 
scholarship assistance was increased, reduced or free tuition policies were
 
established, and "open" admissions policies were implemented. In lower educa­
tion federal assistance was increased and many programs were established to
 
compensate for the inadequate education background of disadvantaged students.
 
This policy did indeed open up college and graduate education to large segments
 
of the population -- for instance, over one-third of the undergraduates at the
 
1 4
'[State of the City: School and Campus," The New York Times, May 19, 1975.
 
iN
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City University of New York come from families with annual incomes below
 
$7,500 -- at a time when a typical college year costs $5,000.
 
Despite these efforts, it is becoming increasingly clear that education
 
is not the route to success and is not effective policy to reduce inequality.
 
It is important to determine what the role of education has been in the past.
 
There is no question that universal education has made possible the integra­
tion of immigrants from disparate cultures and it has enfused a common language
 
and culture across the country, a feat that has not been duplicated in any
 
nation of similar size.
 
Education did serve as the route to success for a long time in this
 
country. During the era of scarce skilled labor and abundant cheap resources,
 
education was the path to success. The current situation is reversed:
 
abundant skilled labor and scarce, expensive resources. This combined with a
 
change in the kind of business being conducted in this country and the way
 
business is conducted spells a different future. Automation, computer control
 
and continuous processing mean the decline of labor in manufacturing. The
 
transition of the economy to a service based economy hardly is the way for
 
meaningful, skilled employment. Technological innovation not withstanding,
 
service jobs are still low skilled. Hence, education is unlikely to serve as
 
the route to success (at least occupation and income success) in the future.
 
Despite these efforts, it is becoming increasingly clear that education
 
is not the route to success and is not effective policy to reduce inequality.
 
In a major examination of the role of education in reducing inequality,
 
Christopher Jenks concludes that: "None of the evidence we have reviewed
 
suggests that school reform can be expected to bring about significant social
 
changes outside the schools. More specifically, the evidence suggests that
 
70o
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equalizing educational opportunity would do very little to make adults more
 
equal.. .Eliminating all economic and academic obstacles to college attendance
 
might somewhat reduce disparities in educational attainment, but the change
 
would not be large. Furthermore, the experience of the past 25 years
 
suggests that even fairly substantial reductions in the range of educational
 
attainments do not appreciably reduce economic inequality 
among adults.'1 5
 
Jenks suggests that the reason education has failed as an equalizer is
 
because of erroneous assumptions underlying education and poverty policy.
 
The 	strategy of the "War on Poverty" was to equalize job skills so that
 
everyone would be competitive in the job market. Jenks identifies three
 
16
 
implicit assumptions of this strategy:
 
1. 	Eliminating poverty is largely a matter of helping
 
children born into poverty rise out of it;
 
2. 	The primary reason poor children cannot escape from
 
poverty is that they do not acquire basic cognitive
 
skills;
 
3. 	The best mechanism for breaking this vicious circle
 
is by educational reform.
 
Jenks' analysis concluded that these assumptions are invalid.
 
Specifically:
 
1. 	Poverty is not primarily hereditary. For instance,
 
there is nearly as much economic inequality among
 
brothers raised in the same house as in the general
 
population.
 
2. 	The primary reason some people end up richer than
 
others is not that they have more adequate cognitive
 
skills. In fact, economic success appears to be a func­
tion more of luck and on-the-job competence which in turn
 
seems to depend more on personality than on technical skills.­
15Christopher Jenks, Inequalitj: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family
 
New 	York) 1972, p.255 .
and-Schooling in America (Basic Books: 

16Jenks, op.cit., p.7-9, 255-257.
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3. 	Finally, there is no evidence that school reform can
 
substantially reduce the extent of cognitive inequality.
 
Neither school resources nor segregation has an
 
appreciable effect on test scores or educational attain-'
 
ment. Even when a school does exert an enormous
 
influence on a child, the results rarely persist into
 
adulthood. It takes a huge change in elementary school
 
test scores to alter adult income by a significant
 
amount.
 
Another study prepared for the Carnegie Commission analyzed the
 
contribution of a college education over a high school education to income.17
 
While an undergraduate education increased earnings by 31% over a high school
 
degree, further education cannot be justified on the basis of its contri­
bution to earnings. In fact, graduate education decreased earnings potential
 
compared to undergraduate education alone. Graduate work (but no degree)
 
increased earnings by only 26% over a high school diploma and a Ph.D. by
 
26% 	-- evidence of the underemployment and over-education of the labor force.
 
The study further tried to analyze the relative cbntribution of mental
 
ability, family background, age, marital status, health and quantity and
 
quality of education to earnings and found that the most significant
 
correlation (more significant than either education or ability) was between
 
earnings and marital status, interpreted as a proxy indicator for motivation
 
and the need for income. The study further concluded that there is little
 
reason to justify education on the basis of its contribution tb earnings and
 
the nation has over-invested in education -- the costs of education greatly
 
exceed the social rate of return. -
Hence, the entire premise of education as a route to success appears to be
 
invalid. Despite the educational and psychological evidence to support this
 
contention, the myth persists and the level of educational attainment keeps
 
17Paul Taubman and Terence Wales, College as an Investment and a Screening
 
Device. A Report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education
 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research (McGraw Hill: New York) 1974.
70 t 
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rising. This is generating a new series of problems because of the over­
education of the labor force for the existing jobs. There is no system that
 
encourages or even -permits matching of college/vocational training with job
 
market requirements; and as a result the nation is creating surpluses of
 
teachers, engineers and Ph.D.'s, among others. Graduate school is quickly
 
becoming one route to unemployment or underemployment. Myron Clark, past
 
president of the Society for the Advancement of Management, estimates that
 
80% of all American workers are underemployed.18 Daniel Bell has noted in
 
The Coming of the Post Industrial Society that the nation may be moving
 
towards establishment of a new meritocracy composed of the 20% of the
 
population holding all the "good" jobs.
 
The proble.m of underemployment is serious for society as a whole.
 
Studies at the University of Michigan indicate that when a worker feels
 
under-utilized he eventually developsphysical and mental health problems.
 
According to a Sandia Laboratory study, it is the intelligent creative blue
 
collar workeri not the dull ones, who are probably the most responsible for
 
damages, low productivity, errors and accidents in the work place.
19
 
So what can be done now? 'Generations have been led to believe that
 
education was the way to the American dream. The only solution is to cease
 
misleading the public about the role and contribution of education. A
 
recent article on education and unemployment concludes: "Simply put, the
 
most constructive thing that can be done to improve the relationship between
 
the worlds of education and work is to stop implicitly and explicitly selling
 
education as an economic investment -- and instead to make students and then
 
iaJames O'Toole, "Too Much Education for the Job," Washington Post
 
May 18, 1975.
 
19 id. 
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parents understand that education is a goal unto itself but not automatically
 
a formula for economic escalation. ,20 Jenks concludes that "...school life
 
is largely an end to itself rather than a means to some other end."21
 
(4) Mass Communications as a Divisive Force: Advances in mass
 
communications in this century have brought into the home the vivid picture
 
of inequality. It can be argued that widespread inequality can be tolerated
 
rather peacefully by a society for long periods of time if those that are in­
equitably treated by society as a whdle are not aware of their relative position.
 
Television shattered this by bringing the Hollywood glamorized version of
 
middle class American life into every home. Television and radio further
 
contributed to the level of rising expectations by re-inforcing the Horatio
 
Alger myth and re-inforcing the rewards of education as well as creating a
 
proliferation of needs and wants. 
This kind of constant socialization
 
contributed to the growth of a common but growing set of expectations about
 
the future.
 
While the relation cannot be proven, it is probably not a coincidence
 
that that the most active and violent period of the civil rights movement
 
occurred just as television was permeating the majority of American homes.
 
The proliferation of television draw attention in a dramatic way to the
 
differences between the standards of living enjoyed by blacks and whites in
 
a way never before seen.
 
The recognition of the persistence of inequality has been exacerbated by
 
the increased mobility of the population. Spurred by the growth of the
 
highway system, the widespread availability of automobiles and frequent job
 
changes, Americans are probably more mobile than any other population group
 
20 
'Toole, op.cit. .
 
J
lenks, op.cit., p.257. 7 
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in the world. This mobility brings many Americans into contact with
 
people who are "more equal" than they are which further aggravates
 
frustration and anger.
 
(5) The Rise of the Welfare State! As it has become increasingly
 
difficult for individuals to provide a minimum level of existence for
 
themselves, the federal government has increasingly begun to assume this
 
responsibility. The movement of the government into the areas of providing
 
individual wants and needs began in earnest with with New Deal during the
 
Depression. It was then that Keynes convinced Roosevelt to try his
 
revolutionary approach to stimulating the economy. That, combined with
 
Roosevelt's concern for the unemployed, led to the development of job
 
creation strategies as well as to the implementation of the first social
 
security insurance legislation. The Social Security Act was passed in
 
1935 and provides old age, invalid and death benefits. Legislation 
authorizing unemployment insurance was passed the same year. Public 
assistance (aid and cash allowances to the aged, disabled, blind, and 
families with dependent children whose need arises from certain approved 
causes) are largely state programs except for.the assistance of Federal 
funds granted to the states under the authority of the Social Security Act. 
This period was the beginning of the federal government commitment to 
the individual. Since then the number, kinds and expenditures devoted to 
public welfare programs have grown enormously. The growth of federal 
government involvement in providing social welfare services is not likely 
to be -reversed. -DanielBell has noted that: 'the government -has made a 
commitment, to not only to create a substantial welfare state, but to 
redress all economic-and social inequalities as well. And the commitment 
- 26 ­
is largely irreversible."22 Another commentator has noted: "The System
 
has always lacked a reverse gear, especially in those movement that repre­
sent an ethical advance."
23
 
This commitment had resulted in an extraordinary growth in the number 
of government empl6yees, government expenditures and benefactors of the
 
social welfare programs. Daniel Bell tells of a one-day survey of
 
California in 1969. Out of 19.8 million people in the state, around 8
 
million were under social care of the government on any one day. The social
 
care services included schools, hospitals, prisons, old age homes, daycare
 
centers, and the like. Bell notes that the number under care was
 
equivalent to the entire California labor force, 8% of which was employed
 
looking after the government cared-for population.24
 
Nationally, only about 8% of the population receives direct welfare
 
(see Figure 7), yet a far larger number receive a host of direct and indirect
 
government services and subsidies. The cost of these programs has been
 
tremendous.
 
Since 1950 federal expenditures for social welfare has risen from
 
$10.5 billion to almost $170 billion, from less than 25% of the federal
 
budget to almost 50% (see Figure 8) and state and local governments spend
 
an additional $250 billion. Total outlays for these programs amount to
 
15% of the national income, up from only 4% in 1950. For the foreseeable
 
future the costs of these programs cannot continue to grow at this rate as
 
there is simply not the resource base available to meet these demands
 
without massive changes in federal expenditure patterns. Already there are
 
22Daniel Bell,"The Revolution of Rising Entitlements," op.cit., p.100.
 
23Max Ways, "A Proposition that Freed a Torrent of Individual Energies,"
 
Fortune (April 1975) p.86 .
 
24Bell, "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements,"op.eit.
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concerns that the Social Security program will be bankrupt because of the
 
impact of demographic changes and inflation. New York City (which pays
 
$1 billion out of the City Treasury for the support of the welfare population)
 
is weeks away from bankruptcy. Regardless of the efficacy or agreement
 
about the worthiness of these programs, reliance upon the traditional means
 
of financing will not be feasible for long.
 
There are numerous kinds of government social welfare programs. The
 
characteristics of these programs have evolved and changed over the decades
 
since the Depression. The major changes have been in that the areas of
 
eligibility requirements and the individual responsibility for the expenses-

As the programs have evolved, the trend has been towards broadening the
 
eligibility so that the programs are more universally applicable, aid
 
secondly, to minimize the recipient's direct share in the financial respon­
sibility of the programs. Thirdly, the focus of the efforts have shifted
 
gradually from merely charitable activities to the beginning of an income
 
redistribution mechanism as the taxes of the middle and upper income popu­
lation have been used to subsidize the lower income groups.
 
Finally, control over therecipient's behavior is declining as well.
 
An example is the transition in the food assistance program from surplus
 
food commodities in the form-of a nutritiously balanced diet, to cash grants
 
redeemable at grocery stores. Transition in the housing assistance program
 
is another example of the declining role of the government in deciding what
 
is best for the poor. Most federal governmept low income housing programs
 
emphasized with subsidizing construction. The largest federal.housing
 
program (FRA and VA mortgages assistance) were not even for the low income
 
but rather existed to help the middle class achieve the great American dream.
 
707
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In fact, a minimum adequate income level was required to qualify for low
 
income housing -- it was commonplace to be too poor for low income housing!
 
These efforts are slowly giving way to direct rent subsidies, as authorized
 
by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. This program will
 
provide direct rent subsidies to low income families so that the individual
 
family will be required to pay no more tha 
15 to 25% of their income for
 
rent.
 
In summary, there are five categories of social welfare programs 
-
that have gradually evolved in a patchwork fashion in this country. 
They
 
include:
 
(1) Special Purpose Assistance: It has always been recognized

that there is a small subset of the population that because of physical

and mental handicaps will be unable to care for themselves. Hence, the
 
blind, disabled, handicapped, incurably insane, have always been viewed
 
as legitimate concerns for government assistance. As well the nation has
 
always felt a commitment to 
care for its war injured and maimed. The con­
cept of "handicapped" has broadened somewhat recently so 
that individuals
 
injured on the job have been included. These programs have rigid eligibility
 
requirements and provide only minimum subsistence.
 
(2) Insurance and Income Maintenance Programs: There is another
 
set of programs which provides income insurance and employment insurance.
 
Largely involuntary and begun during the Depression Era, the Social Security

Program and unemployment insurance program are the major examples. 
While
 
these programs affect a huge portion of the population,. they all have the
 
common requirement that the individual must work in order to qualify. 
Un­
employment benefits, for instance, are not available unless the individual
 
has been employed. 
These programs typically require a financial contribution
 
from the employee himself. 
These programs are often erroneously called
 
"welfare" programs. 
Because the employee must contribute to these programs

they are really no different from any other insurance program.
 
(3) Family Maintenance Programs: These programs are the most
 
controversial and provide cash, rent, and food subsidies to low income
 
families. 
Measured in terms of both federal government expenditures and
 
number of recipients, these programs are probably the smallest of all social
 
welfare programs, but these programs are the heart of the "equality of re­
sults" debate. 
Again, these programs have strict eligibility requirements;
 
one can be "too poor" to qualify, and the presence of an able bodied male
 
threatens the chance of benefits. Ablebodied adults without children are
 
unlikely to receive benefits either.
 7X 
(4) Guaranteed Minimum Standard of Living: First proposed by
 
Milton Friedman in 1962, there has been continual debate ever since. The
 
negative income tax is the most popular method of implementing the concept
 
because of the ease of administering it through the Internal Revenue Service
 
Those
mechanism. Essentially all residents would file income tax reports. 

whose incomes fell below a specified level would receive money, while those
 
whose incomes exceeded the designated minimum income level would pay taxes.
 
Advocates of this stress the ease of implementation, the relative inexpensive­
ness of administration, the lack of arbitrary rules requiring constant in­
terpretation, the ease of avoiding scandal and "welfare cheaters," and the
 
use of objective criteria. Opposition to the concept generally falls into
 
several themes: opposition to getting something for nothing ("I work for
 
my money, why can't he go get a job like everyone else?"), and fears that
 
it would be disincentive for individual work and the entire nation would
 
sit back and wait for the money to roll in. All experimental and case
 
study evidence suggests that the latter fear is completely unsubstantiated
 
and that in comparison to the current welfare system (in which income is
 
-
taxed by 100%) would, in fact, increase the incentives to work.
25 

(5) Programs Based on Economies of Scale: There is a final
 
category of government provided goods and services which are provided on
 
the basis of economies of scale. An example of this is education. A
 
second kind of service are those that are too expensive to be provided
 
solely by the individual or private sector medical and heath care is
 
increasingly becoming one of these services. Inherent in this category
 
of programs and services is that the entire group or society benefits as
 
well as the individual. For instance, the group benefits from police and
 
fire protection are abvious. Society also benefits from an educated labor
 
force and healthy labor force.
 
The greatest dispute and the greatest growth is in the last two
 
categories of programs. It is here that the conflict over the relation­
ship arises betwen individual contribution and individual benefit. It
 
is also the area where the evolving value change and the perception of
 
changing equality has its greatest impact.
 
(6) The Emphasis on Growth: A final factor that contributes to
 
growing expectations and entitlements is the emphasis upon growth in the
 
economy. The orientation and success of the national economy is based on
 
the premise of continued growth, it is argued that without growth the
 
economy cannot sustain itself; the structure of the economy dictates that
 
25David N. Kershaw, "A Negative Income-Tax Exper-nt," Scientific American
 
(October 1972). 7//
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it either grows or declines, it cannot maintain itself in a stationary
 
position. This economic reality, combined with the corporate boardroom
 
requirements of rising profits and sales, dictate policies that continually
 
increase and stimulate demand. New "essential" products are continually
 
being introduced which are often both wasteful of energy and materials as
 
well as of questionable utility (witness the electric can opener, the
 
electric shaving cream heAter-upper). This escalation of needs and the
 
gradual transition of goods from "luxury" status to "essential" status
 
all contribute to the general pattern of rising expectations for increased
 
standards of living. However, many of the so-called "essential" luxury
 
goods are becoming increasingly beyond the means of a large percentage of
 
the population. For instance, large cars, color televisions, luxury
 
appliances 
-- all once symbols of the American dream --
are being replaced
 
by an emphasis on durable, long lasting and utilitarian tools and appliances.
 
The standard American symbol of "success" -- the single family home -­
is becoming an increasingly elusive goal for the majority of the population.
 
The average price of a single family home is $36,600 to $37,000, while the
 
average family income is only about $12,000. A standard rule is that a
 
consumer can afford a home only costing twice his income. 
Hence, a minimum
 
income necessary for the average new home is $18,000, an income level
 
reached by less than 20% of the population.
 
The entire structure of the manufacturing industry in this country
 
is built on this notion of stimulating higher and higher levels of
 
unfulfilled wants, all of which tend to reinforce higher and higher levels
 
of expectations.
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Some Positive Actions:
 
So what can be done? What can be done is largely a function of what
 
the consensus on the evolving dominant value structure and national goals
 
turns out to be. If, as we argue, the demands for a minimum share of the
 
national wealth ana income as a right of citizenship continues to increase
 
the nation must respond to these demands to avert conflict, tension and
 
even violence.
 
Jenks points out that the basic problem is not that of strategies
 
to equalize incomes, but of convincing the public that this is a worthy
 
effort for the American people. He comments:
 
...the best way to equalize competence is to make this
 
an explicit objective of social policy and to encourage
 
employers to reorganize work with this objective in mind.
 
......-.Nonetheless, kibbutz experience suggests that some
 
disparities will also persist, even in a society that
 
deliberately tries-to reduce them.
 
If we want to equalize the distribution of income, then,
 
we need a more direct approach...
 
However, the selection of a suitable mechanism for
 
equalizing incomes is an interesting but politically
 
irrelevant exercise. The crucial problem today is that
 
relatively few people view income inequality as a serious
 
problem...
 
If egalitarians want to mobilize popular support for
 
income redistribution, their first aim should be to convince
 
people that the distribution of income is a legitimate
 
political issue....Until they come to believe that the
 
distribution of income is a political issue, subject to
 
popular regulation and control, very little is likely to
 
change...
 
Nonetheless, if we want substantial redistribution, we 
will not only have to politicize the question of income 
inequality but alter people's basic assumptions about the 
extent to which they are responsible for their neighbors 
and their neighbors for them.26 (Italics added) 
26jenks, op.cit., p.263-264.
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ISSUE: 	 RAPIDLY CHANGING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES IMPACT THE COURSE
 
OF MAN'S FUTURE WITH ACCOMPANYING CONFLICT, TENSION AND
 
ALIENATION
 
The Issue:
 
"Americans currently face a period in which few institutions, beliefs,
 
or values can no longer be taken for granted. All are under strain, all
 
are challenged. Basic transformations of man and society are now underway,
 
and many vital choices of values must be made. 11 If the value system is
 
irrelevant to the need of the emerging twenty-first century as this paper
 
argues, then the search for new values and myths is conflict-ridden as the
 
actions of today, even the search for new values, are determined by the current
 
values, however irrelevant they may be. This conflict and the clash between
 
"'old" and "new" is the essence of the struggle for the re-definition of
 
values in this country.
 
One of the more popular pastimes of the American press is examining
 
new behavioral phenomena of the current times: changing lifestyles, the
 
"generation gap," the implications of the communal experience, the
 
transcendental meditation movement, "drop outs," and the return to nature.
 
Columnists devote pages to the search for "meaning" in individual lives,
 
to improving interpersonal relations, to communicating with their children.
 
Part of this national debate derives from the need of individuals to be
 
reassured about the transition from "traditional" values.
 
At the heart of these new behavioral experiences is a series of funda­
mental value changes which alters the rationale that underlies the
 
basic legitimacy and motivations for man's activities. The popular
 
TRobin M. Williams, American Society; A Sociological Interpretation
 
(A. A. Knopf: New York) 1951.
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analyses of the "generation gap" and the "counter culture" belittles the
 
fundamental and rapid change taking place. There are momentous value
 
changes occurring which are altering the course of man's future in this
 
century from what it might have been had not these societal and individual
 
goals been changed.
 
John D. Rockefeller has noted that the cause of this value change may
 
".b the conflict between the ideals that evolved in the first American
 
Revolution and those of the Industrial Revolution. The American Revolution
 
was based on humanistic values concerned with equality, justice, "life,
 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness." These values rested on faith, good­
ness, dignity and the rationality of people generally. However, the values
 
of the emerging industrial society -- the work ethic, the growth ethic,
 
acquisitive materialism, the dominance of man over nature, the marketplace
 
as the criteria for assessing worth and success, and a tendency to view
 
profit and property as the highest priority terms tended to subordinate
 
human considerations to the goals of scientific, technological and economic
 
2
 progress.
 
Rockefeller believes the current era of change and value conflict is
 ( 
a result of the clash of the ideals and expectations of the founding fathers
 
with the real world of the Industrial Revolution. His thesis is "that we can
 
no longer continue on our present course. We can no longer tolerate two
 
sets of values which are often in conflict, one dominant over the other.
 
The time has come when we must synthesize these values in a coherent
 
",3
ordering of our lives and our futures,
 
2john D. Rockefeller, III, Tha Second American Revolution (Perennial Library:
 
New York) 1973, p.36-37. J
 
3Rockefeller, qpcit., p.39.
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A synthesis of values is likely to emerge from this conflict according to
 
Rockefeller. Most value theorists would dispute Rockefeller's interpretation
 
of history. It is more likely that the synthesis of which he speaks has
 
already emerged from the Industrial Revolution. The conspicuous consumption,
 
materialistic values emerged from and were made possible by the Industrial
 
It is the
Revolution, and were not dominant value themes before then. 

values of the Industrial Revolution -- materialistic success measured by
 
wealth, work (and therefore wealth) as the route to success and status -­
that are currently being rejected and transformed, not the values of the
 
founding fathers. The basic tenets of liberal thought -- equality, freedom,
 
individualism, justice -- have always beeh maintained in this country,
 
although their application has been broadened and transformed within recent times.
 
Technological advancements of the Industrial Revolution itself interacted with 
and fundamentally changed the value structure in a way that we are only just
 
beginning to perceive. Does technology dictate values as Marx argues, or do
 
values determine technological progress as Weber asserts? The synthesis of
 
It is the
which Rockefeller speaks emerged in the early 20th century. 

irrelevance of this synthesis, and its accompanying myths, to the emerging
 
21st Century and its problems that is the cause of the current conflict over
 
the transition in values.
 
Daniel Bell argues that the values and spirit that were motivations
 
for the Industrial Revolution were destroyed by capitalism itself. "Through
 
mass production and mass consumption, it destroyed the Protestant ethld by
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zealously promoting a hedonistic way of life, By the middle of the twentieth
 
century capitalism sought to justify itself not by work or property, but by
 
the status badges of material possessions and by the promotion of pleasure.
 
The rising standards of living and the relaxation of morals became ends in
 
themselves as the definition of personal freedom."
4
 
Yet it is the fact that these early 20th century ideals and values are
 
irrelevant to the impending demands of the twenty-first century that is
 
generating the transition in values. It is the conflict between the 20th
 
century value structure and the requirements of the 21st century that is at
 
the heart of this issue. The Puritan ethic and the Horatio Alger myth as
 
motivations for the Industrial Revolution are two myths that are irrelevant 

perhaps even counterproductive 
-- to the emerging Post-Industrial Society.
 
Why are we concerned about values? Along with the innate drives (hunger,
 
sex) values and other attributes that result from the personality development
 
and socialization process are the major determinants of individual and group
 
behavior. Socialization -- that process of transmitting culture and
 
accommodating the individual into the societal mainstream --
is the basic
 
process of transmitting, maintaining, and homogenizing the dominant value
 
system. While societal values may not be uniform (non-conformity may be a
 
value in itself), it is likely that there is a dominant set of values or
 
behavioral themes of a society which provide the motivations and guidelines
 
for that society. Essentially, violation of values or non-achievement of
 
values is a major source of conflict. Hence, if we wish to understand group
 
interaction, attitudes, the basis for behavior, the rejection or acceptance
 
of new ideas and policies, then values must be understood. To the degree
 
4Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (Basic Books: New York)
 
1973, p.4 77 .
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that the future is determined by man's interaction with man and societal
 
group interaction, values play a dominant, perhaps supraordinate role in
 
the determination of group behavior.
 
Values: A Definition:
 
We have spoken at some length about values without precisely defining
 
them. Professor Kurt Baier of the University of Pittsburgh has defined
 
values essentially as an attitude for or against an event or phenomenon
 
based on a belief that it benefits or penalizes some individual group or
 
institution. This definition rejects the concept of values as intrinsic;
 
instead, values become a manifestation of behavior and as such, observable
 
5
 
and measurable.
 
The sociologist Kluckhohn defined values somewhat differently:
 
"values do not consist in 'desires' but rather in the desirable, that is,
 
what we not only want but feel that it is right and proper to want for
 
ourselves and for others. [Values are] standards that transcend the
 
6
 
impulses of the moment and ephemeral situations." 

Values then become an important assessment device, permitting the
 
determination in advance, however unconscious, of the appropriateness of a
 
given activity. Hence, to some degree values in our definition can easily
 
be the basis for goal statements.
 
5Kurt Baier, "What is value? An Analysis of the Concept," in Baier & Rescher,
 
Eds., Values and the Future: The Impact of Technological Change on American
 
Values (Free Press: New York) 1969, p.5.
 
6Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture and Behavior (Glencoeree Press: New York) 1962,
 
p,28 9.
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A society has a host of devices to re-infoice its cultural values:
 
the dominant themes of beliefs or sentiments that some activities, relation­
ships, feelings or goals are important in the community's sense of well­
being. One of the strongest ways of maintaining this culturll value system
 
and re-inforcing adherence to its basic tenets, as well as maintaining a, 
uniform cultural base, is through a mythic structure. 
Myths: The Foundation of Societal Institutions:
 
Societies create these elaborate myths about specific ideal states to
 
reinforce belief in the values they represent, and encourage activities that
 
may result in their attainment. One student of the role of myths has noted
 
that "they are not to be considered as describing any existing state of
 
affairs (though they may be) or as asserting logical truths. Rather, they
 
are expressions of what is to be considered as right or as *..'natural'...
 
Myths also contain, usually covertly, an imperative or prescriptive meaning
 
which directs individuals to seek to achieve the state which they purport
 
to describe.., myths are taken to be descriptions of how things would be in
 
and of themselves (i.e., naturally) if men would be what they 'naturally'
 
7
 
are."
 
Myths, then, serve as powerful forces to reinforce and shape man's
 
behavior along socially desirable and acceptable lines. The primary function
 
of the myths is to underwrite the basic institutions of society, that is,
 
myths serve to establish the rules of the game.
 
7john D. Shier, "The Myths of the American Family," in A. R. Doberenz, Ed.,
 
The Family Unit: Population Growth Symposium No. 3, The University of
 
Wisconsin at Green Bay, 1972, p.32. ', 7c:6
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Among the more dominant myths are the myth of the family ("the large
 
family is a happy family," "the family is the basic and necessary social
 
institution," "pathological behavior results from family disorganization"),
 
the myth of work (the Protestant ethic, "man's worth is in his work,"
 
"Horatio Alger" "everyone can be successful and wealthy if they work hard
 
enough"), and the myth of education ("education is the route to success,"
 
"equal education makes equal people").
 
As can be readily seen belief in these myths reinforces valued
 
behavior and valued personality attributes. The difficulty emerges when
 
the mythic, supportive structure (the emotional framework man uses to
 
justify his behavior, activities, and to some extent, his existence) is
 
inappropriate to the cultural context. That is, like values, the myths
 
can become obsolete and irrelevant to,societal needs, and most importantly,
 
irrelevant to individual needs and can become an important source of conflict
 
and disillusionment. This is the case today: adherence to the traditional
 
mythic structure (based on tradition values systems) is not satisfying or ful-­
filling the needs of the individual. The underlying premise of the myths is
 
that if one's life is based on the myths, then a fulfilling, happy life will
 
follow. But this is not the case. "It seems clear that we are in a period
 
of crisis in terms of many of our social myths. This is a period in which
 
many of the myths which have so long functioned to give order to life are
 
losing their power. The far-reaching and even fundamental changes which
 
have so altered the context of life in the Twentieth Century can no longer
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be accommodated by traditional institutions."8
 
However, adjustment of myths, like refinement of values is extra­
ordinarily shattering to the individual and the group. In addition, myths
 
are extremely long lived and resistant to change: "there is inevitably a
 
massive resistance to change -- a willingness to endure considerable
 
discomfort rather than seek alternatives. '9 At the same time, because
 
myths are not the product of conscious acts of will, the ability to adjust
 
-- even abandon them -- is limited. Because myths serve as the construct
 
of reality and identity for those who subscribe to them, they are not
 
easily abandoned. Psychologists have amassed a substantial amount of
 
evidence to suggest the lengths to which individuals will go to protect
 
and defend their self images and the amount of discomfort that they will
 
endure to preserve them. It is a classic case of the preference for the
 
"known evil over that unknown good."
 
However, as one attempts to redefine a new new value and a supportive
 
mythic structure for it, the potential for disruption 6f other concepts and
 
institutions is immense. One recommendation is to redirect our style of
 
thinking and aim for a synthesis. " hereas most of our thinking in recent
 
decades has been .conducted in the analytic and problem-solving mode, I
 
want to suggest that it is time to redirect at least some of our energies to
 
the task of once again seeking a synthesis of ideas."1 0  It is suggested
 
that the kind of thinking required -- the emphasis on interrelatedness and
 
interconnectedness 
-- is being pursued by the young and the ecologists.
 
8 Shier, op.cit., p.37.
 
9Shier, op.cit., p.34.
 
1 6Shier, op.cit., p.41.
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The need then, is for a holistic approach to discover the vision of man
 
The traditional
supportive and conducive to the demands of the future. 

myths have failed him.
 
Value Themes:
 
There are reoccurring themes and attitudes which manifest themselves in
 
a host of specific values in this country. Before examining the changing
 
values in society this section will attempt to describe some of the funda­
mental value themes that reoccur in American society. -t has been notedI1
 
that the basic cultural attributes of American society which serve to
 
differentiate it from other cultures include:
 
* basic moral orientation
 
" pluralism
 
Specifically, these attributes manifest themselves as the following
 
reoccurring themes:
 
(1) -nstrumental Action: The organizing principle of American society
 
is active mastery rather than passive acceptance of any situation. This
 
includes a low tolerance for frustration, emphasis on power and control,
 
encourage of success, desire, and ego-reinforcenient.
 
(2) External Physical Emphasis: The society emphasizes the external
 
world of things and events rather than the internal contemplative experience
 
of meaning.
 
(3) Open: The world view is open rather than closed, emphasizing
 
adaptive, outgoing, assertive personalities and a world view that encourages
 
change, flexibility, movement and flux.
 
l This section is adapted. from a discussion of the characteristic American
 
society in Robin M. Williams, Jr.,.American Society: A Sociological
 
46 9 470
 Interpretation (Knopf: New York) 1960, p. - .
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(4) Rationalism: The culture places faith in rationalism rather than
 
traditionalism, de-emphasizes the past and orients to the future,
 
continually questioning processes so that things are not accepted just
 
because they were done in the past in a specified manner.
 
(5) Orderliness: This refers to the emphasis on orderliness rather
 
than unsystematic ad hoc acceptance of transitory experience.
 
(6) Universalism: The emphasis is on a univeralistic rather than a
 
particularistic ethic. Such an ethic emphasizes application of uniform
 
rules or principles, contrary to special treatment on the basis of some
 
exclusionary criteria.
 
(7) Horizontal Interaction: The emphasis in interpersonal
 
relationships on "horizontal" (i.e., peer group relations) rather than
 
vertical relations (subordinate ordinate).
 
(8) Individualism: The culture emphasizes individual personality
 
and development, rather than group solidarity and community.
 
These themes are manifested in a panoply of diverse values. Rescher
 
has developed a "register" of specific values that reflect the value themes
 
and are presented in Figure 1. It is the means of achieving these values,
 
rather than the underlying themes, that are obsolete for the emerging Twenty­
first Century and are undergoing fundamental change. It is this issue of
 
value change that will dominate the rest of this chapter.
 
FIGURE 	 1 
A.TENTATIVE REGISTER OF AMERICAN VALUES
 
I. SELF-ORIENTED VALUES
 
1. 	personal "material" welfare (the right to life and the pursuit
 
of happiness)
 
2. 	self-respect (the right to be treated as a person and as a member
 
in good standing of the community; honor, honorableness)
 
3. 	self-reliance (self-sufficiency; rugged individualism and the
 
pioneer tradition)
 
4. 	personal liberty (the right to endeavor to "shape one's own life,"
 
to work out major facets of one's own destiny and to go one's own way)
 
5. self-advancement _("success," ambition, diligence)
 
6. self-fulfillment (and "the pursuit of happiness")
 
7. skill and prowess
 
II. GROUP-ORIENTED VALUES
 
1. respectability (group acceptance, avoidance of reproach, good repute,
 
conformity, the "done thing" and the "herd instinct") 
2.- rectitude and personal morality (honesty, fairness, probity, reliability, 
truthfulness, trustworthiness -- the "man of honor") 
3. reasonableness and rationality (objectivity)
 
4. 	the domestic virtues (love, pride in family role, providence, simplicity,
 
thrift, prudence, etc.)
 
5. the civic virtues (involvement, good citizenship, law-abidance, civic
 
pride 	-- the "greatest little town" syndrome) 
6. conscientiousness
 
7. friendship and friendliness
 
8. service (devotion to the well-being of others)
 
9. generosity (charity, openhandedness)
 
10. idealism (hopefulness in human solutions to human problems)
 
11. 	recognition (getting due public credit for the good points scored
 
in the game of life; success and status)
 
12. forthrightness (frankness, openness, sincerity, genuineness; keeping
 
things 	"above board," the fair deal) 
13. fair play (the "good sport") 
I1. SOCIETY-ORIENTED VALUES
 
1. social welfare (indeed "social consciousness" as such)
 
2. equality
 
3. justice (including legality, proper procedure, recourse)
 
4. liberty (the "open society"; the various "freedoms") 
5. order (public order, "law and order") 
6. opportunity ("lind of opportunity" concept; the square deal for all) 
7. charity (help for the "underdog") 
8. 	 progressivism optimism (faith in the society's ability to solve its 
problems) 
9. pride .in "our culture" and "our way of life" 
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FIGURE 1 -- Continued 
IV. NATION-ORIENTED VALUES
 
1. 	the patriotic virtues (love of country, devotion to country,
 
national pride)
 
2. democracy and "the American way"
 
3. "public service" in the sense of service of country (the nation) 
V. MANKIND-ORIENTED VALUES 
1. the "welfare of mankind"
 
2. humanitarianism and the "brotherhood of man"
 
3. internationalism
 
4. pride in the achievements of "the human community"
 
5. reverence for life
 
6. human dignity and the "worth of the individual"
 
VI. ENVIRONMENT-ORIENTED VALUES 
i. aesthetic values (environmental beauty)
 
2. novelty
 
Source: Nicholas Rescher, "What is Value Change? A Framework for
 
Research," in Baier and Rescher, Eds., Values and theFuture
 
(Free Press: New York) 1969, p.92-85.
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Value Change:
 
To understand changes in society and the basis for future change, all
 
theorists agree that understanding the driving forces of value change as
 
well as a model of value change is essential. This implies a science of
 
values -- long lacking, and clearly, a long way from development. A science
 
of values requires a theory of value change which in turn requires a set
 
of hypotheses which are consistent with each other, and consistent with an
 
observable and empirically testable data base. Neither of these require­
ments are met, nor are they likely to be for some time. Examination of the
 
historical data base by such theorists as Sorokin and Marx (among others)
 
has led them to opposite conclusigns. The lack of an observable data base,
 
or even a consensus of what the observable or measurable variables should
 
be, precludes a hasty solution., Yet, it is argued, that an understanding
 
and theoretical basis for value change is essential to understanding social
 
change, and hence, the future.
 
To maintain, or to further encourage the beneficient course of man's
 
history,, it has been aigued, required an understanding of value modification
 
to ensure that "good values" are maintained. "If the world we build is to
 
C
 
be decent and humane (in terms of present values), if we are to place
 
limits on, for instance, invasions of privacy or tinkering with the gene,
 
we must understand the mechanisms by which control over technological
 
changes can be exerted. We need to know who the controllers are -- and
 
1 2
 
-whatvalues they hold.
 
12Alvin Toffler, "Value Impact Forecaster - A Profession of the Future,"
 
in Baier and Rescher, eds. Values and the Future: The Impact of
 
Technological Change on American Values (Free Press: New York) 1969,
 
p.18-19. r M 
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Modes of Value Change: There have been many attempts ro generate an
 
analytic framework for the study of social change and values. The philosopher
 
Nicholas Rescher developed a typology identifying the modes of value change.1
3
 
These modes identify the alternative mechanisms or channels by which value
 
change occur. The modes are not to be confused with the cause of such value
 
change, but they are merely the processes or mechanisms that occur that
 
facilitate the value change, whatever the cause, The seven modes include:
 
(1) 	Value acquisition and abandonment: The most radical sort
 
of value change, it is normally associated with religious
 
or ideological conversion. Essentially it refers to an
 
individual subscription (or non-subscription) to a
 
particular value -- a change in his yes/no vote for a
 
given value.
 
(2) 	Value redistribution: This refers to the change in the
 
extent or pattern of distribution of subscription to a
 
value in a soci&ty.1 4 A value becomes a societal value
 
when 	it becomes more and more generally diffused; that
 
is, more and more extensively distributed throughout the
 
society.
 
(3) 	Value emphasis and de-emphasis: A value may suddenly
 
come to be emphasized because changes in the environment
 
force it to the focus of attention.
 
I 
(4) 	Value scaling: Values of individuals -- and to some
 
degree, a society -- can be compared on a scale of higher
 
and lower, and can be arranged on a hierarchy. This is
 
an indicator of the extent of the individuals'commitment
 
to the value.
 
13The entire typology is adapted from Nicholas Rescher, "What is Value Change?
 
A Framework for Research," in Baier and Rescher, eds., Values and the Future
 
(Free Press: New York) 1969, p.68 -7 2 .
 
14"Subscription" as Rescher uses it merely refers to acceptance of the value.
 
A subscriber is one who has, accepts, holds, is dedicated or gives his
 
adherence to a given value.
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(5) 	Value redeployment or application: This refers to the
 
extension or limitation of the range of application. For
 
instance, extension of equality to American blacks and
 
Indians does not mean a change in the relative position on
 
the hierarchy of this value, but rather, merely changed
 
boundaries of application -- the range or domain of appli­
cation hasbeen increased.
 
(6) 	Value reassessment: This refers to a change in the standard
 
of implementation of a value, or the measures for assessing
 
the attainment of value within the range of application. An
 
example would be a change in the traditional measure
 
(education) of inequality. And this is exactly what has
 
happened in the measurement of equality -- a change from
 
equality of opportunity (education) to equality of results
 
(income). The hierarchical position of the value of
 
equality is constant, but the objective measures of its
 
attainment or success and the domain of application, have
 
been 	broadened.
 
(7) 	Value implementation retargeting: This refers to a change in
 
the strategy used for satisfying a value or goal. Completion
 
of a given activity, or the discovery that it cannot be done,
 
may lead the individual to move on to another target for
 
implementing the value at stake. This is a frequent mode of
 
change for achieving racial equality in this country.
 
This 	discussion of value change -- using Baier's definition of values 

emphasizes the normative quality of this concept of values. The term "goal"
 
often can easily be substituted for the world "value." This normative
 
quality makes objective assessment of the contribution of a given event,
/­
phenomenon or activity to a value possible, and perhaps even measurable.
 
This 	discussion identified the mechanisms or processes by which
 
values change in individuals and among social groups. It is through these
 
modes that changes in values can manifest themselves.
 
The Sources of Value Change: Rescher also develops a conceptual
 
framework for describing the sources of and forces for value change in
 
society. He notes that value ch~nge can occur either derivatively or
 
directly. Value change occurs derivatively when the value in question is
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subsidiary or subordinate to another value and changes because the primary
 
value changes. This also implies value change when one is instrumental
 
in the achievement of another such as in cause and effect relationships.
 
Value change is.direct when it occurs because of the direct, immediate
 
operation of causal factors. Here are the most fundamental kinds of value
 
changes. Of course, a direct value change can also initiate derivative
 
value changes, in fact, it is likely to do so. It is here in the area of
 
induced, direct value change that the greatest concern of theorists lie.
 
Rescher identifies several categories of induced or direct value change.
 
(1) Value change induced by ideological and political change.
 
Here the basic cause of change is value indoctrination. Such value change
 
can occur slowly and naturally through processes of conditioning, acculturation
 
and propaganda or they can be imposed through authoritarian methods. One
 
can see that in those areas of the world where socialist and communist
 
political changes have been most successful, fundamental valuechange has
 
occurred through a slow operant conditioning and reward process that has
 
taken decades to achieve -- witness the massive changes in twentieth century
 
China. Of course, this slow process of value change is more likely to
 
change the fundamental culture of the area and persist in time than that
 
kind of change imposed by an authoritarian government which is likely to be
 
much more transient.
 
(2) Value erosion by boredom, disillusionment and reaction.
 
This is a significant area of value change in American society and essentially
 
refers to the erosion of importance of a value as a consequence of either the
 
satiation of the value or the realization that it is irrelevant to society,
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leading to disenchantment and disillusionment. "Is that all there is?" is
 
indicative of this source of value change.
 
Material success as a goal and motivating force for human endeavor is
 
losing favor as A-ominant value through this process, Disenchantment with
 
the boredom of work and the disillusionment with the rewards of material
 
success have downgraded materialism and conspicuous consumption as a value.
 
(3) Value change induced by a change in information: Iere the
 
value change is of the purely cognitive sort typified by value changes
 
brought about by discoveries in science. The fundamental changes brought
 
by Keynesian economic policies may be of this sort. Familiarity with
 
economics probably contributed to profound value changes by affecting the
 
attitudes towards the role of government in the maintenance of full employ­
ment. Full employment became an explicit societal value. As success with
 
Keynesian policy increased so did the value of full employment increase.
 
This is not an uncommon correlation between the ability to attain a value
 
and the importance of that value.
 
(4) Value change indaced by technological and economic innovation.
 
There is no question that this is one of the most fundamental effects upon
 
values in our society today. Technology offers tremendous opportunities
 
for the enhancement of traditional ideals and values; and poses grave
 
threats to the realization of others. Consider for example the impact of
 
the birth control pill. For the first time in the history of mankind it is
 
now possible with full assurance to separate pregnancy from intercourse.
 
The relationship between the birth control pill and the fundamental .family
 
and life style value change is unclear. Did sexual freedom lead to widespread se
 
of contraceptives? 
 3/ 
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Technology and Values: 
 It may well be that this is the most funda­
mental and profound influence upon values. The rapidity with which values
 
have been observed to be changing is likely to be a function of the
 
rapidity of technological innovation. Communications and increased mobility
 
alone have had a tremendous impact on the perceptions of situations 
-­
witness the impact of the proliferation of television upon the Civil Rights
 
Movement.
 
The essence of the technology/values relationship is the question of
 
causality: 
 what is the leading edge.of change, values or technology? This
 
issue is at the very heart of sociological and historical debate, but we are
 
sure of but one thing: the relationship is strong, but causality is unclear.
 
Marx, for instance, examining the historical basis for societal change,
 
concluded that technology, especially as used by capitalists, so dominated
 
society that it not only dictated values (and the seeds of the capitalist
 
destruction) but profoundly changed the fundamental laws of history. 
Marx
 
wrote:
 
'1..The profound intervention in the civilization base of human
 
life signified by the scientific and technological revolution
 
in its entirety 
--
viewing it in its intrinsic correlation with
 
.the whole complex of social revolution of our day -- cannot fail
 
to impinge on the elementary laws of history. In many respects
 
the course of civilization acquires a new logic and time scale!'f5
 
In other wordsthe influence of technology and science is so pervasive
 
that it overrides every other aspect of society and dominates value change
 
especially. Many "non-Marxists" would agree with this domination.
 
15Karl Marx, Selected Works, Volume I (Moscow: 1933) p.210.
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Other observers have concluded that ideology and values dominate the
 
growth and development of technology. Pitirim Sorokin, an historical analyst
 
of societal development, opposes the conclusion of Marx and has concluded
 
that it is the non-material items of culture that are the prime movers of
 
16
 
society; that is, ideology dominates technology.

"In a qualitative change of a system its component of meaning, values,
 
and norms -- its ideology -- tends to change [and spread] first
 
while its component of behavioral and material values, including
 
technique, tends to lag in the change.. .Before a different airplane
 
or gun or spade or any variation of a particular gadget is built,
 
there is a prior variation of the controlling ideas. It is the
 
conceived ideology that chooses its vehicles and not the vehicles
 
that determine the ideology. 17 
This causal relationship between values and technological development is
 
thought by Sorokin to hold true. However, just how important is causality?
 
Others assert that this relationship is not clear and that it is cyclic
 
and serendipitous. While Kenneth Boulding believes the relationship is
 
indeterminable, he does acknowledge the interplay of science and technology
 
with values and attitudes:
 
"In this great transition there has been a constant interplay
 
between changing technologies and changing values... The interaction
 
between values and technologies is so complex that it is quite
 
impossible to say which precedes the other. ... It seems fairly
 
certain, for instance, that there were changes in values, that-is,
 
preference systems, which were a necessary prerequisite for the
 
rise of science.,.These changes in values, however, were not
 
unconnected with certain preceding changes in technology... The
 
development of the more elaborate folk technology imperceptibly
 
changes the values of society which used it, and by giving man
 
a little power over the material would perhaps increase his desire
 
'
 
"
 for knowledge about it.
 
1 6Charles P. Loomis and Z. K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories: Selected
 
5 94.
American Writers (Van Nostrand: Princeton) 1961, p.
1 7Pitirim Sorokin, Societl, Cultural and Personality: Their Structure and' 
Dynamics (Harpers: New York) 1947 p.659. 
18Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Emerging Superculture," in Baier-and Rescher, 
op-cit., p.345. /_74,o9 
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Other writers on the subject, such as Theodore J. Gordon, recognize
 
the "apparent relationship between technology and values" but de-emphasize 
the question of causality. Gordon developed a closed loop system relating
 
technology and values. The model implies that values influence the forces
 
that drive technology both directly,-and indirectly -- but technology.itself
 
results in value change, which in turn affects the social forces doing research
 
which, again, dominates new technology. Discounting the importance of causality,
 
Gordon stresses the importance of the model as a way of conducting an ordered
 
inquiry into the factors which define research. 19
 
So what does the lack of consensus over the technology/values relationship
 
mean for our inquiry into values? First, it means there is no theoretical
 
base upon which to base any inquiry. The predictive capability is negligible,
 
and the explanatory capability weak. Secondly, the data base is
 
inadequate for a substantial test of-any hypothesis. Thirdly, while historical
 
evidence suggests that the relationship between technology and values is
 
strong, and among the dominant determinants of values, the lack of under­
standing of causality implies extreme difficulty in developing a predictive
 
capability. Hence, until the theoretical base exists and a model can be
 
developed, future value changes can be explored largely by speculation assisted 
by historical analogy. In sum, we can only conclude that there is indeed 
a strong relationship -- however difficult it is to identify -- between 
technology and values.
 
19Theodore J. Gordon, "The Feedback between Technology and Values," in
 
Baier and Rescher, op.cit., p.150-151.
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The study of values -- whether current or future -- is further complicated
 
by the intrusion of values in their study. By this we mean that the observations
 
and analyses may be tinged by the values of the observer himself.- Hence, the
 
objective study of values is obscured by the potential value-ridden bias .of the
 
researcher.
 
Rate of Change of Values: Until the last several centuries the rate of
 
change of values was so imperceptively slow that it could not be observed within
 
the lifetime of a single observer. Hence, most value studies relied on retro­
spective interpretations of perceptions of past events and consequences.
 
However, within the last three hundred years the speed of value change
 
has increased enormously so that an individual can see fundamental change
 
occurring within several decades. As mentioned previously, it is likely that
 
this rate of change is related to technology and increases in the rate of diffu­
sion. Clearly, the past two decades have'beensuch periods in this country.
 
This "speed up" of the rate of change may encourage observation and data collection
 
so that the development of a theoretical base is possible.
 
It is the speed of the change that is at the heart of the conflict and
 
tension. Despite our professed expertise, we really do not know very much
 
about change -- we know that change is disruptive to social systems and in
 
some sense painful for individuals to undergo. The entire thesis of
 
Alvin Toffler's Future Shock is that the rapidity of this change is such that
 
individuals cannot cope with it: the change is so rapid that it literally
 
causes a physical illness. It may well be that the rapidity of this value change
 
is so great that it is at the root of much of the disillusionment and aliena­
tion that is evident today.
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In times past, the rate of change, whether of technology, values,
 
institutions or whatever, was so slow that it did not wreak such social
 
change.
 
Value Change in the United States:
 
Previous discussions have outlined the kinds of values that have dominated
 
the American culture. We have repeatedly asserted that values are in fact changing.
 
The purpose of this section is to explore the manifestations of these value changes.
 
There are primarily four categories of evidence of value change. The primary
 
indicators of value change are either direct or indirect. 
Direct indicators
 
include overt changes in behavior. Indirect indicators of value change can be
 
elicited from statements about value change, observations of friction, conflict
 
and tension, as well as less obvious changes in behavior. Despite the use of
 
public opinion data to support evidence of value change, public opinion data and
 
surveys are notoriously inaccurate representations of such change. Opinions are
 
situational and therefore, do not reflect valuesdirectly or accurately. Public
 
opinion is relatively unstable and fluctuates with changes in the immediate situa­
tion, even in matters of grave consequences. Public opinion flows are unpre­
dictable because the judgments are specific. Hence, public opinion data will
 
not be cited here. The four categories of evidence are discussed below.
 
(1) Indicators of Social Disorganization: One of the primary manifesta­
tions of the transition from an old social order to a new social order is social
 
disorganization. This is characterized by such things as an increase in crime
 
and violence, mental and physical illness, juvenile delinquency, suicide, drug
 
use and alcoholism, among others. All of these indicators of social disorganiza­
tion are showing an increase. It can be argued that these kinds of social
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disruptions are in fact related to urbanization and overcrowding -- however, 
widespread urbanization is itself indicative of profound value changes. 
Such social disorganization occurred in the past as well and accompanied
 
the transition from a traditional, agrarian society to an industrial urban
 
society. This kind of social disruption is similar to that which is
 
occurring in many lesser developed countries as they begin the transitional
 
process of modernization. It is not surprising that the United States is
 
undergoing such a similar transformation as it enters the "Post-Industrial
 
Society." The transition, however, into the Post-Industrial Society is
 
only in its beginning stages and it is likely that as it progresses it
 
will disrupt societal patterns of organization more substantially. Hence,
 
we can foresee that these indicators of societal disorganization are likely
 
to worsen in the short run.
 
Suicide rates, an indicator of social disorganization, has long been
 
used as a measure of the group or societal cohesiveness. Emile Durkheim
 
in a investigation pointed out that suicide was an indicator of social
 
integration -- that is, the degree to which the individual was integrated
 
into group life determined whether he would be motivated to suicide.
 
Strangely enough either extreme was sufficient motivation for suicide:
 
either high integration into the group or low, superficial integration
 
into the group. The former is likely to provoke altrusic suicide,
 
sacrificing individual life for group goals (i.e., Kamikaze pilots, the
 
Vietnamese Buddhist monks), and the latter is likely to lead to suicide of
 
disillusionment and alienation.
 
20Robert J. Trotter, "Cities, Crowding & Crime," Science News (Vol 106)
 
November 2, 1974 p. 282. 
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Both kinds of integration difficulties are likely to grow during
 
transitional, conflict-ridden times. Hence, we should expect an increase
 
in suicide rates. However, to some degree this may be tempered by the
 
group solidarity that results from the challenge of a crisis.
 
(2) Indicators of Family Instability: The nuclear family has
 
been the source and maintenance of human interaction for thousands of years
 
and has persisted through hundreds of culture. The nuclear kamily based
 
on the dyadic marriage that is so pervasive that some sociologists have
 
viewed the conjugal unit as so basic as to differ little from the
 
biological pairing of other mammalian species.21 The sociologist Murdock
 
has concluded, based on a study of 250 societies, that some form of nuclear
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family is found in every society. Recently, rare cases of the disappearance
 
of the nuclear family has been noted, such as thelsraeli's Kubbutz.
 
Marriage is probably the oldest social invention, pre-dating even
 
religion and is thought to have arisen with the evolution of Homo Sapiens.
 
Historically, marriage has served the same functions: to legitimize parent­
hood and to legitimize sexual relationships.
23
 
Suddenly the oldest social institution of mankind is being questioned.
 
The nuclear family appears to be in trouble. While marriages are occurring
 
at a higher rate than ever before, they are also failing at a higher rate
 
than ever before -- divorce rates have been escalating since the formation
 
of the republic, and at especially high rates in the last two decades.
 
2lRalph Linton, "The Natural History of the Family," in RN.Anshen (Ed)
 
The Family: Its Function and Density (Harper & Tow: New York) 1959.
 
22George P. Murdock, Social Structure, (Macmillan: New York) 1949. 
23Bronislaw Malinowski, The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern 
Melanasia (Harvest Books) 1929" 73 9 
- 25 -
Concomitant with the declining stability of the marriage and nuclear
 
family is the exploration and search for alternative life styles. The
 
alternative life style movements, the "counter culture," is a much more
 
fundamental manifestation of value change than the faddish quality the
 
popular press gives it. This search for alternative life styles reflects
 
the growing disillusionment with the traditional nuclear family. As
 
discussed earlier in this paper, the myth of the family and the role of
 
the nuclear family in developing and maintaining basic and desired values
 
and personality attributes is at the heart of Western culture, and yet
 
this very institution is being questioned, threatened and abandoned.
 
Some theorists 24 argue that it is the abandonment of the nuclear
 
family and the dissolution of the family bonds that is the root cause of
 
the social disorganization of which we have spoken. That these two
 
phenomena are related is probably without question. However, the dis­
organization of the American family unit manifests the lack of fulfillment
 
and satisfaction that it is providing the individual. Many of the
 
alternative life styles are group oriented rather than couple oriented,
 
and attempts are made to substitute the extended family for the nuclear
 
family., What this may mean is that in a complex, highly technological,
 
urbanized, information dense society the individual feels most comfortable,
 
fulfilled and satisfied in a supportive group structure, rather than in the
 
comparative isolation of a dyadic unit.
 
There are probably three other factors contributing to thedecline
 
of the nuclear family unit. One is the transition in the economic role
 
24Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Origins of A'5enntion." Scientific
 
American (August 1974) p 534. 
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of the nuclear family. In agrarian and early industrial periods the
 
married state was essentially an economic necessity for both males and
 
females. 
However, no longer do women need to be "supported" and no
 
longer do men need to be "cared for." 
 Hence, the economic justification
 
of the nuclear family unit no longer holds.
 
Secondly, life expectancies have been extended so very much that
 
the notion of "til death do us part" has assumed much greater dimensions
 
than ever before in history. Rarely does mankind make a decision of any
 
sort that he is happy with for fifty years -- and in the volatile field
 
of human relations and differentially growing personalities, it is even
 
more unlikely.
 
A final factor that is undoubtedly affecting the stability of the
 
nuclear family unit is the advance in contraception technology that now
 
makes it possible to separate sexual activity from parenthood. This
 
undoubtedly reduces the need for marriage as legitimization of sexual
 
activity.
 
(3) Failure of Social Binds: 
 Another category of evidence that
 
values are changing is the observation that the institutions which
 
traditionally served as reinforcers of the status quo and desired values
 
are no longer effective in this role and are themselves seriously
 
threatened by the transformation of society.
 
In addition to the destabilization of the family, such traditional
 
social forces as the church, school, social organizations and the like are
 
not functioning in the traditional mode of socialization agents. The
 
difficulty with the American educational system is legend and tied to
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the general disillusionment and alienation of American youth. At the same
 
time the pace of education as an equalizing force and as the route to
 
success is increasingly questioned Recent analyses suggest that
 
equalization of educational achievement has little to do with equalization
 
of income. In fact, the growing over-education of the labor force is likely
 
to become an increasingly severe problem of the future. Hence, the respect
 
that education once enjoyed both as an activity as well as an institution
 
And with it the function education served as a socialization
is declining. 

agent, a force for cohesiveness, is declining.
 
Rigidification of traditional religious institutions has resulted in
 
declining attendance and declining influence of religion over daily
 
activities. Church attendance is lower than it has ever been, yet interest
 
in meditation, ideational activities, and alternative states of consciousness has
 
probably never been higher. A host of new religious sects are developing
 
which are well attended and supported with tremendous furvor. There is
 
increasing interest, even in respected academic and research circles, in
 
the definition of life, the delineation between life and death and the
 
quest for altered states of consciousness. The charismatic movement
 
within the Catholic church, transcendental meditation and interest in
 
parapsychology are but a few examples of this growing movement.
 
This movement indicates that the role of religious and spiritual
 
experiences in man's life is changing. The function of religion as an
 
explainer of the unknown and regulator of behavior is beoming increasingly
 
irrelevant to individual needs in the emerging twenty-first century. This
 
is accompanied by two auxiliary events: transition of the religious
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institutions themselves in an effort to maintain membership and influence
 
and, at the individual level, an increasing search and exploration fot
 
meaning-in life.
 
(4) Rejection of traditional and accepted myths: A final category
 
of evidence of changing values is the increasing rejection of traditional
 
myths and accepted role behavior. This, to some degree underlies all the
 
other categories of evidence of value change. This category of evidence
 
reflects the extensive conflict between existing, traditional myths and
 
values and the new, emerging values of the Post Industrial Society. Much
 
of the rejection revolves around the roles that individuals play in society.
 
The notion that individual role types could be imposed upon individuals
 
on the basis of gender, socio-economic status or family background Is
 
becoming increasingly rejected. This rejection is manifested in a variety
 
of ways ranging from individuals seeking the traditional occupations of
 
the opposite sex (i.e., male nurses, female telephone repairman), to
 
abandonment of the traditional behavior or costume of a given role.
 
The rejection of traditional myths and role types is also becoming
 
a legitimate concern of legislatures and the courts. To some extent
 
this rejection is an expression of the broadening concept of equality of
 
opportunity and is reflected in the Equal Rights Amendment, Anti-Age Racial
 
Discrimination movement, and, of course, the Women's Liberation Movement.
 
This movement essentially states that the role that an individual'plays
 
in society should be a function of the individual's desires and capabilities,
 
rather than a function of any innate characteristics.
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The Emerging Values of the Future:
 
Earlier discussions have described the kinds of values that have been
 
the dominant American values. We have noted that the previous value revolution,
 
that of the 18th century, occurred as the modernization supplanted traditional
 
valuea and ethics. Talcott Parsons, the Harvard sociologist, describes this
 
transition in terms of three sets of "pattern variables" that epitomized the
 
change. The alternatives include "collectivity of interest versus self
 
interest," "particularism versus universalism" and "functional diffuseness
 
versus functional specificity." In each pair, the former pattern describes
 
a pre-modern tendency and the latter a modern one. The collective/individual
 
pair is self evident. The second pair, particularism versus universalism,
 
refers to the modern value of criteria that are abstract, formal, and
 
generally applicable to a host of situations, rather than a unique consideration
 
of each situation. Such generalizable principles are at the root of the
 
manageability of the bureaucracy -- "we can't make exceptions to the rules."
 
The third pair, functional diffusion versus specificity, refers to the emergence
 
of specialized functions within narrowly defined roles -- "that's not my job."
 
The current value revolution is a search for situations that can
 
accommodate, to some degree, the pre-modern values. The Post-Industrial
 
Society will be characterized by small group interactions in which individual
 
interactions are dominated by the pre-modern values, but the interactions
 
among the groups will be determined by the modern abstract values. An
 
individual is likely to belong to several groups, of which each group is
 
likely to have a very functionally specific role, but the individual role
 
within the group is likely to be more diffuse.
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So what does this all mean? The abstract modern value structure
 
that Parsons identified did not fulfill the requirements of individuals:
 
they did not have a sense of meaning, well-being or satisfaction. One of
 
the recurring themes is of alienation, loneliness, isolation -- all of
 
which resul-t in the search for feaning through group interaction.
 
John D. Rockefeller identifies how these new values will be manifest
 
in attitudes and actions. His categorization includes:
25
 
1) Positive view of nature: Increasing recognition of the importance
 
of environment, conservation ethic and need for man to establish harmonious
 
relationship with nature.
 
2) Positive view of man: Man is increasingly viewed as good rather
 
than evil with an emphasis on "humanistic" values.
 
3) Sense of community: Underlying many of the emerging value trends
 
is the need for community and group interaction to overcome the isolation
 
and alienating qualities of industrialization and urbanization. The loneli­
ness of modern life is quite pervasive, and this search for meaning through
 
group interaction is likely to be a dominant theme of the value structure
 
of the future.
 
4) Irdividuality: At the same time there is a growing sense of
 
community, there is also a strong emphasis on individuality. This is not
 
the contradiction that it may first appear; rather, within the support of
 
a group structure the individual is freer to "do his own thing." This freedom of
 
individual expression is consistent with the current rejection of traditional
 
roles and myths.
 
2 5fRockefeller, op.cit. 7 # 
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roles and myths.
 
Charles Reich has suggested that the loss of self is the most
 
devastating problem facing America. "Beginning with school, if not before,
 
an individual is systematically stripped of his imagination, his
 
creativity, his heritage, his dreams, and his personal uniqueness; in
 
order to style him into a productive unit for a mass technological
 
society."2 6It is the rediscovery of self that is at the heart of the new
 
values.
 
5) Freedom: Underlying many of the value changes is the expanded
 
notion of freedom of choice of the individual. One key aspect of the
 
emerging value system is a tolerance for diversity and a variety of life­
styles and role behaviors. This increasing tolerance is essential to the
 
broadening freedom of individual action and behavior. This broadening of
 
freedom can be seen in such legislative changes as the reduction of the
 
role of the state in the regulation of sexual and behavioral acts, the
 
elimination of victimless crimes, and the increasing tolerance of previously
 
proscribed activities.
 
6) Equality: As is discussed in some detail elsewhere, the basic
 
concept of equality has been broadened so that the notion of what it is
 
that constitutes equality is much greater than in previous times.
 
7) Participatory Democracyt The notion that democracy is a
 
fundamental tenet of the nation should not be viewed as new or different.
 
But what is new and different is the notion of participatory democracy -­
each and every citizen has the right, perhaps even the duty, to make his
 
voice heard in decisions that will affect him. In times past, this
 
Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (Bantam Books: New York)
 
1970, 
p. 7-8. 
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participation was delegated to a select body of elected officials who
 
became an elite decision making body. As Alvin Toffle has noted, there is
 
now a revolt of the "planees" against the "planners" and the result is
 
that a large portion of the public is cancelling their previous delega­
tion of responsibility to this elite. Charles Reich suggests that it is
 
the universal sense of powerlessness that is the root cause of the
 
dilemma America is in, "We seem to be living in a society that no one
 
created and that no one wants." 27
 
The rise of participatory democracy can be seen in the attendance
 
at federal hearings, the growth of class action suits and the proliferation
 
of social activist movements. Common Cause, the citizens lobby, is
 
probably the best example of this growing trend. The reform of the
 
operating rules of the House of Representatives is another example.
 
8) Social and Corporate Responsibility: The growing sense of
 
responsibility for the consequences of a given action as well as responsi­
bility for the entire group is a fairly new,value'and reflects the collec­
tivist viewpoint. This social responsibility includes the concept of
 
helping others, both as an individual and as a corporate body. It
 
includes the concept of being responsible for the consequences of given
 
actions in a very broad and general way. Caveat emptor has given way to
 
caveat vendor in that the seller is responsible not only for delivering a
 
product, but also for preventing, to the degree possible, the misuse of
 
that product.
 
Reich, op. cit. p.8
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9) Changing View of Materialism: The conspicuous consumption era 
of the American public has come to an end. As Rockefeller notes, it is 
not that materialism does not count but rather materialism is placed in 
its proper perspective. Materialism is no longer seen as the route to 
heaven and happiness, but a good way to supply the basic material needs 
of life. 
10) A Positive View of Work: Work is slowly being separated from
 
duty, obligation, and the Prostestant ethic and is -increasinglyviewed as
 
a way of expressing man's creativity and productivity. Work must be
 
"meaningful" and enjoyable. This value will become increasingly
 
difficult to satiate as Daniel Bell notes that soon only 20% of the jobs
 
will be "meaningful" and the remaining 80% will be repetitive, boring
 
experiences. The problem of overeducation of the labor force will
 
exacerbate the difficulty.
 
11) A Rising Metaphysical and Religious Consciousness: Exploring
 
altered states of consciousness and the frontiers of the mind is a new
 
desire of man. In some individuals, this spiritual rebirth has religious
 
significance, in others the metaphysical experiences are largely without a
 
religious role. This exploration leads to questioning the demarcation
 
between life and death, exploring the "hereafter" as well as trying to
 
expand levels of consciousness.
 
Conclusion
 
So what does all this value change mean? The fundamental value change
 
that is underway is part of the transition from the industrial era to the
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post industrial era. It is important to note that value change is not
 
the resutt of this transition but it is a fundamental part, and perhaps 
root cause of it.
 
We have suggested the impetus for the value change underway today is
 
the response to the increasing rate of technological innovation over the
 
past century. We have also suggested that the values, institutions and
 
myths of the industrial society are irrelevant for the emerging post­
industrial society. The dominant characteristic of the emerging values
 
will be the availability of a wide range of alternative lifestyles, roles
 
and behaviors that are socially acceptable.
 
One of the characteristics that is developing is the tolerance for
 
a proliferation of variety. No more will a single dominant life style
 
be the only acceptable mode, nor will a single style of behavior be
 
reinforced. "But you don't.act like a banker" will be an observation of the
 
past as there will be no such thing as "banker behavior." Society will
 
tolerate -- even encourage -- greater diversity. Members of society who
 
are now viewed as deviates (such as hippies) will be judged as legitimate
 
members of society in the post-industrial society.
 
A second characteristic will be the search for meaning. The motiva­
tion and basic value of the industrial revolution was the demand and
 
need for material rewards. These needs have been essentially satiated
 
by the rapid achievement of affluence in this country. Now materialism will
 
be superceded by the search for meaning in activities and of paramount
 
importance is the meaningfulness of the work environment, school environment,
 
anid the interpersonal growth-environment. Sorokin has called this
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phenomenon the increasingly sensate culture. We have noted the search
 
for religious meaning but the search for meaning goes much beyond that to
 
an exploration of alternative states of consciousness and an exploration
 
of the boundaries of the mind. Examples of movements in this direction
 
are the increasingly serious inquiry into the ESP and parapsychology and
 
the growing consciousness movement (i.e., transcendental meditation). It
 
is the search for meaningful activity that is leading some firms to
 
redesign their factory layout to incorporate a greater sense of participa­
tion and meaningfulness in the work endironment. Meaningful contribution
 
will be a motivation for work where material reward will not. "Fun jobs"
 
and the need to enjoy one's work are becoming essential.
 
A third characteristic is the removal of boundaries on role
 
behavior. No longer will individuals be prohibited from certain roles
 
or ascribed to other roles solely by virtue of certain innate characteris­
tics such as sex, race, previous training, previous experience. Exploring
 
and empirical learning will be rewarded so that behavior patterns become
 
more flexible.
 
A fourth characteristic of the post-industrial society is increased 
responsibility of the group for the individual. The founding fathers 
viewed this nation as encouraging the individual to make the best of his 
life in every way-possible -- yet the individual was responsible for his 
success or lack of success. A changing value is that society as a whole 
and its member groups have a responsibility to the individual members to 
not only assist them and maintain a standard of living but to protect them 
from physical and psychological harm. This notion of group responsibility 
- 36 ­
for individual consequences has already been manifested in such things
 
as the Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency,
 
the Consumer Protection Agency. Such organizations are predicated on the
 
premise that the individual can be harmed as well as benefit from actions
 
of the group; hence, the requirement for these restraints. This kind of
 
growing responsibility stems from two factors. One is the persistence of
 
inequality. The concept of equality of opportunity has been broadened
 
over the past several decades as equality of-results did not evolve. In
 
fact, income inequality has been increasing in this country. A second
 
factor is the growing realization that technology has disbenefits as well
 
as benefits and that unrestrained technological growth can have grave
 
negative impacts.
 
This value scheme described herein is the values of the emerging lost
 
Industrial Society and are the values of probably only a small minority of
 
the population so far. The transition to the post-industrial society and
 
adoption of these values will be turbulent, as is any period of discontinuity.
 
Conflict and even violence are likely to occur over the next several
 
decades as this evolution and transition takes place. The mass media has
 
commented on the cessation of violence on the campuses and the streets
 
and has assumed that the nation is once more "on the right track,"that is,
 
the track of the glorious, blind optimism of the fifties. It would be quite
 
erroneous to accept this analysis of the current behavior. During any mode
 
of transition and conflict-there is a continual flip-flop back and forth'
 
from old to new and new to old as the society tries to adapt to and incor­
porate changes. It is this kind of reaction-innovation-reaction mechanism
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that is currently underway. One could also note that the cessation of
 
demonstrations and violence may have been prematurely celebrated as
 
there is increasing evidence that with a continuation of the recession 
in the face of rising affluences in some sectors, some part of the popula­
tion would take to the streets and demand redistribution of this income 
and demand employment. The major source of concern in the late sixties -­
the Vietnamese War -- is gone but it may be replaced by a new concern -­
the persistence of inequality. The existence of a large group of unem­
ployed side-by-side with an even larger group of the population experi-. 
encing unprecedented affluence can do nothing but create violence and 
conflict.
 
One can foresee with a great deal of certainty that the nqxt few decades
 
will be conflict ridden. This discussion has implied that there is a
 
consensus about the value structure of the future. It is quite clear that
 
there is not a consensus, in fact, some writers have confused the processes
 
at work and have ignored the cyclical behavior of innovation and reaction.
 
Values have always been changing, but never this rapidly. It is a
 
threatening process because it strikes at the most fundamental belief
 
and mythic structure of the individual, and it becomes especially
 
threatening because the rate at which it is occurring is accelerating.
 
Ideological transition and value changes is not a new phenomena and is as
 
old as civilization itself. Great alarm and furor among generations should
 
be understood for what it is which is a conflict between beliefs as
 
ideologically engrained; it is the conflict between capitalists and
 
communists. However, one can argue that one of the great current problems
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is that the beliefs and value structure underlying 20th Century America
 
are Inappropriate for the emerging problems of the 21st Century and it
 
is only through this tortuous and painful process of value chaige that
 
we can indeed hope to realize the promises of the future. But the transi­
tion will be filled with conflict.
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ISSUE: 	 INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE CAUSED BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC
 
INEFFECTIVENESS INHIBITING, PERHAPS PRECLUDING, CHANGE NECESSARY
 
FOR SOLUTION OF SOCIETAL PROBLEMS
 
The Issue:
 
There is increasing concern at all levels of government and industry as well
 
as among the public that the increasing ineffectiveness and paralysis of American
 
organizations, institutions, and bureaucracy is precluding solution, perhaps­
even contributing to the furtherance, of current economic, technological and
 
societal problems. This concern is manifested in a variety of ways from
 
declining confidence in government as a problem solver; to violation of the 
law; to "dropping out" of the system; to massive budget reductions, department 
reorganizations and personnel changes; to activist efforts to "reform' the 
system (i.e., the freshman House, Ralph Nader's organization and Common Cause).
 
While this discomfiture takes many different guises, the underlying premise
 
is that:
 
* 	organizations and bureaucracies no longer deliver services
 
or accomplish goals as they once did or as they were
 
designed
 
o 	the goals of organizations and bureaucracies are irrelevant,
 
perhaps even inimical, to the goals demanded by present and
 
emerging national problems
 
* 	the assumptions and underlying beliefs that serve as
 
operating procedures of American organizations and bureaucra­
cies are no longer accurate representations of reality
 
* 	organizational and bureaucratic structure is becoming
 
increasingly rigidified, thereby preventing change and dis­
couraging innovation, adaptability, flexibility, and
 
willingness to take risk
 
* 	such organizational rigidification and obsolete premises is
 
the major obstacle to solution of societal problems.
 
While traditional discussions of institutional failure often include
 
descriptions of the institutions of church, family, marriage, education,
 
government and so forth, this discussion will be largely devoted to public
 
and private bureaucratic organizations as they affect national priorities,
 
decision making and strategies for achieving these goals in this nation.
 
Obviously, the societal values towards such bureaucratic organizations are
 
a function of the societal role and attitudes'towards such ihstitutions
 
as family, marriage, education, church and so forth, but the changing role
 
of these institutions is discussed in another paper (see Chapter on Changing
 
Societal Values). In this paper, we are concerned with the changing effective­
ness of organizations which have the following characteristics:
 
* 	organizations which are goal-oriented, recognizing that the
 
explicit and external goal statements and the implicit and
 
internal goal statements may differ
 
* 	 organizations whose existence, structure, and explicit 
goals .are publicly perceived and known 
* 	 organizations whose existence, structure, and goals are, or 
at one time were, indicative of consensus concerning 
the legitimate activities and goals of a particular interest 
group, value set, regional or national grouping, or some sub­
set of the population 
* 	organizations whose structure and existence is explicit so
 
that whether an individual or group is part of the larger
 
organization can be determined with some certainty
 
It 	is the contention of this paper that such organizations are no
 
longer effective in meeting the goals for which they are designed, or that
 
these designated goals and functions are obsolete and irrelevant to the
 
demands of the emerging twenty-first century. This organizational effective­
ness retards, perhaps even inhibits, progress.
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Among the specific institutional failings that will be discussed in
 
this paper are the following:
 
* 	the inability of the economic system and federal policy makers
 
to develop, implement and monitor effective economic policy to
 
meet national economic goals of full unemployment and price
 
stability as well as coherent and cogent energy policy
 
a 	the inability of the economic market system and government
 
actions to mitigate resource shortages, inflation and capacity
 
limitations
 
o 	the failure of a large portion of the population to gain access
 
to national wealth and an adequate standard of living and the
 
failure of corrective measures to have a meaningful impact on
 
the situation
 
e 	the failure (or distortion) of the free market process to
 
allocate goods, services and resources in an efficient and
 
effective way
 
a 	the growing contradiction between industrial goals and societal
 
goals; i.e what's good for GM is not necessarily good for the
 
country
 
Dimensions of the Problem:
 
The discussion of the failure of institutions of organizational
 
inadequacy is faced with a troublesome problem: how do we know that institu­
tions and organizations are ineffective and how do we measure the failure of
 
such entities? Managers within the organizations tend to evaluate their
 
organizations on the basis of some internally devised "performance
 
indicators;" yet because they are internally devised, it is not at all clear
 
whether they do in fact have any relevance to the success of the organization
 
within its societal setting.
 
The question of institutional efficacy must revolve around the central
 
forces which give the organization its legitimacy. These forces are
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pubtic confidence and consensus. The definition of such indicators
 
obviously is a subjective measurement that changes with time. In the
 
democratic form of government and economic free market structure that we
 
have built, the effectiveness of any institution is a function of the
 
public confidence in the behavior and conduct of that entity which reflects
 
a public consensus over the kinds of expectations-that the public has for
 
the behavior of such organizations. For instance, the recent collapse of
 
the Presidency was an example of the application of such measures. There
 
was clearly a public donsensus over the kind of behavior and conduct that
 
society expected of the President. This consensus was implicitly
 
derived, yet specific enough so that the public could, in fact, evaluate
 
the performance of the institution with respect to this implied code of
 
behavior. 
When found wanting, public confidence in the institution dis­
solved, and the organization required massive personnel and procedural
 
changes. The national intelligence community seems to be in the initial
 
stages of such a transformation based on identieal kinds of mechanisms.
 
The failure of a President and the failure of the intelligence
 
community are but two examples of this generalized institutional failure
 
that is perceived to be underway in the nation. While at first it may be
 
difficult to relate these institutional failings to a more generalized
 
pattern, it is clear that the same kinds of mechanisms and organizational
 
.deviations are at work. Before a more detailed discussion of specific
 
examples of institutional failings, let us'examine some of the fundamental
 
organizational and societal changes and perturbations which may contribute
 
to the generalized problem of instititibnalfailure.
 
5
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(1) Changing Societal Values: Another paper deals,extensively with
 
changes in societal values that are currently underway. Changing societal
 
values have always placed a tremendous pressure on organizations, and are
 
the foundation for changing national priorities which should, in theory,
 
change organizational goals in a consistent fashion.
 
Several emerging value trends are likely to place continuing pressure
 
upon organizational responsiveness and viability in the future. One is the
 
new value of the nation providing a minimum standard of living for all. It
 
is a fairly new idea and one that most probably can be traced to the impact of
 
affluence and the concomitant feelings of guilt that starvation in the land of
 
plenty elicits. Essentially, a national consensus is being reached that the
 
conditions of starvation, malnutrition and absence of the bare necessities of living
 
are intolerable and inexcusable in a nation as affluent as the United States.
 
This, as is argued elsewhere, is a fairly radical notion when considered in
 
light of the historical role of tbz Protestant ethnic. Early settlers of
 
this country believed that all citizens (and remember how limited that notion
 
of citizenship was) were entitled to the opportunity to make a living. Now
 
we are arguing all citizens are entitled to achie e that standard of living
 
by virtue of their citizenship. The national consensus on this value is by
 
no means firm, but one can easily see the beginning of its impact on welfare,
 
education, health and social security policy. Heairh care, housing, food
 
and educational assistance are increasingly being accepted as automatic
 
rights of citizenship. While in the past one can be too poor to qualify
 
for federal or state assistance, poverty is decreasingly being viewed as
 
an indicator of a personality or individual defect.
721 )­$71> 
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A second major value change trend is the notion that growth for the
 
sake of growth may not be beneficial and that growthcan have distenefits
 
as well as benefits. The rising importance of externalities (pollution,
 
congestion, wasteful use of resources, etc.) as well as the widening
 
concept of externalities (boring jobs, occupational hazards, product
 
dangers, etc.) in evaluating organizational success and effectiveness
 
is having a marked impact on federal legislation, court decisions and
 
the general procedures under which organizations must function.
 
The rising importance of this value also may be attributed to affluence -­
as well as the changing concept of the "good life."
 
A third and final value change which is having a substantial impact
 
on organizational viability is freedom of choice. While obviously freedom
 
of choice has been a mainstay of American ideology for two centuries, it is
 
only recently that this value has'been applied to a host of disparate
 
activities such as working hours, working responsibilities, educational
 
courses and programs of activities, etc. It is associated with the rise of
 
the individual, the belief that the individual is most well-qualified to
 
determine what is best for himself, rather than an omnipotent bureaucracy.
 
We see this value emerging as, for example, conflict with and between institu­
tions over the demand for homosexual marriages, the demand by students for "stu­
dent's rights," and the demand by labor for participation in decision making and
 
management. The value change has already affected organizations to some
 
degree and changed, gorinstance, policy with respect to food assistance
 
(the poor are now viewed as competent to purchase their own food rather
 
than requiring the direct provision of food), and housing policy (again, a rise in
 
the perception of the competence of the poor is occurring so that experiments
z/5f
 
are being made to provide direct rent subsidies to the poor rather than
 
federal subsidies to the builder and manager of low income housing).
 
This category of value change is likely to put increasing pressure upon
 
organizations and even threaten their very existence. A very large portion
 
of the employment and resources of social welfare organizations, for example,
 
are devoted to deciding what is best for the individual and his family. If
 
we now decide that the individual is capable of making these decisions on
 
his own, the organization's existence is threatened because it reduces their
 
authority and eliminates some of their-responsibility. This threat to
 
organizational viability is the source to a great deal of the conflict and
 
concern over institutions. The self-interest of the organizational members
 
increasingly comes into conflict with the mandated goals and responsibilities
 
of the group.
 
(2) Changing Priorities Among National Goals: Organizational and
 
bureaucratic goals must reflect the national goals which are consistently
 
evolving and changing to reflect changing values and continually changing
 
social conditions. For instance, any organization operating in
 
ignorance of the changing attitudes towards and by women will likely find
 
itself immersed in controversy, and even extended litigation.
 
While concern with crime continually continues to surface at the top
 
of any Gallup poll, it is also becoming increasing clear that the American
 
public will not tolerate abuses of civil liberties in the name of crime
 
control. However worthy the ends are, the mans do not justify them.
 
- 8 ­
(3) Technological Change: Another pressure upon organizations can
 
come from technological changes which may affect organizations by
 
changing the relationships and responsibilities within the organization as
 
well as changing the responsibilities and relationships with their client
 
population. Several examples come to mind.
 
One is an organization created to monitor or regulate an activity or
 
enterprise which has become or is becoming obsolete. Consider, for example,
 
the Federal Railroad Administration. As the dominance of the railroads has­'
 
been superceded by trucking and the airlines, the importance of the railroads
 
has declined, yet the government bureaucracy has no "bankruptcy" procedure,
 
and the work of the Federal Railroad Administration goes on.
 
A second, and more probable pressure on organizations, is the impact of
 
technological innovation upon organizational responsibilities. For instance,
 
the information explosion and computer revolution has transformed organi­
zational relationships, changed the value of information and data, and affected
 
the relationship among individuals in the organization and between the
 
organization and its external audience. Such a technological innovation has
 
revitalized Western Union, but is threatening the Postal Service because
 
their traditional services are being supplanted by advanced telecommunications
 
services offered by competing entities.
 
A third impact of technology is to affect the area of responsibility or
 
goals of an organization. Again, the computer revolution is a good example
 
of its impact upon organizations. It has transformed the nature of
 
information transfer and as such has questioned the very way that such insti­
tutions such as the tax collection system, the banking and financing organi­
zations, the postal and mail services, and the magazine, book, and newspaper
 
publishing organizations operate.
 
-- 9 
Technological advance always threatens some organizations and some
 
individuals because of the fear of obsolescence and unemployment. Just as
 
the railroads and telegraph substituted and made obsolete the Pony Express so
 
are other organizational responsibilities and goals continually been made
 
irreleqant to on-going and emerging needs., The original organization either
 
fights the new ways or more forward looking organizations adapt and seize
 
upon the opportunity afforded by the change. But change implies risk, and
 
most organizations reward the status quo, non-boat rocking activities and
 
effectively discourage risk taking. Centralized decision making and formal
 
procedures, characteristic of mature organizations, are also characteristic
 
of low risk and innovation-less organizations.
 
(4) Societal Change: Certain fundamental changes in society often
 
put pressures on organizations. Consider, for example, the impact of the
 
great population transition from rural to urban areas, and then from urban
 
to suburban areas. Thomas Jefferson once noted that our system of government
 
was perfect for an agrarianrural based population, but if the United States
 
ever became dominated-by large urban centers as in Europe, our government
 
would become as corrupt as Europe. Little has occurred either in this
 
country or in Europe to persuasively disprove his fears.
 
Congress is still largely controlled by rural interests. Many urban
 
specialists argue that this is the single fundamental reason for the collapse
 
of American cities. Influence by rural interests can also explain the
 
construction and maintenance of a 40,000 mile network of interstate highways,
 
and the absolute lack of federal funds for intracity mass transit.
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The influence of rural interests, despite the presence of a dominant
 
urban industrial population and a world food-shortage, explains the -continuing
 
subsidy of the American farmer and the maintenance of small inefficient
 
farming units. Free market economics would indicate that large industrialized
 
farming so characteristic of successful American agriculture would be the
 
only economical way to produce food. Yet in the interests of maintaining the
 
rural way of life (Americans have always felt, or at least rural Congressmen
 
-have always felt, a reverence for things rural) the Federal government-has
 
continually subsidized the small (as well as the large) farmer.
 
This same conflict is increasingly being seen between suburban interests
 
and urban interests, again with urbad areas the eventual loser.
 
(5) Institutional Change: A final pressure can come from institutional
 
change itself. For instance, it can be argued that the current economic
 
dilemma is a function of fundamental institutional changes in the economic
 
system during the past several decades. The Keynesian economic politices,
 
implemented in the 1930xs to correct the economic ills of that period, have
 
so profoundly altered the economic system that the model upon which their
 
design was based no longer exists in reality. That is, economic policy makers
 
are applying policy designed for the fepression economic configuration which
 
haa been profoundly altered by past applications of the new same policy. The
 
efficacy of this policy in the past is the very reason it is ineffective
 
today. Hence, the model that 'serves as the basis for policy formulation has
 
no correspondence with reality. For instance, monetary theorists will even
 
'admit that monetary policy has little value when the impact of Euro-dollars
 
and an active international economic trading scene is factored into the
 
analysis. Yet these international economic relationships are very much a
 
fundamental characteristic of our current economic activity.
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Another example of such past institutional change as a cause for
 
current institutional failings may be seen in the intervention of government
 
into private economic markets. Motivated by fears of excesses or the need to
 
protect the public good, the government plays a substantial regulatory and
 
decision making role in such markets as the utilities, transportation,
 
insurance, finance and freight industries. Originally envisioned as an aid
 
to competitive and efficient allocation and distribution of such services, a
 
1
 
recent study by Brookings has concluded that government regulation as
 
currently conducted actually detracts from the efficient provision of services
 
and increases their costs.
 
The sections below will discuss some indications of current institutional
 
failings.
 
(1) The Failure of the Bankruptcy Mechanism: As Kenneth Boulding has
 
noted, capitalism is the only economic or social system that has a built-in
 
destruct device for organizations that do not work right: bankruptcy. Just
 
as individuals who spend more than they take in must over the long run settle
 
with their creditors, so must corporations. However, we are increasingly
 
seeing the argument that "it's too big to go under, think what would happen
 
if they folded." This distortion of market economics leads one auto giant
 
to price its cars on the basis of Brand X's costs, stimulated by fears that
 
the demise of Brand X would bring about monopoly regulation for the giant.
 
Hence, the market competition mechanism which was so advocated by Adam Smith
 
Almarin Phillips, Ed., Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets (Brookings
 
Institution: Washington, D. C.) 1975.
 
7;
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is not allowed to operate and the result is higher priced cars for
 
all.
 
Consider the recent economic difficulty of such super giants as
 
Lockheed and Pan Am. Again, free market economics and the laws of competition
 
would argue that if they cannot make it in a competitive market, then they
 
do not belong in business. Instead, fears of economic dislocation, local
 
unemployment, and ultimate political disaster lead to artificial attempts
 
by government interests to keep these firms alive.
 
Consider, for example, the impact of such Federal policy upon the
 
2
 
airlines industry. Govermment intervention in the air transport industry
 
has been justified since its inception in 1938 to control "excessive
 
competition" that was allegedly eroding safety standards and bringing the
 
entire industry close to bankruptcy. An immediate response of the CAB was
 
to impose a total blockade on entry to the industry -- a total violation of
 
a major tenet of the'theory of pure competition. Since then the CAB's
 
policy of maintaining minimum fares below which prices could not go, while
 
fostering competition by requiring two or more airlines to serve the same
 
route, has stimulated the great "sandwich/gourmet meal versus-first run
 
movie" campaign that has resulted in higher airline prices,
 
Brookings concludes that this policy has contributed to higher priced
 
travel and more inefficient service that than would have occurred under
 
conditions of freer market competition. In fact, Brookings concludes that
 
service rivalry, made possible by the fare structure established by the
 
board (CAB) drives down load factors and produces a quality of service
 
2George C. Eads, "Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Industry: 
 Too
 
Much or Too Little?" in Phillips, op.cit.
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above that desired by the traveling public, particularly in 
long-haul markets.3
 
They conclude that benefits would accrue from increasing the amount of
 
competition in the industry which could effectively reduce the number of
 
carriers and reduce the redundancy of parallel service (which in turn would
 
increase load factors per airline route and lower passenger mile costs). The
 
successful venture of California airlines in their intrastate (and hence, non-

Federal regulated market) give supportive evidence to increasing competition
 
to improve airline efficiency and lower consumer costs.
 
A note must be made about the role of competition and the number of
 
firms in an industry. More competition is not synomymous with more firms.
 
In fact, in some industries the impact of increased competition would be to
 
reduce the number of firms because if free market pressures were allowed to
 
operate, then the inefficient firms would be driven out of business. This is
 
clearly the case of the airline example. Hence, a fewer number of
 
would be more economically efficient and beneficial to the consumer.
 
HoweVer, it appears that in some industries such industrial concen­
tration would result in higher costs than smaller firms would incur.
 
Electric utilities seem to be an example of the diminishing returns to scale
 
of large firms. Brookings found that competitive utility firms produce at
 
lower average costs than monopolies, at least within certain size constraints.
 
However, this advantage to competitive firms seems to decrease as the size of
 
the area supplied increases.
 
3Ead, op.cit.
 
4Leonard W. Weiss, "Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry," in
 
Phillips, op.cit.
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It appears clear that bankruptcy as envisioned by Adam Smith had a very
 
functional purpose in the economic system: that is, it rewarded firms who
 
were successful and efficiently managed, and penalized firms that were not
 
cost or product competitive. To remove such an effective natural regulating
 
force from the market seems to contradict the national economic goals.
 
(2) The Free Marked System: Can it Survive? There has been increasing
 
concern, in terms of both worry as well as joy, that the form of capitalism
 
which dominates the American economic system may be dying and that fundamental
 
economic change is evolving or must be imposed to further societal and
 
economic objectives. The business literature is filled with discussions
 
concerning the collapse of American -business in the face of rising government
 
intervention. Let us explore this issue in some detail.
 
In the early days of this century the popular belief at the time was:
 
"what's good for tusiness is good for the country." The focus of most legis­
lation was to maintain a good environment for business. Of course,
 
government also tried to prevent business from abusing the public to an
 
intolerable level; but this was a secondary goal. As one writer has
 
indicated this pro-business attitude of government is a fundamental tenet
 
of capitalism:
 
The overriding objective of all capitalists governments is
 
the preservation and strengthening of capitalism -- that is,
 
of the private enterprise system. In our own economy, this
 
means that successive postwar administrations have above all
 
else looked out for the welfare of business corporations; and
 
in the final reckoning they have been principally, though not
 
exclusively, engaged in promoting the welfare of the few
 
hundred industrial, commercial, and financial giants that
 
define and shape the U.S. economy. Since the welfare of these
 
huge corporations is best measured by their profits, one basic
 
concern of U.S. administrations has been the establishment of
 
as favorable an environment as possible for corporate profit­
making, both here and abroad. 5
 
5John G. Gurley, "The Future of American Capitalism," Quarterly Review of
 
Economics and Business (Autumn 1972), p. .
 7
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It seems inevitable that large coporations will disagree with this
 
In fact, a recent article in Fortune
evaluation of government activity. 

magazine argues that further government incursion into the market system
 
threatens the very essence of our heritage and freedom.
6 However, even this
 
author admits the willingness of business to plead, argue, lobby and
 
manipulate government agencies for favorable regulatory stances, (and, as
 
recent evidence shows, business is even willing to buy and pay for such
 
amenities) and otherwise manipulate the operations of an "objective"
 
bureaucracy the benefit of big business.
 
What exactly has happened? In the era of unlimited resources, American
 
hegemony both politically and economic, upward mobility of the population,
 
available pools of cheap labor, what was good for business was good for
 
,America. More profits meant more jobs, more pay, mote homes, and higher
 
standards of living for the population. Growth in the economy was accompanied
 
by growth in the individual standard of living. However, the underlying
 
assumptions and working premises of that era are no longer operant or
 
relevant in the current and emerging economic system. For instance, we
 
are energy constrained, material constrained, land constrained in many
 
areas, and to some degree for the short run, technology constrained. The unreg­
ulated use of technology has had serious deleterious societal, economic, and environ­
mental effects, the magnitude of which we are just beginning to see. Until recently
 
industry had unregulated use of the national air and water, and the quality
 
characteristics of its products were constrained only by what the market
 
would tolerate.
 
6Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "Putting the Cuffs on Capitalism,"Fortune (April 1975).
 
p.104±. 1 
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It was gradually perceived that the essence ot quality of life that would 
be provided for Americans if industrial hegemony continued to dominate 
national policy would be inferior to that which had been previously expected 
and clearly inferior to what was desired. The realization of this does not 
represent evolution of.a new goal or new expectations, rather it represents ­
greater understanding of the interactions of various economic and .techno­
logical forces. It is the consequence of these interactions which were not 
foreseen and which are necessitating government intervention. 
It is foolish for writers to expect that the economy can operate any
 
other way. If as Gurley argues, profits are the dominant influence over
 
industry and the single most valuable measure of industrial success, then
 
it is wildly inappropriate to expect that industry would voluntariZy under­
take such activities as pollution abatement, land and site reclamation,
 
extensive product safety testing and refinement, environmental impact
 
analyses -- all of which detract from that single motivator: profits. If
 
one argues for the mechanisms of a free market, one also has to recognize the
 
free market and perfect competition definition will preclude certain
 
desirable activities from occurring (i.e. environmental protection) because
 
these activities do not improve the competitive position of the individual
 
firm.
 
A second aspect of the problem must 5d discussed as well. Fortune
 
magazine, for instance, belabors the impending death of the free market and
 
competition. No serious writer on the economy can generate a believable
 
argument that perfect compeition exists or ever has existed in this country.
 
From the middle of the last century onward American industry has been
 
characterized by "big business," the extensive presence of oligopolistic
J71? 
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market structures, interrupted only by occasional monopolistic market
 
structures. The underlying assumptions of perfect competition -- which
 
all 	good businessmen argue will bring unlimited wealth and high standards
 
of living tO the entire population -- have clearly never existed in this
 
country during this century and probably not in the last century. Before
 
discussing the impending death of competitive markets any further, let us
 
review the classic characteristics and definitions of perfect competition
 
to indicate how inappropriate this is as a model of current economic
 
behavior. Perfect competition exists if:
 
(1) 	No single firm, entrepreneur or labor group is so large
 
or has sufficient market share that his actions can
 
affect the market price;
 
(2) 	There is perfect market knowledge on the part of both
 
buyers and sellers;
 
(3) 	There are no barriers to entry to the market.
 
One can easily determine that there has been no such configuration in
 
the American economy and that the American system is a mixture of monopoly,
 
oligopoly and minor degrees of competition. "A cynic might say of perfect
 
competition what Bernard Shaw said of Christianity: The only trouble with
 
it is that it has never been tried." 7 
Believing that in fact market forces are important and should to the
 
degree possible be relied upon to effect economic and societal goals, the
 
function of government regulation and intervention in the market place has
 
been to try to manipulate the above three characteristics to encourage market
 
7Quoted in Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (Ninth Edition) (McGraw Hill:
 
New York) 1973, p.43.
 
- 19,­
in areas of improved product safety and environmental protection and
 
rehabilitation), result in activities that would only be undertaken under
 
such govenmunt influence.
 
Fortune argues that "every proposal for governmental action should be 
reviewed in the light of what it would do to competition and to freedom, 
When the effect would-be negative, the reasons for the action would have 
to be-especially compelling."8 
While there is no question that our technological complexity and reliance 
upon large scale systems demands that any government action -- for that 
matter, any industrial action as well -- be assessed and evaluated in advance 
of their implementation, it is not clear that Fortune has identified the 
relevant evaluation criteria. If government action is being suggested, there 
should be explicit statements of the goals of this intervention and then
 
analysis, in advance, to determine the likelihood of meeting these goals as
 
well as the possibility of unplanned and unwanted secondary consequences.
 
(3) Shortage Plagued Economy: Will it Ever End?
 
One of the more pressing problems of the national and international
 
economy is the continuation of serious material and resource shortages
 
which have caused the price of all go6ds and services to rise to historical
 
highs. The question before us must be: is there any incentive for this to
 
change? If we accept the arguments of an earlier discussion that profit
 
is the single most important,evaluator of perfoimance of an industry, then
 
there is little incentive for the corporate body to increase the supply of a
 
material resource, an act which will reduce the price of that material.
 
8Guazardi, op.cit., p.105.
 
competition, or in the case of so-caliednatural monopolies, to regulate
 
the perfprmance of the monopoly so that the classical fears about monopolies
 
do not occur.
 
Hence, many of the new product safety requirements and occupational
 
safety requirements (as well as truth in lending legislation, .accurate
 
labeling laws, etc-.) are stimulated by the need for -thebuyer to be
 
increasingly informed as the complexity and sophistication of products
 
-increases.* Hence, the government intervention is aimed at trying to
 
increase the amount of market information.
 
The notion that a single firm is not so large as to be able to influence
 
the selling price of a good or service is unheard of in this country in all
 
M
 
_
7 but the most disaggregated industries such as consumer' services '(laundries-'
 
dry cleaning, television repair,, etc.). Price leadership in the steel 
industry is notorious and one of the best examples of this distortion.. -Yet 
in those same areas where market activipy would substantially lower the -: 
price, business and industrial interests have been effective in persuading 
the government to intervene in,the market place and arbitrarily support 
higher prices than the market would otherwise award. This can be seen in 
the agricultural industry, telephone industry, the airlines and a host of­
other commodities.
 
The .question, then, is not over the rble or existence of government
 
intervention in the market place; the proper question should be whether such
 
intervention helps or retards achievement of national socio-economic goals;
 
It is clear that many regulatory activities hamper industrial efficiency,
 
contribute to higher consumer costs and have a general negative impact on
 
the economy. It is equally clear that other government interventions (say
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